§ 1. “Oligarchy” is sometimes employed for aristocracy, but properly and precisely it is defined by Aristotle as “Ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν εὐπόρων,” government instituted for the utility of the rich. Book 3, chapters 7 and 8: “ὅταν κύριοι ὦσι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες,” when those who possess property are dominant in the commonwealth. It would perhaps be called more rightly “εὐποραρχία” or “πλουσιαρχία” when counsel is taken for the advantages of the rich and not of the whole commonwealth.
It can certainly happen that within some commonwealth there are more rich men than men of moderate or small means, as Aristotle testifies was the case at Colophon before the war of the Lydians. Therefore, if elsewhere there are more rich than poor, it will nevertheless be called an oligarchy, the dominion of a few. For although it is not then that of a few, when it was established it first belonged to a few; and even now in every commonwealth the number of the rich is small, while that of men of moderate and small means is very great.
§ 2. When magistrates are created on account of bodily height or beauty, as formerly among the Ethiopians, it is not an oligarchy, because those gifts can belong to men of moderate and small means as well as to the rich. Nevertheless, the name agrees with it, for it is necessary that the power belong to a few; very few excel in bodily dignity. If these men regard the common good, it will be called an aristocracy; if the good of only one party, an oligarchy.
Therefore, although, if only the rich command, it must be called “ἀρχὴ τῶν εὐπόρων,” government of the rich, it can nevertheless also be “ἀριστοκρατία,” aristocracy, if they do not command for the utility of the rich but of everyone. Plato observed this most prudently: “ὅταν ἄρα οἱ πλούσιοι ταύτην μιμῶνται, τότε ἀριστοκρατίαν καλοῦμεν τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν νόμων μὴ φροντίζωσι, ὀλιγαρχίαν. When, therefore, the rich imitate that form, we then call that commonwealth ‘ἀριστοκρατίαν’—‘aristocracy’; but when the laws are neglected, we call it an oligarchy.” The laws are neglected when the rich refer all things to their own advantages and desires.
The dominion of a few and of the rich is therefore not unjust if it keeps its aim, which is the safety of all. For it is equitable that the man who expends ten thousand gold pieces for the commonwealth should be preferred to another who contributes only ten to the common fund. Yet the man who furnishes so much to his fatherland ought not to obstruct the advantages of a citizen of smaller means.
§ 3. Aristotle recognizes four kinds of oligarchy in book 4 of the Politics, chapter 5. The first exists when a magistrate is selected according to the census, so that the poor are excluded. At Rome the senate was selected according to a census qualification of eight hundred thousand sesterces. Thus indeed the prices of life perished; nevertheless, they judged that the splendor of the most august order must also be increased by domestic means. Accordingly, when his census was diminished, both senator and knight lost his dignity.
The second kind exists when certain men are chosen according to the census, but those men select others for themselves, whether from those qualified by the census, from the best men, or from everyone.
The third exists when a son succeeds his father, as generally occurs among the Venetians, where all nobles who are twenty-five years old possess the right to enter the senate. Nevertheless, there is no corrupt oligarchy in these arrangements if the public good is regarded, but either aristocracy or polity. For just as in a kingdom one man can succeed one man without thereby incurring the mark of tyranny, so in an aristocracy several can succeed several while the integrity of the best government is preserved.
The fourth kind, therefore, is a corrupt oligarchy, when affairs are conducted not by law but by the decisions of those who govern, and all things are administered for the advantages of the powerful. This kind of government is most destructive because in place of one tyrant it possesses several petty tyrants, and those cruel and needy. Just as this government is wicked, so it can by no means be long-lasting, since the greatest part of the commonwealth hates the smallest and desires it to perish.
Not only injury but even the suspicion of injury must be avoided. Otherwise anyone at all, however weak, can be a leader against them; nor in their overthrow is anything more difficult than the first utterance. At the beginning of the preceding century, many cities of the Empire rose against their own magistracy, and slaughters and plundering occurred. It makes no difference whether they suspect the senate truly or falsely.
The memory of the disturbance at Frankfurt is recent. Its leaders were human beings of the lowest condition but exceedingly powerful through the favor of the people, because government by the best was hateful. They could have done more harm if they had begun the sedition more moderately. Formerly at Massilia and Heraclea the rich rioted against the few and changed the form of the commonwealth. Aristotle, book 5 of the Politics, chapter 6.
§ 4. A tyranny of several is therefore overthrown with the easiest effort, but never more easily than when dissensions arise among them, or when one of them reveals secrets or makes himself popular. They do this either when they have suffered injury and seek power, or when they have broken and squandered their own resources and strive to conceal private disgraces with public evil. The more savage and importunate they are, the briefer their government is.
Those whose conspiracy is most inequitable have perished through foul examples. Aristotle recalls in book 5 of the Politics, chapter 9, that there was one of this kind: “For now in certain oligarchies they swear thus: ‘I shall be ill-disposed toward the people, and I shall devise against the people whatever evil I can.’” But it is necessary for them both to think and to display and simulate the opposite, signifying in the prescribed words of the oath that they will inflict no injury upon the people.
They swear, therefore, that they will be enemies of the people, and perjure themselves that they will be friends.