§ 1. Although my purpose is to transmit practical politics and to abstain from speculations, nevertheless, because it is true that honorable actions are produced by doctrines, not only by precepts, and most arts—and the most liberal among them all—have their doctrines, not only precepts, and no art is without its own doctrines, which the Greeks call dogmata, it seemed good to me to comprehend briefly those things which theologians and jurists teach concerning laws. For canon and civil laws are derived from these. They therefore define them thus.
§ 2. Eternal law is a dictate of the divine mind by which it judges that certain things are both right and to be observed by creatures, together with the will to oblige creatures.
§ 3. Second, eternal law is the rule of eternal
and practical truth, to which all creatures are obliged by nature: irrational and brute creatures only naturally, intelligent creatures also morally.
§ 4. Third, that law is necessarily in God, because all things are governed by the providence of God; but law is the practical reason of the whole government.
§ 5. Fourth, it is distinguished by reason from an Idea, because it concerns not a thing to be made but a thing to be governed; next, it obliges, which an Idea does not do. This is called a law in God, although it has not yet been promulgated; if anyone contends about the word, we shall not be troublesome.
§ 6. Fifth, the necessary actions of God, such as the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, are not subject to the eternal law, because they are from natural necessity, not from providence.
§ 7. Sixth, the free actions of God are not properly said to be under the eternal law. Nevertheless, because, in a certain manner of conceiving, infinite prudence is the reason of the most holy will, just as immutability is the reason of eternity, we shall not unsuitably say that all the free actions of God are done according to the eternal law. For if the effects themselves of the divine mind, will, and power are under that law, then also the ordering and will of the effects are governed by that law; that is, it has from itself the ability and will to act with immutable rectitude.
§ 8. Without promulgation that law can be perfect, because its decrees are immutable by nature and always oblige without any variation as soon as a creature uses reason. Nevertheless, of itself it does not oblige immediately, but through other laws; therefore, when no creature exists, it obliges potentially rather than actually.
§ 9. Eternal law is one in itself, just as divine providence and will are one. Nevertheless, according to its multiple relations to diverse matter, it is called multiple—just as are Idea, providence, and will.
§ 10. From this law flows all the obligation which exists in the other laws. For all power is from God, and all direction proceeds from eternal wisdom. Natural law and the positive law of God, if they are considered not as they are in the conception and will of God but as they are in creatures and promulgated, are thus judged effects of the eternal law and have their force immediately from it. But the laws of princes and states are not derived from the eternal law in that manner, but with the power and will of a created legislator intervening.
§ 11. Eternal law is altogether immutable; for God cannot change, reject, or abrogate it, since he would deny his own intelligence and goodness. Nevertheless, some of its precepts are immutable, such as that one must not lie and that God must not be held in hatred, for they can never be removed. Others are mutable, such as circumcision, holocausts, and similar things, which by the prescription of eternal law were imposed until the time of correction.
§ 12. The foundation of natural law is eternal law. Hence a nature furnished with intelligence and choice is considered as possible; for what is consonant with it is good, but what is alien and repugnant to it insofar as it possesses reason and will is evil. Nevertheless, this is not properly natural law, because it is not a precept; indeed, it precedes the will of God. The same must be thought concerning maxims, or the general axioms of morals—that evil is not to be done and that God is to be worshiped—if they are considered in nature as they are conceived to exist in the judgment of God antecedent to his will. For in that state they do not possess the character of a precept.
§ 13. Natural law, as it is in creatures using reason, is a dictate of natural, and therefore right, reason which indicates the goodness and wickedness existing in necessary matter, and which promulgates the divine will commanding necessary goods and forbidding evils, together with the obligation to obey. For all the matter of natural law is necessary: it is therefore commanded because it is good, and therefore forbidden because it is evil. Hence no creature can be created with reason and freedom of choice which is not held by natural law. For it would be a creature to which it was lawful to sin, which cannot happen; for if it were lawful, it would not be sin. That law is not promulgated through human beings or signs, but is implanted in reason itself; nor is there any people so barbarous or corrupt upon whom it has not been imposed.
§ 14. Natural law contains various precepts of all the virtues and prohibitions of the vices. Nevertheless, it can be called one law, because it is observed under the one character of natural good.
This natural right remains firm and one among all nations if you consider first act—that is, the natural light of the human intellect. If you consider second act—whether actual judgment or even depraved habits born from that judgment—it has variation.
For some nations have so corrupted natural judgments by evil customs that they established inequitable laws contrary to natural right. The Sardinians killed parents weakened by old age after beating them with clubs, because they called it an outrage for them to lead idle and inactive lives. Other nations violated the right of nature in other matters.
§ 15. Hence it appears that we are obliged by this law above all, not only to do honorable things and flee shameful things, but also to do this honorably. For fulfillment of the law ought to proceed from knowledge and will.
§ 16. That natural law is altogether immutable is evident from its matter. When an honorable thing is commanded, it is of such a kind that it is always honorable; and when a shameful thing is prohibited, it is such that it can never be honorable. Therefore, both negative and affirmative precepts are always necessary, nor do circumstances ever cause a natural precept to be rendered useless, imprudent, or harmful.
§ 17. Therefore, when a sword is not returned to a madman, and when a robber is killed, no sin is committed against natural law, although it is commanded that a deposit be returned and the killing of one’s neighbor is prohibited. For the precept of the law is that a deposit be returned justly, without danger and wrong to another, and that a killing not be committed by private authority and unjustly. For the circumstances cause these particulars not to be contained under the general law, since it is a natural law not to return a sword to a madman.
§ 18. When natural law is restricted and determined to a definite kind by a positive law, whether divine or human, it is not changed, but, remaining wholly intact, receives a certain addition—or rather a mode, which nevertheless can be changed. God must be worshiped; positive law prescribes the mode of worship, adoration, and sacrifices. Parents must be honored by all, but the honor of parents varies according to the custom of regions.
§ 19. Therefore no one can dispense from the natural law, because no inferior can
abrogate the law of a superior. But since natural law concerns necessary matter, it never ceases; nor indeed can God dispense from it. For things which are immutably evil, such as idolatry and similar things, he cannot make lawful by any law; and things which are good he cannot make evil by a law, such as loving God and willing to live well.
§ 20. The principal theologians teach that the law of nations is distinct in matter from natural law. For they say that the law of nations is a human law which, ἀγράφως, without writing, has been established by the consent of all peoples; its matter is in itself neither good nor evil but receives honorableness or shamefulness from the law, and therefore obliges because the nations have consented to that obligation. To this law belong receiving ambassadors and dismissing them in safety, conducting commerce, making contracts, pursuing enemies in war, and making those captured in war slaves. We see that all nations, unless they are altogether barbarous, live by this law. Therefore, if any nation violates ambassadors, it is oppressed by the just war of all nations.
§ 21. Jurists define natural right a little differently, but the disagreement concerns words; in the matter itself we agree. They call the natural inclination of each thing natural right, and this they call primary natural right. Second, they call that which is proper to human beings secondary natural right, such as standing by promises and harming no one; this is what theologians call natural law simply. Jurists call it the primary law of nations. But what those jurists call the secondary law of nations is that which has been gathered by practical reasoning, such as that ambassadors are to be inviolate.