Book VIII of the Topics, Treatise II, Chapters IV-VI.

or through the taking-away of that because of which the false is made or follows; for he who takes away the false which is in the premises does not solve the false thing syllogized, nor again does he solve it even if what is taken away is false. For sometimes a speech or argumentation will have several false things, and nevertheless not all those false things are the cause of the falsity of the conclusion. The example of this is if someone says that one who sits, insofar as he sits, writes; for from this an unsuitable thing follows: for it happens that Socrates sits, and from these things it follows or happens that Socrates writes, which is false. Therefore, when the false has been taken away, that is, “Socrates writes,” the speech is no more solved, because that because of which the speech is false is not stated and taken away, although the axiom, that is, the assumed proposition, which is taken away is false. And this is so because that because of which the speech or argumentation is false is not taken away on account of this: because if someone is sitting and not writing, it is clear that the solution does not hold in this case. Wherefore the solution which was given will not be suitable; wherefore one ought not to have taken away “Socrates sits,” but rather ought to have taken away this, namely that one sitting, insofar as he sits, writes, for not everyone who sits writes insofar as he sits. Therefore he wholly solves the syllogistic argumentation who takes away that because of which it is false in the minor proposition and not in the major. But he knows how to solve, or knows the solution, who has known why the speech was false. A likeness and example of this in mathematics is in those lines which are described falsely with a circle: as if I should say that lines drawn from the same center of a circle to the circumference are equal, and curved lines drawn from the center to the circumference are described, and it is inferred that these are not equal. For in such argumentations it is not sufficient to object and to show that it is false because curved lines are unequal, where straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal. For thus, by assigning the cause of falsity, it will be manifest whether some one of the respondents, foreseeing or not foreseeing the cause of falsity, has brought an instance against the universal or against the syllogistic argumentation.

CHAPTER V.

On reasoning toward a speech not concluded.

Now a speech can be, or happens to be, prohibited from being concluded, that is, a problem or conclusion can be prohibited lest it be concluded, because question, problem, and conclusion are the same. But this prohibition that it not be concluded also happens in four ways. For this happens either because the respondent shows in what the false consists, on account of which it does not conclude, as was said a little before. Or in a second way, by bringing an instance, that is, an impediment, to the questioner, lest he proceed to the conclusion, as by seeking the meaning of the things proposed interrogatively, or by inquiring into lateral questions near the proposed thing, and as if by reproaching the respondent. For often the respondent does not indeed solve in order to show the cause of falsity, but so that he makes the questioner unable to carry the speech further or direct it all the way to the conclusion because of the many things asked. But the third impediment is to contradict the things interrogated or the things proposed to the questioner: for it happens that what we wish is not made, that is, does not follow, from the interrogated things, because they have been interrogated not well, that is, not in the due mode or order, or deficiently; and when something is added, that is, in due order, or when that which was deficient is added, it happens that the intended conclusion is made. Therefore such an omitted thing the respondent ought to state against the interrogated things from his office. Therefore if the questioner cannot, because of things omitted by himself, produce his speech further, that is, up to the conclusion, then an instance with rebuke of the opponent will have to be brought by the respondent to the questioner, that is, against the questioner. But if the impediment belongs to the questioner and not to the thing interrogated, so that the questioner can indeed proceed to the conclusion, then it belongs to the respondent to seek an instance to the things interrogated, so that from this side he may impede the conclusion, lest he seem to suffer something else on account of it. But the fourth and worst instance, which most afflicts the opponent, is the one which is for time: for respondents object with more prolix speeches, toward which disputing belongs to more time than belongs to the present exercise, which concerns the principal proposed thing; and this is what was said before, the assumption of greater difficulty. And by these modes the one working and disputing obviatively is impeded, lest he arrive at the intended conclusion.

Therefore, by way of recapitulation, as was said before, instances are made in four ways. But by comparing these instances with one another, we say that among these instances or impediments there is no solution of a speech not concluding, except only the first, as was determined in the preceding chapter. But the remaining three stated instances are not solutions, but certain prohibitions and impediments of conclusions, lest they be made against the respondent, who ought to prohibit lest he seem to suffer something else from the opponent.

CHAPTER VI.

On rebuke of a speech from the side of the one using it, in general, and from the side of the speech in general, and so on.

But rebuke of a speech, or a rebukable speech, is sometimes both according to the speech itself and also from the side of the one using it, and when the same things are not interrogated which ought to be interrogated toward the proposed thing according to the quality of the proposed thing which is intended and toward which the disputation ought to be, or in that sense in which it must be interrogated. For very often the respondent who is interrogated in disputation is the cause that the speech or position is not well disputed, because he, acting perversely, does not concede those things from which one could plainly dispute toward the proposed speech; and then the speech becomes rebukable from the side of the one using it. For since disputing is the work of two, of the opponent and also of the respondent, it does not belong to one alone to take well, that is, to lead to the due end, the common work in which each must be helped by the other. Whence sometimes it is necessary for the opponent to strive with reasons toward him who says, that is, against him who says, that without doubt he then does not respond according to the true account of response, although indeed against the opponent, when both he who responds and performs the office of respondent observes this, so that by obviating he may say contrary things to the questioner or opponent, and strives to oppose the opponent and not to be helped toward the inquiry of the position; and especially when he says contrary things to the opponent, persuading them by reason because thus it is or seems to be probable. For such respondents, weighing down the opponents themselves in this way, do the things which belong to exercise contesting and wrestling, and not to dialectic, which proceeds from probable things for determining a problem or position.

But since speeches of this sort on the side of the respondent and on the side of the opponent are for training or wrestling and contest, and for the experiment which the respondent wishes to receive concerning the powers of the opponent, and are not inquisitive for making doctrine concerning the position, it is plain that for restraining the respondent the opponent must syllogize not only the true but also the false, so that he may sometimes conclude false things against the respondent; nor must the opponent always pre-syllogize through true things, but sometimes through false things, so that sometimes he may proceed against the respondent from false things given by the respondent. For often it happens that, when a true thing has been posited, the disputants or opponents must take it away, because through it the respondents themselves impede the disputation; and then, because the true is not taken away by the true but by the false, in the syllogism false things must be extended and proposed.¹ Since also when a false thing has been posited, this cannot be taken away except by leading through false things to an unsuitable result, then also false things must be extended: for nothing prevents those things which are not, that is, which are false, from sometimes seeming to some of the respondents in probable matters more than the things which are true seem. For example, that the sun is one foot across seems more to someone than that it is larger than a dwelling; on account of which, when an argumentation has been made from false things which seem to be answered to him, he will be more persuaded so that he is restrained than helped.

On account of this, when argumentation has been made from false things for doctrine or teaching, the speech is sometimes badly syllogized from the side of the opponent, because the opponent who transfers and refers obviative disputation to the respondent, if he wishes to conduct himself well in disputing, ought to transfer dialectically and not contentiously, so that he also disputes from probable things toward the position, and does not transfer himself to contention; just as the geometer also ought to dispute geometrically. And this the opponent indeed ought to observe, whether what is to be concluded against the proposed thing is false or true. But what sort of dialectical syllogisms the opponent ought to use was said before in the first book of this science.

But since he is a bad companion who impedes the common work, it is plain that in a speech, that is, in disputation, he is bad who impedes the due progress of disputation. For where what is proposed in definitions is a common work both to the opponent and to the respondent, but with these, the opponent and respondent, contending and striving against each other for victory, it is not possible for the same thing which each intends to happen to both. For when two contend against each other, it is impossible for more than one to win: both cannot win, but one will win, and the other will yield or succumb. But it makes no difference, with respect to the impediment of disputation, whether this, namely to litigate badly, is done by responding or by interrogating. For just as one who opposes litigiously, that is, for the end of strife, litigates badly, so also does he who responds litigiously, as the one who in responding does not concede what seems so and what is probable, nor by assenting receives anything of that which the questioner, making the proposed position, wishes to inquire into.

Therefore from these things which have been said it is manifest that not similarly, that is, not from the same cause, must both the speech in itself or according to itself, and the questioner or opponent, be rebuked; rather the opponent is rebuked for one cause, and the respondent for another. For nothing prevents the speech indeed from sometimes being bad, while the questioner, as it happens, that is, insofar as the disputation and speech permit, disputes very well against the respondent according to the mode and law of dialectical disputation. For against difficult respondents perhaps it is not possible immediately unless he is first restrained through cavillations, such as someone or another of the opponents wishes to make syllogisms; but he must make such as it happens to make for restraining the difficult one.