Volume 2 · pp. 368–371
Treatise II. Chapter I. On considerations accepted from contraries
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TRACTATUS II
DE GENERE LOGICO, SIVE NON CONTRACTO PER LOCOS EXTRINSECOS.
CAPUT I.
De considerationibus acceptis a contrariis.
Sic autem determinato problemate de genere per locos intrinsecos, videndum est quomodo idem problema per locos extrinsecos habeat terminari. Considerabimus autem primo in contrarie oppositis dicentes et ponentes primo considerationes destructivas: post constructivas etiam ponemus ad doctrinae sufficientiam. Docemus ergo discernere genus comparatum ad suam speciem, quando species habet contrarium suum. Et deinde ponemus considerationes a contrariis, specie contrarium non habente, dicentes.
Amplius, praeter omnia quae intrinsecus generi sunt adducta ad generis destructionem, considerandum est si ei quod assignatum est pro specie, aliquid sit contrarium. Est autem multiplex haec consideratio: quia variatur tam inspiciendo in extrema contrariorum, quam etiam inspiciendo in media. Inspiciendo quidem extrema secundum quod sunt in eodem genere, et secundum quod sunt in diverso genere, et secundum quod sunt in uno genere: et sic inspectio in extrema variatur. Primum quidem igitur considerandum si contrarium assignatae speciei sit in eodem genere cum ipsa specie: quia contraria sunt quae posita sub eodem genere maxime a se distant. Adhuc autem, quia vera contraria habent fieri circa idem materiale cui respondet genus, oportet igitur contrarium speciei assignatae in eodem genere esse, si nihil sit contrarium generi, sed speciei tantum: et si contrarium speciei non est in eodem genere cum specie assignata, non est genus quod assignatum est pro genere.
Consideratione autem secunda considerandum si tam species assignata quam genus habent contrarium. Inspiciendum autem si contrarium speciei sit in contrario genere, sicut est assignata in proposito genere: necesse est enim contrarium speciei esse in contrario genere cum sit generi assignato ad contrarium. Palam est unumquodque eorum quae dicta sunt per inductionem: et si contrarium specie non in contrario genere, non est bene assignatum genus quod pro genere dictum est inesse.
Rursum si ambo habeant contraria et genus et species, considerandum est in contrario speciei utrum sit in genere, vel genus in genere, ut bonum: bonum enim et malum genera sunt aliorum, praecipue in moribus: quia ad ipsa omnia alia referuntur per praedicationem, et non convertitur. Sunt autem contraria secundum quod in habitibus et actibus accipiuntur. Considerandum ergo si contrarium speciei non est in genere, sed genus sit: si enim hoc non est in genere, sed genus, nec contrarium generi est in genere sed genus: et si assignatum sit in genere existens, est male assignatum: sicut accidit in bono et in malo: neutrum enim horum est in genere, sed utrumque est genus.
Deinde considerandum est in contrariis medium habentibus per inspectionem ad media. Considerandum ergo si contrarium alicui et in genere et in specie, ita quod genus et species habeant contraria et contrariorum generum vel specierum est aliquod medium: illorum autem reliquorum nihil est medium: tunc male assignatum est genus. Nam si contrariorum generum est aliquod medium, et contrariarum specierum erit aliquod medium: et si specierum contrariarum est aliquod medium, erit etiam contrariorum generum aliquod medium, sicut patet in virtute et vitio quae sunt contraria genera, et justitia et injustitia quae sunt contrariae species: utrorumque enim est aliquod medium: virtutis quidem et vitii indifferens quod nec vitium nec virtus est, vel bonum in genere: sed potentia est utrumque. Justitiae autem et injustitiae medium est quod nec communicativum nec distributivum est.
TREATISE II
ON LOGICAL GENUS, OR GENUS NOT CONTRACTED, THROUGH EXTRINSIC LOCI.
CHAPTER I.
On considerations accepted from contraries.
With the problem concerning genus thus determined through intrinsic loci, one must see how the same problem is to be terminated through extrinsic loci. But first we shall consider in contrary opposites, first saying and setting down destructive considerations; afterward we shall also set down constructive ones for the sufficiency of the doctrine. Therefore we teach how to discern genus compared to its species when the species has its contrary. And then we shall set down considerations from contraries when the species does not have a contrary, by speaking of them.
Moreover, besides all the things that have been brought intrinsically to genus for the destruction of genus, one must consider whether something is contrary to that which has been assigned as species. This consideration is multiple, because it is varied both by inspecting the extremes of contraries and also by inspecting the middles. The extremes are inspected according as they are in the same genus, according as they are in a diverse genus, and according as they are in one genus; and thus inspection concerning the extremes is varied. First, then, one must consider whether the contrary of the assigned species is in the same genus with the species itself, because contraries are those things which, placed under the same genus, are maximally distant from each other. Furthermore, because true contraries have to occur concerning the same material thing to which the genus responds, therefore the contrary of the assigned species must be in the same genus if nothing is contrary to the genus but only to the species; and if the contrary of the species is not in the same genus with the assigned species, it is not the genus that was assigned as genus.
But by a second consideration one must consider whether both the assigned species and the genus have a contrary. One must inspect whether the contrary of the species is in the contrary genus, just as the assigned species is in the proposed genus; for the contrary of the species must be in the contrary genus, since it is contrary to the assigned genus. Each of the things that have been said is plain by induction; and if the contrary in species is not in the contrary genus, the genus said to inhere as genus has not been well assigned.
Again, if both have contraries, both genus and species, one must consider in the contrary of the species whether it is in a genus, or the genus is in a genus, as good is. For good and evil are genera of other things, especially in morals, because all other things are referred to them through predication, and it is not converted. But they are contraries according as they are taken in habits and acts. Therefore one must consider whether the contrary of the species is not in a genus, but the genus is. For if this is not in a genus but is a genus, neither is the contrary to the genus in a genus, but is a genus; and if what exists in a genus has been assigned, it has been badly assigned, as happens in good and evil: neither of these is in a genus, but each is a genus.
Next, in contraries having a middle, one must consider by inspection of middles. Therefore one must consider whether there is a contrary to something both in genus and in species, so that genus and species have contraries, and there is some middle of contrary genera or species, while of the remaining things there is no middle. Then genus has been badly assigned. For if there is some middle of contrary genera, there will be some middle also of contrary species; and if there is some middle of contrary species, there will also be some middle of contrary genera, as is clear in virtue and vice, which are contrary genera, and justice and injustice, which are contrary species. For of each pair there is some middle: of virtue and vice, the indifferent which is neither vice nor virtue, or good in genus, but is potentially each; and of justice and injustice the middle is that which is neither communicative nor distributive.
[Marginal label, printed page 369: Removet dubium.]
De speciali enim justitia loquimur: et non de generali vel heroica justitia: quia taliter dicta justitia et injustitia medium non habent.
Instantia tamen videtur hujus considerationis: quoniam sanitatis et aegritudinis in corporalibus non est medium: boni autem et mali medium est. Sed hujus solutio est, quod bonum et malum non uno modo sumuntur secundum quod sunt genera in moribus, et secundum quod sunt genera sanitatis et aegritudinis. In moribus enim medium habent in quibus est bonum simpliciter, et malum simpliciter sive per se. Secundum autem quod sunt consequentia ad sanitatem et aegritudinem, non sunt genera, sed transcendentia quae sunt in omni genere et non in uno genere qualitatis: et sicut in genere logico hoc modo non sunt contraria: sed opponuntur ut privatio et habitus: quae medium non habent: et ideo instantia non impedit considerationem. Unde quidam dicunt quod de moralibus contrariis intelligitur, et non de naturalibus. Primum dictum est melius.
Adhuc autem si utraque contraria et genera et species habeant, et utraque habeant media 1. Considerandum est si similiter sive uniformiter ponantur utrorumque media, vel non uniformiter: sed horum quaedam media ponantur per extremorum abnegationem: illorum autem ponantur ut subjectum in extremis, hoc est, per extremorum participationem: quia id quod extrema participant, subjicitur eisdem ut principiis constituentibus ipsum: quamvis hoc non sit necessarium: tamen probabile et ut in pluribus est verum, quod medium in utrisque, hoc est, contrariis generibus et contrariis speciebus sit similiter sive uniformiter, sicut in virtute et vitio, inter quae est medium per abnegationem: et justitia et injustitia, inter quae est medium similiter per abnegationem: in utrisque enim horum secundum abnegationem est medium.
Amplius adhuc tertio inspiciendum est etiam ad contrariorum medium: quando enim non est generi assignato aliquid contrarium, sed species assignata habet contrarium: tunc enim tantum non considerandum est ad contrarium, sed ad medium quod est inter contraria, ita quod tunc non tantum contrarium cum contrario debet esse in eodem genere, sed etiam medium quod est inter ea, debet esse ejusdem in eodem genere: et si non, male assignatum est genus: quia in genere in quo sunt summa, hoc est, extrema, in eodem est medium inter ea, praecipue si dicitur medium participatione extremorum, sicut patet in albo et nigro extremis in colore: quia color est unum genus horum mediorum colorum.
[Marginal label, printed page 369: He removes a doubt.]
For we are speaking of special justice, and not of general or heroic justice, because justice and injustice spoken of in that way do not have a middle.
Yet there seems to be an instance against this consideration, since of health and sickness in bodily things there is no middle, but of good and evil there is a middle. But the solution of this is that good and evil are not taken in one way insofar as they are genera in morals and insofar as they are genera of health and sickness. For in morals they have a middle, in which there is good simply and evil simply or per se. But insofar as they are consequents upon health and sickness, they are not genera, but transcendent things which are in every genus and not in one genus of quality; and as in logical genus, in this way they are not contraries, but are opposed as privation and habit, which have no middle. And therefore the instance does not impede the consideration. Hence some say that it is understood of moral contraries and not of natural contraries. The first statement is better.
Furthermore, if both contraries, both genera and species, have middles 1, one must consider whether the middles of each are posited similarly or uniformly, or not uniformly; but whether some middles of these are posited through negation of the extremes, while the middles of those are posited as a subject in the extremes, that is, through participation of the extremes, because that which the extremes participate is subjected to the same extremes as principles constituting it. Although this is not necessary, nevertheless it is probable and true in the majority of cases that the middle in both, that is, in contrary genera and contrary species, is similarly or uniformly present, as in virtue and vice, between which there is a middle through negation; and justice and injustice, between which there is a middle similarly through negation; for in both of these there is a middle according to negation.
Moreover, thirdly, one must also inspect the middle of contraries: for when there is not anything contrary to the assigned genus, but the assigned species has a contrary, then one must consider not only the contrary but the middle which is between the contraries, so that then not only the contrary with the contrary ought to be in the same genus, but also the middle which is between them ought to be of the same thing in the same genus. And if not, genus has been badly assigned, because in the genus in which the highest things, that is, the extremes, are, in the same genus there is the middle between them, especially if the middle is said by participation of the extremes, as is clear in white and black, extremes in color, because color is one genus of these middle colors.
Instantia tamen etiam contra hanc considerationem esse videtur: quia egestas et abundantia in vitiis distant a medio: et audacia et timiditas sunt extrema: et fortitudo quae media est, non est in eodem genere cum extremis: cum extrema sint in genere mali, virtus autem medium est in genere boni. Nec videtur esse instantia contra hanc considerationem in media: quia ista est de eo quod habet contrarium in genere. Instantia autem de eodem quod in genere habet: quia egestas et abundantia sunt contraria genera: et ideo dicunt quidam quod instantia est, quae videtur et non est. Et sic ad minus est instantia contra hoc quod dictum est, in eodem genere sunt extrema et medium. Sed intelligendum est quod extrema superabundantia et defectus sunt extrema in malo, et ideo sunt in genere uno: utrumque enim et abundat et deficit a genere boni: quod est in medio. Et hoc modo virtus in medio est, quae nihil abundat nec deficit a medio. Et ideo in bono virtus est extremum non medium. Consideratio autem est de his quae omni modo medium sunt per participationem extremorum, sicut est in coloribus in quibus medium participat genus sicut et extremum coloris: quod non potest esse in egestate et abundantia: quia medium causa est quod cum extremis in eodem genere esse non potest: eo quod in bonum extremum esse causatur ab ipsa mediatione, quae causat abnegationem generis extremorum: et haec est vera sententia instantiae et causa: sed si medium non esset nisi medium et non extremum, sequitur, quod si contrarium haberet species et medium, et genus, non quod in eodem genere esset medium cum extremis: sed quia ab eo efficitur medium per circumstantias et extremum in bono, ideo oportet quod sit in alio genere quam extremum. Medius autem color per ipsam mediationem non constituitur nisi in natura ipsa ejusdem generis et ad speciem determinatur in illa, et ideo oportet quod sit in eodem genere cum extremis.
[Marginal label, printed page 370: Objectio.]
Et si quis objiciat, quod tunc non est generalis consideratio,
[Marginal label, printed page 370: Solutio.]
Dicendum quod sufficit quod ipsa dialectica sit in pluribus: et si non in omnibus, tamen generalis est in talibus mediis de quibus dictum est.
Amplius autem inspiciendo ad medium e contrario inductae considerationi: et si genus quidem aliquod contrarium est assignato generi, species autem assignata non est contraria alicui speciei: nam si genus est alicui contrarium, oportet quod species sit contraria eidem in speciem considerato, et ad speciem deducto, quemadmodum virtus et vitia contraria sunt genera, et justitia et injustitia contrariae species: et si justitia est virtus, erit injustitia vitium. Unde si genus assignatum habeat contrarium, assignata autem species non habeat contrarium, non est genus quod assignatum est pro genere. Exemplum autem hujus per oppositum: quemadmodum virtus et vitium sunt genera contraria, et justitia et injustitia sunt contrariae species: ut etiam hoc modo homo species non habeat contrarium, sicut justitia et injustitia contrariae sunt. Similiter et in aliis exemplis consideranti medium esse videtur.
Nevertheless, there also seems to be an instance against this consideration, because poverty and abundance in vices are distant from the middle, and rashness and timidity are extremes, and fortitude, which is a middle, is not in the same genus with the extremes, since the extremes are in the genus of evil, but virtue, the middle, is in the genus of good. Nor does there seem to be an instance against this consideration in middles, because that consideration concerns that which has a contrary in the genus. But the instance concerns the same thing which it has in the genus, because poverty and abundance are contrary genera; and therefore some say that it is an instance which seems to be one and is not. And thus at least it is an instance against what has been said, that extremes and middle are in the same genus. But it must be understood that the extremes, superabundance and defect, are extremes in evil, and therefore are in one genus; for each both abounds and falls short from the genus of good, which is in the middle. And in this way virtue is in the middle, since it neither abounds nor falls short from the middle; and therefore in the good, virtue is an extreme, not a middle. But the consideration concerns those things which in every way are a middle through participation of extremes, as happens in colors, in which the middle participates the genus just as the extreme of color does. This cannot be so in poverty and abundance, because the middle is the cause that it cannot be in the same genus with the extremes, since being an extreme in the good is caused by the mediation itself, which causes the negation of the genus of the extremes. And this is the true meaning and cause of the instance. But if the middle were nothing except a middle and not an extreme, it follows that if the species and middle and genus had a contrary, not that the middle would be in the same genus with the extremes, but because by it a middle is made through circumstances and an extreme in the good, therefore it must be in another genus than the extreme. But a middle color is constituted by its very mediation only in the very nature of the same genus and is determined to species in it; and therefore it must be in the same genus with the extremes.
[Marginal label, printed page 370: Objection.]
And if someone objects that then the consideration is not general,
[Marginal label, printed page 370: Solution.]
it must be said that it is enough that dialectic itself holds in the majority of cases; and if not in all, nevertheless it is general in such middles about which it has been said.
Moreover, by inspecting the middle contrary to the introduced consideration: and if indeed some genus is contrary to the assigned genus, but the assigned species is not contrary to any species, for if the genus is contrary to something, the species must be contrary to the same thing considered in species and brought down to species, just as virtue and vices are contrary genera, and justice and injustice are contrary species; and if justice is virtue, injustice will be vice. Hence if the assigned genus has a contrary, but the assigned species does not have a contrary, what has been assigned as genus is not genus. But an example of this is through the opposite: just as virtue and vice are contrary genera, and justice and injustice are contrary species, so also in this way human being as species does not have a contrary, as justice and injustice are contraries. Similarly also in other examples a middle seems to exist to one considering.
Instantia tamen videtur esse in quibusdam: in sanitate enim et aegritudine, et simpliciter universaliter sanitas aegritudini contraria est. Quaedam autem aegritudo species est aegritudinis, nullum habens contrarium in specie: cum tamen sanitas et aegritudo bene sunt assignata genera. Quaedam autem aegritudo nullum habens contrarium sicut febris et ophtalmia, quod est oculi apostema. Et intellige quod haec instantia non impedit considerationem, quia revera contraria genera contrarias habent species. Sed quando species causatur a privatione medii quod genus constituit, tunc non habet nomen nisi in genere, sicut ophtalmia dicitur aegritudo: quia sanitas est medium in complexione et debita proportione compositionis et figurae totius corporis et omnium membrorum, et ophtalmia est solutio figurae in debita proportione, et febris solutio medii in debita complexione, quod in speciali hoc vel isto non habet nisi genus in quod dicatur haec ut infirmitas aliquo speciali sic dicta: et cum primum habitum sanitatis in toto corpore et medium contrarium non habet secundum quod est in hoc, sed secundum quod est in toto corpore, quia pars in toto et non totum in parte, aegritudo partis solvit medii rationem: quia non omnes istae considerationes a contrariis et mediis destructivae sunt.
Ideo epilogando subjungimus, quod ei qui intendit interimere problema de genere inspiciendo in contrariis et mediis, tot modis qui dicti sunt inspiciendum est: si enim insunt generi vel speciei secundum inspectionem ad contraria vel media quae dicta sunt, palam quoniam non est genus quod assignatum est pro genere.
Construere autem volenti problema de genere, tripliciter considerandum est in istis. Primum quidem si genere non habente contrarium, sed specie habente contrarium, considerandum est si contrarium speciei sit in dicto genere: nam si contrarium est in genere assignato, tunc est medium quod etiam species proposita est in eodem, quia contraria sunt in eodem genere: et sic verum assignatum est genus. Amplius si medium inter contraria speciei sit in eodem genere: quia tunc bene assignatum est genus loquendo de medio participatione extremorum, ut paulo ante dictum est. Rursum tertio modo quando et generi et speciei est contrarium, si contraria species in contrario, et alterum contrarium in altero generi illi contrario: tunc enim palam est, quod sicut contrarium est in contrario, etiam propositum est in proposito: et tunc iterum bene assignatum est genus.
Nevertheless, there seems to be an instance in some cases: for in health and sickness, and simply and universally, health is contrary to sickness. But a certain sickness is a species of sickness having no contrary in species, although health and sickness are well assigned genera. But a certain sickness has no contrary, such as fever and ophthalmia, which is an abscess of the eye. And understand that this instance does not impede the consideration, because in truth contrary genera have contrary species. But when a species is caused by privation of the middle which constitutes the genus, then it has a name only in the genus, as ophthalmia is called sickness, because health is a middle in complexion and due proportion of composition and figure of the whole body and of all members, and ophthalmia is a dissolution of figure in due proportion, and fever a dissolution of the middle in due complexion; and this in this or that special case has only the genus in which it is said, as such an infirmity specially so called. And since the first habit of health in the whole body, and the middle contrary, is not present according as it is in this part but according as it is in the whole body, because the part is in the whole and not the whole in the part, sickness of the part dissolves the account of the middle; for not all these considerations from contraries and middles are destructive.
Therefore, by epiloguing, we add that one who intends to destroy a problem concerning genus by inspecting contraries and middles must inspect in as many ways as have been stated. For if they belong to the genus or species according to inspection of the contraries or middles that have been named, it is plain that what has been assigned as genus is not genus.
But one who wishes to construct the problem concerning genus must consider triply in these matters. First, when the genus does not have a contrary but the species has a contrary, one must consider whether the contrary of the species is in the genus named. For if the contrary is in the assigned genus, then the middle is that the proposed species also is in the same genus, because contraries are in the same genus; and thus the assigned genus is true. Moreover, if the middle between the contraries of the species is in the same genus, then the genus has been well assigned, speaking of the middle by participation of extremes, as was said a little before. Again, in a third way, when both genus and species have a contrary, if the contrary species is in the contrary, and the other contrary in the other genus contrary to it, then it is plain that just as contrary is in contrary, the proposed is also in the proposed; and then again the genus has been well assigned.
Notes
- From this it is clear that according to the Philosopher the middle is twofold, namely through participation and through negation. P. J. (Ex quo patet quod duplex est medium secundum Philosophum, scilicet per participationem et per negationem. P. J.) ↩
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