Volume 2 · pp. 350–352
TREATISE III. CHAPTER I. On particular determination
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TRACTATUS III.
DE DETERMINATIONE PROBLEMATIS PARTICULARIS ET DETERMINATI.
CAPUT I.
De determinatione particularis.
Hucusque a principio secundi hujus scientiae libri dictum est, qualiter destruitur et construitur problema de inesse et accidente, sive simpliciter insit, et non contractum et comparatum accipiatur, sive accipiatur ut contractum et comparatum. Deinceps autem determinandum est de problemate particulari. Et cum duplex sit problema particulare, et particulare secundum rem et particulare secundum modum, et particulare secundum rem et non secundum modum, prius determinandum de eo quod est particulare secundum rem et modum, quod quidem in re particulariter et non universaliter inest, et signum habet particulare per quod particulariter inesse designatur, ut quidam homo currit: et deinde dicendum erit de particulari secundum rem et non secundum modum particularis determinatum, quod est infimum. Adhuc autem particulare secundum rem et modum potest terminari absque hypothesi construendo, sive sit affirmativum sive negativum: potest etiam terminari cum hypothesi destruendo. Primo modo dicamus qualiter particulariter et universaliter positum problema de accidente construatur absque hypothesi.
Dicimus igitur, quod si particulariter et non universaliter problema de accidente ponatur, primum notandum, quod communes loci praeinducti ad problema de accidente universaliter posito, sive sint destructivi, sive constructivi, omnes sunt utiles ad terminandum problema particulare: constructivi enim construunt affirmativum, et destructivi construunt negativum. Nam nos universaliter interimentes problema de accidente et universaliter construentes, ut particulare positum idem de accidente problema perimatur. Si enim sit probatum quod omni inest, monstratum est quod et alicui inest: et si monstratum est quod nulli inest, et quod alicui non inest monstratum est. Maximae autem et sic communes loci ad construendum universale et particulare problema de accidente, competentes ad constructionem tam affirmativi quam negativi, sunt loci ex oppositis et casibus et conjugatis. Nam si oppositum de opposito, quia propositum de proposito: aequaliter enim ista et opinabilia et probabilia sunt et in universali et particulari. Si enim omnis voluptas bonum, aeque opinabile est omnem tristitiam malam esse: et si aliqua voluptas est bona, aeque opinabile est aliquam tristitiam malam esse. Et in oppositis privative similiter est sicut in contrariis. Si enim aliquis sensus non est potestas naturalis secundum sensum illum agendi, aeque probabile illi erit, quod aliqua insensibilitas non est in ipso naturalis: et si quoddam opinatum in relative oppositis non est disciplinatum scibile, sequitur aeque probabiliter, quod quaedam opinio non est disciplina: et hoc est per locum a relative oppositis.
Rursum per locum a contrariis virtute oppositorum ut privatio et habitus sequitur si quid justum est bonum, etiam aeque probabiliter sequitur si est injustum malum, et quod injuste est, male est: et si quid delectabile fugiendum, delectatio fugienda per locum a conjugatis sequitur. Secundum hoc autem quod ejusdem loci a conjugatis sunt, et sequitur aeque probabiliter, quod si aliquid delectabile in quantum delectabile est proficiens et bonum, erit quaedam delectatio proficiens et bonum quoddam.
[Marginal label, printed page 351: Objectio contra locum a conjugatis.]
Quamvis locus a conjugatis videatur habere instantiam: quia non sequitur, album est clarum, ergo albedo est claritas: album est disgregativum visus, ergo albedo est visus disgregativum.
TREATISE III.
ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE PARTICULAR AND DETERMINATE PROBLEM.
CHAPTER I.
On particular determination.
Up to this point, from the beginning of the second book of this science, it has been said how the problem concerning being-in and accident is destroyed and constructed, whether it is taken as inhering simply and not as contracted and compared, or whether it is taken as contracted and compared. But next one must determine concerning the particular problem. And since the particular problem is twofold, both particular according to the thing and particular according to mode, and particular according to the thing and not according to mode, one must first determine concerning that which is particular according to thing and mode, which indeed inheres in the thing particularly and not universally, and has a particular sign by which inhering particularly is designated, as "a certain human being runs"; and then one will have to speak concerning what is particular according to the thing and not according to the mode determined as particular, which is the lowest. Moreover, what is particular according to thing and mode can be terminated without hypothesis by constructing, whether it is affirmative or negative; it can also be terminated with hypothesis by destroying. In the first way let us say how a problem concerning accident posited particularly and universally is constructed without hypothesis.
Therefore we say that, if a problem concerning accident is posited particularly and not universally, first it must be noted that the common loci previously introduced for a problem concerning accident universally posited, whether they are destructive or constructive, are all useful for terminating a particular problem: for constructive loci construct the affirmative, and destructive loci construct the negative. For we, universally destroying the problem concerning accident and universally constructing it, do so in order that the same problem concerning accident posited particularly may be destroyed. For if it has been proved that it inheres in every one, it has been shown that it also inheres in some one; and if it has been shown that it inheres in no one, it has also been shown that it does not inhere in some one. But the maxims, and thus the common loci for constructing the universal and particular problem concerning accident, suitable for the construction both of the affirmative and of the negative, are loci from opposites, cases, and conjugates. For if the opposite is predicated of the opposite, then the proposed thing is predicated of the proposed thing, because these things are equally matters of opinion and probability both in the universal and in the particular. For if every pleasure is good, it is equally a matter of opinion that every sadness is evil; and if some pleasure is good, it is equally a matter of opinion that some sadness is evil. And in privative opposites it is similar as in contraries. For if some sense is not a natural power of acting according to that sense, it will be equally probable to him that some insensibility is not natural in it; and if something opined among relative opposites is not a disciplined object of knowledge, it follows with equal probability that some opinion is not discipline. And this is through the locus from relative opposites.
Again, through the locus from contraries, by the power of opposites such as privation and habit, if something just is good, it also follows with equal probability that, if it is unjust, it is evil, and that what is unjustly is badly; and if something pleasurable is to be fled, it follows through the locus from conjugates that pleasure is to be fled. According to this, however, because they are from the same locus from conjugates, it also follows with equal probability that, if something pleasurable, insofar as it is pleasurable, is advantageous and good, there will be some pleasure that is advantageous and a certain good.
[Marginal label, printed page 351: Objection against the locus from conjugates.]
Although the locus from conjugates seems to have an instance against it, because it does not follow: the white thing is clear, therefore whiteness is clarity; the white thing is dispersive of sight, therefore whiteness is dispersive of sight.
[Marginal label, printed page 351: Solutio.]
Sed intelligendum quod in conjugatis principale et sumptum debent esse secundum formam ejusdem essentiae, sicut albedo color, album et coloratum: et nunquam habet instantiam.
Adhuc in corruptionibus quidem et generationibus sunt loci ad hoc competentes: sequitur enim aeque probabiliter, quod si aliquid sit corruptivum delectationis alicujus, vel corruptivum disciplinae est alicujus, sequitur aeque probabiliter quod quaedam delectatio et quaedam disciplina est malum sive de numero malorum. Similiter autem aeque probabiliter si corruptio quaedam cujusdam disciplinae est de numero bonorum, et aliqua generatio alicujus disciplinae est de numero malorum. Cujus exemplum est, quod oblivisci scientiae qua quis foeda agit, ut furari, vel perdere, de genere bonorum est: quia talia scire malum est. Dico autem de scientia practica, non speculativa. Similiter autem e converso reminisci scientiae qua quidem mala agit, de numero malorum est, sequitur aeque probabiliter, quod scire scientiam practicam qua quis foeda agit, de numero malorum. Similiter autem et in aliis similibus et in omnibus talibus simpliciter sive aeque opinabile in universali et in particulari unum sicut aliud.
Amplius etiam ex locis ad universale affirmativum et negativum construendum, adductus est locus sumptus ex magis et minus tractus. Si enim aliqua duo non ex eodem genere comparentur, non secundum magis et minus accidens quod est bonum inesse, et unum eorum sit magis tale vel videatur esse, aliud autem sit ita quod nihil sui generis sit tale, ut magis quaedam disciplina videatur esse bonorum quaedam quam corporalis voluptas, ut si magis videatur quaedam disciplina bonum quam voluptas videatur bonum, sic et nulla disciplina bonum sit vel de numero bonorum, sequitur quod nec voluptas quaedam est bona vel de numero bonorum. Et secundum quod dicit Aristoteles 1 intelligitur de disciplina practica malorum quae dunatica vocatur, et de voluptate tormentali quae non est naturalis ex genere, nec etiam ex specie, sed vocatur in X Ethicorum aegritudinalis: de his enim intellecta consideratio est generalis. Ex similiter autem et ex minus videtur inesse eodem modo, et erit construere problema particulare tam affirmativum quam negativum. Ex similiter quidem acceptis considerationibus erit utrumque facere et interimere et construere: ex minus autem sive a minori vel construere tantum, et non destruere: quia a minori valet argumentum affirmative tantum et non negative: si enim sic se habet potestas ad bonum, et disciplina quaedam potestas est: est autem quaedam potestas bonum in politica, sequitur quod erit etiam quaedam disciplina bonum: et hoc est construere a simili. Si autem nulla potestas bonum, hoc est, minus videatur potestas quaedam bonum quam disciplina videatur esse bonum, si nulla potestas sit bonum cum videatur minus, non erit necesse propter hoc quod nulla disciplina sit bonum: quia a minori non valet negando. Manifestum ergo quoniam per locum a minori non erit nisi construere tantum: non tantum autem ex alio et alio genere sumptis et ad idem accidens comparatum aliquibus, et est destruere per locum a minori problema particulare: sed etiam ex eodem genere sumptis aliquibus comparatis ad idem accidens ab eo qui sumit: quod maxime videtur esse tale in illo accidente, et non inest ei accidens: tunc enim sequitur quod nec inest ei cui minus videtur inesse. Ut si positum sit ab aliquo respondente, quod quaedam disciplina est bonum: tunc accipitur disciplina quaedam quae maxime videtur esse bonum, ut prudentia quae maxime videtur bonum, ut ostendatur quod prudentia quae maxime bonum non est bonum, sequitur quod nec aliqua alia quae minus bonum esse videtur, erit bonum: quia si alicui magis videbatur inesse, et non inest, sequitur quod nec cui minus videbatur inesse, inerit: sunt autem disciplina et prudentia ejusdem quod est virtus intellectualis.
[Marginal label, printed page 351: Solution.]
But it must be understood that in conjugates the principal and the derived term must be according to the form of the same essence, as whiteness and color, white and colored; and then it never has an instance against it.
Furthermore, in corruptions and generations there are loci suitable for this: for it follows with equal probability that, if something is corruptive of some pleasure, or is corruptive of some discipline, it follows with equal probability that some pleasure and some discipline is an evil or among the number of evils. Similarly, with equal probability, if some corruption of some discipline is among the number of goods, then some generation of some discipline is among the number of evils. An example of this is that to forget the knowledge by which someone does base things, such as stealing or destroying, belongs to the genus of goods, because to know such things is evil. But I speak of practical knowledge, not speculative knowledge. Similarly conversely, to remember the knowledge by which one does evil things is among the number of evils; it follows with equal probability that to know practical knowledge by which someone does base things is among the number of evils. And similarly in other like cases and in all such things, simply or equally, one thing is opinable in the universal and in the particular just as the other.
Moreover, also from the loci for constructing the universal affirmative and negative there has been brought in a locus taken from what is treated from more and less. For if two things not from the same genus are compared, not according to more and less with respect to the inhering accident which is good, and one of them is more such or seems to be, while the other is such that nothing of its genus is such, as some discipline seems to be more among goods than bodily pleasure is, so that if some discipline seems more to be good than pleasure seems to be good, then if no discipline is good or among the number of goods, it follows that neither is any pleasure good or among the number of goods. And according to what Aristotle says 1, this is understood of practical discipline of evils, which is called dunatic, and of tormenting pleasure, which is not natural from genus nor even from species, but is called diseased in book X of the Ethics; for concerning these the understood consideration is general. But from the similar and from the less, being-in seems to occur in the same way, and it will be to construct the particular problem both affirmative and negative. From considerations accepted from the similar, indeed, it will be possible to do both things, to destroy and to construct; but from the less, or from the lesser, only to construct and not to destroy, because an argument from the lesser has force affirmatively only and not negatively. For if power stands thus toward good, and some discipline is a power, and some power is good in politics, it follows that some discipline will also be good; and this is to construct from the similar. But if no power is good, that is, if some power seems good less than discipline seems to be good, if no power is good although it seems less, it will not on this account be necessary that no discipline is good, because an argument from the lesser has no force by denying. Therefore it is manifest that through the locus from the lesser there will be only construction, and not destruction. But not only from things taken from one and another genus and compared by some people to the same accident is there destruction of a particular problem through the locus from the lesser; rather, also from certain things taken from the same genus and compared to the same accident by the one who takes them. What seems maximally to be such in that accident, if the accident does not inhere in it, then it follows that it also does not inhere in that in which it seems to inhere less. Thus if it is posited by some respondent that some discipline is good, then some discipline is taken which seems most of all to be good, such as prudence, which seems most of all a good, so that it may be shown that prudence, which is most of all good, is not good; it follows that no other discipline which seems less to be good will be good. For if it seemed more to inhere in something and does not inhere, it follows that it will not inhere in that to which it seemed to inhere less. But discipline and prudence are of the same thing, namely intellectual virtue.
[Marginal label, printed page 352: Objectio contra locum a simili.]
Id autem quod est dictum, quod locus a simili sit constructivus et destructivus, videtur habere calumniam, quia videtur quod non universaliter convenit destrui vel construi per locum a simili: non enim universaliter sequitur, si A et B similiter se habent ad C, si A est genus C, quod B similiter sit genus C, quia non contingit plura esse genera ejusdem. Similiter non sequitur, si A et B ordinantur ad C, si A est diffinitio ejus quod est C, quod B sit diffinitio ejusdem: quia non contingit plures esse diffinitiones ejusdem.
[Marginal label, printed page 352: Solutio.]
Sed ad haec respondetur, quod revera locus a simili in praedicatis essentialibus non est constructivus, sicut objectum est, sed in accidentalibus. Objiciunt tamen quidam dicentes, quod si A et B similiter ordinentur ad C, si A non est diffinitio, nec B erit diffinitio: ergo a consequentia a contrario si B est diffinitio, et A est diffinitio, non valet: quia consequentia e contrario non tenet in contrariis, nisi in praedicatis essentialibus et essentialiter ordinatis, ut si albedo color, illud quod non color, nec albedo. Si autem quaeratur qualiter problema particulare terminetur in hoc tertio cum particulare sit in universali, et ex ipso terminetur, ut praedictum est: vel a signo particulari quod non opponitur universali, et particulare secundum rem, et hoc opponitur universali et inhaerenti et fundatur in natura accidentis contracti, de tali particulari hic loquimur: et ideo cum accidente contracto in eodem libro determinatur.
Amplius quod ex hypothesi probare contingit: et si alicui inest accidens, quod sequitur per hypothesim et omni inesse: et si cui non inest, sequitur nulli inesse: ut hominis alicujus anima videtur esse immortalis, sequitur per hypothesim et alias aliorum animas hominum esse immortales. Si autem detur quod hujus hominis anima non sit immortalis, sequitur ex hypothesi, quod nec aliae hominum animae sunt immortales. Si ergo aliquid accidens positum est inesse alicui, ostendendum est ab opponente quando alicui non inesse, et hoc ab opponente per hypothesim sequitur nulli inesse. Si autem a respondente positum est alicui non inesse, et hoc ab opponente per hypothesim destrui debeat: tunc ostendendum est ab opponente, quoniam inest alicui: nam si per hypothesim consequitur tamen inesse, et per hoc destruitur particulare negativum alicui non inesse.
Palam ergo ex dictis est, quoniam qui in terminatione problematis particularis hypothesi utitur, facit de particulari problema universale: quia confitetur sicut est in uno, ita esse in omnibus aliis: vel sicut non est in uno, ita nec esse in aliquo aliorum: et sic qui particulariter concedit aliquid inesse vel non inesse, probabit universaliter oportere confiteri, eo quod uni et omni similiter probat: dicit enim, quod sicut est in uno, ita est in omnibus aliis.
[Marginal label, printed page 352: Objection against the locus from the similar.]
But what was said, that the locus from the similar is constructive and destructive, seems to have a cavil, because it seems that it does not universally belong to a thing to be destroyed or constructed through a locus from the similar. For it does not universally follow, if A and B stand similarly to C, that if A is the genus of C, B is similarly the genus of C, because several genera of the same thing cannot occur. Similarly it does not follow, if A and B are ordered to C, that, if A is the definition of what C is, B is the definition of the same thing, because several definitions of the same thing cannot occur.
[Marginal label, printed page 352: Solution.]
But to these things it is answered that, in truth, the locus from the similar in essential predicates is not constructive, as has been objected, but it is constructive in accidental predicates. Yet some object, saying that if A and B are similarly ordered to C, if A is not a definition, neither will B be a definition; therefore, from the consequence from the contrary, if B is a definition and A is a definition, it has no force, because consequence from the contrary does not hold in contraries except in essential predicates and things essentially ordered, as, if whiteness is color, that which is not color is not whiteness. But if it is asked how the particular problem is terminated in this third book, since the particular is in the universal and is terminated from it, as was said before, either it is from the particular sign which is not opposed to the universal, and the particular according to the thing, and this is opposed to the universal and inhering and is founded in the nature of contracted accident; we are speaking here of such a particular, and therefore it is determined with contracted accident in the same book.
Moreover, it is possible to prove from hypothesis: if an accident inheres in some one, through hypothesis it follows that it also inheres in every one; and if it does not inhere in some one, it follows that it inheres in no one. For example, if the soul of some human being seems to be immortal, it follows through hypothesis that also the other souls of other human beings are immortal. But if it is granted that the soul of this human being is not immortal, it follows from hypothesis that neither are the other souls of human beings immortal. Therefore, if some accident has been posited to inhere in someone, it must be shown by the opponent when it does not inhere in someone, and from this it follows for the opponent by hypothesis that it inheres in no one. But if it has been posited by the respondent that it does not inhere in someone, and this must be destroyed by the opponent through hypothesis, then it must be shown by the opponent that it inheres in someone; for if through hypothesis being-in nevertheless follows, the particular negative, namely not inhering in someone, is destroyed through this.
Therefore it is plain from what has been said that the one who uses hypothesis in the termination of a particular problem makes a universal problem out of a particular one, because he confesses that as it is in one, so it is in all the others, or as it is not in one, so neither is it in any of the others. And thus the one who particularly grants that something inheres or does not inhere will prove that it must be confessed universally, because he proves similarly concerning one and every one; for he says that as it is in one, so it is in all the others.
Notes
- In books 6 and 7 of the Ethics. (In 6 et 7 Ethicorum.) ↩
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