§ 1. Magistracy is divided in many ways. First, according to the different kinds of state: thus one kind is monarchical, another aristocratic, another political or democratic; and in each of these a great variety is discerned. Next, according to the very nature of the power: one magistracy is supreme, as a King, a Senate, or the people; another is subordinate, as a Viceroy, a Consul, or a Demarch. Third, according to its proximate end: some are appointed to give counsel and to determine, as are those who are the Counselors of Kings and Princes; others to execute the things which have been decreed, as a Consul, a Praetor, or a Satrap. And this is a distinction taken from the thing itself; for otherwise the power of deliberation and of execution frequently resides in the same person, and it is expedient that it should be so. For prudent men execute counsels more promptly and prudently when they themselves were participants in them or even their authors.
Fourth, the distinction taken from the matter with which, and the persons with whom, the magistracy is concerned is exceedingly varied. Hence one is civil, another military, and each is occupied with a great variety of affairs and business. Hence also there are Urban and Provincial magistrates.
§ 2. Therefore, those who entrust to one man the care of great or many affairs—indeed, sometimes of all affairs—gravely injure the state.
That arrangement has never turned out happily. The Sejani, Plautiani, Rufini, Eutropii, Stilichones, and Ablavii had dreadful ends. Men of the middle age whom excessive responsibility oppressed were likewise overtaken by the indignation of Princes: Belisarius, Narses, and Peter de Vinea of Campania, who under Frederick II was privy to and governor of all his secrets and, after he had been cast down from his dignity and deprived besides of his eyes, was driven into madness and killed himself. Nor did excessive power turn out happily for those at whom our own times have marveled. In nearly one year magnates fell in Germany, France, and Spain.
But if Alfonso prudently detested Princes who were the slaves of their Counselors and conducted everything at another’s judgment, how much more shall we detest the man whom the malicious cunning of one person holds in its power? Aristotle speaks excellently in book 4, chapter 15 of the Politics:
In great states it both can and ought to happen that one magistrate is set over one matter. For it can happen that many men participate in principal offices and commands, because there are many citizens, so that it is permissible to leave some magistracies vacant for a long time and to hold others once. It is then better that the care of each matter and action should fall to a man placed and occupied in one business than to one distracted by many. But in small states it is necessary to unite and concentrate many magistracies in a few men. For because of the small number and scarcity of men, it is not easy for many to be in magistracies.
§ 3. The form and end of the state, and the virtues and vices of those who govern, have already been discussed in the preceding books. The state must now be furnished with magistrates; the offices of the several magistrates must be explained; and certain special precepts must be added. And first, indeed, we shall treat of the supreme magistrate.
It seems to me, not without reason, that the condition of mortals must be lamented: although they alone among animals cannot live without a state and command, they alone nevertheless are malicious and contumacious toward those who command. In all matters we grieve to be overcome, even in those in which it is nobler to be overcome. The desire to excel and command has neither end nor measure, but no one endures subjection to another except through necessity. Man alone can neither govern himself nor endure a governor.