Volume 2 · pp. 360–363
Chapter III. On considerations accepted by considering several genera
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CAPUT III.
De considerationibus acceptis considerando ad plura genera.
His habitis quae inspectionem ad unum genus assignatum considerare debent, considerandum est in plura genera si alius aliud genus assignatae speciei posuit, videndum si aliud genus est ejusdem speciei, quod nec continet assignatum genus, nec subalternans ipsum, neque continetur sub illo sicut subalternatum: si enim tale genus aliud ab assignato invenerit, id quod assignatum est pro genere, non erit genus. Cujus exemplum est Socratis, ut si quis tanquam assignatae speciei ponat justitiae genus esse scientiam communicandorum vel distribuendorum, consideranti autem statim occurrit, quod aliud genus est justitiae quod est virtus moralis, et neutrum horum continet alterum: propter quod non potest esse scientiam genus justitiae: quamvis enim scientiae genus sit virtus, non tamen est virtus moralis: quia scientia est speculativa, et virtus moralis est habitus in modum naturae rationi consentaneus, ut dicit Tullius: et hoc modo sub uno communi non continentur, sed sub diversis sunt ordinibus praedicabilium: et medium virtutis est inter plus et minus: medium autem scientiae est ratio recta, ut in VI Ethicorum dicit Aristoteles, et si utrumque dicatur virtus, non erit hoc per unam rationem: et ideo virtus non est genus unum sub quo ambo contineantur. Quod autem secundum unam rationem non praedicatur de contentis, non est genus, neque praedicatur ut genus.
Calumniam autem videtur habere quod dictum est et instantiam: videtur enim quando sive aliquando, quod una assignata species sub duobus generibus est, quod alterum sub altero generum illorum contineatur ut in pluribus, habet tamen dubitationem in quibusdam, et non videtur generaliter verum esse: quibusdam enim videtur quod prudentia, quae est assignata et debita species, et virtus sit, sive in genere virtutum, et scientia, hoc est, in genere scientiae esse: et neutrum istorum generum a neutro videtur contineri: et sic instantiam videtur habere inducta consideratio.
Sed ad hoc respondeo, quod non ab omnibus conceditur prudentiam scientiam esse: quamvis enim exemplum ejus sit agendorum ratio recta, non est tamen nisi his quae sunt, ad finem ad quem tendunt, ut nulla virtus moralis: et ideo non est scientia absolute, quae non consideret nisi verum, et sit ad finem veri sicut scientia. Et si quis admittit verum esse quod dictum est, prudentiam esse scientiam, non tamen est necessarium neque videtur esse necessarium, quod scientia est virtus, aut sint sicut genera subalterna, quorum unum sub altero continetur, ut scientia sub virtute, quae ejusdem, hoc est, prudentiae genera esse dicuntur: sed satis est quod ambo sint sub eodem genere subalternante utrumque, quemadmodum in virtute et scientia accidit; utraque enim sunt sub eodem genere: nam utrumque istorum secundum generis praedicationem est habitus et dispositio certa, sicut dictum est. Proponatur consideratio sic, quod considerandum si aliud a genere assignato inventum est genus assignatae speciei, ita quod illa duo genera sic se habeant, quod neutrum illorum quae dicta sunt, inest generi quod assignatum est, et quod nec unum sub alio est, nec sub eodem genere ambo sunt genera: tunc non erit genus quod assignatum est pro genere.
CHAPTER III.
On considerations accepted by considering several genera.
After these things have been had, which ought to consider inspection toward one assigned genus, one must consider several genera: if someone has posited another genus of the assigned species, one must see whether there is another genus of the same species which neither contains the assigned genus, nor subalternates it, nor is contained under it as subalternated. For if he finds such a genus other than the assigned one, that which was assigned as genus will not be genus. The example belongs to Socrates: if someone, as of an assigned species, posits that the genus of justice is the science of things to be communicated or distributed, yet it immediately occurs to one considering that there is another genus of justice, namely moral virtue, and neither of these contains the other. Therefore science cannot be the genus of justice; for although the genus of science is virtue, nevertheless it is not moral virtue, because science is speculative, and moral virtue is a habit, consonant with reason in the manner of nature, as Tullius says. And in this way they are not contained under one common thing, but are under diverse orders of predicables. And the mean of virtue is between excess and defect; but the mean of science is right reason, as Aristotle says in book VI of the Ethics. And if each is called virtue, this will not be by one account; and therefore virtue is not one genus under which both are contained. But what is not predicated of the things contained under one account is not a genus, nor is it predicated as genus.
But what has been said seems to have a cavil and an instance. For it seems that when, or at some time, one assigned species is under two genera, the one of those genera is contained under the other, as in many cases; nevertheless it has doubt in some cases and does not seem to be generally true. For to some it seems that prudence, which is the assigned and due species, is both virtue, or in the genus of virtues, and science, that is, to be in the genus of science; and neither of those genera seems to be contained by the other. And thus the consideration introduced seems to have an instance against it.
But to this I answer that it is not granted by all that prudence is science. For although its example is right reason concerning things to be done, nevertheless it belongs only to those things that are toward the end to which they tend, as no moral virtue does; and therefore it is not science absolutely, which considers nothing except the true and is toward the end of truth as science is. And if someone admits that what has been said is true, that prudence is science, nevertheless it is not necessary, nor does it seem necessary, that science is virtue, or that they are like subaltern genera of which one is contained under the other, as science under virtue, which are said to be genera of the same thing, that is, of prudence. But it is enough that both are under the same genus subalternating each, as happens in virtue and science; for each is under the same genus, since each of these according to the predication of genus is a habit and a certain disposition, as has been said. Let the consideration be proposed thus: one must consider whether another genus of the assigned species has been found besides the assigned genus, so that those two genera are related in such a way that neither of those which have been named inheres in the genus that has been assigned, and that neither one is under the other, nor are both genera under the same genus. Then the genus that has been assigned as genus will not be genus.
Adhuc autem an genera non subalterna considerandum est et inspiciendum est in genus assignati generis, et sic semper ascendendo in eadem linea praedicamentali ascendendum est et videndum si omnia superiora genera praedicantur in quid, per hanc maximam, quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subjecto, omnia quae de praedicato dicuntur, et de subjecto dicuntur, et eadem praedicatione dici oportet: et ideo si genus assignatum praedicatur in quid, omnia superiora de eadem specie in quid praedicabuntur. Nam omne superius genere assignato de specie assignata in quid praedicari oportet: et si aliud superiorum assignati generis non praedicatur de specie assignata, non erit genus quod assignatum est pro genere.
Rursum in plura genera subalternatim posita inspiciendum est penes hoc, quod oportet inferius participare suum superius, et non e contrario. Considerandum ergo si assignatum genus vel aliud genus in recta linea super genus assignatum sit: eo quod nullum quod est superius, participat quod inferius: et si ergo tale genus sit assignatum quod vel ipsum vel aliud superiorum participat speciem assignatam, non erit genus quod pro genere est assignatum. Hac consideratione utendum est destruenti, quemadmodum dictum est: astruenti autem sive problema astruere volenti, si concedat, quod id quod assignatum est pro genere, insit speciei cujus esse assignatum est etiam ponendo inesse, adhuc dubitat utrum id quod assignatum est pro genere, assignatae insit ut genus, cum tamen non dubitet quin insit ut praedicatum, sufficit ostendere quod aliquid superiorum in recta linea ad genus assignatum inest speciei assignatae in eo quod quid est sicut inest genus: uno enim talium superiorum in eo quod quid est de assignata specie praedicato: omnia quae superiora sunt ad illud, in eo quod quid est praedicantur de eadem specie: et hoc est verum si sint superiora his de quibus praedicantur secundum rectam lineam: omnia enim taliter superiora praedicantur in eo quod quid est sicut inest genus suis inferioribus: propter quod assignatum genus in eo quod quid est praedicabitur, si aliud suorum superiorum in eo quod quid est praedicetur; et si unum assignatum est pro genere.
Furthermore, whether genera are not subaltern must be considered, and one must inspect the genus of the assigned genus; and thus one must always ascend by ascending in the same predicamental line and see whether all the superior genera are predicated in what a thing is, through this maxim: when one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all the things that are said of the predicate are said also of the subject, and they must be said by the same predication. And therefore if the assigned genus is predicated in what a thing is, all the superiors will be predicated in what it is of the same species. For every superior above the assigned genus must be predicated in what it is of the assigned species; and if some other of the superiors of the assigned genus is not predicated of the assigned species, the genus that has been assigned as genus will not be genus.
Again, in several genera placed subalternately, one must inspect according to this, that the inferior must participate its superior, and not the reverse. Therefore one must consider whether the assigned genus, or another genus, is in the straight line above the assigned genus, because nothing that is superior participates what is inferior. And therefore if such a genus has been assigned that either it itself or some other of the superiors participates the assigned species, it will not be the genus that has been assigned as genus. This consideration must be used by one destroying, as has been said. But for one constructing, or wishing to construct the problem, if he grants that that which has been assigned as genus inheres in the species of which it has been assigned to be the genus, even by positing inhering, and still doubts whether that which has been assigned as genus inheres in the assigned thing as genus, although he does not doubt that it inheres as predicate, it suffices to show that some one of the superiors in the straight line to the assigned genus inheres in the assigned species in what it is, just as genus inheres. For when one of such superiors is predicated in what it is of the assigned species, all things that are superior to that are predicated in what it is of the same species; and this is true if they are superior to the things of which they are predicated according to a straight line. For all such superiors are predicated in what a thing is, just as genus inheres in its inferiors. Therefore the assigned genus will be predicated in what it is, if another of its superiors is predicated in what it is, and if one thing has been assigned as genus.
Quoniam autem uno taliter superiorum in eo quod quid est de specie assignato praedicato, omnia alia in eo quod quid est praedicantur. Sumendum ergo etiam inductione in omnibus generibus praedicamentorum, quamvis hoc in Praedicamentis sit determinatum: et sic quidem faciendum est quando non dubitat, sed sine dubitatione certum est, quod insit speciei et praedicetur de specie id quod pro genere est assignatum: tunc non sufficit ostendere id tantum quod et aliud superiorum generum illi quod dubitatur inesse, in eo quod quid est praedicetur et de specie assignata, sed oportet duo ostendere sicut duo sunt in dubitatione, etiam quando dubitatur utrum insit, et utrum ut genus insit: oportet enim ostendere, quod superiorum aliud insit ut genus, et quod nullum genus ex opposito divisum contra genus assignatum praedicatur de assignata specie: quia diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae. Hujus exemplum est, ut si ambulationis tanquam assignatae speciei genus assignetur latio, sive secundum locum mutatio, non sufficit ostendere quoniam ambulatio est motus, et quod motus de ambulatione praedicatur in quid, eo quod alii praeter lationem motus sunt: sed oportet hoc ostendere, quod ambulatio nullum contentorum sub motu participat de numero eorum quae sunt secundum divisionem, nisi lationem solum: et ideo quia est necesse quod id quod genus participat, aliquam specierum etiam, quae sit in genere illo, participare: quia praedicatur participative de genere, praedicatur et participative de specie. Praedicentur quaecumque sunt participata de inferioribus secundum primam et rectam divisionem, nisi lationem solam: et tunc sic arguendum est, quod si ambulatio nec augmentum participat nec diminutionem nec aliorum motuum aliquam praelationem, tunc medium est quod lationem et genus participabit: et ideo sequitur, quod latio erit genus ambulationis.
Adhuc in subalternis generibus considerandum est, si id quod assignatum est pro genere, praedicatur in quid de eisdem de quibus praedicatur in quid assignata species. Similiter considerandum, si omnia quae directe supra genus assignatum sunt, de eadem et eisdem praedicentur: quoniam si alicui in aliquo eorum quae superius sunt, dissonant, palam quoniam non est genus quod assignatum est pro genere: si enim esset genus, omnia superiora hoc et etiam plus quod assignatum est pro genere, de specie assignata in eo quod quid est praedicarentur: et quando non sic est, non est genus quod assignatum est pro genere. Destruere igitur volenti utile est considerare si non praedicatur genus vel aliquod superiorum assignatum pro genere in eo quod quid est: accidit enim in omnibus coordinationibus genus et speciem de eodem in eo quod quid est praedicari. Astruere autem volenti utile est videre si aliquod praedicatum vel aliquod superius ad ipsum in eo quod quid est praedicetur: tunc enim accidit, hoc est, sequitur, et genus assignatum et speciem assignatam de eodem in eo quod quid est praedicari: propter quod etiam ipsum quod est species assignata cum sub duobus sit generibus, necesse est ista genera esse subalterna, quorum unum sub altero continetur, si ostendatur quod id quod voluimus genus esse non contineri sub specie: tunc palam est quod sequitur, quod sub hoc alterum sicut species sub genere erit: quia ex quo subalterna sunt, et id quod sub illo non continetur, necesse est sub reliquo contineri, et reliquum sub alio contineri. Sic ergo in genera tam subalterna quam non subalterna considerandum: quia si illud non est genus quod praeter haec accipitur, tunc patet quod nec illud est genus quod assignatum est pro genere.
But because, when one such superior is predicated in what it is of the assigned species, all the others are predicated in what it is, one must therefore take this also by induction in all the genera of the predicaments, although this has been determined in the Categories. And thus it must indeed be done when one does not doubt, but it is certain without doubt, that what has been assigned as genus inheres in the species and is predicated of the species. Then it is not enough to show only that some other of the superior genera of that which is doubted to inhere is predicated in what it is and of the assigned species; rather, two things must be shown, just as there are two things in doubt, even when it is doubted whether it inheres and whether it inheres as genus. For one must show that some other of the superiors inheres as genus, and that no genus divided from the opposite against the assigned genus is predicated of the assigned species, because of diverse genera not placed subalternately there are diverse species and differences. An example of this is: if locomotion, or change according to place, is assigned as the genus of walking as of an assigned species, it is not enough to show that walking is motion and that motion is predicated of walking in what it is, because there are motions other than locomotion. Rather, one must show that walking participates none of the things contained under motion from the number of those things that are according to division, except locomotion alone. And therefore, because it is necessary that what participates a genus also participates some one of the species that is in that genus, since it is predicated participatively of the genus and is predicated participatively also of the species, whatever things are participated by inferiors according to the first and straight division must be predicated, except locomotion alone. And then one must argue thus: if walking participates neither increase nor diminution nor any priorlation of the other motions, then the middle term is that it will participate locomotion and genus; and therefore it follows that locomotion will be the genus of walking.
Furthermore, in subaltern genera one must consider whether that which has been assigned as genus is predicated in what a thing is of the same things of which the assigned species is predicated in what a thing is. Similarly one must consider whether all things that are directly above the assigned genus are predicated of the same and of the same things, because if they are discordant for someone in one of those things which are superior, it is plain that it is not the genus that has been assigned as genus. For if it were genus, all the superiors, both this and also the further superior which has been assigned as genus, would be predicated of the assigned species in what it is; and when it is not so, it is not the genus that has been assigned as genus. Therefore for one wishing to destroy, it is useful to consider whether the genus, or some superior of the thing assigned as genus, is not predicated in what a thing is. For in all coordinations it happens that genus and species are predicated of the same thing in what it is. But for one wishing to construct, it is useful to see whether some predicate or some superior to it is predicated in what a thing is. For then it happens, that is, it follows, that both the assigned genus and the assigned species are predicated of the same thing in what it is. Therefore also, since that very thing which is the assigned species is under two genera, those genera must be subaltern, of which one is contained under the other, if it is shown that that which we wished to be genus is not contained under the species. Then it is plain that it follows that under this the other will be as species under genus, because since they are subaltern, and that which is not contained under that must be contained under the remaining one, and the remaining one contained under the other. Therefore one must consider in genera both subaltern and not subaltern, because if that is not the genus which is taken in addition to these, then it is clear that neither is that the genus which has been assigned as genus.
Adhuc considerandum ad totam rationem generum, et non tantum in particulas quae ponuntur in diffinitionibus generum eorum quae assignata sunt, vel quae superiora ipsorum. Considerandum autem et rationem illorum generum, si aptantur per convenientiam substantialem ad assignatam speciem: necesse est enim omnes rationes generum superiorum praedicari de assignata specie, et de omnibus his quae participant speciem, sicut inferiora superiora sua participant. Si ergo in aliquo dissonet, quod ratio superiorum inferiori non aptatur, palam quod non est genus quod pro genere est assignatum. Sic ergo in particulas diffinitiones generis, et in eas quae particulas consequuntur, ut in totam diffinitionem generum tam non subalternorum quam subalternorum est considerandum: quae omnia in linea recte ascendenti praedicamentali considerantur: quae considerationes sunt plurimum destructivae, aliquae tamen sunt constructivae, in aliquibus admixtae. Quod autem est dictum, quod diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae, ideo est, quia si esset genus unum talium specierum, hoc esset de diffinitione utriusque, et sic unum esset diffinitivum duorum oppositorum, quod est inconveniens.
Furthermore one must consider the whole account of genera, and not only the particles which are placed in the definitions of the genera of those things which have been assigned, or which are their superiors. One must also consider the account of those genera, whether they are adapted by substantial agreement to the assigned species. For all accounts of superior genera must be predicated of the assigned species, and of all those things which participate the species, just as inferiors participate their superiors. Therefore if there is discord in something, so that the account of the superiors is not adapted to the inferior, it is plain that it is not the genus that has been assigned as genus. Therefore one must consider in this way both the particles of the definition of genus and those things which follow the particles, as also the whole definition of genera, both non-subaltern and subaltern, which are all considered in the straight ascending predicamental line. These considerations are for the most part destructive, though some are constructive, and in some cases mixed. But what was said, that of diverse genera not placed subalternately there are diverse species and differences, is so because, if there were one genus of such species, this would be in the definition of each, and thus one thing would be definitive of two opposites, which is unfitting.
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