§ 1. It is established that the power of Princes over their subjects has been various. I have approved as best the power tempered from monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy. This must especially be provided for: when the form of the state is changed, the power of customary magistrates should be changed slowly and in parts, but their names most slowly of all, until, when the matter itself has declined, they vanish of their own accord.
This was done with the greatest deliberation in the Roman Empire. At first tyranny raged under the name of Dictator when Sulla was savage; afterward the dictatorship was given to Caesar, but perpetually. Third, under the name of the Triumvirate for settling the state, proscription removed the foremost of the leading men. And although the Emperors could do everything, they secured their power by the titles of lesser magistrates. Hence they were declared Chief Pontiffs and Consuls; and, what rendered them safest of all, they renewed annually the title of tribunician power. For by that power they were held sacrosanct and retained the favor of the people, since that magistracy had been established for the sake of the people against the injuries of the more powerful citizens.
§ 2. The power of all Christian Kings is constituted not after the manner of Gentile Kings but of Hebrew Kings. For just as the authority of the High Priest and of the supreme council, the Sanhedrin, was inviolable and was not oppressed by royal power, so too a Christian King must command in such a way that he nevertheless hears and venerates the prelates of religion. Then let him weigh within himself how great a thing it is to reign fortified by the friendship and favor of the supreme presiding authority in religion. For when this bond of concord is neglected, everything is violently disturbed. Histories teach us how great a cause of evil was the importunity of the Emperors who claimed everything for themselves in the conflicts between the Henrys and the Pontiffs, and afterward the Fredericks and other Pontiffs. For since the Empire was transferred by pontifical authority from the Greeks to the Franks and then from the Franks to the Germans, it follows that the Pontiffs have some part in its government. To speak of the present condition, Nicholas Bellus, in discourse 1 On the Pontiffs, relates that the Electors were established not only by Imperial but also by pontifical authority.
From this assertion of pontifical authority over Kings, it follows that the Pontiff can much more involve himself in affairs of the Empire, since they belong to pontifical law and are immediately subject to the Apostolic See. This is proved because Gregory V established the number of Electors to whom he granted the power of electing Caesars. Although authentic copies of the Golden Bull which he issued for this purpose cannot be produced, nevertheless, after I undertook great labor to ascertain the clear truth of this matter, many letters patent together with copies of them came into my hands. In these many ancient Electors expressly acknowledged that they attributed their authority to the Supreme Pontiffs, as may be seen in the treasury in Castel Sant’Angelo and in the three books entitled Privileges of the Emperors, and likewise in the Vatican Library, where there are copies taken from those preserved in Castel Sant’Angelo. From these it is clearly evident that the authority and institution of the Electors depend upon the Holy Roman Church.
To prove this more fully, I bring forward the fact that on different occasions Electors were deprived by different Pontiffs of the privilege of electing, as John XXII formerly did. Leo X likewise deprived the Duke of Saxony; but Clement VII maintained and asserted that the election of Charles V was valid even without the vote of that Duke, as may be seen in a certain book bound in red leather entitled Capitulations of Princes, which is preserved in the pontifical repository. In the registers of Leo X and Clement VII in the Archive of the Apostolic Camera, this authority appears more clearly: as soon as a King of the Romans or Emperor is elected, the Electors seek confirmation from the Pontiff; and quite often, when the Pope did not grant his consent, they proceeded to a new election, as may be observed if careful attention is given to the said books.
I would not wish conflicts to arise between the Christian kingdom and the royal priesthood, conflicts which have often been quieted by the disasters of peoples. I give this political and prudent warning: for the sake both of piety and of the state, an Emperor ought courteously to observe the authority of the Pontiff. Let the remaining evidence be seen and the histories consulted. The same writer says that Charles V, when challenged to single combat by Francis, King of the Gauls, answered that he was a son and defender of the Holy Apostolic See, that he was bound to it by an oath, and that he could determine nothing concerning himself.
Charles spoke truly and rightly. The destinies of so many peoples ought not to have been weighed upon one sword, and the death of either King would have given rise to greater evils. But that most wise Prince showed how close the bond between Emperor and Priest is. If the safety of the supreme Prince is so closely joined with the advantage of the Church, so too will be that of other
Kings and states. For the several kingdoms—Britain, Denmark, Poland, Aragon, Hungary, and Naples—have their own treaties. Nor can even the most powerful Kings despise the common father to whom assistance is brought by many sons.
§ 3. In the more cultivated kingdoms, the power of rulers depends in great part upon the council of the fatherland, or the estates of the fatherland. It has great utility against more unjust Princes, but also many disadvantages, since it brings delay to useful or necessary matters. By its authority it moderates the disposition of the Prince and ensures that, if anything happens to him, the fatherland is not without government.
The greatest disadvantages arise if the estates are not in agreement. All of us in Germany complain about this matter, and yet we always act in such a way that there is occasion for complaints. In Germany there are three orders which assemble at the great council or public diet: first the Electors; then the other Princes and Counts; third the free cities. Hence everything is completed slowly, and now, after much time, almost nothing is accomplished. The causes are delay in assembling, the absence of some, the restricted power of the delegates, debate concerning the matter to be proposed, and manifold disagreements. The chief disagreements now concern religion, but many cover their desires with a pretext of piety. In reality there are rivalries among the Princes, and between the Princes and the rest of the nobility, which is oppressed by some, although otherwise they wish to be subject to the Emperor alone as companions and ministers of his court. Greater is the rivalry between the free cities and neighboring Princes. The aims and endeavors of the cities tend toward preserving their liberty; some Princes strive to render them subject to themselves.
The happiness of these cities is situated in peace; when war arises, they are in great danger, because most defend their liberty not by force but by laws, and when laws fall silent amid civil arms, liberty stands beneath the blow. This appeared in the civil war waged against Charles V, in which the cities made the greatest expenditures, obtained an inglorious partnership in the war, and, once defeated, were most grievously fined. They would have been in a worse condition if they had conquered; for during the war they had offended the Princes by obeying less promptly, and even if there had been no offense, the rewards of victory would nevertheless have fallen to the Princes alone as the more powerful. Once this had occurred, the cities would have lacked the protection of the Empire and their neighbors would have pressed upon them more severely. Thus, even as victors, they would have retained their liberty only through the favor of the Princes. These, therefore, are the causes why the Empire moves so slowly: in the same body the same things are never advantageous when it has departed from harmony and a legitimate tempering of the humors.
§ 4. Gaul also has its estates: the Ecclesiastics, the nobles, and the common people. There are two councils, a secret one and a public one. Formerly the public Council was convoked from the three estates. In that Council there was supreme authority and so high a reputation for integrity that many foreigners also referred their controversies to it. The gravest matters—or, as they call them, affairs of state—were treated there: whether a King was to be created or abdicated; whether war was to be waged, peace made, laws enacted, principal prefectures conferred, crimes of Princes examined, or a dowry assigned to royal children. Indeed, the accounting of expenditures and taxes was also treated in that council; and this is what they call the General Court or Parliament.
At that time, therefore, the power of the Kings of France was very greatly curtailed. But their successors diminished the authority of the council—they attribute this to Hugh Capet—by erecting a college of peers who would judge concerning the fortunes of Princes and other matters. Parliaments were later added, but now for a long time they have referred the affairs of the kingdom to the Privy Council. Hence deliberations are more expeditious. Estates of this kind also exist in Gaul, Spain, England, Scotland, and other kingdoms; any Prince can easily regulate his power according to their constitution.
§ 5. The Senate formerly represented the estate of the fatherland—not as one ruling in a free state, but as one sharing in councils and public honors under moderate Emperors. Probus had it in this condition, according to Vopiscus, for he granted appeal from all men to the Senate and other things which had already fallen into disuse. It was done again under Honorius. Claudian says concerning Stilicho:
When the Senate judged wars in the ancient order,
Stilicho restored the custom neglected now for so many ages:
the Fathers would entrust battles to commanders,
and by decree of the toga the fortunate watchword
would go forth to the legions.
Stilicho did this, but not to honor the Conscript Fathers; rather, he wished to diminish the authority of the Emperor and by this popularity to prepare a path to tyranny for himself and his son Eucherius. Tiberius, when with the greatest dissimulation he had most eagerly accepted the imperial office, long refused its name; sought protection from the Senate; said that the soldiers belonged to the state, not to him; wished to be called Prince of the Senate; and desired colleagues. But these were cruel mockeries by which he explored the sentiments of the nobles. He held magistrates in honor, just as if the state were still standing, and rose before the Consuls; and whenever he gave them a dinner, he went to the doors to meet them as they entered and accompanied them as they departed.