§ 1. I have shown that the power of ecclesiastics to govern and pronounce law is legitimate, just, customary, and useful to the state. Now, because heretics rise up vehemently against it, let us answer them as well from divine law, human law, and approved custom.
Their first axiom is that the Pope, all Bishops, and Prelates can possess no civil administration. Most of them vehemently cry this out; Sharpe treats it in a long disputation in question 6, On Antichrist. For after he had objected to himself that ecclesiastics possess jurisdiction by the gift of Princes, he replies:
Although the antecedent is controversial, as was said above, nevertheless the conclusion does not follow, because both the Pope’s acceptance and the Princes’ donation were contrary to Divine law and even contrary to Pontifical law. For in the Decrees, canon Dicenti, 25, question 11, Pope Pelagius says that rescripts which are obtained by deception or false petitions confer no right; and in the gloss, that Clerics who use them must be stripped of offices and benefices, while Laymen must be excommunicated. But the Princes’ rescripts by which the Pope obtained jurisdictions were deceptive, if not by reason of their drafting and issuance, at least by reason of the cause alleged in them, which was that Christian piety demanded that Bishops be adorned with those gifts and privileges—expressly contrary to the word of God.
And a little later he says that the Pope acquired temporal power in no other way than through robberies. Then he continues:
Pope Alexander III by a rescript in chapter Vigilanti, and Pope Innocent III in chapter Si diligenti, and the Lateran Council in chapter Quoniam, and the Canonists in canon Placuit, 16, question 3, say that, just as time does not remove the obligation from a possessor in bad faith, neither does it acquire any right. And the Bishops did not obtain those Principalities in good faith, who acted contrary to Christ’s institution, as above. Bellarmine therefore rightly compares the Pope’s right with a kingdom acquired through robberies.
Finally, he accuses the Princes who donated goods to the Church:
Princes who donated to the Church that from which Pastors can support themselves are to be praised. But those who handed over those immense riches, from which they live sumptuously and idly, acted badly, because they thus corrupted the Church; and therefore that saying is right: “Religion gave birth to riches, but the daughter devoured her mother.” The Princes indeed had zeal, but not according to knowledge. But those who conferred temporal jurisdictions acted impiously, because they violated Christ’s institution. Nor did the Popes follow the example of Christ, who fled when the Jews wished to appoint him King: John 6:15. See Bernard in the books On Consideration.
§ 2. Hence it is easily apparent that, if the matter is decided by the opinion of the preachers, all temporal jurisdiction must be taken away from Bishops and Prelates; for they judge it to have been impiously donated and accepted, to have been acquired through robberies, and now to be held unjustly by possessors in bad faith and robbers, with no right of prescription. Therefore, when an opportunity is given, it can altogether be seized from them by secular Princes.
Nor can any treaties, compacts, or laws of the Empire stand in the way, because he says that it is contrary to divine law. Hence it is clear that, so long as that heresy holds dominion, peace cannot be established, since one party judges the other—although it alleges rights of donation, purchase, and prescription—to possess unjustly and defend itself by robbery. Hence, by necessary consequence, they strive to extinguish all force of laws and judgments. For whatever the judges of the Imperial Chamber decree in favor of any ecclesiastic, those impostors affirm to have been decreed contrary to right and equity in favor of a robber. If a secular Prince invades and occupies the wealth and dominion of some Bishop, they declare that possessions have rightly been seized from robbers.
This opinion produces the greatest dissension among the Estates and an ἄσπονδον—implacable—war, which, although it is not always waged, is nevertheless always feared and prepared. Nor can any Bishop be secure if secular Princes should at some time believe their own ministers, whom the ministers’ madness continually endeavors, by hope of ecclesiastical wealth, to drive into the slaughter and destruction of their fatherland. But after bishoprics have been subdued and plundered, and Bishops and Pastors have been driven out or slain, they trust that their Doctors will be able freely to vaunt and spread their heresy. But they err, and God has already long since shown their error to the world.
§ 3. It is certain that by natural law the priesthood and kingship, or civil jurisdiction, do not conflict. For under the law of nature the same persons were both Kings and Priests. In Genesis 14, Melchizedek; Moses in Exodus 18 is judge and Pontiff; and Eli in 1 Kings 1. The Maccabees were Princes and Pontiffs. Sharpe replies that these things were lawful then, but by no means now, and, secondly, that those instances were extraordinary.
The first point is altogether sufficient for us: namely, that the firstborn were at once Princes and Priests, and that Patriarchs, Prophets, and others exercised those two offices. The second point is false. For under the law of nature the same persons were ordinarily both Princes and Priests. Furthermore, the Maccabees were ordinary Pontiffs and Princes.
§ 4. Next, no law has provided in the New Testament that the same person may not be both Prince and Bishop, or possess both civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. For the laws which they allege in favor of this opinion do nothing for it, and their arguments are frivolous. Yet it will have been worth the effort to weigh them, if only so that the ignorance and intellectual weakness of the seditious may appear.
Argument 1.
Those things which God has separated and distinguished must not be confounded by human beings, Matthew 19:6. But God distinguished civil and ecclesiastical offices, both under the Old Testament and under the New,
in the persons administering them, their causes, laws, punishments, and so forth—except extraordinarily and at certain times—as in 2 Chronicles 19 and Matthew 18:15. Therefore these cannot exist together in one person.
I reply: In Matthew 19:6 it is written, “What God has joined, let man not separate”; but it treats of marriage. Next, in 2 Chronicles 19 Jehoshaphat distinguished the offices of the temple from the civil offices. But it is not consonant with reason that, although they have sometimes been separated, they can never be joined. For they are of such a kind that they change according to the conditions of the times. In Moses, Eli, Samuel, and the Maccabees both powers were joined. Indeed, Eleazar the son of Aaron and Joshua the son of Nun divide the land among the sons of Israel, Joshua 14:1; but to give land, as is written there, pertains to secular jurisdiction. But what appearance of an argument is this: God did not wish those joined in marriage to be separated; therefore a Bishop cannot be a judge in a civil cause or administer a part of the state, not even a village?
Argument 2.
That which Christ himself denies pertains to him and refuses cannot pertain to his successors and ministers, because no one’s authority can be greater than Christ’s, Matthew 10:24. But Christ denies that civil jurisdiction pertains to him, Luke 12:14, John 6:15 and 8:11. Chrysostom therefore rightly says in Homily 42 on John that he did this to admonish us to despise human dignities and to show that he needed no secular things. Therefore—
I reply: In Luke 12:14 Christ avoided the office of judging: “Man, who appointed me judge or divider over you?” In John 6:15 he fled when they wished to make him King. In John 8:11 he asks the adulteress, “Has no one condemned you?” and, when she answers, “No one,” he says, “Neither will I condemn you.”
But these things establish nothing against the temporal jurisdiction of Bishops. For Christ rejected that division not because he could not judge, but because he did not wish to do so for a legitimate reason. First, those men had their own magistracy. Next, from that division an opportunity could have been given to the Pharisees to calumniate and to the magistracy to rage against him. Finally, he had not come to divide small fields. But if this deed is understood so that all jurisdiction and civil office are taken away from a Bishop, Gospel Ministers will not be able either to divide fields, to be arbitrators, or to be witnesses concerning political affairs. For who appointed them dividers? Christ fled kingship because he taught by his example that honors are to be fled. Many holy and prudent men have fled kingdoms and Bishoprics; others, however, accepted the same without fraud or fault. If the example given imposes an obligation, therefore it excludes everyone from kingship. For that which Christ fled must be fled. Indeed, the Donatists, Libertines, and Anabaptists use these words against the Magistracy; for they say that the office of ruling is evil in itself. And would that the ministers lived according to Christ’s example rather than according to their own morals. For Christ had nowhere to lay his head; Christ did not take a wife, yet thus far he has found no imitator among the ministers. Let those who say Christ fled them therefore flee possessions and a wife.
Argument 3.
If Christ’s kingdom is not of this world or concerned with the affairs of this world, then the office of Ministers ought not to be concerned with political affairs and civil principalities. But the former is true, John 18:36, 1 Corinthians 4:1, 2 Corinthians 10:4. Therefore Ambrose rightly says: “It does not befit one man to possess a double possession”; and Lyra on John 6: “Christ did not accept the honor, giving an example of fleeing honors.” Therefore—
I reply: Christ’s kingdom was not of this world in the sense that it was supported by worldly power and wealth; for he had come in order not only not to employ a kingdom but not even to possess property. Yet he did not forbid Christians to possess kingdoms, even if they are Bishops, just as he did not forbid them to possess property. They can be occupied with civil business, and indeed sometimes ought to be, if the safety of the state and the cause of religion so demand. Certainly, if a noble, a baron, a count, a Prince, or a King wished to devote himself to the ecclesiastical ministry, and if he were ordained by the imposition of hands, they could not by right deprive him of his jurisdiction and kingdom. For why would they judge him worthy of so great a penalty that, by undertaking the office of preacher, he should strip himself and his sons of them? A Calvinist or Lutheran Superintendent can therefore retain both jurisdictions; why, then, could a Catholic not do so?
Argument 4.
That which was forbidden to the Apostles, who were the primary Ministers of the Church after Christ, is not lawful for others. But the exercise of principality was forbidden to the Apostles without qualification, Matthew 20:25, Mark 10:43, Luke 22:25. Tertullian therefore rightly says in On Idolatry, chapter 18, “Christ judged the glory of the age foreign to himself and his own”; and Bernard in book 2 of On Consideration, chapter 4: “Lordship is forbidden to the Apostles; therefore dare to usurp it yourself. Either the Lord exercises the Apostleship, or the Apostle exercises lordship: you are plainly forbidden from both”; and Cyril in book 3 on John, chapter 20: “The honor and glory of the world must be fled by those who wish to attain the glory of God.” Therefore—
I reply: The passage Matthew 20:25 is a support, but a ruinous one, of the caviling heresy. “You know,” says the Lord, “that the Princes of the Gentiles lord it over them, and those who are greater exercise power over them. It shall not be so among you,” and so forth. But this has nothing to do with the present matter. For by those words harsh and imperious lordship, such as belongs to people seeking their own advantages, is forbidden. For this is κατακυριεύειν: to oppress by violent domination; this is κατεξουσιάζειν: to exercise power over subjects with arrogance. Thus it is not rule, but the abuse of rule, violence, and pride that are censured by those words.
The Anabaptists object with the same passage against the magistracy. Sharpe replies to them: “For Christ distinguishes the ministry from civil dominion, even legitimate dominion, because he does not wish ministers to exercise lordship in the Church as kings do in a kingdom.” One must add, “as the kings of the Gentiles do in a kingdom,” such as Herod, Tiberius, and others at that time.
Argument 5.
Christ does not send Pastors to exercise any office other than that to which he was sent by the Father, John 20:21. But Christ was not sent to exercise political principality, as Bellarmine concedes above, chapter 4. Chrysostom therefore rightly says in Homily 11 on the Epistle to the Ephesians: “The teaching of the word has been entrusted to us, not the authority of power.”
I reply: Pastors are sent by Christ to exercise a spiritual office, and civil command is not given by that mission, for these are distinct commands and offices. Yet Pastors are not forbidden to undertake even civil care for the safety of the Church and the state. Certainly, teachers are appointed over pupils in order to examine their abilities and form their morals; yet they are not forbidden also to plead their causes and to make provision for their health, food, and lodging. Indeed, this is often necessary.
Although, therefore, their mission does not bind them to civil offices and solicitude, that care is nevertheless frequently useful and sometimes necessary; it is not, however, forbidden. Unless perhaps someone should censure Ambrose when he undertakes dangerous embassies for the sake of peace, or condemn other Bishops keeping watch over the safety of their people. Moreover, what will the Lutherans do about the Lutheran Bishops of Germany, or the Calvinists about the Calvinist Bishops in England, who not only rule widely,
but also administer royal offices at court?
Argument 6.
If necessary offices, even natural ones, must be omitted so that ministers may discharge the ecclesiastical office, then much more ought a minister to abstain from political office and principality. But the former is true, Luke 9:60. Therefore the Council of Chalcedon, canon 7, rightly forbids a Bishop under penalty of excommunication to accept secular honors; and canon 3 forbids any Cleric to undertake the guardianship and care of an Orphan.
I reply: Christ did not forbid natural offices. He was calling the disciple; the man asks leave to bury his father; Christ denies it to him. “Allow,” he says, “the dead to bury their own dead. But you, go and proclaim the kingdom of God.” He was asking for a delay and respite, and indeed one of uncertain duration, until the death of his father. For what if the father prolonged his life not merely for a long time but even beyond the years of the son? Christ cuts off these slow endeavors. For the father was not dead, just as those dead men who were going to commit the dead to the tomb were not dead, but dead perhaps because they had lost the life of grace. Beza indeed interprets it thus: “Namely, those devoid of true life and obstinately resisting the doctrine of eternal life.” But if this opinion of Christ the Lord commands the ministers of the Church to abstain from every natural office, so that they cannot even be present at the funeral of their parents, who will attempt to excuse preachers who bury their parents, enter upon an inheritance, and often divide it with others by litigation and law? Indeed, they contract marriages and arrange them for others; they give their daughters in marriage and bring wives home for their sons. Are these not secular things?
Argument 7.
He adduces the example of soldiers who do not entangle themselves in secular business. Does he not know that these things are harmful only insofar as they impede spiritual things, but are otherwise useful and divine? Civil business can be conducted spiritually by a spiritual man to the glory of God. Certainly Augustine not only judged causes but indicates that this was customary, Letter 147:
And indeed, when people desire to finish their secular causes before us and have need of us for them, they call us saints and servants of God in order to transact the business of their earth. At some time let us also conduct the business of our salvation and theirs—not concerning gold, not concerning silver, not concerning estates and livestock, on account of which things we are greeted daily with bowed head so that we may bring people’s dissensions to an end; but concerning our Head himself there is so shameful and destructive a dissension among us.
But these matters are to be handled as secondary, and in such a way that they do not impede spiritual matters. No one fails to understand that hearing and bringing to an end the causes and controversies of the state is a holy and most useful work, unless he is so contentious that he delights in discords and lawsuits.
Argument 8.
He who ought to be wholly engaged in reading and preaching, in season and out of season, so that he may render an account of souls, ought not to exercise a civil office in addition to his ecclesiastical office. But the Minister of God ought to be such, Romans 12:17, 1 Timothy 4:15, 2 Timothy 4:2. Therefore the Fourth Council of Carthage rightly commands a Bishop to attend only to preaching, reading, and prayer; and the Canons of the Apostles command that a Bishop who entangles himself in secular affairs be excommunicated.
I reply: The Apostle says, “Meditate upon these things; be in these things”; and, “Preach the word,” and so forth. These things were said to all Bishops, but in such a way that they omit neither hospitality nor other duties. They can perform those things without omitting these. Could not David meditate on the law of the Lord by day and night and nevertheless wage wars, administer a kingdom, and subdue neighboring nations? Did not many holy Kings do this, although they ruled many and very great kingdoms? Why, therefore, could some Bishop not administer a small territory and at the same time keep watch over the salvation of souls? The King of Great Britain administers three kingdoms reduced into one body and is nevertheless the head of the Church; why could the Bishop of Cambridge not take care of a few towns? Nor can ministers complain about these things when, entangled in domestic and public affairs, they assign the smallest part of their time to meditation upon divine things.
Argument 9.
If the Apostles, who were not inferior to the many ministers of the Church in gifts, could not exercise two ecclesiastical offices, between which there is a greater affinity than between political and ecclesiastical office, then much less can other ministers administer civil and ecclesiastical principality. But the former is true, Acts 6:2 and 4. Therefore—
I reply: The Apostles, living among the magistrates of the Jews and Gentiles, received no jurisdiction from them. Yet they could judge. Indeed, the Apostle Paul did what is more than judging: he erected a new tribunal, 1 Corinthians 6:4: “If, therefore, you have secular judgments, appoint those who are held in contempt in the Church to judge.” Behold, without Caesar’s knowledge, he himself appoints judges of secular matters in the midst of the Church. If he did this without jurisdiction, why did he do it? If with jurisdiction, then he possessed the power to command it. Therefore those two offices can be exercised by one person. Why, then, could one Pastor of the smallest village not govern the same village with both civil and spiritual jurisdiction, when one King administers so many kingdoms?
Arguments 10 and 11 have already been answered. The spiritual care of Pastors exercises only spiritual offices; their civil care exercises civil offices as well.
Argument 12. If no one is fit to exercise the spiritual office alone, then he who is called to it ought not to exercise another, civil office. But the former is true, 2 Corinthians 2:16. Therefore—
I reply: Plainly no one administers civil command unless called. For all Bishops who handle the secular business of their dioceses are called to it by legitimate election.
Argument 13. If it is lawful for the ministry to exercise political principality, then it is lawful for a political Magistrate to discharge ecclesiastical office, because the reason for each is equal. But the consequent is absurd, as is evident from Scripture, for those who arrogated this to themselves were gravely punished by God, as may be seen in the example of King Uzziah and others. Therefore—
I reply: The reason is widely different, because sacred power is much more eminent than civil power. Next, this can be conceded in a legitimate sense. Just as a Bishop can govern a city politically if this government is offered to him, so a Prince, if he is initiated into sacred things, can retain secular jurisdiction. For the Christian Priesthood is not restricted to definite families as the Levitical priesthood was. Thus the example of King Uzziah does nothing for this matter.
Argument 14 has been answered. For Bishops are not, by vocation and office, judges of secular affairs or rulers of the state, but they are so by the donation and summons of Princes—although the Church, by command of the Bishops, possesses a certain freedom of its own in appointing judges, as I have taught from Saint Paul. In the primitive Church, however, Princes were not the supporters or patrons but the executioners of Bishops; nor were the Bishops eminent in dignity, but lay hidden in caverns and caves of the earth.
He advances these things not only against Catholics but also against Lutherans and Calvinists, who in various places employ the episcopal title and power, both secular and spiritual, but more secular than spiritual. Others object that many abuse the wealth of the Church. It is true, but abuse pertains to the vices of human beings, not to the confusion of the order.
Many of the rich are wanton in their luxuries, yet they do not therefore cease to be lords of their own possessions. Thus Sharpe himself, On the Magistracy, question 1, objection 7, proposes an Anabaptist argument: “Many Princes abuse their power, and few have been good.” He replies: “It is a fallacy of Accident, because the vices of the person do not vitiate the office. It is similar to saying: Judas was evil; therefore the Apostolic office must be rejected.” The inference is denied. Next, more Kings were good.
Let those who desire the things themselves to be abolished because of abuse suppose that precisely the same answer has been given to them.
§ 5. The second axiom of the Sectarians is that civil laws, or the laws of magistrates, do not bind in conscience. Thus Sharpe, On the Magistracy, question 2.
From this it follows, first, that according to the opinion of our adversaries all force of laws and all authority of the magistracy are weakened and cast away. For if civil laws do not bind the conscience, neither, therefore, does the command of the magistracy. For Sharpe defines law thus in question 1: “A law is nothing other than a king’s command.” If, therefore, his principal command, which consists in the enactment of laws, does not bind the consciences of subjects, much less do other commands, which are promulgated with less effort, solemnity, and care. Secondly, from this we see the origin of the peace disturbed in Germany. For after people whom the laws had scarcely governed before heard that they could transgress civil laws without sin, they deemed lawful whatever they could contrive against the laws. Hence Imperial edicts are despised, the judgment of the Chamber is eluded, and all laws and judicial sentences are harassed. For if the legislator does not bind the conscience and no fear of vengeance hangs over them, why should those to whom it is harmful obey the laws? To this opinion, therefore, we owe the discords and disasters of the tribunals; hence arose so many lawsuits and the contentious immortality of causes pending and to be reviewed.
Many considerations teach us how perniciously and gravely they err. For it is the common character of law that it binds not only to punishment but also to guilt, unless this is specifically excepted. Sharpe does not weaken this reasoning when he says that no one possesses right over the conscience except God alone. For this right over the conscience flows from the law of God. If the magistrate is God’s vicar, then he commands in the place of God; he must therefore be obeyed as one sent by God, and consequently those who resist him sin. Next, Sharpe says in question 2 that it is lawful for a father of a household to govern his children and servants by discipline, punish them, and affect them with rewards; therefore it is lawful also for the magistrate, who is the father of the state. Draw the conclusion farther: therefore subjects must obey just as children do. For failure to obey one’s parents is reckoned among the grave sins of children. Hence the same Sharpe says in question 1: “Magistrates are called Gods, because, having been instituted by God, they hold God’s place,” Joshua 10, verse 35; and concerning those who reject the magistracy, 1 Samuel 6:7. Therefore—“An office for which God prescribes laws is from God; but the magistracy prescribes laws,” Deuteronomy 17 and elsewhere; therefore—
Those who are given and sent by God as servants of God, also for the good of the Church, possess an office that is good and to be tolerated among Christians. But Magistrates are such. Therefore—See Proverbs 8:15, Isaiah 10:5 and 45:1, Jeremiah 27:6, Ezekiel 29:20, Daniel 2:24, and elsewhere.
And thereafter it is commanded in the New Testament that we subject ourselves to the magistrate, even a Gentile one, Matthew 22:21, Romans 13:1 and following, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1:13. Therefore it is much more lawful to be subject to a Christian magistrate. And if it is lawful to be subject rather than to preside, then to be subject is more contrary to Christian liberty than to preside. But what God commands is good and to be tolerated among Christians. Therefore—
But since a law is the command of a magistrate, it altogether binds, even if it concerns a matter otherwise indifferent. Let the English law be an example: that the inhabitants shall not eat meat on Wednesday. If the King cannot bind consciences to this, then, in secret, it is as free for everyone to eat meat as it was before the law, and the King possesses no right whatsoever over their minds.
Satan’s design in overthrowing order and discipline must not be passed over in silence. At the beginning of the disturbances, by their disputations they tore down the authority, power, and laws of the Church’s Prelates. They professed that they were defending the political Magistracy; indeed, of their own accord they even lavished much right over the Church upon it. But after they oppressed ecclesiastical laws by force, artifice, and vices, they assail political laws and dissolve their sinews. For they attribute less to them than to ecclesiastical laws. Thus Sharpe says in question 2: “If ecclesiastical laws do not bind the conscience outside a case of scandal and contempt, then much less do civil laws.” Behold: they place civil laws below ecclesiastical laws. What else remains but that, just as Luther reduced the Canons to ashes, so they should burn the Pandects, the Code, all the Novels, all the laws of Germany, the entire Chamber, and indeed justice itself?
The third axiom is that it is lawful to kill the magistrates themselves. I treated that error in the book On Syncretism, but I have learned that certain things have been scattered abroad by some anonymous man; concerning these the reader must be briefly instructed elsewhere.