Volume 2 · pp. 371–372
Chapter II. On considerations accepted from cases and conjugates
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CAPUT II.
De considerationibus acceptis a casibus et conjugatis.
Rursum per locos extrinsecos cognitionem habentes cum proposito sicut a casibus et conjugatis, et ea quae similiter se habent ut cognata proposito, quae similiter sese consequuntur, ut casus et conjugata, et interimere volenti et construere problema de genere considerandum: et hoc quidem considerare non est difficile, ut in talibus si nomen est genus in una conjugatione, casus erit genus in casuum coordinatione: haec enim secundum similitudinem unam et eamdem insunt ut genera, ut si justitia est disciplina quaedam vel scientia, vel quod disciplina sit genus justitiae, tunc et juste fieri erit disciplinate fieri: ita quod casus erit genus casus, et in conjugatis erit justus disciplinatus, ita quod sumptum erit genus sumpti, sicut principale genus est principalis. Si autem horum aliquid non est genus sibi coordinati, nec reliquum ullum est genus sibi respondentis in coordinatis secundum casus et conjugata.
Rursum considerandum in similibus secundum proportionem in qua duo ad duo comparantur in his quae similiter secundum proportionem se habent ad invicem, sicut si suave sive delectabile similiter se habet ad voluptatem, sicut se habet perficiens, hoc est, utile ad bonum, hoc est, honestum, et ratio similitudinis, quod utrumque est utriusque effectivum, hoc est, hoc illius, alterum alterius: quia suave est effectivum sive inductivum voluptatis, et perficiens est effectivum honesti, sicut id quod est ad finem, est inductivum finis, ita quod sic ordinetur proportio: sicut se habet suave ad voluptatem in efficiendo eam, sic proficiens ad bonum in efficiendo ipsum: et commutata proportione, sicut se habet secundum ad quartum, sic se habet primum ad tertium: ergo si voluptas est aliquod bonum honestum, erit suave aliquod perficiens. Et est destructiva: quia nec voluptas est genus boni, nec suave est genus perficientis.
CHAPTER II.
On considerations accepted from cases and conjugates.
Again, through extrinsic loci having cognition with the proposed thing, such as from cases and conjugates, and through those things that are similarly related as cognate to the proposed thing, which similarly follow one another, as cases and conjugates do, one who wishes both to destroy and to construct a problem concerning genus must consider. And this indeed is not difficult to consider: in such things, if the name is a genus in one conjugation, the case will be a genus in the coordination of cases. For these inhere as genera according to one and the same likeness; for example, if justice is some discipline or science, or if discipline is the genus of justice, then also to be done justly will be to be done disciplinately, so that case will be the genus of case, and in conjugates the just will be the disciplined, so that the derived term will be the genus of the derived term, just as the principal genus is the genus of the principal. But if some one of these is not the genus of the thing coordinated with it, neither is any remaining one the genus of what responds to it among things coordinated according to cases and conjugates.
Again, one must consider in similars according to proportion, in which two things are compared to two in those things that stand similarly to one another according to proportion, as if sweet or delightful stands similarly to pleasure as perfective, that is, useful, stands to good, that is, honorable. And the account of the likeness is that each is effective of each, that is, this of that and the other of the other: because the sweet is effective or inductive of pleasure, and the perfective is effective of the honorable, just as what is toward the end is inductive of the end. Thus the proportion is ordered in this way: as the sweet stands to pleasure in effecting it, so the advantageous stands to good in effecting it; and with the proportion changed, as the second stands to the fourth, so the first stands to the third. Therefore if pleasure is some honorable good, the sweet will be something perfective. And the consideration is destructive, because neither is pleasure the genus of good, nor is sweet the genus of the perfective.
Similiter autem in generationibus et corruptionibus aliquorum inspiciendum est, ut si aedificare, hoc est, generare quoddam est operari: tunc secundum locum a conjugatis, aedificasse secundum genus est operatum esse. Et eodem modo si discere est reminisci, ut in Mennone dicit Socrates, ut dixit Plato, secundum genus, tunc sequitur quod didicisse est recordatum esse secundum genus. Et in corruptionibus similiter. Si enim dissolvi est corrumpi secundum genus, et dissolutum esse est corruptum esse secundum genus, et dissolutio secundum genus est corruptio. Et in generativis et corruptivis eodem modo, quod similiter in his quae dicunt potentiam sive facultatem ad aliud, et in usibus sive in his quae dicunt usum secundum quod usus est expeditus actus ex frequenter egisse proveniens: et omnino sive universaliter secundum quamlibet similitudinem proportionalem acceptis et se invicem consequentibus: et haec tam interimere volenti problema de genere, quam construere volenti sunt omnia ista consideranda, quemadmodum in generatione et corruptione secundum casus et conjugata jam parum ante diximus. Nam si dissolutivum secundum genus est corruptivum, sequitur quod dissolvi est corrumpi secundum genus, et generatio secundum genus est factio.
[Marginal label, printed page 372: Usus quid.]
Similiter autem in conjugatis casibus secundum potentiam sive facultatem et usum sumpta: nam si potentia sive facultas est dispositio secundum suum genus, et si alicujus usus est actus secundum genus, tunc sequitur quod uti secundum genus proprium sit agere, et usum esse etiam secundum suum genus erit egisse.
Similarly, one must inspect in generations and corruptions of some things, as if to build, that is, to generate, is a certain working; then according to the locus from conjugates, to have built according to genus is to have been worked. And in the same way, if to learn is to remember, as Socrates says in the Meno, as Plato said, according to genus, then it follows that to have learned is to have remembered according to genus. And similarly in corruptions: for if to be dissolved is to be corrupted according to genus, then to have been dissolved is to have been corrupted according to genus, and dissolution according to genus is corruption. And the same is true in generative and corruptive things, and similarly in those things that name a power or faculty toward another, and in uses or in those things that name use according as use is an unimpeded act arising from having acted frequently. And altogether or universally, when things are accepted according to any proportional likeness and follow one another, all these things must be considered both by one wishing to destroy a problem concerning genus and by one wishing to construct it, as we said a little before concerning generation and corruption according to cases and conjugates. For if the dissolutive according to genus is corruptive, it follows that to be dissolved is to be corrupted according to genus, and generation according to genus is making.
[Marginal label, printed page 372: What use is.]
Similarly also in conjugate cases taken according to power or faculty and use: for if power or faculty is a disposition according to its genus, and if the use of something is an act according to genus, then it follows that to use according to its proper genus is to act, and to have use according to its genus will also be to have acted.
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