§ 1. Democracy is “ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων συμφέρον,” government which regards the utility of the poor or those of small means. The end of this government is diametrically opposed to oligarchy. For the latter pleads the cause of the rich; the former, that of those who are poor or of small means; neither pleads that of the whole commonwealth.
No democracy has ever been long-lasting; or, if any endured for some time, it was agitated by perpetual dissensions and ended either in the tyranny of one or in oligarchy. It has ended more often in tyranny, because the dregs of the people, when divided within itself and unable to prevail, entrusts itself to one man from whom it expects rewards for the power it has given; but it is afterward oppressed by him.
The reason why that administration cannot be long-lasting is that, when the advantages of citizens of small means are provided for through injuries to the more honorable, it is necessary that the principal part of the city—without which the other part cannot exist—suffer distress. For if the nobility is harassed with outrages, or the condition of the city is so tossed about in the hands of the poorer men that the rich are uncertain about their property, who can doubt that the latter will either finally draw power to themselves or desert a commonwealth in which they are the mockery and prey of every most sordid man? Nor will they remain inactive for long in that danger when they possess a great faculty of taking vengeance.
§ 2. Democracy can exist even where the number of the poor is smaller than that of the rich, if the helm of administration is turned according to the judgment and advantages of the poor. Nevertheless, the portion of those of small means and of those who either possess no property or possess little is generally greater.
Formerly, however, in military cities the supreme power often resided among the lowest persons. To this form must be assigned those periods of the Roman commonwealth when the common people beneath the rostra enacted laws; when votes returned for sale annually upon the Field; and when the Praetorian soldiers, or a few legions, despising the authority of the senate and people and bargaining for gifts, plunder, and license, raised monsters of human beings to the august summit and soon killed those same men by a nefarious crime.
§ 3. Tyranny is most easily born from this form of commonwealth. Plato speaks excellently: “ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν, οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι, ἢ εἰς ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει. εἰκὸς γάρ, εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται, ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. ἐξ (οἶμαι) τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας, δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. For excessive liberty is accustomed to be changed into the most grievous servitude, among private persons as well as cities.” For thus it is accustomed to happen, and I deservedly said that tyranny arises from no commonwealth other than democracy: from the greatest liberty comes the greatest and most monstrous servitude.
The reason why the man to whom the people has entrusted itself oppresses it with tyranny is that he distrusts that he can otherwise be safe. Since many wicked men seek many things
and terrify him, he cannot hold them by love for himself; therefore he prepares force.
§ 4. There are four kinds of democracy. The first exists when the more honorable part of the city, which possesses moderate means, deliberates after excluding the rich and entrusts magistracies to rich men as well as those of moderate means. Because this form attributes more to magnates, it is firmer. For it does not exclude the rich and noble from public affairs, and it entrusts itself to be ruled by the fidelity of those whom it possesses as candidates and suppliants.
The second form exists when it is permitted to everyone, so far as birth is concerned, to administer the commonwealth, yet no one is admitted unless it is possible for him to be at leisure. This administration generally also belongs to the best men, for craftsmen, merchants, and others are removed.
The third form exists when by law even those who cannot be at leisure are admitted to the helm. Yet because they possess no leisure from their own affairs and do not wish to attend to public affairs to the detriment of their domestic property, they voluntarily abstain from magistracies.
The fourth species of democracy—or rather a tyranny of many, as Aristotle judges in book 5, chapter 11 of the Politics—exists when the poor are not merely admitted to government but are given payment so that they may be at leisure. That arrangement harms justice in many ways. For honorable and noble men suited to administering public affairs are barred from taking counsel for their fatherland by filth so unbecoming and indeed extreme. Next, since money must be gathered from the entrails of the commonwealth to support the leisure of the poor, the nobles and rich suffer injury, since they are compelled with their own money to buy magistrates for themselves and indeed to bring it about by their own resources that they cannot attain honors—than which nothing is more bitter. Finally, men of this sort are generally inexperienced in affairs, desirous, and abuse power.
But although a good man would not wish to conduct government for the sake of either money or honor, he nevertheless customarily undertakes this burden lest a worse man command him. For men judge there to be the greatest necessity of assuming the helm lest it be entrusted to the inexperienced and all be endangered for that reason. In this democratic tyranny, however, by violence, laws, and payment it is arranged that honorable men should not preside over the commonwealth, but that every most foul and needy man should command.
§ 5. Moreover, various democratic laws against the best men have been devised by popular leaders; nevertheless, those laws oppressed the people itself and converted liberty under the name of liberty into tyranny. Yet the tyranny of no single person is to be equated with a raging people.
The first law is that a magistrate should come from everyone. Both examples and reason teach how destructive it is. For what is more foreign to true reason than that rulers of the commonwealth should be placed in command by the judgment and opinions of the most imprudent? That those who possess the highest honors and supreme power should be selected from the dregs of human beings? No one entrusts a vineyard to an inexperienced cultivator or a field to an ignorant farmer. What prudence, then, is it to entrust bodies, fortunes, and liberty to the judgments of human beings seeking their own advantages?
What popular leaders say—that the common people generally do not err in selecting magistrates—is altogether otherwise. No one is a less suitable arbiter of his liberty than the people; no one abuses it more in any matter than in creating magistrates. All seek the man whom they judge advantageous to themselves, not the one useful to the commonwealth. Let us trust the Roman people, whose assemblies, after the likeness of the Euripus, changed in different directions. Cato twice suffered electoral rejection; Clodius, Vatinius, Piso, and Antony sat upon the curule chair.
§ 6. The second law: to command in turn and frequently change governments. The people loves this, but it leads to anarchy and license. For what man born from the common people, endowed with a brief power already about to expire, will restrain wicked and audacious human beings from injury to citizens? Who will contain by the fear and force of laws and penalties those whom he is going to see in the supreme position the next day, when the wheel of the assemblies turns? The powerful man whom you irritate today you will experience as your lord tomorrow. As a private person you will receive your enemy armed with public authority. To report familiar things, consider Cicero alone. During his most glorious consulship, the preserver of the fatherland aroused against himself the hatred of the most powerful citizens, and their hatred possessed such force that he was driven into exile.
§ 7. The third law: to divide the goods of condemned men among the common people. If the people judges the case, it would be manifestly inequitable, as Aristotle warned in book 6, chapter 5. Who doubts that a needy judge can be induced without difficulty to condemn an accused man by whose destruction he has determined to increase his own property? If those judgments are in the hands of the best men but the plunder in those of the common people, although there is less danger, it is nevertheless not equitable that a public fine be expended for the advantages of one party. Next, after neglecting labors, they will begin to direct slanders against the rich.
§ 8. The fourth law: that accusations against noble and brave men should be frequent. Nothing was more customary at Athens, and for this reason they fell.
§ 9. The fifth law: that magistrates should be selected by lot. Certainly nothing is more suitable than this law for overthrowing the commonwealth.
§ 10. The sixth law: that revenues should be distributed to those who come to the assembly.
§ 11. The seventh law: that the wealthy should receive no payment for the labor of judging, but those of small means a large payment.
§ 12. The eighth law: that no craft should prevent one from commanding.
§ 13. The ninth law: that no one, except rarely, should hold any magistracy twice.
§ 14. The tenth law: that this can nevertheless occur in a dangerous war.
§ 15. The eleventh law: that no magistracy should be perpetual; indeed, that all should be exceedingly brief, so that more persons may command.
§ 16. The thirteenth law: to admit foreigners also to honors.
§ 17. The fourteenth law: secretly to oppress the nobility, while outwardly cultivating it, and to entrust to nobles certain magnificent and expensive functions.
§ 18. The fifteenth law: to guard against their being irritated.
§ 19. The sixteenth law: to inflame them mutually against one another and wear them down with enmities; to furnish with honors and power, and defend, those from the nobility who possess many enemies.
§ 20. The seventeenth law: to institute very many tribes and intermingle them as much as possible.
§ 21. The eighteenth law: to unite various associations of craftsmen, merchants, and others.
§ 22. The nineteenth law: to permit the license of living as each person wishes. “ἥδιον γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως, ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως. For it is sweeter for the multitude to live without order than temperately.”
§ 23. The twentieth law: to surround all magistrates with the guardianship of other magistrates, lest they be able to do anything
against the will of the people. Thus at Rome the tribunes of the common people often vetoed the best counsels and, under the appearance of defending the common people, disturbed the commonwealth.
If we weigh the origin, rationale, and examples of all those laws, they can do little to establish the democratic constitution. Consequently, no democracy was ever stable or without perpetual disturbances. Besides Athenian and Roman history, one may read the history of the Florentine Republic from the times of Frederick, in which you will read with astonishment of the greatest and swiftest changes of affairs, internal battles, and fighting from towers.