§ 1. Usage has customarily called this eloquence properly so called. Some define it as wisdom speaking copiously; others, as the art of speaking well. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, chapter 2:
Ἔστω δὴ ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.
Thus, therefore, rhetoric is the faculty which considers what has force for persuasion in each particular matter. For this is proper to no other art. For although both those who speak without art and those who proceed dialectically and philosophically endeavor to persuade, rhetoric nevertheless transmits the method of persuasion in all matters; for no one will have taught dialectic, medicine, or jurisprudence perfectly without eloquence.
No one can attain eloquence unless he has already become accustomed beforehand to speak correctly:
Ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἑλληνίζειν.
“The beginning of expression is to speak Greek correctly,” says Aristotle, when discussing the eloquence of his native language. For the man who fastens the figures of eloquence upon faulty speech will do just what one does who sews golden borders and jeweled meanders upon a ragged and torn cloak. For he both dishonors the ornaments and makes poverty more conspicuous by the neighboring abundance, since contiguous contraries manifest one another. And, what is the chief point, he produces a monster fit to be laughed at: Irus in purple, golden sandals soiled with mud, a chamber-pot made of a gem.
Here there comes to my mind the premature haste of many parents in the education of their sons: they order those who do not yet speak to become orators. Hence we discern that the books of many theologians, jurists, physicians, and philosophers, though most polluted in their utterance, sometimes contain phrases and sentences ridiculously affected.
For it usually happens that the most infantile man is the one who most affects eloquence. Eloquence is altogether a rare thing. Cicero is witness, in Book 1 of On the Orator: “For what reasons should anyone not rightly wonder that, from the whole memory of ages, periods, and states, so small a number of orators is found?”
He gives the reasons in the same book: “But unquestionably it is something greater than men suppose, and gathered from more arts and studies. For amid the very great multitude of learners, the great abundance of masters, the most excellent abilities of men, the infinite variety of cases, and the most ample rewards proposed for eloquence, what else could anyone think to be the cause, except a certain incredible magnitude and difficulty of the thing? For there is both a knowledge of very many matters to be comprehended, without which fluency of words is empty and ridiculous; and the speech itself must be established not only by the choice but also by the construction of words; and all the movements of minds which nature has bestowed upon the human race must be thoroughly known, because the whole force and method of speaking must be displayed in either soothing or arousing the minds of those who hear. To this must be added a certain charm and wit, an education worthy of a free man, and speed and brevity both in replying and in assailing, joined with subtle grace and urbanity. Moreover, all antiquity must be grasped, together with the force of examples; nor must knowledge of laws or civil law be neglected. For why should I say more about delivery itself, which must be governed by bodily movement, gesture, countenance, and the formation and variation of the voice? How great this is by itself, the slight art of actors and the stage declares: although all labor over the regulation of face, voice, and movement there, who does not know how few there are, or have been, whom we can watch with an untroubled mind? What shall I say of memory, the treasury of all things? Unless it is applied as guardian to matters and words discovered and conceived, we understand that all of them, even if most splendid, will perish in the speech. Therefore let us cease wondering what the cause of the scarcity of eloquent men is, since eloquence consists of all those matters in each of which it is an exceedingly great thing to labor. Let us rather exhort our children and the others whose glory and dignity are dear to us to embrace in mind the magnitude of the matter, and not to trust that they can attain what they seek by those precepts, masters, or exercises which everyone uses, but by certain others. And in my judgment no one will be able to be an orator heaped with every praise unless he has attained knowledge of all great subjects and arts. For speech ought to flower and overflow from knowledge of things; unless the matter has been perceived and known by the orator, speech possesses a certain empty and almost childish eloquence. Yet I would not impose so great a burden upon our orators, especially amid so great an occupation with the city and with life, as to think that they may be ignorant of nothing—although the force of the orator and the very profession of speaking well seem to undertake and promise this: that upon every matter whatsoever proposed, he may speak ornately and copiously.”
§ 2. Eloquence must indeed be maintained in a state because it conciliates the highest dignity for the state; but it must especially be cultivated by the nobility and by the prince. Aristotle truly says to Alexander:
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐσθῆτα σπουδάζεις τὴν εὐπρεπεστάτην τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχειν, οὕτως εὕρεσιν λόγων λαβεῖν ἐστί σοι πειρατέον τὴν ἐνδοξοτάτην. Πολὺ γὰρ κάλλιόν ἐστι καὶ βασιλικώτερον τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν εὐγνωμονοῦσαν ἢ τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος ὁρᾶν εὐειματοῦσαν. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπόν ἐστι τὸν τοῖς ἔργοις πρωτεύοντα φαίνεσθαι τῶν τυχόντων τοῖς λόγοις ὑστερίζοντα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰδότα ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευομένοις ἡ ἀναφορὰ περὶ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰς τὸν δῆμόν ἐστι, τοῖς δ’ ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίαν τεταγμένοις, πρὸς λόγον. Ὥσπερ οὖν τὰς αὐτονόμους τῶν πόλεων διορθοῦν εἴωθεν ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιστον ἄγων ὁ κοινὸς νόμος, οὕτω τοὺς ὑπὸ τὴν σὴν βασιλείαν καθεστῶτας ἄγειν δύναιτ’ ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ συμφέρον ὁ σὸς λόγος. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος ἐστίν, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, λόγος ὡρισμένος καθ’ ὁμολογίαν κοινὴν πόλεως, μηνύων πῶς δεῖ πράττειν ἕκαστα.
For just as you strive to excel other men especially in the adornment and magnificence of clothing, so you must also strive to receive that invention and force of speaking which is most beautiful and surpassingly most illustrious. For it is far more beautiful and more kingly to be well constituted in mind than to behold the condition of the body adorned with beautiful garments. For it is absurd that one who excels others in the glory of deeds should appear to yield in speaking to certain men of the lowest rank, especially since you are not ignorant that those who live under popular government refer all matters to the people, while those who have been placed under the guidance of one man’s rule refer them to reason and speech. Just as the common law which leads toward some most honorable end has been accustomed to direct free states, so in the same manner may your speech also be able to lead those whom you hold under your rule to what is advantageous and useful. For law, so to speak, is a certain speech which, defined by the common consent of the state, commands in what manner each thing is to be done.
Certainly, speaking has been given commonly to all men; eloquence is what shows men to be learned, or makes them appear learned. Speech joined to learning is the guide of life. And certainly, after reason itself, nothing greater than the majesty of speaking has been given to man; for he who speaks well is heard both pleasantly and beneficially. Indeed, this is the chief ornament: as ability is the glory of a man, so eloquence is the light of ability. Afranius, when asked what he had learned in eighty-one years, replied: “Nothing except to teach well and to speak well,” placing in this not only the whole dignity but even the majesty of life.
Nothing has raised more men to dignity than eloquence. Generals have attained the government of the state with greater danger, orators with greater labor. Yet there is this difference: orators hold authority both in war and in peace; generals hold it only in war and are neglected in peace. And certainly generals themselves who were distinguished in war, such as Vespasian, Hadrian, Domitian, and Alexander, established salaries for orators and immunity from burdens; thus Modestinus in Si duos, §6. Leo and Anthemius joined advocates and eloquent patrons of causes to them. In free states, as there was always greater regard for eloquence, so there was also greater danger. Pericles held tyranny with arms.
Cicero, in Book 1 of On the Orator, commends it splendidly: “Nor indeed does anything seem to me more excellent,” he says, “than to be able by speaking to hold assemblies of men, entice minds, drive wills wherever one wishes, and lead them away from wherever one wishes. This one thing, among every free people and especially in peaceful and tranquil states, has always flourished preeminently and has always held dominion. For what is so admirable as that, out of an infinite multitude of men, there should arise one who, either alone or with a few, can do what has been given by nature to all? Or what is so pleasant to know and hear as speech adorned and polished with wise thoughts and weighty words? Or what is so powerful and magnificent as for the movements of the people, the religious scruples of judges, and the gravity of the senate to be turned by the speech of one man? What, moreover, is so kingly, so liberal, so munificent as to bring aid to suppliants,
raise up the afflicted, grant safety, free men from dangers, and retain men in the state? And what is so necessary as always to possess weapons by which you can either be protected yourself, challenge the wicked, or avenge yourself when provoked?”
I marvel at the great affection of the Athenians toward Gorgias of Leontini, for they called the days on which he had delivered a speech ἑορτάς (festivals), and named the speeches themselves λαμπάδας (torches). He was the first to adorn speech with antitheses, equal clauses, similarly falling endings, and other figures; and therefore Greece erected a golden statue at Delphi for him alone.
§ 3. This indeed is the dignity of eloquence; its force and efficacy in moving are far more conspicuous. Pyrrhus’s orator Cineas is commonly adduced as an example: by speech he captured more cities than the most skillful commander captured by war. Cicero spoke most truly: “The authority and speech of a good citizen wrench weapons from the hands of angry citizens.” More men have attained kingdoms and principalities through eloquence than through military courage. More men have also retained them. Caesar himself is an example. When the soldier enlisted for service against his fatherland had grown fierce because men stained by the same crime boasted that they had been made equal even to their commander, Caesar restrained them by a brief speech and brought it about that they inflicted punishment upon themselves:
He stood upon a rampart of supported turf, Undaunted in countenance, and deserved to be feared By fearing nothing; and, as anger dictated, he spoke these words: “Soldier, who just now raged with face and right hand Against me while absent, you have my breast bare and ready for wounds. Flee from here, if the end of war pleases you, after abandoning your sword.” The mutiny disclosed unwarlike minds, having dared nothing bravely; The young soldiery had contemplated only flight And had grown weary of the undefeated leader’s successes. “Go, and leave me to my own fates for war. These weapons will find hands, and when you have been rejected, Fortune will restore as many men as spears will be vacant. Or do the peoples of Italy follow the flight of Magnus With so great a fleet, while victory will not give us a throng Which, merely driven on, may carry off the prizes of war, Seize the reward of your labor, and attend Laurel-bearing chariots without a wound? You, old men despised and a throng exhausted of blood, Will behold our triumphs, now the Roman commons. Do you think Caesar’s course can feel Any loss from your flight? Even if all the rivers Should threaten to withdraw the springs which they mingle with the sea, The deep would never sink more when those waters were removed Than it now rises through their waters. Do you think that you Have given me any weight at all? Never does the care of the gods Press itself down so far that the fates have leisure for your death Or your safety. The movements of the great—all these things follow them. The human race lives in a few. The terror of the Iberian world And the northern soldier under my name Would certainly have fled with Pompey as leader. Labienus was brave In Caesar’s arms; now, a worthless deserter, With his preferred leader he traverses lands and seas. Nor is your loyalty better to me if you wage wars With neither enemy nor me as leader. Whoever abandons my standards And does not deliver his weapons to Pompey’s party Never wishes to be mine. Surely these camps are The care of the gods, who wished me to engage in such great wars Only after my soldiery had been changed. Alas, how great a burden Fortune removes from shoulders Now weary beneath its weight! It is granted to disarm right hands That hope for everything, for which this world is not enough. Now surely I shall wage wars for myself. Depart from the camp; Cowards, hand over my standards to men—Quirites! But a few, through whose instigation this madness blazed, Are held back not by Caesar but by punishment. Prostrate yourselves upon the earth, Lower your guilty heads, and stretch forth your necks to be struck. And you, raw recruit, upon whose strength alone the camp will now stand, Behold the punishment, and learn to strike; Learn to die.” Under the savage voice of the threatening man The inert multitude trembled, and so great a body of young men feared One head, although they were about to make it a private man, As though he commanded their very swords And would set the steel in motion even against his soldiers’ will. Caesar himself fears Lest weapons and right hands be denied him for this crime. Endurance conquered the savage leader’s hope And offered throats, not merely swords. Nothing does more than readiness to die to destroy minds accustomed to crime. And each fears to perish. By the stroke of so dreadful a compact Peace was obtained, and the soldiery returned, reconciled by punishment.
There is certainly great force in speech, nor should the eloquence of Hegesias, the Cyrenaic philosopher, seem astonishing: he discoursed so effectively upon the good of death and the evils of life that many laid hands upon themselves and sought lakes and precipices. Valerius, Book 8, chapter 9: “How powerful in eloquence do we suppose Hegesias, the Cyrenaic philosopher, to have been? He represented the evils of life in such a way that, when their pitiable image had been planted in the breasts of his hearers, he engendered in many a desire to meet voluntary death. Therefore King Ptolemy prohibited him from discoursing further on this matter.”
Hence also the tales of the Gallic Hercules, of Thebes built to the lyre, of trees and wild beasts led along, and of the underworld pacified are told for this reason. The discipline of speaking well pertains no less to the providence of a prince than that of acting rightly. For since the multitude which addresses the prince is infinite, and since many have deserved exceedingly well of him, he cannot satisfy everyone in deed; therefore kindly words are necessary, so that he may raise them up and sustain them. For an honorable profusion of words is more welcome to many than benefits—benefits which princes insufficiently skilled in eloquence bring into hatred through harshness of words and a haughty brow. Such is often their arrogance that one regrets having obtained the request. For a benefit is unwelcome when given with hateful speech.
Anger, consternation, and arms yield to eloquent words. For learned eloquence both leads kings wherever it wishes and draws peoples. “After the kings had been expelled,” says Valerius, Book 8, chapter 9, “the commons, in dissension from the fathers, settled under arms beside the bank of the river Anio upon the hill which is called Sacred. And the condition of the state was not only disgraceful but also most wretched, the remaining part of the body being divided from its head by a pestilential sedition. And had the eloquence of Valerius not come to its aid, the hope of so great an empire would have collapsed almost at its very birth. For by a speech he recalled the people, rashly rejoicing in a new and unaccustomed liberty, to better and sounder counsels and subjected it to the senate; that is, he joined city to city. Therefore anger, consternation, and arms yielded to eloquent words.”
He next produces from Greece an example not unlike it: “But Pericles, polished and equipped by the most earnest study under his teacher Anaxagoras, in addition to nature’s most fortunate augmentations, placed the yoke of servitude upon the free necks of Athens. For he drove the city and turned it at his own judgment. And although he spoke against the will of the people, his voice was nevertheless pleasant and popular. Therefore the slanderous tongue of Old Comedy, although it desired to lash the man’s power, nevertheless confessed that a charm sweeter than honey dwelt upon his lips, and proclaimed that certain stings, as it were, were left in the minds of those who had heard him. It is reported that a certain man, when already very old, attended the first public address of the young Pericles, and that the same man, as a youth, had heard the now decrepit Pisistratus address the assembly; he could not restrain himself from exclaiming that this citizen ought to be guarded against, because his speech was most like the speech of Pisistratus. Neither his assessment of the utterance nor his augury of the character deceived the man. For what difference was there between Pisistratus and Pericles, except that the former exercised tyranny armed, the latter without arms?”
Victor likewise relates concerning Constantine that by eloquence he accomplished what could either scarcely be obtained or could be obtained only with much blood.
§ 4. But two things must be considered by a prince. First, he must carefully take heed that wicked men are not cultivated by eloquence. Second, eloquence must be accommodated to his own state.
The first is necessary, for power generally follows eloquence. Curios, Alcibiadeses, and the others of that kind must be kept away, lest they be armed against the state.
The second is that eloquence is not to be considered true unless it is accommodated to the manners of the people. If an Asiatic orator brings verbal cosmetics and luxuriance to Sparta, he will accomplish this: he will be mad according to method. For streams of words are not agreeable to them. When the Samians, oppressed by the tyrant Polycrates, came as suppliants to the Lacedaemonians for aid and set forth their calamities in a long speech, the latter—certainly arrogant in the face of another’s calamity—replied that they did not remember the earlier things and for that reason did not understand the later. Then the Samians, to show that they too could λακωνίζειν (speak laconically), brought forward a bread-basket and said that it needed bread. The Lacedaemonians said that “bread” was superfluous; and thus aid was then decreed and given to them. For since the end of speech is that you disclose your mind to another and persuade him of what you wish, one must not employ speech from which the other is estranged. He speaks best who speaks suitably not only to art but also to the minds of his hearers, for this is considered the highest art. A calamitous yet royal woman attributes everything to eloquence:
Τί δῆτα θνητοὶ τἄλλα μὲν μαθήματα μοχθοῦμεν ὡς χρὴ πάντα, κἀματεύομεν; Πειθὼ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνην οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς τέλος σπουδάζομεν, μισθοὺς διδόντες μανθάνειν, ἵν’ ἦν ποτέ πείθειν ἃ τις βούλοιτο, τυγχάνειν θ’ ἅμα.
Why, then, do we mortals labor in the other disciplines and, as is proper, investigate them all, yet not rather pursue Persuasion, or Suada, who alone is queen of men, giving payment so that a man may be able to persuade others of what he wishes and at the same time obtain it?
If, therefore, the hearer is devoted to brevity, you will persuade briefly. Demetrius of Phalerum thinks that concise expressions penetrate more vehemently and that brevity befits those who command. Brief are those replies of the Spartans: to the Argives, αἴκα (if); to Philip, Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ (Dionysius at Corinth). Indeed, they also had laws written with the same brevity. Charilaus spoke truly: ὅτι τοῖς ὀλίγα λέγουσιν ὀλίγων καὶ νόμων ἐστὶ χρεία. “Since they speak with few words, they also have need of few laws.”
Yet I judge that brevity so extreme should scarcely be used, for it indicates great contempt and can be drawn into various meanings. Certainly you will not easily render a man well-disposed by a single little sentence; you will, however, collect great and eternally enduring hatreds if, as with a sharp weapon, you dig into his innermost parts. For deep and small wounds can scarcely be healed. The brevity of Phocion is praised by the ancients. When someone said to him, Σκεπτομένῳ ἔοικας, ὦ Φωκίων—“You seem like one looking intently, O Phocion”—he replied that he was looking to see what he could remove from the things he was going to say before the Athenians. Certainly, he was considering most properly what he could remove without prejudicing the cause; otherwise brevity would be unadorned and harmful. For he who omits the things that ought to be said betrays his trust; and he too betrays the matter who touches only in passing upon things that must be driven home, impressed, and repeated. But he who drives home foreign, exotic, and obscure things does not speak in order to persuade, nor does he wish to be believed, but to seem learned.