Volume 2 · pp. 415–416
Chapter VIII. On the determination of property through considerations taken from the comparison of the property to the species or to the subject.
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CAPUT VIII. De determinatione proprii per considerationes sumptas ex comparatione proprii ad speciem sive ad subjectum.
Deinde considerando ad subjectum cujus proprium assignatur, considerare oportet si idem nomine et diffinitione ejusdem proprium posuit: tunc enim non erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium. Cujus ratio est, quia idem esse indicat: aut implicite, si idem nomine: aut explicite, si idem diffinitione: quod autem esse indicat, non proprium, sed diffinitio, ut diffinitio large sumatur pro omni eo quod implicite vel explicite indicat esse rei. Ut quoniam qui dixit honesti proprium esse decens vel pulchrum: decens enim in moribus vel pulchrum idem est honesto, ut dicit Tullius. Peccavit ergo sic assignans proprium: quia idem in moribus decens et pulchrum et honestum. Non ergo est proprium decens honesti.
Juxta autem eamdem considerationem per oppositum acceptam construentem inspicere oportet, si aliquis non idem ejusdem proprium assignavit, sed in entia diversum, conversim tamen de subjecto praedicatum: tunc enim erit proprium quod ab adversario positum est non esse proprium. Cujus exemplum est, ut qui ponit animalis proprium esse, quod sit substantia animata, non posuit idem ejusdem proprium: et assignavit pro proprio id quod conversim praedicatur: ergo est animalis proprium substantia animata. Et intelligendum quod substantia animata dicitur dupliciter, ut composita ex anima et corpore, anima corpus continente: et sic non est proprium, sed esse indicans animati ut diffinitio. Dicitur etiam substantia animata, substantia habens animationem et habitum relatum ad actum: et sic animatum est consequens esse animalis: et sic est proprium conversim praedicatum: et sic planta non habet perfectam animam ex qua sit motus vitae manifestus: sed, sicut dicitur in libro de Plantis, habet partem partis animae secundum motum augmenti et alimenti et generationis.
Deinde quia in homogeniis eadem est ratio totius et partis, destruentem oportet considerare, quod in his quae similium partium sunt, si quod totius est proprium, non verum est de parte, ita quod vere de parte praedicetur: tunc enim non erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium. Similiter considerandum si in talibus proprium quod assignatur parti non praedicatur de toto: tunc enim iterum quia eadem est ratio et species quae est forma partis et totius, non erit proprium quod positum est esse proprium. Accidit enim in aliquibus homogeniis hoc fieri sive sic assignari proprium totius quod universo convenit et non parti, et aliquando quod parti convenit et non toti universo: assignabit enim aliquis taliter in his totis quae similium partium sunt proprium aliquoties quidem intuens sive inspiciens in universum totum et non in partem, aliquoties autem intuens sive inspiciens in id quod particulariter parti convenit et est particulare, et non inspiciens in totum: cum tamen totum universum et pars sint ejusdem rationis: et sic aliquis ipsum seipsum intelligens sive intellectum dirigens, aliquando inspicit ad totum non ad partem, aliquoties ad partem et non ad totum: erit enim tunc neutrum proprium ratione assignatum, et ideo non erit proprium. Cujus exemplum est, ut in universum intuens et non in partem quamlibet, ut qui dicit maris proprium esse, quod sit aqua plurima salsa: hoc enim ejusdem totius quod similis partis est, posuit proprium: tale autem assignavit proprium quod non verum est de qualibet parte: quia non quaelibet pars est aqua plurima: non enim erit quaedam pars forte parva et pauca mare: quaelibet enim pars maris mare est, non tamen aqua plurima salsa: non ergo erit maris proprium, quod sit aqua plurima salsa. In parte consideranti et non in toto exemplum est, ut qui posuit proprium aeris spirabile esse: hoc enim alicujus quod est similis partis, posuit proprium: tale autem posuit proprium quod est de aliqua aeris parte verum, et non de toto aere universo verum dicitur: non enim totus aer spirabilis est, sed tantum ille qui est refrigerans in pectore spirantis: non igitur erit aeris proprium spirabile.
CHAPTER VIII. On the determination of property through considerations taken from the comparison of the property to the species or to the subject.
Next, by considering the subject whose property is assigned, one must consider whether he has posited the same thing in name and definition as the property of the same thing; for then what has been posited to be a property will not be a property. The reason for this is that it indicates the same being: either implicitly, if it is the same in name, or explicitly, if it is the same in definition; but what indicates being is not a property but a definition, provided that definition is taken broadly for everything that implicitly or explicitly indicates the being of the thing. Thus, since one who said that the property of the honorable is the becoming or the beautiful: for the becoming in morals, or the beautiful, is the same as the honorable, as Tullius says. Therefore one assigning a property in this way has erred, because in morals the becoming, the beautiful, and the honorable are the same. Therefore the becoming is not a property of the honorable.
But alongside the same consideration, taken by opposition, one who is constructing must inspect whether someone assigned as the property of the same thing not the same thing, but something diverse in beings, nevertheless predicated conversely of the subject; for then what was posited by the adversary not to be a property will be a property. The example of this is that one who posits that the property of animal is that it is animate substance has not posited the same thing as the property of the same thing; and he assigned as a property that which is conversely predicated; therefore animate substance is a property of animal. And it must be understood that animate substance is said in two ways: as composed of soul and body, the soul containing the body, and in this way it is not a property, but something indicating the being of the animate as a definition. Animate substance is also said as substance having animation and a habit related to act; and in this way being animated is consequent upon the being of animal; and in this way it is a property predicated conversely; and in this way a plant does not have a perfect soul from which there is a manifest motion of life, but, as is said in the book On Plants, it has a part of a part of soul according to the motion of increase and nourishment and generation.
Next, because in homogeneous things the account of whole and part is the same, one who is destroying must consider that, in those things which are of like parts, if what is the property of the whole is not true of the part, so that it is truly predicated of the part, then what has been posited to be a property will not be a property. Likewise one must consider whether in such things the property which is assigned to the part is not predicated of the whole; for then again, because the account and species which is the form of part and whole is the same, what has been posited to be a property will not be a property. For in some homogeneous things it happens that this is done, or that the property of the whole is assigned in such a way that it belongs to the universe and not to the part, and sometimes that what belongs to the part does not belong to the whole universe. For someone will assign a property in such wholes that are of like parts sometimes indeed by looking at or inspecting the universal whole and not the part, and sometimes by looking at or inspecting that which belongs particularly to the part and is particular, and not by inspecting the whole, although nevertheless the universal whole and the part are of the same account. And thus someone, understanding his very self or directing his understanding, sometimes inspects the whole and not the part, and sometimes the part and not the whole; for then neither will be a property assigned by reason, and therefore it will not be a property. The example of this, looking to the universal and not to every part, is one who says that the property of the sea is that it is very much salty water; for he posited this as the property of the same whole which is of like part. But he assigned such a property as is not true of every part, because not every part is very much water; for some perhaps small and scant part will not be sea. For every part of the sea is sea, yet not very much salty water; therefore it will not be the property of the sea that it is very much salty water. An example in one considering the part and not the whole is one who posited as the property of air that it is breathable; for he posited this as the property of something which is of like part. But he posited such a property as is true of some part of air, and is not said to be true of the whole universal air; for not all air is breathable, but only that which cools in the breast of the one breathing; therefore breathable will not be the property of air.
Astruenti autem juxta eamdem considerationem considerandum est per oppositum si id quod positum est in talibus proprium, verum est praedicatum de unoquoque quod est pars talis totius, et non verum etiam per universum. Cujus exemplum est, ut quoniam verum est de omni sive universa terra simul deorsum ferri secundum naturam: est autem et hoc idem proprium, et alicujus quod est pars quaelibet terrae, secundum universum sive per naturam universi est pars ejusdem speciei: nam tunc secundum terram, hoc est, terrae naturam et speciem quae in parte salvatur, erit terrae proprium deorsum ferri secundum naturam. Attendendum autem, quod universum dicitur totum homogenium: eo quod una ratione quaelibet pars participat totum, ut particularia subjectiva participant speciem: alia autem tota non dicunt universum.
But one who is constructing, alongside the same consideration, must consider by opposition whether that which is posited as a property in such things is truly predicated of each thing that is a part of such a whole, and not truly also through the universe. The example of this is that it is true of all, or the whole, earth at once to be borne downward according to nature; but this same thing is also a property, even of anything that is a part, any part of earth, according to the universe, or through the nature of the universe, it is a part of the same species. For then according to earth, that is, according to the nature and species of earth which is preserved in the part, being borne downward according to nature will be a property of earth. But it must be noted that the universe is called a homogeneous whole, because each part participates in the whole by one account, as subjective particulars participate in the species; but other wholes do not mean a universe.
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