§ 1. As I undertake to set forth civil doctrine, I am not unaware that an accusation stands prepared against me, and that I must plead a case concerning the very title. For since the envy of the malevolent always opposes honorable endeavors, and in this age—exceedingly fruitful in vices no less than in virtues—no one can either teach rightly or act rightly without the disparagement of many, it ought to seem surprising to no one if, in these disputations, which are liable not only to the judgments, censures, cavillations, and reprehensions of readers and writers, but also, if an error has been committed, to the vengeance of those who reign, we experience harsh judgments and the hostile dispositions of many.
§ 2. There are, however, four things that are placed as obstacles at the very entrance and outset of the work. First, the profession of the religious order to which I have given my name appears altogether to forbid and prohibit the treatment and study of secular affairs. For why do you, to whom the world has been crucified—or ought to have been—set a worldly commonwealth in order? Why do you, who have been crucified to the world (unless you falsely profess religion), while hanging from your cross, fasten laws upon kings and kingdoms? What part can you have in the court, in the council chamber, in tribunals, or even in seditions and wars, when zeal for prayer and the study of the sacred Scriptures ought to have struck every recollection of these things from you?
Secondly, it is a work full of perilous hazard to prescribe not only laws but also counsels to rulers, for good counsels have cost many dearly. How readily offense arises in this matter, even when fault and error are absent, anyone who does not know is never fit to write on politics.
Thirdly, it appears an excessively proud—or, rather, insane—profession to wish to teach the senate, princes, kings, emperors, and pontiffs; for to obey them when they command, and not to write the laws of command, is the part of a good citizen.
Finally, he who has never taken part in any department of the commonwealth, but nevertheless writes counsels and laws concerning the administration of the commonwealth, will never be able to escape the ridicule directed at Phormio of Ephesus. Hannibal judged him the most foolish of all old men because, in the presence of a veteran and a commander of many triumphs, he declaimed about marking out a camp, drawing up a battle line, and engaging in battle. Surely it appears no less foolish if one who has not even been a praetor at Formiae or in the Alps forces upon the rulers of the world—whom education has formed for command, practice has exercised, variety of events has instructed, and age and prudence have confirmed—the method and manner of governing a commonwealth. For if in all arts the greatest distinction comes from practice or from practitioners, and if only by experience is it learned how arduous and how subject to fortune the burden of governing all things is, why do you not consider the persons of your hearers, lest you be laughed at before you are heard? Do you not fear that untimely wisdom may be wearisome to the powerful and a laughingstock to the wise? I, however, do not fear these things at all, nor indeed ought I to fear them. You, whoever you are who will read these things, weigh the reasons with me.
§ 3. In the first place, to treat of the reciprocal duties and obligations of kings, princes, and subjects, and of the government of the whole commonwealth, is not only not foreign to our Society, but is so proper and closely connected to it that it can neither avoid this office nor delegate it to another, provided that it wishes hereafter to persist in the standards of its constitutions and in the footsteps of the Fathers. We interpret Sacred Scripture and the whole of Scholastic Theology both privately and publicly; but Sacred Scripture no less than Scholastic Theology carefully forms the commonwealth, and prescribes not only the duties of peace, but also the method of justly waging or refraining from war.
Nor do we concern ourselves with human judgments where a divine oracle goes before us, which sends kings to priests and theologians. Deuteronomy 17:18: “After he has sat upon the throne of his kingdom, he shall write for himself the Deuteronomy of this law in a volume, receiving a copy from the priests of the Levitical tribe; and he shall have it with him and shall read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God and to keep his words and ceremonies, which have been commanded in the law. Nor shall his heart be lifted up in pride above his brethren, nor shall he turn aside to the right hand or to the left, that he himself and his sons may reign for a long time over Israel.”
Therefore, he who explains Scripture ought to institute a disputation concerning the just and unjust law of kingship, such as is set forth at 1 Kings 8:11; and whoever has undertaken the public office of teaching is a debtor not only to private and unwise persons, but also to magistrates and wise persons. But if kings are commanded to hear and to learn, it also belongs to theologians to teach. Concerning kings and their instruction, Wisdom itself pronounces thus, chapter 6:1: “Wisdom is better than strength, and a prudent man than a strong man. Hear therefore, O kings, and understand; learn, O judges of the ends of the earth. Give ear, you who hold multitudes under your sway and take pleasure in the crowds of nations; because—”
“—power has been given to you by the Lord, and might by the Most High, who will inquire into your works and search your thoughts; because, although you were ministers of his kingdom, you did not judge rightly, nor keep the law of justice, nor walk according to the will of God. Terribly and swiftly he will appear to you, because a most severe judgment will be made upon those who rule. For mercy is granted to the lowly, but the powerful shall powerfully suffer torments.”
Therefore, the magistrate must be instructed with great care from the divine writings, so that he may judge the people of God in justice, and God’s poor in judgment; so that he may hope in the Lord, and in the mercy of the Most High may not be moved.
§ 4. Hence it is that God always joined prophets and priests to kings as instructors, admonishers, praisers of deeds rightly done, but fearless censurers of crimes. Samuel was joined to Saul; Nathan to David; Shemaiah to Rehoboam; Ahijah to Jeroboam; Hanani to Baasha; Elijah to Ahab; Elisha to Jehoram; Isaiah to Hezekiah; Jeremiah to Hezekiah’s descendants; and others to others. They delivered precepts concerning the right government of the commonwealth; and although they discharged an extraordinary office of embassy, the diligence of ordinary teachers was not on that account without employment. For they too admonished the magistrate; and when they turned the duty of teaching and reproving into silence or flattery, they were accused and condemned as defendants upon a charge of injured eternal majesty, and heavenly justice required the blood of perishing souls from the hand of the shepherds.
Nor has the instruction of devout theologians ever been lacking to Christian kings. Examine both the writings and the deeds of Saints Athanasius, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Leo, Gregory, Remigius, and others, and you will find that care of the commonwealth was always of chief importance to them. Nor was the mind of the Scholastic theologians different. Their works concerning the commonwealth—and, above all, the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas On the Government of Princes and the commentaries upon Aristotle’s Politics—are in men’s hands. And would that those sincere and Christian expositors, rather than new, detestable, atheistic, Epicurean ones, were offered to the courts of princes.
If, therefore, care for the commonwealth, love of country, and the instruction of princes and subjects are imputed to me as a fault, so many great and holy names must likewise be summoned with me to trial, and prophets, priests, and teachers must be entered among the accused. For it is not just that, in an equal cause, I should be condemned and others acquitted. Nor, when disputing about worldly empires and secular affairs, do I depart from spiritual care and duty, since my purpose is so to order the temporal commonwealth that it may direct earthly good and happiness toward spiritual and heavenly good and happiness. For the aim and end of my undertaking is to show how all human things, private as well as public, are to be directed toward the highest good and ultimate end.
Therefore, just as the Apostle instructs us spiritually when he says (1 Timothy 2:1), “I beseech, first of all, that supplications, prayers, petitions, and thanksgivings be made for all men, for kings and all who are in high station, that we may lead a quiet and tranquil life in all piety and chastity; for this is good and acceptable before God our Savior,” so also that doctrine must be judged spiritual by which kings and those invested with high station so restrain, instruct, and draw their subjects by arms, laws, and example that they may lead a quiet and tranquil life in all piety and chastity. And so I can not undeservedly hope that this labor of mine will be good and acceptable before God our Savior, and salutary to all who wish to use it.
§ 5. But if you wish to inspect and weigh the other functions of our Society, you yourself will admit that this study is most consonant with it. In schools, in churches, and in assemblies, almost all of us must treat daily of every kind of duty: all must be instructed, admonished, and strengthened toward virtue and a blessed life; subjects must be taught to obey the magistrate, to acknowledge the right of superiors and their own obligation to obey; magistrates must be admonished to use their right for the preservation of those who obey, not for their own advantages, lest power be a perpetrator of injuries, but rather their banisher and avenger, an armed guardian of what is equitable and honorable.
This care extends more widely than to private persons and embraces public affairs as well, for the household government and morals of private persons also depend upon the right constitution and government of the commonwealth. Certainly, we labor in vain to form tender youths within the walls of schools for prudence, modesty, and piety, if, after they have been released from tutelage, they are swept away into common evils by the violence of public vices. Few cultivate virtue amid public license; many, steadfast for a long time, at last admit its enticements, and finally even perpetrate crimes.
But there will be a proper place for speaking—or, rather, weeping—about this matter. For the present it is enough to understand that, without the best government of the city, without public discipline as the enemy and avenger of vices, the exhortations of religious men possess little strength. For if, in addition to allurements that by their own sweetness cling tenaciously as though with birdlime, there are added the examples of many, impunity, ancestral custom, and public authority that either approves, dissembles, or at least is unequal to the vices, who will deny that the case is lost?
Sections 6–8
§ 6. If, however, Theology excludes me from civil disputations, I shall return by another road and, by counsels that take a middle course, put myself forward as a professor of History and Philosophy. For I have read histories and expounded them to my hearers so that young men might imbibe civil prudence with agreeable ease. Philosophy, moreover, the banisher of vices and commender of virtues, has a most excellent work: to establish laws, to constitute the order of the commonwealth, and to discover, for the peace, advantage, and happiness of both, an equality between rulers and subjects who are unequal. Which of the ancient philosophers did not discourse upon the commonwealth? Who did not establish laws? So that it may not be necessary to proceed through examples, consider Plato and Plato’s disciple Aristotle, who bestowed more labor upon illustrating moral philosophy than upon the subtleties of dialectic or the investigation of the secrets of nature.
What, then, did Aristotle do? He wrote ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics, two books of the Great Ethics, seven books of the Eudemian Ethics, one book On the Virtues, eight books of the Politics, two books of Economics, and one book On Nobility. But perhaps these things are slight. What, however, is more wonderful than that which trustworthy authors relate? Diogenes Laertius, in his catalogue of Aristotle’s books, says: “Πολιτειῶν,” he says, “πόλεων δυοῖν δεουσῶν ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν· καὶ ἰδίᾳ δημοκρατικαί, ὀλιγαρχικαί, ἀριστοκρατικαί, τυραννικαί.” “Constitutions of one hundred and fifty-eight cities, and, separately, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic, and tyrannical constitutions.” Ammonius, in his Life of Aristotle, says that he accompanied him as far as the Brahmans and there established two hundred and fifty-five constitutions. Indeed, Cicero too testifies in Book V of On Ends that he wrote a very great many works about these matters: “From Aristotle we have learned the customs, institutions, and disciplines of almost all cities, not only of Greece but also of the barbarian world; and from Theophrastus, their laws as well.” And Varro, in Book VI of On the Latin Language, cites Aristotle’s “Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά”—Ordinances of the Barbarians.
All those works have perished; nevertheless, books concerning some of the following are cited, namely, the commonwealths of the Athenians,
the Aeginetans, Aetolians, Agrigentines, Ambraciots, Argives, Arcadians, Bottiaeans, Geloans, Delians, Euboeans, Epirotes, Thessalians, Ithacans, Himeraeans, Carians, Corcyraeans, Cians, Cyonians, Cymaeans, Cypriots, Lacedaemonians, Leucadians, Locrians, Massilians, Megarians, Methonaeans, Melians, Naxians, Opuntians, Orchomenians, Samians, the people of Samothrace, Sicyonians, Syracusans, Tarentines, Tegeans, Tenedians, Troezenians, Tyrrhenians, and Phocians. Although these are few, and some of them rather obscure, there is no doubt that he was more industrious concerning the famous and illustrious commonwealths. If, therefore, this was granted to Aristotle as a matter for praise, why should it be imputed to me as a fault?
But if I were even to prepare commentaries upon Aristotle’s Politics itself, young men—and perhaps statesmen—would owe me gratitude, and the examples of weighty authors would defend me: Thomas Aquinas, Jacques Lefèvre, Bernard of Siena, Antonio Montecatini, Ciriaco Strozzi, Denis Lambin, Donato Acciaioli, Guillaume Grégoire, Giovanni da Fabriano, and others. The sectarians too would plead my cause, for Camerarius, Melanchthon, and many others also sweated in this arena. Let that field therefore be free to me as well, and let neither the malevolence of enemies cut off the Society’s opportunity to teach well nor the timidity of friends make it more difficult.
§ 7. But it is dangerous. As though our Society could discharge any office without danger, when it proceeds with perpetual constancy amid continual dangers—on one side surrounded by open enemies, on the other assailed by clandestine rivals, who display friendship in their words and countenance, but in deed and intention are more harmful than manifest enemies by as much as concealed hatreds are stronger than professed ones. Accordingly, no peculiar danger hangs over me in this cause. For there is no fear that my ship will be dashed against a rock if it holds to the course by which so many vessels have hitherto gone and returned unharmed. Nor do I see what I ought to fear, unless perhaps I diminish the power of princes or appear, on the contrary, to speak too harshly against the liberty of peoples. This I shall easily guard against if, walking upon the middle road, I set forth those things that are certain concerning the majesty of princes and the right of the people, and leave to the jurists those that are ambiguous and exposed to calumnies.
§ 8. Nor need I fear the suspicion of pride if I assume for myself the teaching of the commonwealth. For if it is not only permitted to me, but necessary by reason of my office, to speak about Sacred Scripture and heavenly things, why should it be a crime if I speak about earthly things? Kings, princes, and senators of commonwealths certainly need instruction, counsels, and, when they wish too much to be permitted to them, frequent and grave admonitions by which they may be brought back within bounds. The children of magnates are born under no different condition from the children of the poor: just as they are constrained by bodily weakness and mortality, so too are they constrained by ignorance and depraved passions. Look upon empires, and you will perceive the truth. Consider the errors of rulers; consult the deeds done from Julius himself down to Constantine, and from Constantine down to Charlemagne. You will see that some failed in fewer matters, others in more, and most in the most depraved and foulest matters, and that they administered dominion avariciously, cruelly, lustfully, and—what pertains to the present subject—with the greatest folly and without any principle of politics.
If, nevertheless, anyone is indignant that laws should in any manner be written for kings, let him receive these writings of mine as though they had been dictated to the children of princes, magnates, nobles, and senators, a distinguished number of whom our Society instructs in the studies of humane learning and wisdom. Let them read and learn, so that when they have been placed at the helm nothing may be lacking except experience. Although experience can accomplish much, it nevertheless does not suffice by itself, since accurate reasoning and manifold prudence are needed for judging the very things that occur in counsels and affairs to be conducted. Evil princes have experienced conspiracies by their own men and enormous hatreds, whose source and origin was cruelty; but they suspected every other thing, cast the causes upon others, intensified their cruelty as though by that remedy alone they could meet the machinations of their adversaries, and hastened their own destruction.
What, then? Do you dare to write about governing a city when you have never governed one? See how readily I answer the question that appears difficult. Young men sometimes hold the helm of the commonwealth, the unskilled do so on occasion, and all who have ever ruled were at one time inexperienced, because they had only begun their government. God alone has held an eternal dominion without a beginning. If, therefore, you admit an inexperienced man to kingship, why do you remove him from counsel? An unskilled hand certainly applies a remedy with greater danger than an inexperienced mind recommends one; for counsel can be disregarded or corrected, whereas a harmful drug is never administered without the destruction of the sick man.
Next, look around the Christian world and, from the many thousands who serve princes as counselors, count those who have governed a commonwealth or any part of one. When you have driven these men from all courts, you will also be able to deter me from writing. I know for certain that neither Plato, Aristotle, Lipsius, nor others governed a commonwealth. Yet if kings obeyed their counsels, assuredly many kings would consult more prudently for their own safety, longevity, and reputation, and—what is the principal matter—for the welfare of their peoples.
I confess that it is burdensome and almost proud to wish to teach the experienced, and perhaps also dangerous to teach princes; nevertheless, even the greatest pilots are accustomed to be admonished by passengers in great storms. [Cicero, Philippic VII.] That well-known saying is wise: “ἐρέτην χρῆναι πρῶτα γενέσθαι πρὶν πηδαλίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν”—one ought first to be an oarsman before holding the helm. [Aristophanes, Knights.] Yet we know celebrated admirals whose hands were not hardened by the oar. He who is ignorant of the arts does not readily judge concerning them, for while craftsmen labor, certain things spontaneously disclose themselves to them that lie hidden from others. Nevertheless, Fulgentius spoke truly: “An evil life plunges immature old men into Tartarus; a good life conducts mature young men to the kingdom.” [Epistle 2.] This is so not only with respect to the heavenly kingdom, but also to this earthly kingdom, which nevertheless is given both to the good and to the evil. Kingship, accordingly, belongs to young and old alike.
Experience is an excellent teacher, but right reason is a better one. He who has read, heard, and seen many things concerning the commonwealth often judges it better than one who has had experience of it. Isocrates spoke truly: “Πάντας ἀνθρώπους πλείους ἐπιστήμας ἔχειν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἢ τῆς ὄψεως”—all men have imbibed more branches of knowledge by hearing than by seeing. [Panathenaicus.] Physicians embrace all diseases in their knowledge and cure them by art, although they have felt few diseases, or often none; but those who are tormented by diseases are ignorant of the method of healing. Therefore, one who has not struggled with those evils will also be able to preserve the health of the commonwealth—that is, peace and tranquility—and to allay and restrain its diseases—that is, seditions and wars—provided that he has learned suitable remedies from the sayings and deeds of the wise and has wisely applied them to the commonwealth.
I praise experience, but I prefer reading, history, and knowledge. For who can experience everything? A lifetime is spent in one kingdom, one town, one court, and frequently in one function. A man knows the character of his own prince, his own nation, and his own colleagues; if anyone thinks to transfer these things to others, he will act just as one who wished to practice horsemanship at Venice or seamanship at Nuremberg.
As to Hannibal’s judging Phormio mad because he discoursed about war in the presence of a commander, although he himself had never seen a camp and had never heard the sound of a trumpet except at spectacles: Hannibal went astray through self-confidence and Punic pride. Antiochus, who approved of Phormio, judged much better. For how many things could Phormio have taught Hannibal even about war? Namely, that he should not act treacherously; that he should not be cruel toward the conquered and those who had surrendered; that he should make use of victory; that he should not enervate his soldier with Campanian luxuries; that he should not fight Scipio without some advantage of his own; and that he should not cast everything upon the hazard of a single battle.
Finally, it was necessary for one who both wished and was able to conquer the Romans by means of Antiochus’s forces to win the king’s favor by courtesy, if he shunned flattery. But Hannibal, with barbarian arrogance, alienated from himself a king accustomed to the soft speeches of his own men, and by one witticism delivered the Romans from the greatest dangers. For when the king displayed to him an army splendid in costly clothing and gleaming weapons and asked Hannibal whether he thought these things would be enough for the Romans, he said, “Entirely enough, even if they are exceedingly avaricious.” Since by this piece of wit he had mocked the royal equipment, all its commanders, and indeed Antiochus himself, he was held in contempt by those who were indignant; and thus by one witticism he benefited the Romans more than Scipio did with so many legions. But if he had approved those forces, exercised them gradually, and enrolled new soldiers, it would not have been difficult to overthrow the Roman Empire with such resources.
But reason often escapes great men in the greatest affairs, and the principle of true statecraft escapes the most practiced statesmen. This happened altogether to Hannibal, who was acquainted with a popular commonwealth but inexperienced in kingship. For while, as an exile, he dealt with the king with the same liberty as though, as a consul of Carthage, he were contending with a rival senator, he lost a most splendid opportunity to liberate both himself and his country. Nor am I moved by the bulla-wearing crowd who admire the cleverness of his answer and extol Hannibal’s experience, when they admit that an experience confined within Carthage alone, as within a narrow lake, could not hold its course upon the ocean and amid the variety of commonwealths and nations. For whatever Hannibal did afterward, he was never able to obtain the power to conduct the war according to his own judgment.
Experience, accordingly, although praiseworthy, is nevertheless always incomplete. It is often found in a commonwealth in which no one is wise and in which, because of the stupidity of the nation, the senate has passed into a proverb. Some call political knowledge and prudence a practical discipline. Besold says that jurisprudence is subordinated to it. Different men have held different views.
And I judge these things sufficient for my defense. But if we weigh in our minds the necessity for these disputations, which the license of our times produces, we shall certainly all understand that I have undertaken this labor rightly, deservedly, and from plain necessity. For at the present time it is not one class of men that overturns commonwealths, but very many, who nevertheless demand to be regarded and called statesmen. Some, without learning and without experience, rely upon their own judgment and devise certain novel and astonishing things. They do less harm for the very reason that they generally collapse in the actual attempt and at its beginnings.
Some cling so closely to the institutions of the ancients that they approve nothing unless it is drawn from the Athenian, Spartan, or Roman commonwealth. They are involved in great errors. For, in the first place, they must necessarily judge all who were born after Augustus to be ignorant of ruling and counseling—and thus even Augustus himself, who changed almost all the ancient statutes, although he generally retained their names and appearance in order to deceive the people. For who does not know what a difference there is between a consul who is Caesar’s follower and flatterer and a consul of unimpaired liberty? He, therefore, who directs his mind’s eye toward the truth itself will find many things in the commonwealths of the ancients that are scarcely commendable, and very many better things in new kingdoms and cities.
Most men also frequently err in judgment and affection: now they praise this man, now that one, and take sides. Most defend the victors and, as is customary in human affairs, lean toward the fortunate wall. Many, in order to delight and to obtain admiration for their work, prefer to speak and write things that are specious rather than true.
But in the present age there has grown strong—and in many places has almost prevailed—a detestable class of pseudo-statesmen who, in place of a true and legitimate commonwealth, erect a “πονηρόπολιν,” that is, a city of impious, ruined, and utterly nefarious men. In the preceding century Niccolò Machiavelli carried the torch before them, with which he scorched many kingdoms. For when he teaches that religion is to be accommodated to dominion, that vices and errors are to be approved for the sake of the kingdom, that utility is to be placed before justice, that factions are to be admitted, and other things of which we shall treat in their proper places, what else does he do than make the prince unjust, impious, crafty, a dissembler, and a hypocrite?
In this matter, indeed, he departs from the ultimate end and therefore builds ruin; and since he is involved in continual error and deprived of divine wisdom, he does not even instruct the prince in human prudence. For he cannot perpetually conceal hypocrisy, since nothing feigned can be lasting; and perfidy and dissimulation, once disclosed, take away trust forever. But no one whom neither his subjects nor his neighbors trust can retain dominion for long.
Against these men, I have resolved to demonstrate the true and solid art and power of ruling: founded upon divine laws, constituted by natural reason, and armed with true prudence, religion, and virtue. Yet I shall do so not from my judgment alone, but from the divine writings, the teachings of the holy Fathers, the laws of legitimate princes, just custom, the order and manner of commonwealths, approved history, examples and reason, and the natural judgment of men. And thus I shall bring forward whatever I judge to pertain to the security and majesty of government, to the tranquility and advantages of subjects, and to the salvation and happiness of all, rulers as well as people.