Volume 2 · pp. 426–427
Tractate IV. Single Chapter.
TRACTATUS IV. DE DETERMINATIONE PROPRII CONTRACTI AD POTESTATEM ET ACTUS, ET AD SUPERABUNDANTIAM DICTI.
CAPUT UNICUM.
Deinde ad proprium aliquo modo speciale et contractum ad dictum secundum potestatem et actum, et superabundantiam dictum, hac consideratione destruenti considerandum est, si aliquis potestate proprium assignans subjecto existente in actu, proprio autem non existente: et ad hoc subjectum quod est proprium, quod non est assignavit, vel quod potestate est non contingente, hoc est, potestate quae non est, et quam contingit non esse id quod non est, existente tamen eo cui inest ut proprium: tunc enim non erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium. Exemplum, ut qui dixit aeris proprium esse quod inspirabilis sit, secundum actum assignavit proprium quod potestate passiva est proprium, quae in actu non ducitur nisi per aliud activum et spirans: nam hujus ens quod est aer vel spirabile, ut spirari possit, aliquo activo spirante spiraculo indiget: assignavit autem et ad hoc respectu ejus quod non est vel potest non esse proprium: quia cum non est animal quod inspirare natum est aera, contingit sive possibile est aerem esse: non tamen possibile spirari aerem actu, cum non est animal spirans: propter quod non erit proprium aeris hujus quod est spirari vel spirabile esse, cum animal non erit hujusmodi ut spirare possit: non ergo erit aeris proprium spirabile esse.
Construenti autem hac consideratione opposito modo utendum est, ut si potestate ens assignans proprium ad hoc subjectum quod est actu, assignavit proprium, aut ad hoc quod non est actu, sed potestate tali quali contingit id proprium, quod non est inesse aliquando: erit enim tunc proprium quod ab adversario opinatum est non esse proprium. Cujus exemplum est, ut qui assignavit proprium entis simpliciter, quod possibile est pati vel facere, quod est subjecto proprium, aut simpliciter est, hoc est, potestate, quidem assignans proprium ad hoc, assignavit proprium ad hoc quod est, non tamen entis quod actu est proprium, et possibile pati et facere erit aliquando proprium: propter quod proprium entis est quod possibile est pati aliud aut facere. Et attende quod potest assignari secundum potestatem materiae, et sic nihil prohibet proprium assignari potestate ens. Potest autem assignari potestate passiva relata ad activum aliquod, et sic male assignatur potestate ens ad subjectum ens actu.
Deinde destruenti considerandum est si ex subjecto non existente dicitur esse proprium, si per abundantiam ponit proprium: tunc enim non erit proprium: accidit enim sic assignantibus proprium, non veram esse rationem quae est proprium de quo: non tamen subjecti est proprium: corrupta enim re nihilominus vera erit ratio quae est proprium; quia adhuc alicui de numero eorum quae
TRACTATE IV. ON THE DETERMINATION OF CONTRACTED PROPERTY WITH RESPECT TO POTENCY AND ACTS, AND OF THE THING SAID ACCORDING TO SUPERABUNDANCE.
SINGLE CHAPTER.
Next, regarding property in some way special and contracted to what is said according to potency and act, and to what is said according to superabundance, one who is destroying must consider by this consideration whether someone, while assigning a property in potency to a subject existing in act, while the property is not existing, has assigned to this subject which is the property what is not, or what is in potency while not being contingent, that is, with a potency which is not, and which it happens not to be that which is not, while nevertheless that to which it belongs as a property exists; for then what has been posited to be a property will not be a property. An example: one who said that the property of air is that it is breathable assigned according to act a property which is a property in passive potency, which is not led into act except through another active and breathing thing. For this being which is air, or breathable, in order that it can be breathed, needs some active thing breathing with a breathing-apparatus; but he also assigned it to this in respect of that which is not or can not be a property, because when there is no animal that is naturally fitted to breathe air, it happens or is possible for air to be; yet it is not possible for air to be breathed in act when there is no breathing animal. On account of this, for air this thing which is to be breathed, or to be breathable, will not be a property, since an animal will not be of this sort so that it can breathe; therefore it will not be the property of air to be breathable.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration in the opposite way, so that if, by assigning a property as a being in potency to this subject which is in act, he assigned a property, or to this which is not in act but in such a potency as that property happens sometimes not to belong, then what was thought by the adversary not to be a property will be a property. The example of this is that one who assigned as the property of being simply that it is possible to suffer or to act, which is proper to the subject, either is simply, that is, in potency, indeed by assigning a property to this, assigned a property to that which is, yet not a property of being which is in act; and to be able to suffer and to act will at some time be a property. On account of this the property of being is that it is possible to suffer something else or to act. And note that it can be assigned according to the potency of matter, and thus nothing prevents a property from being assigned as a being in potency. But it can be assigned as passive potency related to some active thing, and thus a being in potency is badly assigned to a subject that is a being in act.
Next, one who is destroying must consider whether, from a subject not existing, it is said to be a property, if he posits a property through abundance; for then it will not be a property. For it happens to those assigning a property in this way that the account which is a property is not true of that of which it is a property; nevertheless it is not the property of the subject. For when the thing has been corrupted, the account which is a property will nonetheless be true, because still to some one from the number of those things which
sunt, proprium maxime, hoc est, per superabundantiam inerit. Cujus exemplum est, ut si quis igni assignat proprium esse corpus levissimum corporum: tunc enim corrupto igne vel posito non esse, aliud adhuc corporum residuorum ab igne adhuc levissimum est: et tamen tunc non erit ignis proprium, quod sit corporum levissimum.
Construenti autem hac consideratione utendum est quod consideret si aliquis non id quod per superabundantiam assignavit proprium: et secundum hoc bene positum est proprium. Attendendum autem quod haec consideratio refertur ad proprium specie quod est supra consideratum: sed illic interimitur proprium si non ponitur haec consideratio specie: hic autem interimitur ex eo quod subjecto destructo adhuc potest proprium existere. Attendendum quod superius est assignatum proprium semper. Unde ubi dicitur semper inesse proprium, est actu, et hoc est quo existente subjectum potest non esse.
Si autem alius objiciat, quod omne proprium dicit aptitudinem, et sic omne proprium potestate est. Solvendum, quod aptitudo est duplex. Activa, et illa est actu: et passiva, et illa potentia et non actu. Item quod arguitur, quod spirabile posse non esse per spirare quod non est, videtur argui unum contrariorum per aliud: hoc autem inconveniens non est quando unum contrariorum est causa alterius.
are, the property will belong maximally, that is, through superabundance. The example of this is that, if someone assigns to fire as a property that it is the lightest body of bodies, then, when fire has been corrupted or posited not to exist, some other thing among the bodies remaining after fire is still the lightest; and nevertheless it will not then be the property of fire that it is the lightest of bodies.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration by considering whether someone has not assigned as property that which is through superabundance; and according to this the property has been well posited. But it must be noted that this consideration is referred to property by species, which was considered above; but there the property is destroyed if this consideration is not posited by species; here, however, it is destroyed from the fact that, when the subject has been destroyed, the property can still exist. It must be noted that above property was assigned as always. Hence where a property is said always to belong, it is in act, and this is that by the existence of which the subject can not be.
But if another objects that every property states an aptitude, and thus every property is in potency, it must be solved that aptitude is twofold: active, and that is in act; and passive, and that is in potency and not in act. Likewise, as to what is argued, that the breathable can not be through breathing which is not, it seems that one contrary is being argued through another; but this is not unsuitable when one of the contraries is the cause of the other.
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