Volume 2 · pp. 373–376
Chapter V. On inspection in relatives or things toward something
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CAPUT V.
De inspectione in relativis sive ad aliquid.
In ad aliquid autem inspiciendo terminatur idem problema considerandum in assignata specie: nam si species assignata est ad aliquid vere non secundum dici tantum, sed secundum esse: tunc considerandum si assignatum genus sit ad aliquid: nam si species vere secundum esse est ad aliquid, et genus erit ad aliquid, velut patet in duplici et multiplici: duplicis enim est genus multiplex: utrumque autem horum est ad aliquid: e contrario tamen non videtur necessarium quod etiam si genus sit ad aliquid, quod species sit etiam ad aliquid: nam disciplina, quae genus est, est ad aliquid: grammatica autem, quae est species disciplinae, non est ad aliquid. Sic ergo considerando in relativis oportet dicere.
Sed neque illud quod prius in consideratione dictum est, verum esse videbitur generaliter, quod scilicet si species est ad aliquid, quod genus sit ad aliquid: nam virtus quod bonum, hoc est, species boni, et quod pulchrum sive in genere pulchri et honesti: et virtus est quidem ad aliquid: bonum vero non est in genere ad aliquid, neque pulchrum quae sunt in genere virtutis. Attende autem quod bonum est genus virtutis in eo quod virtus et honestum. Pulchrum autem genus ejus est secundum quod est laudabilium bonorum. Virtus autem est ad aliquid secundum quod est perfectio ad actum. Instantia quae ponitur, est in his quae id quod sunt, amborum dicuntur, quae relativa secundum dici: sed nunquam est instantia contra considerationem in his quae id quod sunt, ad aliquid sunt.
Rursum ad relative opposita inspiciendo in his quae secundum esse relativa sunt, utrum ad idem dicantur genus et species: quia si non ad idem dicantur, non est genus quod assignatum est: debet enim ad idem dici species secundum se et secundum suum genus, ut si duplum dicitur dimidii duplum, et multiplex quod est genus dupli, dicitur dimidii multiplex. Si autem non ita multiplex dicatur ad idem, non erit multiplex genus dupli. Amplius considerandum est ad superiora genera: quia si species non ad idem dicitur et secundum se et secundum genus proximum, et secundum omnia illius coordinationis genera generi proxima, male assignatum est genus: quia si duplex est multiplex dimidii cum hoc transcendens vel excedens, sic genus multiplicis erit genus dupli transcendens proportionem dimidii: et sic simpliciter et universaliter sic secundum omnia superiora secundum eamdem coordinationem genera, ad dimidium dicitur.
Instantia autem contra hanc considerationem esse videtur, quod etiam non necesse sit aliquid secundum se et secundum suum genus ad idem dici relative. Nam scientia dicitur scibilis, scibile scientia scibile: habitus autem qui est genus scientiae et dispositio, non sunt scibilis, ita quod dicantur dependentia ad scibile, sed dicunt aliud quod importat dependentiam positione ad actum, quo perficitur positio ad actum. Unde dicitur habitus animae secundum positionem ordinatam ad actum. Et hujus causa est, quia scientia addit supra habitum respectum ad id de quo est: quod non facit habitus, qui non ponit respectum nisi cujus ut subjecti est habitus, et non ponit respectum ad id de quo est habitus ut objecti: et ideo etiam non est instantia, quia scientia dicit dependentiam ad scibile: habitus autem dicit dependentiam ad rem habentem.
CHAPTER V.
On inspection in relatives or things toward something.
But by inspecting in things toward something, the same problem is terminated by considering the assigned species. For if the assigned species is toward something truly, not only according to being said so, but according to being, then one must consider whether the assigned genus is toward something. For if the species truly according to being is toward something, the genus also will be toward something, as is clear in double and multiple: for the genus of double is multiple, and each of these is toward something. Conversely, however, it does not seem necessary that, if the genus is toward something, the species also is toward something; for discipline, which is a genus, is toward something, but grammar, which is a species of discipline, is not toward something. Therefore in considering relatives one must speak in this way.
But neither will that which was said earlier in the consideration seem to be generally true, namely that if the species is toward something, the genus is toward something; for virtue, as a good, that is, a species of good, and as beautiful or in the genus of the beautiful and honorable, is indeed toward something, but good is not in the genus toward something, nor is beautiful, which are in the genus of virtue. But attend that good is the genus of virtue insofar as virtue is honorable. But beautiful is its genus insofar as it is of laudable goods. But virtue is toward something insofar as it is a perfection toward act. The instance that is posited is in those things in which what they are is said of both, which are relatives according to being said; but there is never an instance against the consideration in those things which, as to what they are, are toward something.
Again, by inspecting relative opposites in those things which are relatives according to being, one must ask whether genus and species are said toward the same thing, because if they are not said toward the same thing, it is not the genus that has been assigned. For species must be said toward the same thing according to itself and according to its genus, as if double is called double of half, and multiple, which is the genus of double, is called multiple of half. But if multiple is not said toward the same thing in that way, multiple will not be the genus of double. Moreover, one must consider the superior genera, because if the species is not said toward the same thing both according to itself and according to the proximate genus, and according to all the genera of that coordination proximate to the genus, the genus has been badly assigned. For if double is a multiple of half with this transcending or exceeding, then the genus of multiple will be the genus of double transcending the proportion of half; and thus simply and universally, according to all superior genera according to the same coordination, it is said toward half.
But there seems to be an instance against this consideration, that it is not necessary for something according to itself and according to its genus to be said relatively toward the same thing. For science is called science of the knowable, and the knowable is knowable by science. But habit and disposition, which are the genus of science, are not of the knowable, so that they are called a dependence toward the knowable; rather, they name something else that implies dependence by position toward act, by which the position is perfected toward act. Hence habit is called a habit of the soul according to a position ordered to act. And the cause of this is that science adds over habit a relation to that of which it is, which habit does not do, since habit posits relation only to that of which it is the habit as subject, and does not posit relation to that of which it is the habit as object. And therefore there is not an instance, because science names dependence on the knowable, but habit names dependence on the thing having it.
Rursum autem adhuc inspiciendo ad relativa considerandum est adhuc in vere relativis si similiter, hoc est, secundum eumdem casum dicitur species et genus ad aliquid, ita quod secundum casus dicantur similiter, ut si species dicatur alicui secundum dativum, aut alicujus secundum genitivum, aut quomodolibet aliter: nam ut species secundum aliquem casum dicitur ad aliquid, et genus illius secundum eumdem casum dicetur ad idem: et si non, tunc non est genus quod assignatum est pro genere: velut est videre in duplo et in superioribus dupli generibus: illa enim dicuntur omnia secundum dativum ad aliquid, dicitur enim alicui duplum, et alicui multiplex. Similiter autem est ut in relativis secundum dici ad aliquid secundum comparationem ad subjectum, ut in scientia quae alicujus scientia dicitur: et similiter genera in quibus ut in superioribus est ut habitus et dispositio, et alicujus secundum genitivum dicuntur ut animae vel hominis.
Videtur autem instantia esse in hoc, quia aliquoties videtur non esse sic. Dicuntur enim differens et contrarium ad aliquid secundum dativum: dicitur enim differens alicui differens, et contrarium alicui contrarium: diversum autem cum sit genus ad differens et ad contrarium, dicitur ad aliquid secundum ablativum: dicitur enim diversum ab aliquo diversum. Haec instantia non reperitur in his quae vere sunt relativa: haec enim secundum eumdem casum referuntur in generibus et speciebus. Differens autem et contrarium et diversum quamvis vere relativa sint, non tamen relativum habent: quia differens dicit, quod aliqua quaecumque differentia differt: contrarium autem ponitur respectu ad extremum: diversum autem est medium inter haec: et opponuntur eidem: et quia dicunt habitudines et dependentias diversas, ideo referuntur secundum diversos casus.
Rursum adhuc in relativis est considerandum secundum quod ad convertentiam dicuntur, si similiter, hoc est, secundum eosdem casus convertantur ea quae dicuntur ad aliquid in specie et in genere: quia si non convertuntur similiter, non est genus quod pro genere assignatum est, velut patet in duplo et multiplici: utrumque enim horum ad convertentiam dicitur ut alicujus secundum genitivum: et sic dicitur idem: alicujus enim dicitur idem, et similiter alicujus dicitur dimidium: quod etiam secundum convertentiam genitivum ad convertentiam dicitur dupli, et alicujus submultiplex quod secundum genitivum ad convertentiam dicitur ad multiplex.
Similiter autem est et in relativis quae secundum dici sunt relativa, ut patet in disciplina et opinione: nam alicujus ut alicujus convertuntur, hoc est, secundum convertentiam dicuntur. Similiter autem disciplinatum, cujus dicitur esse disciplina, et opinatum cujus opinio dicitur esse, dicitur alicujus disciplinae disciplinatum, et alicujus opinionis opinatum. Si vero species assignata et genus assignatum non similiter convertantur in specie et genere, palam quod non est genus unum alterius quod est assignatum pro genere.
Rursus adhuc in relativis considerandum quando ad plures secundum plures casus comparantur: si enim tunc ad aequalia non dicuntur genus cum specie, non erit genus quod assignatum est pro genere. Et similiter enim, hoc est, secundum similes casus, et aequaliter, hoc est, tot modis et casibus genus, quot species ad alium dici videntur: quemadmodum est in dono et datione quae genus doni est: dicitur enim donum alicujus ratione ejus quod donatur, et alicui ratione ejus cui donatur, et sic dicitur ad aliquid et secundum genitivum et secundum dativum, et datio quae est genus doni dicitur similiter, et alicujus ratione ejus quod datur, et alicui ratione ejus cui datur.
Again, still by inspecting relatives, one must further consider in true relatives whether the species and genus are said toward something similarly, that is, according to the same case, so that they are said similarly according to cases, as if the species is said to something according to the dative, or of something according to the genitive, or in any other way. For as the species is said toward something according to some case, so its genus will be said toward the same thing according to the same case; and if not, then it is not the genus that has been assigned as genus. This may be seen in double and in the superior genera of double; for all those are said toward something according to the dative: it is said double to something, and multiple to something. Similarly it is also so in relatives according to being said toward something according to comparison to a subject, as in science, which is called science of something; and similarly the genera in which, as in superiors, habit and disposition are, are said of something according to the genitive, as of soul or of human being.
But there seems to be an instance in this, because sometimes it seems not to be so. For differing and contrary are said toward something according to the dative: something is called differing from something, and contrary to something. But diverse, since it is the genus of differing and contrary, is said toward something according to the ablative: something is said to be diverse from something. This instance is not found in those things which truly are relatives, for these are referred according to the same case in genera and species. But differing and contrary and diverse, although they are truly relatives, nevertheless do not have a relative in the same way; for differing says that some things differ by whatever difference, while contrary is posited with respect to an extreme, and diverse is a middle between these, and they are opposed to the same thing. And because they state diverse relations and dependencies, therefore they are referred according to diverse cases.
Again, still in relatives one must consider, according as they are said toward conversion, whether those things that are said toward something in species and in genus are converted similarly, that is, according to the same cases. For if they are not converted similarly, it is not the genus that has been assigned as genus, as is clear in double and multiple. For each of these is said toward conversion as of something according to the genitive; and thus the same is said: for the same is said of something, and similarly half is said of something, which also according to conversion is said in the genitive toward conversion of double; and submultiple of something, which according to the genitive is said toward conversion with multiple.
Similarly it is also so in relatives which are relatives according to being said, as is clear in discipline and opinion: for they are converted as being of something, that is, they are said according to conversion. Similarly, the disciplined thing, of which discipline is said to be, and the opined thing, of which opinion is said to be, is called the disciplined thing of some discipline, and the opined thing of some opinion. But if the assigned species and the assigned genus are not similarly converted in species and genus, it is plain that one is not the genus of the other as assigned as genus.
Again, still in relatives, one must consider when they are compared to several things according to several cases. For if then genus with species is not said toward equal things, it will not be the genus that has been assigned as genus. For similarly, that is, according to similar cases, and equally, that is, in as many modes and cases as the species seems to be said toward another, the genus also is said. This is the case in gift and giving, which is the genus of gift: for a gift is said to be of something by reason of that which is given, and to someone by reason of the one to whom it is given; and thus it is said toward something both according to the genitive and according to the dative. And giving, which is the genus of gift, is said similarly, both of something by reason of that which is given, and to someone by reason of the one to whom it is given.
[Marginal label, printed page 375: Datio est genus doni.]
Est autem datio genus doni: nam donum non omnis datio est, sed est datio quaedam irreddibilis, hoc est, ejus quod gratis datur et redditio non expectatur. Datio quaecumque datio est, sive sit gratuita, sive spe redditionis facta.
Instantia tamen videtur esse ad hoc: quia in aliquibus non accidit ad aequalia dici speciem et suum genus. Nam duplum dicitur alicujus duplum: superans autem et majus dicitur aliquo superans et majus: et tamen superans et majus videntur genera esse duplici, secundum quod genera hic accipiuntur: quia magis sequitur ad duplum, et etiam superans absque conversione dicitur superans aliquo et secundum quid, hoc est, secundum aliquid in quo excedit: omne enim superans et majus aliquo superat ad aliud superat. Propter quod oportet dici, quod aut non sunt genera quae dicta sunt dupli: eo quod non ad aequalia et similia specie dicitur genus et species, aut quod non universaliter verum est quod dictum est, quod etiam genus et species ad aequalia et similia dicantur. Et per hoc patet quod instantia non instat: quia duplum dicit comparationem proportionis ad excessum, hoc est, ad id quod exceditur. Majus autem dicit excessum sine proportione: superans autem indiffinite ex parte excedentis, et ideo secundum diversa referuntur ad aliquid. Consideratio est in his quae secundum idem comparantur in proportione.
Adhuc autem considerandum est in relativis respiciendo ad plures species et oppositas, et ad plura et opposita genera. Considerandum enim si oppositum genus oppositae speciei: quia tunc etiam propositum genus erit propositae speciei, ut si est genus dupli multiplex, tunc subdupli erit genus submultiplex: in talibus enim quae vere relativa sunt, oportet oppositum genus esse oppositae speciei. Si ergo ponat aliquis scientiam esse idem quod sensum, hoc est, quemdam sensum, ita quod sensus sit genus et scientia species, oportebit etiam tunc in correlativis illorum, quod scibile sit quoddam sensibile secundum genus: sed hoc non est verum: non enim scibile sensibile est, cum genus universaliter de specie praedicatur. Quod autem non sit scibile sensibile, sic probatur. Intelligibilium, hoc est, intelligentiarum quaedam scibilia sunt quae non per se sensibilia sunt. Propter quod sensibile non est genus scibilis. Si autem hoc non est genus illius, sequitur quod nec sensus erit genus scientiae. Fuit autem dictum Pythagorae, quod esset sensus genus scientiae, et quod scire omne sit sentire quodammodo.
[Marginal label, printed page 376: Quomodo sensibile est scibile: et quomodo non.]
Utrum autem sensibile sit scibile vel non, sciendum quod sensibile dicitur dupliciter etiam secundum quod sensibile a sensu, et secundum formam et virtutem sit acceptum, et sensibile in sensu acceptum, et secundum hoc dicitur dupliciter ut in sensu secundum actum acceptum, et cum sensu secundum actum facto acceptum. Primo modo sensibile non est intelligibile vel scibile. Secundo autem modo in sensu acceptum est intelligibile: quia universale accipitur in sensu, et secundum sensum notius est prout est confusum in sensibili, quamvis secundum hoc esse quo est in sensibili, non sit intelligibile vel scibile. Tertio modo quo sensibile accipitur, est adjunctum intelligibili per collationem ad nocivum et conveniens, sicut amicum esse vel inimicum hoc quod accipitur sensu: et hoc est aestimabile in brutis, rationale autem in hominibus: tamen in talibus non est magna vis quantum ad praesentem intentionem: quia non utitur hic exemplis istis Aristoteles, nisi ut facilior sit doctrina apud discentem.
[Marginal label, printed page 375: Giving is the genus of gift.]
But giving is the genus of gift: for a gift is not every giving, but is a certain irreddible giving, that is, of what is given freely and no return is expected. Giving, whatever giving it may be, is giving whether it is free or made in hope of return.
Nevertheless, there seems to be an instance against this, because in some cases the species and its genus do not happen to be said toward equal things. For double is called double of something, but exceeding and greater are called exceeding or greater than something; and yet exceeding and greater seem to be genera of double, according as genera are taken here, because greater follows upon double, and also exceeding is said without conversion to exceed something and in some respect, that is, according to something in which it exceeds. For every exceeding and greater thing exceeds something and exceeds toward another. Therefore one must say either that the things named are not genera of double, because genus and species are not said toward equal and similar things in species, or that what has been said is not universally true, that genus and species are said toward equal and similar things. And through this it is clear that the instance does not stand, because double states a comparison of proportion to excess, that is, to that which is exceeded. But greater states excess without proportion; and exceeding states it indefinitely on the part of the one exceeding, and therefore they are referred toward something according to diverse things. The consideration concerns those things which are compared in proportion according to the same thing.
Furthermore, one must consider in relatives by looking to several species and opposite species, and to several and opposite genera. For one must consider whether the opposite genus belongs to the opposite species, because then also the proposed genus will belong to the proposed species. Thus, if multiple is the genus of double, then submultiple will be the genus of subdouble; for in such things that are truly relatives, the opposite genus must be of the opposite species. Therefore if someone posits that science is the same as sense, that is, a certain sense, so that sense is genus and science species, then also in their correlatives it will be necessary that the knowable be something sensible according to genus. But this is not true; for the knowable is not sensible, since genus is predicated universally of species. That the knowable is not sensible is proved in this way: of intelligible things, that is, of intelligences, some are knowable which are not sensible per se. Therefore sensible is not the genus of the knowable. But if this is not the genus of that, it follows that neither will sense be the genus of science. But it was a saying of Pythagoras that sense was the genus of science, and that all knowing is sensing in some way.
[Marginal label, printed page 376: How the sensible is knowable, and how not.]
But whether the sensible is knowable or not, one must know that sensible is said in two ways, also according as sensible is accepted from sense and according to form and power, and sensible accepted in sense; and according to this it is said in two ways, as accepted in sense according to act, and as accepted with sense made according to act. In the first way the sensible is not intelligible or knowable. But in the second way, accepted in sense, it is intelligible, because the universal is accepted in sense and, according to sense, is better known insofar as it is confused in the sensible, although according to this being by which it is in the sensible it is not intelligible or knowable. In the third way in which sensible is accepted, it is joined to the intelligible through comparison to the harmful and the fitting, as being friendly or hostile is what is received by sense; and this is estimable in brute animals, but rational in human beings. Nevertheless, in such matters there is not great force with respect to the present intention, because Aristotle does not use these examples here except so that the doctrine may be easier for the learner.
[Marginal label, printed page 376: Triplicia sunt relativa secundum comparationem in subjecta ad quibus sunt.]
Adhuc autem quantum ad terminandum problema de genere inspiciendum in relativis secundum comparationem ad subjecta in quibus sunt. Ad hoc autem talem dabimus trimembrem divisionem, quod etiam eorum quae ad alia dicuntur, quaedam ex necessitate sunt in illis, ut in subjecto ad quae dicuntur: alia autem sunt circa ista ad quae dicuntur, et non sunt in illis ut in subjecto: alia autem contingit in illis esse aliquando ut in subjecto, aliquando contingit non esse in illis. Exemplum primi est ut habitus et dispositio et mediocritas virtutis, quae in alio nullo possibile est esse, nisi in illis ad quae dicta sunt. Est enim habitus habentis, et dispositio dispositi, et mediocritas omnis quoad nos: et ideo id quod est in nobis, est mensura medii virtutis, et sic ista sunt in illis ad quae dicuntur. Alia autem quae sunt de tertio membro, non necesse quidem esse in eodem subjecto ad quod dicuntur: convenit autem aliquando, sicut scibile quidem et scientia sunt in anima aliquando, et dicuntur scibile et scientia ad invicem: eo quod nihil prohibet aliquando scientiam sui ipsius habere animam: et tunc scientia et scibile sunt in anima, non tamen sicut relativum in suo correlativo ut in subjecto: potest enim et in alio habere esse eadem scientia quando scibile non est in anima: et tunc non erit scientia in scibili ut in subjecto, sed in alio quam in scibili, quia tunc scientia est in anima quae tunc non est scibile. Alia vero quae sunt de subjecto secundo membro, simpliciter et universaliter non contingit in illis esse ut in subjecto ad quae dicuntur, ut contrarium dicitur ad suum contrarium, et non est in illo: quia contrarium non est in contrario ut in subjecto, nec potest esse: nec scientia potest esse in scibili nisi primo modo solo, si scibile sit anima vel homo sciens et scitum.
Sic autem ista divisione praemissa considerandum si alius in genere ponat ad relativum hujus de aliquo trium membrorum quod non est hujus in veritate: quia tunc interemptum est genus quod assignatum est pro genere. Cujus exemplum est, ut si memoriam secundum genus dixit mansionem, ita quod mansio sit genus memoriae: eo quod, sicut dicit Damascenus, memoria est mansio scibilium specierum et reservatio: omnis enim
[Marginal label, printed page 376: Relatives are threefold according to comparison in the subjects in which they are.]
Furthermore, for terminating the problem concerning genus one must inspect relatives according to comparison to the subjects in which they are. For this we shall give such a three-membered division, namely that even of those things that are said toward others, some are necessarily in those things as in subjects toward which they are said; others are about those things toward which they are said and are not in them as in subjects; and others can sometimes be in them as in subjects and sometimes can fail to be in them. An example of the first is habit and disposition and the middleness of virtue, which cannot possibly be in anything else except in those things toward which they are said. For habit belongs to one having it, and disposition to one disposed, and every middleness is with respect to us; and therefore that which is in us is the measure of the middle of virtue, and thus these things are in those toward which they are said. But the things that are of the third member indeed need not be in the same subject toward which they are said, though sometimes it is fitting, as the knowable and science are sometimes in the soul, and the knowable and science are said toward each other because nothing prevents the soul sometimes from having science of itself. And then science and the knowable are in the soul, yet not as a relative is in its correlative as in a subject. For the same science can have being also in another when the knowable is not in the soul; and then science will not be in the knowable as in a subject, but in another than in the knowable, because then science is in the soul which then is not the knowable. But the things that are of the second member concerning subject simply and universally cannot be in those things as in subjects toward which they are said, as contrary is said toward its contrary and is not in it, because a contrary is not in its contrary as in a subject, nor can it be; nor can science be in the knowable except only in the first way, if the knowable is the soul or a knowing and known human being.
With this division thus premised, one must consider whether someone places in the genus, with respect to a relative of this from one of the three members, something that is not truly of this; because then the genus that has been assigned as genus is destroyed. An example is if he said, according to genus, that memory is abiding, so that abiding is the genus of memory, because, as Damascene says, memory is the abiding and preservation of knowable species: for every
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