Volume 2 · pp. 429–431
Book VI of the Topics. Tractate I. Chapter I. On matters to be set forth by way of preface.
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LIBER VI TOPICORUM.
TRACTATUS I. DE INTEREMPTIONE DIFFINITIONIS SECUNDUM BONITATEM.
CAPUT I. De proaemialiter praemittendis.
Cum autem jam determinatum sit qualiter dialectico syllogismo terminatur problema ejus quod est inesse ut accidens, secundum quod praedicatum accidit subjecto per hoc quod inest ei: et hoc est praedicatum inesse subjecto: et si non inest, non est praedicatum sicut accidentis esse est inesse: et si non inest, sequitur quod similiter non est accidens, et consequenter quod non est in eo. Quod si est: aut est substantia, aut accidens et non substantia. Item si non inest: ergo non est accidens, et sic nihil si non inest. Ergo et in hoc simile est inesse praedicati, ut praedicatum est, accidenti: quia si non inest subjecto, non est praedicatum ipsius: et hoc fuit praedicatum primum elementare ad diffinitiones. Et ideo sequitur, si non inest, non inest ut diffinitio: ut si non inest, non est praedicatum. Et si non inest ut praedicatum, non inest ut diffinitio; quia potissimum praedicatum est diffinitio.
Propter quod syllogismo dialectico ostensum est qualiter terminatur problema de genere, quod quid dicit in diffinitione praedicati de diffinito: et iterum qualiter terminandum est problema de proprio quod per inesse convertitur, quod convenit diffinitioni in quantum est terminus diffiniti, nec plus nec minus continens quam diffinitum: et non sint plura elementaliter ordinata ad diffinitionem. Restat nunc dicere qualiter syllogismo dialectico ex probabilibus habet terminari problema de diffinitione. De diffinitione enim docere qualiter est tota rei essentia, relinquendum docere primo Philosopho. Qualiter autem medium demonstrationis et causa passionis de subjecto, jam in doctrina Posteriorum determinatum est. Qualiter communis praedicati est intentio, secundum quod communiter ad subjectum ut praedicatum referri habet per communia et probabilia habet determinari, hanc doctrinam habet facere dialecticus 1.
Sic autem hic loquentes de diffinitione dicimus, quod ejus negotii dialectici quod est circa diffinitiones, prout communia praedicata elementaria referuntur communiter ad quodcumque subjectum, partes sunt quinque. Aut enim sic quantum ad inesse comparatur ad subjectum, ita ut de quo subjecto de quocumque de quo verum est dicere vel praedicare nomen diffiniti secundum quod datur diffinitio, non sit verum etiam dicere vel praedicare rationem sive diffinitionem: et sic per non inesse simpliciter intelligitur diffinitio: quod est propter hoc, quia oportet hominis rationem sive diffinitionem de omni homine veram esse. Et similiter dicendum est de qualibet vera diffinitione alia relata ad suum diffinitum. Et ista est pars prima negotii.
Aut genere existente diffiniti ille qui diffinit diffiniendo non ponit diffinitum in genus, quod primum est in diffinitione ponendum: vel si posuit ipsum in genus, non tamen posuit in genus conveniens, sed forte in remotum vel analogum: et hoc quia oportet quod qui diffinit ponat in genus primo, et sic post genus oportet differentias addere generi, quae genus usque ad ultimum actum determinent. Et hujus causa est, quia genus videtur maxime omnium eorum quae sunt in diffinitione, substantiam diffiniti significare.
BOOK VI OF THE TOPICS.
TRACTATE I. ON THE DESTRUCTION OF DEFINITION ACCORDING TO GOODNESS.
CHAPTER I. On matters to be set forth by way of preface.
But since it has now been determined how, by dialectical syllogism, the problem of that which is to belong as an accident is terminated, according as the predicate happens to the subject through this, that it belongs to it, and this is for the predicate to belong to the subject; and if it does not belong, it is not predicated, just as the being of an accident is to belong; and if it does not belong, it follows that similarly it is not an accident, and consequently that it is not in it. But if it is, either it is substance, or accident and not substance. Likewise, if it does not belong, therefore it is not an accident, and thus it is nothing if it does not belong. Therefore also in this, the inherence of the predicate, as it is a predicate, is like accident, because if it does not belong to the subject, it is not its predicate; and this was the first elementary predicate toward definitions. And therefore it follows: if it does not belong, it does not belong as definition; as, if it does not belong, it is not a predicate. And if it does not belong as a predicate, it does not belong as definition, because definition is the most powerful predicate.
On account of this, by dialectical syllogism it has been shown how the problem concerning genus is terminated, which states the what in the definition of the predicate concerning the defined thing; and again how the problem concerning property is to be terminated, which is converted through belonging, which belongs to definition insofar as it is the term of the defined thing, containing neither more nor less than the defined thing, and there are not several things ordered elementally toward the definition. It remains now to say how, by dialectical syllogism from probable things, the problem concerning definition has to be terminated. For to teach concerning definition, in what way it is the whole essence of the thing, must be left to be taught by the First Philosopher. But in what way the middle of demonstration and the cause of passion concerning the subject are, this has already been determined in the teaching of the Posterior Analytics. In what way the intention of a common predicate, according as commonly it has to be referred to the subject as predicate, has to be determined through common and probable things, this teaching the dialectician has to make 1.
But speaking here in this way about definition, we say that of that dialectical business which is about definitions, insofar as common elementary predicates are referred commonly to any subject whatever, there are five parts. For either, with respect to belonging, it is compared to the subject in such a way that, concerning that subject, concerning whatever thing of which it is true to say or predicate the name of the defined thing according as the definition is given, it is not also true to say or predicate the account or definition; and thus definition is understood simply through not belonging. This is because the account or definition of man must be true of every man. And similarly it must be said of any other true definition related to its defined thing. And this is the first part of the business.
Or, while the genus of the defined thing exists, the one who defines, in defining, does not place the defined thing in a genus, which must be placed first in the definition; or if he has placed it in a genus, nevertheless he has not placed it in a suitable genus, but perhaps in a remote or analogous one. And this is because one who defines must first place it in a genus, and then after the genus must add differences to the genus, which determine the genus all the way to ultimate act. And the cause of this is that genus seems most of all the things which are in the definition to signify the substance of the defined thing.
Et si quis objiciat quod in diffinitione genus est potentia et sic materia, differentia autem forma et ut actus: actus autem in plus est et indicat quam potentia, dicendum est quod genus est ut quid substans, et in quid praedicatum, et hoc modo confert etiam speciei in quid praedicari, et ut in quid stans et fixum in seipso esse videtur: differentia autem actus et conferre actu esse ut forma quae genus formatum per differentiam facit ipsum quale quid secundum formam et perfectionem substantiae, et perficit ad actum, sed non facit quid, sed potius quid generis format et perficit secundum quale formale; et sic quantum ad hoc non indicat quid, sed quale: quia omnis forma in quale praedicatur. Et sic intelligitur quod dicitur, quod genus omnium eorum quae ponuntur in diffinitione, maxime significat quid diffiniti, sicut primum stans et primum formabile per differentias. Istae ergo sunt duae partes hujus negotii.
Tertia autem est, ut quoniam non est diffinitio propria, hoc est, convertibilis cum specie diffinita: tunc enim est propria quando omni convenit et soli: quia tunc propria dicit speciei et essentialia: et quia soli convenit et ad alia non extenditur, oportet eam esse convertibile cum diffinito secundum nomen et speciem: oportet enim diffinitionem propriam esse, quemadmodum prius et nunc dictum est.
Quarta autem pars istius negotii, aut si omnia tria quae dicta sunt aliquis est faciens sive observans, diffinitio assignata non dicit quid est esse diffiniti per essentialia illius.
Adhuc autem quinta pars istius negotii est: quia aliquando praeter omnia quae dicta sunt, considerandum quod si etiam diffinitio determinavit quid est, non bene tamen et obscure, ita quod non clarum sed confusum generat intellectum. Istae sunt partes quinque negotii, non diffinitionis: quia diffinitio ex his non ponitur, sed negotium determinationis problematis diffinitionis interimendi circa ista versatur. Et haec quinque non ut partes integrales ad diffinitionem referuntur: sed modus inhaerendi quintuplex acceptus ab his quinque accipitur: et hoc modo sunt partes et non aliter. De his igitur enumeratis partibus istius negotii dicamus, de quibus jam dictum est, et de quibus restat in hoc libro considerandum.
Dicimus igitur, quod si considerari debeat prima harum partium, hoc est, quod si non est verum inesse vel praedicari rationem de quo ut de subjecto praedicatur nomen, secundum quod datur, vel est verum si inest eidem, nomen et rationem, considerandum ex his locis et considerationibus quae in secundo hujus scientiae libro ad inesse ut accidens adducta sunt: quia ex his quae ibi dicta sunt, terminatur simpliciter inesse praedicatum subjecto, sicut saepe dictum est: eo quod si quid accidit, accidit substantiae in qua est secundum inesse quod est accidentis secundum praedicatum per se stanti, accidit quantum ad inesse, quo subjectum informatur, non oportet hic ad hoc specialem facere considerationem: quando enim in secundo libro superius disputavimus, quoniam inest generaliter accidens: tunc quia ab inesse causatur verum esse accidens praedicatum de subjecto, tunc satis ostensum fuit, quia verum est illud inesse: et quando disputare docuimus, quoniam non inest, tunc ostensum fuit quoniam non est verum praedicatum de subjecto: nam illic in secundo libro, utrum verum vel non verum sit praedicatum de subjecto per simpliciter inesse vel non inesse praedicatum in subjecto, omnis consideratio fit, sicut ibidem determinatum est.
And if someone objects that in the definition genus is potency and thus matter, while difference is form and as act, and act is in more things and indicates more than potency, it must be said that genus is as a subsisting what, and predicated in what, and in this way it also contributes to the species to be predicated in what, and as standing and fixed in what it seems to be in itself; but difference is act, and to confer being in act as form, which makes the genus formed through difference to be a certain qualified what according to the form and perfection of substance, and perfects it to act, but does not make a what, but rather forms the what of the genus and perfects it according to formal quality; and thus, as to this, it does not indicate what, but of what quality, because every form is predicated in quality. And thus is understood what is said, that genus, of all those things which are placed in the definition, most of all signifies the what of the defined thing, as the first thing standing and the first thing formable through differences. These, therefore, are two parts of this business.
The third is this: since the definition is not proper, that is, convertible with the defined species, for then it is proper when it belongs to every one and to it alone; because then it states things proper and essential to the species; and because it belongs to it alone and is not extended to others, it must be convertible with the defined thing according to name and species; for the definition must be proper, just as was said before and now.
The fourth part of this business is whether, if someone does or observes all three things that have been stated, the assigned definition nevertheless does not state what the being of the defined thing is through its essentials.
Moreover, the fifth part of this business is this: because sometimes, beyond all the things that have been stated, one must consider whether, even if the definition has determined what it is, it nevertheless has not done so well, but obscurely, so that it generates an understanding that is not clear but confused. These are the five parts of the business, not of the definition, because the definition is not posited from these, but the business of the determination of the problem of destroying definition turns on these matters. And these five are not referred to the definition as integral parts; rather the fivefold mode of inhering, taken from these five, is received from them, and in this way they are parts and not otherwise. Therefore, when these parts of this business have been enumerated, let us speak about those concerning which something has already been said, and those concerning which something remains to be considered in this book.
Therefore we say that, if the first of these parts ought to be considered, that is, that if it is not true that the account belongs or is predicated of that of which the name is predicated as of a subject, according as it is given, or if it is true that name and account belong to the same thing, this must be considered from those places and considerations which in the second book of this science were adduced for inherence as accident. For from the things which were said there, the predicate simply belonging to the subject is terminated, as has often been said; because if something is an accident, it happens to substance in which it is according to the inherence which belongs to an accident according to a predicate standing through itself, and it happens as regards inherence by which the subject is informed, and there is no need here to make a special consideration for this. For when above in the second book we disputed that accident belongs generally, then, because from inherence an accident predicated of a subject is caused to be truly, it was then sufficiently shown that that inherence is true; and when we taught how to dispute that it does not belong, then it was shown that it is not truly predicated of the subject. For there in the second book every consideration is made whether a predicate is truly or not truly of a subject through simply belonging or through the predicate not belonging in the subject, as was determined in the same place.
Si vero aliquis subjectum non in conveniente genere posuit, quod est secunda pars negotii: aut etiam propter hoc si convertibilis est assignata ratio sive diffinitio, quod fuit tertia pars negotii praesentis: ex his considerationibus et locis quae ad genus sive inesse ut genus in quarto libro hujus scientiae, et quae ad proprium sive inesse ut proprium in quinto hujus scientiae libro adducta sunt: ex illis ubi de his duabus partibus est perspiciendum: ex illis enim haec duo sufficienter considerantur. Reliquum sive relictum est in hoc libro considerandum de quarto et quinto si diffinitiones non determinavit, per quod destruitur substantia diffinitionis: aut si bene non diffinivit, per quod destruitur bonitas diffinitionis. De his enim duobus in hac methodo sexta aliquo modo per communia et probabilia transeundo, et non determinando nec profundando subtiliter usque ad causarum assignationem relinquitur dare in hac methodo.
Et quamvis esse simpliciter sit ante bene esse, tamen primo ostendemus qualiter destruitur diffinitio quantum ad bene esse, et postea quomodo secundum esse destruitur. Cujus ratio est, quia facilius est quodlibet fecisse secundum substantiam et esse, quam fecisse bene secundum perfectam sui bonitatem: et ideo magis erratur circa benefacere aliquid, quam circa facere: eo quod laboriosius est benefacere quam facere: quia plura requiruntur ad bene facere, quam ad facere simpliciter: propter quod facilior est argumentatio opponentis, quae est contra hoc quod est bene facere, quam contra illud quod est simpliciter facere: a facilibus autem inchoandum est: et plura sunt ex quibus destruitur bene facere diffinitionem, quam ex quibus destruitur facere eam simpliciter, etc.
But if someone has not placed the subject in a suitable genus, which is the second part of the business, or also on account of this, if the assigned account or definition is convertible, which was the third part of the present business, one must inspect from those considerations and places which have been adduced concerning genus, or inhering as genus, in the fourth book of this science, and those concerning property, or inhering as property, in the fifth book of this science; from those places where one must look into these two parts, for from them these two are sufficiently considered. The remaining or leftover thing to be considered in this book concerns the fourth and fifth parts: whether he has not determined definitions, by which the substance of definition is destroyed, or whether he has not defined well, by which the goodness of definition is destroyed. For concerning these two, in this sixth method, it is left to give something by passing through common and probable things in some way, and not by determining or delving subtly down to the assignment of causes in this method.
And although being simply is before being well, nevertheless first we shall show how definition is destroyed with respect to well-being, and afterward how it is destroyed according to being. The reason for this is that it is easier to have made anything according to substance and being than to have made it well according to the perfect goodness of itself; and therefore one errs more concerning doing something well than concerning doing it, because it is more laborious to do well than to do, since more things are required for doing well than for doing simply. On account of this the argumentation of the opponent, which is against doing well, is easier than that which is against simply doing; but one must begin from easy things; and there are more things from which doing a definition well is destroyed than from which making it simply is destroyed, etc.
Notes
- From this it is clear how the metaphysician treats definition in one way, the posterioristic teacher in another way, and the topician in another way. P. J. (Hinc patet qualiter de diffinitione aliter tractat metaphysicus et aliter posterioristicus et aliter topicus. P. J.) ↩
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