Volume 2 · pp. 420–422
Chapter II. On considerations taken from cases, from similars and proportionals in being, being generated, being corrupted, and things of this sort.
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CAPUT II. De considerationibus sumptis a casibus ex similibus et proportionalibus in esse et generari et corrumpi et hujusmodi.
Est autem locus extrinsecus ex convenientibus essentialiter et accidentaliter sumptus. Essentialiter quidem ut casus: accidentaliter autem ut simile proportionabile magis et minus, et hujusmodi. Deinde ergo, post opposita quae maxime et extrinseca sunt, destruere volenti problema de proprio, considerandum si casus propositi proprii non est proprium casus subjecti assignati, tunc enim sequitur quod nec in proposito casus erit proprium: ut quia ejus quod est juste, non est proprium id quod est bene, nec justi proprium erit bonum: si enim casus removetur a casu, et nomen removetur a nomine.
Construenti autem hac consideratione opposito modo utendum est, si casus est proprium casus, tunc et nomen nominis, et e contrario: ut quoniam hominis proprium est gressibile bipes esse, et homini erit proprium gressibile bipedi secundum casum dici, ut etiam gradiendo bipedaliter dicatur. Haec autem consideratio a casibus non tantum est in opposito, sed in natura oppositorum, quemadmodum in prioribus locis hujus scientiae ubi de casibus agebatur, dictum est. Si enim ejus quod est juste fieri, proprium est bene fieri: et ejus quod est injuste fieri, proprium est male fieri.
Destruenti quidem ergo hoc loco sic utendum, quod si oppositi casus non est proprium oppositi casus, tunc neque in proposito propositi casus. Cujus exemplum est: si enim ejus quod est juste fieri, proprium est bene fieri, et ejus quod est injuste fieri, est proprium male fieri.
Construenti vero hac consideratione per oppositum modum utendum est, si casus oppositi est proprium casus alterius oppositi, tunc et in proposito casus istius oppositi est proprium casus illius oppositi: ut si boni est proprium esse optimum, ut boni per se est proprium esse optimum inter bona quae sunt utile, delectabile, honestum, tunc etiam mali erit per se proprium pessimum: et de quibus debet formari si optime esse est casus boni per se, pessime esse est casus mali per se.
Deinde etiam inspiciendum in ea quae similiter se habent in proportione ad aliud. Destruere quidem volenti problema de proprio, considerandum si quatuor sunt, quorum primum ad secundum se habet sicut tertium ad quartum: si secundum non est proprium primi, quartum non erit proprium tertii. Si enim quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet in proportione ad ipsum, non est proprium: neque in proposito quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet, erit proprium. Cujus exemplum, sicut quoniam similiter se habet ad faciendum aedificium aedificator, et medicus ad faciendum sanitatem, uterque arte facit: sicut non est medici proprium ut ex arte semper inducat sanitatem, ita non erit aedificatoris proprium facere vel perficere aedificium.
Hac autem consideratione construenti per oppositum est utendum, si quod similiter se habet, ejus quod similiter se habet, est proprium: quia quod similiter se habet in proportione eadem, est ejus quod similiter se habet, proprium in proportione simili. Cujus exemplum est, quoniam similiter se habet medicus ad praeservationem ab infirmitatis periculo, sicut gyrustes, hoc est, luctator ad perfectivum euechiae. Est autem gyrustes proprium quod sit perfectivum euechiae, erit proprium medici praeservando facere sanitatem, sive quod hoc modo perfectivum sit sanitatis. Intelligendum autem quod gyrustes in antiquis urbibus fuit luctarum in cursibus et pugnis et ludis magister: quia, sicut dicit Victorinus, instituta fuerunt ad euectionem corporum, et excitationem caloris, et subtiliationem sanguinis, ut in bona dispositione et densitate carnis conservaretur corpus: et ideo arte ad hoc indiguit, quod ludos et pugnas et luctas instituerit, et quando et quibus et ubi quilibet etiam exercerent luctas in corpus: apud inertes et pigros resolvitur et laxatur caro ut nocivum recipiat et laxum, et a se repellere non possit per calorem hebetatum: et tales luctae sunt ut palestrae cursus in stadiis. Idcirco cursus equorum pypodroneum vocatur et tripudium et hujusmodi: per haec enim praeservabant corpora ne cachechiam incurrerent.
CHAPTER II. On considerations taken from cases, from similars and proportionals in being, being generated, being corrupted, and things of this sort.
Now an extrinsic place is taken from things agreeing essentially and accidentally. Essentially, indeed, as a case; accidentally, however, as the similar, the proportionable, more and less, and things of this sort. Therefore next, after opposites, which are most of all extrinsic, for one wishing to destroy the problem concerning property, one must consider whether the case of the proposed property is not the property of the case of the assigned subject; for then it follows that neither in the proposed matter will the case be a property. For example, because of that which is justly, that which is well is not the property, nor will good be the property of the just; for if the case is removed from the case, the name also is removed from the name.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration in the opposite way: if a case is the property of a case, then also the name is the property of the name, and conversely. Thus, since to be a walkable biped is proper to man, it will also be proper to man to be called a walkable biped according to case, so that he is also said to walk bipedally. But this consideration from cases is not only in the opposite, but in the nature of opposites, just as was said in the prior places of this science where cases were being treated. For if it is the property of being done justly to be done well, it is also the property of being done unjustly to be done badly.
Therefore one who is destroying must use this place thus: that if the case of the opposite is not the property of the case of the opposite, then neither in the proposed case is it the property of the proposed case. The example of this is: for if it is the property of what is to be done justly to be done well, and the property of what is to be done unjustly is to be done badly.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration by the opposite mode: if the case of the opposite is the property of the case of the other opposite, then also in the proposed matter the case of this opposite is the property of the case of that opposite; as, if it is the property of good to be best, as it is the property of good through itself to be best among the goods which are useful, delightful, and honorable, then it will also be the property through itself of evil to be worst; and concerning these it must be formed thus: if to be best is the case of good through itself, to be worst is the case of evil through itself.
Next one must also inspect those things which have themselves similarly in proportion to another. For one wishing to destroy the problem concerning property, one must consider, if there are four things, of which the first has itself to the second as the third to the fourth: if the second is not the property of the first, the fourth will not be the property of the third. For if what has itself similarly is not the property of that which has itself similarly in proportion to it, neither in the proposed matter will what has itself similarly be the property of that which has itself similarly. The example is this: since the builder has himself similarly to making a building, and the physician to making health, each makes by art; just as it is not the property of the physician always to introduce health from art, so it will not be the property of the builder to make or complete a building.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration by opposition: if what has itself similarly is the property of that which has itself similarly, because what has itself similarly in the same proportion is the property of that which has itself similarly in a similar proportion. The example of this is that the physician has himself similarly to preservation from the danger of illness, as the gyrustes, that is, the wrestler, to that which perfects good bodily condition. But the property of the gyrustes is that he is perfective of good bodily condition; therefore it will be the property of the physician to make health by preserving, or that in this way he is perfective of health. But it must be understood that in ancient cities the gyrustes was a master of wrestlings in races and fights and games; because, as Victorinus says, they were instituted for the good motion of bodies, and the excitation of heat, and the subtiliation of the blood, so that the body might be preserved in good disposition and density of flesh. And therefore it needed art for this, that he should institute games and fights and wrestlings, and when and with whom and where each should also exercise wrestlings upon the body. Among the inactive and sluggish the flesh is dissolved and loosened so that it receives what is harmful and loose, and cannot repel it from itself through heat grown dull; and such wrestlings are like the runs of the palestra in stadia. Therefore the racing of horses is called pypodroneum and dancing and things of this kind; for through these they preserved bodies lest they incur cachexy.
Deinde comparando unum proprium ad duo subjecta per similem proportionem, inspiciendum ex his subjectis quae sic, hoc est, similiter, se habent ad illud proprium quod comparatur ad ipsa. Et destruenti quidem considerandum si quod sic, hoc est, similiter, se habet, non est proprium subjecti quod similiter se habet: tunc neque in proposito quod sic se habet ad proprium. Si autem ejus quod sic se habet in simili habitudine, est proprium ejus quod sic se habet: tunc sequitur, idem proprium quod prioris subjecti est proprium, non est proprium secundi subjecti, ad quod similiter se habet sicut ad primum, sicut positum fuerat esse proprium ejus. Et hujus causa est, quia idem proprium non potest esse duorum subjectorum specie differentium. Hujus autem exemplum est, quoniam si sic se habet prudentia ad pulchrum in moribus et foedum, quod disciplina utriusque eorum est: non est autem prudentiae disciplinam esse pulchri: sequitur quod etiam non erit proprium ejus disciplinam esse foedi. Si vero est proprium prudentiae disciplinam esse pulchri, sequitur quod non sit proprium ejus disciplinam esse foedi: impossibile enim est idem esse plurium proprium, ut dictum est. Unde locus iste construenti nihil utilis est, eo quod se habet ubi unum proprium ad subjecta plura comparatur. Proprium autem unum non potest esse plurium subjectorum: et si ponatur, destruitur proprium.
Deinde adhuc destruenti in similitudine habitudinum considerandum est in esse et generatione et corruptione similiter habentibus. Destruenti igitur inspiciendum ad esse et generari, et non inesse et corrumpi: si enim id proprium quod secundum esse dicitur, est proprium alicujus secundum esse dicti: tunc etiam corrumpi, hoc est, quod secundum corruptionem dicitur, erit proprium ejus subjecti quod dicitur secundum corrumpi: neque enim id proprium quod secundum rationem dicitur, erit proprium ejus subjecti quod dicitur animal generari: quoniam non est hominis proprium, quando est, esse animal, sed est consequens ad ipsum: neque ejus quod est hominem generari, erit proprium generari animal, sed ex consequenti generatur: neque ejus quod est hominem corrumpi, erit proprium corrumpi animal, sed ex consequenti corrumpitur. Eodem autem modo accipiendum est e converso ex habitudine ejus quod est generari ad esse et corrumpi, et ex corrumpi ad esse et generari: et quemadmodum dictum est nunc in consideratione ultimo inducta, ex esse ad generari et ad corrumpi: quaecumque enim horum trium aliis duobus comparentur, similis erit habitudo quantum ad susceptionem proprii.
Next, by comparing one property to two subjects through a similar proportion, one must inspect from these subjects which thus, that is, similarly, have themselves to that property which is compared to them. And one who is destroying must consider whether what thus, that is, similarly, has itself is not the property of the subject which has itself similarly; then neither in the proposed matter will what thus has itself to the property be a property. But if of that which thus has itself in a similar relation, it is the property of that which thus has itself, then it follows that the same property which is the property of the prior subject is not the property of the second subject, to which it has itself similarly as to the first, just as it had been posited to be its property. And the cause of this is that the same property cannot be of two subjects differing in species. The example of this is that, if prudence has itself thus to the beautiful in morals and to the shameful, that it is the science of each of them, but for prudence to be the science of the beautiful is not a property, it follows that for it to be the science of the shameful will also not be its property. But if for prudence to be the science of the beautiful is a property, it follows that for it to be the science of the shameful is not its property; for it is impossible that the same thing be the property of several things, as was said. Hence this place is of no use to one constructing, because it has itself where one property is compared to several subjects. But one property cannot belong to several subjects; and if it is posited, property is destroyed.
Next, still for one destroying, in the likeness of relations one must consider things similarly related in being and generation and corruption. Therefore one who is destroying must inspect with respect to being and being generated, and not belonging and being corrupted: for if that property which is said according to being is the property of something said according to being, then also to be corrupted, that is, what is said according to corruption, will be the property of that subject which is said according to being corrupted. For that property which is said according to account will not be the property of that subject which is called animal generated, because it is not the property of man, when he is, to be animal, but it is consequent upon him; nor will it be the property of that which is man being generated to be animal generated, but it is generated by consequence; nor will it be the property of that which is man being corrupted to be animal corrupted, but it is corrupted by consequence. But the same must be taken conversely from the relation of that which is to be generated to being and being corrupted, and from being corrupted to being and being generated; and as has now been said in the last introduced consideration, from being to being generated and to being corrupted, for whichever of these three is compared to the other two, the relation will be similar as regards the receiving of a property.
Construenti autem hac consideratione opposito modo utendum est, si ejus quod est secundum esse positum, proprium est ejus subjecti quod secundum esse positum est, tunc erit proprium. Cujus ratio est, quia et ejus quod secundum generari positum est, erit hoc proprium quod secundum generari dicitur: et ejus quod secundum corrumpi positum est, erit proprium hoc quod est secundum corrumpi assignatum. Cujus est exemplum, ut hominis accepti secundum esse proprium est esse mortale: tunc etiam ejus quod est generari hominem, est generari mortale: et ejus quod est corrumpi hominem, est proprium corrumpi mortale. Eodem modo accipiendum est e converso, et ex generari et ex corrumpi ad esse arguendo et ad propria quae ex his sunt in construendo, velut dictum est, et in destruendo, paulo habita consideratione: et quia species est similitudo quaedam individuorum.
Deinde post omnia quae dicta sunt de similibus, inspiciendum est in speciem positi sive subjecti cujus assignato proprio secundum esse et generari et corrumpi. Destruenti considerandum si proprium quod assignatur, speciei illi cui assignatur, non inest secundum esse quod habet in materia secundum naturam, aut si non inest speciei secundum quod dicitur esse species id quod est subjectum cujus proprium assignatum est: tunc enim non erit proprium quod assignatum est esse proprium. Cujus exemplum, ut quoniam eidem homini secundum quod habet esse in natura et in materia non inest hoc proprium quod est quiescere, hoc est, immobilem esse in eo quod homo est in natura et in materia et generari et corrumpi, sed inest homini in eo quod species et generari et corrumpi a materia est: patet quod non est hominis proprium quiescere.
Construenti autem hac consideratione per oppositum modum utendum est, si proprium assignatum inesse speciei et secundum quod est proprium quod dicitur sive praedicatur de eodem assignato subjecto, illud subjectum cujus subjecti positum est esse proprium: tunc enim erit proprium quod ab adversario positum est non esse proprium. Cujus exemplum est, ut quoniam eidem animali quod in natura et in materia est ut proprium ex anima et corpore esse compositum, et inesse ei in eo quod animal secundum esse in natura: tunc hoc erit animalis proprium quod est ex anima et corpore esse compositum.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration in the opposite way: if of that which is posited according to being, the property belongs to that subject which is posited according to being, then it will be a property. The reason for this is that also of that which is posited according to being generated, this property which is said according to being generated will be the property; and of that which is posited according to being corrupted, that which has been assigned according to being corrupted will be the property. The example of this is that the property of man taken according to being is to be mortal; then also of that which is man being generated, it is to be mortal generated; and of that which is man being corrupted, it is proper to be mortal corrupted. The same must be taken conversely, and from being generated and from being corrupted by arguing to being and to the properties which are from these in constructing, as was said, and in destroying, once the consideration shortly stated has been had; and because species is a certain likeness of individuals.
Next, after all that has been said concerning similars, one must inspect the species of the thing posited, or of the subject whose property is assigned, according to being and being generated and being corrupted. One who is destroying must consider whether the property which is assigned does not belong to that species to which it is assigned according to the being which it has in matter according to nature, or whether it does not belong to the species according as that which is the subject whose property has been assigned is said to be a species; for then what has been assigned to be a property will not be a property. The example of this is that, since this property which is to rest, that is, to be immobile, does not belong to the same man according as he has being in nature and in matter, insofar as man is in nature and in matter and is generated and corrupted, but belongs to man insofar as he is species and insofar as being generated and corrupted is from matter, it is clear that to rest is not the property of man.
But one who is constructing must use this consideration through the opposite mode: if the assigned property belongs to the species, and according as it is the property which is said or predicated of the same assigned subject, the subject of which subject it has been posited to be the property, then what was posited by the adversary not to be a property will be a property. The example of this is that, since it belongs as a property to the same animal which is in nature and in matter to be composed of soul and body, and belongs to it insofar as animal is according to being in nature, then this, to be composed of soul and body, will be the property of animal.
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