Volume 2 · pp. 346–347
CHAPTER VIII. On the considerations of choosing what is related to an end
A marker with ≈ is an approximate page boundary, placed by measure of the text; the page photographs remain the authority. In the paired views, clicking a page marker brings that page into view.
CAPUT VIII.
De considerationibus eligendi relati ad finem.
[Marginal label, printed page 346: Gloria quid.]
In considerationibus et regulis eligendi boni, quae trahuntur ex ipso relato ad finem, considerandum: quia si unum quidem sit bonum propter se, quia sibi per se est finis in bono: alterum autem boni rationem habet, eo quod ad gloriam, sicut in corporalibus bonis sanitas est magis eligenda decore qui propter gloriam desideratur, cum sanitas desideretur propter seipsam. Diffinitio autem faciens cognoscere id quod est propter gloriam, et non gloriae diffinitio est, quod nullo consciente non festinat inesse: gloria enim, ut dicit sapiens, est clara cum laude notitia, ut est dictum Augustini. Tullius autem dicit, quod est late patens praeconium, vel ore multorum celebrata laudatio. Et ideo patet quod id quod fit propter gloriam, quaerit innotescere praeconiis hominum in laude: et ideo nullo consciente illud cum faciente, non festinaret inesse: quia non cognosceretur, et non laudaretur. Dico autem festinare id quod propter gloriam fit, quia gloriatio calcaribus festinat et incitatur ad festinandum. Unde Ovidius,
Excitat auditor studium, laudataque crescit Virtus, et immensum gloria calcar habet.
Juxta hoc autem alia accipitur maxima, quod si duorum relatorum ad finem, hoc fit propter se et propter gloriam civilem (quae non est vana nec mala), illud autem reliquum bonum fit propter alterum: illorum tamen melius est, quod est per se eligendum: quodcumque enim est magis propter se honorandum, hoc quidem est melius et magis eligendum. Honorabilius autem erit, quod per se est bonum, ita quod nihil aliud esse debeat per ipsum acquisitum: cum enim dicitur aliud esse bonum propter aliud, per hoc ipsum quod est propter aliud, diminuit rationem boni.
Amplius in considerationibus boni per se et propter alterum, dividendum est per distinctionem quoties (hoc est, quot modis) quod eligendum est, dicitur, et quot modis dicitur eligendum aliorum finium gratia ad quos refertur: et verbi gratia, videtur eligendum gratia aut expedientis sive delectabilis, vel boni (hoc est, honesti) quod est secundum se bonum, vel delectabile quod est ex convenientia conjunctionis cum eligente bonum: nam quod ad omnia haec vel ad plura est utile sicut causa boni, magis eligendum, sicut dicit Tullius de amicitia super virtutem fundata, quae per se bona est et multam habet delectationem et utilitatem adjunctam: et hoc magis eligendum quam quod non est sic utile ad omnia vel ad plura.
CHAPTER VIII.
On the considerations of choosing what is related to an end.
[Marginal label, printed page 346: What glory is.]
In the considerations and rules of choosing the good which are drawn from the thing itself related to an end, one must consider this: if one thing is good for its own sake because for itself it is an end in good, but another has the account of good because it is for glory, as in bodily goods health is more to be chosen than beauty, which is desired for the sake of glory, since health is desired for its own sake. But the definition making known what is for the sake of glory, and not a definition of glory, is that it does not hasten to be present when no one is aware of it. For glory, as the wise man says, is clear knowledge with praise, as Augustine has said. But Tullius says that it is far-spreading proclamation, or praise celebrated by the mouth of many. And therefore it is plain that what is done for the sake of glory seeks to become known in the proclamations of human beings in praise; and therefore, if no one were aware of it together with the doer, it would not hasten to be present, because it would not be known and would not be praised. But I call that which is done for the sake of glory "hastening," because glorification hastens with spurs and is urged on to hasten. Hence Ovid says:
"The listener excites zeal, and virtue grows when praised, and glory has an immense spur."
According to this another maxim is taken: if, of two things related to an end, one is done for its own sake and for civil glory, which is not vain nor evil, but the other remaining good is done for the sake of another, nevertheless that one of them is better which is eligible per se. For whatever is more to be honored for its own sake is indeed better and more to be chosen. But that will be more honorable which is good per se, so that nothing else ought to be acquired through it; for when something else is said to be good for the sake of another, by this very fact, that it is for the sake of another, it diminishes the account of good.
Moreover, in considerations of good per se and for the sake of another, one must divide by distinguishing how many times, that is, in how many ways, what is to be chosen is spoken of, and in how many ways it is said to be chosen for the sake of other ends to which it is referred. For example, something seems to be chosen for the sake either of the expedient or the pleasurable, or of the good, that is, the honorable, which is good according to itself, or of the pleasurable which comes from the fittingness of conjunction with the one choosing the good. For what is useful for all these things or for several of them as a cause of good is more to be chosen, as Tullius says of friendship founded upon virtue, which is good per se and has much pleasure and utility joined to it; and this is more to be chosen than what is not useful in this way for all or for several things.
Si autem aliquod bonum est, quod eadem causa utrisque bonorum comparatorum insint: tunc considerandum est utro vel uter magis haec insunt inter duo vel plura comparata, et utrum sit delectabilius vel melius, hoc est, honestius vel expedientius sive utilius: quia hoc erit magis eligendum.
Rursum juxta hoc accipitur consideratio, quod id duorum bonorum vel plurium quod propter melius est et quod concluditur ad ipsum, magis est eligendum. Si autem non includeret illud melius propter quod inest, non teneret consideratio, sicut melius est quod est propter virtutem, quam id quod est propter delectationem corporalem. Similiter autem per contrarium est in fugiendis: nam magis fugiendum est quod impedit virtutes, ut aegritudo quae impedit actum virtutum exteriorem: quia magis fugienda est quam foeditas quae est in ablatione decorum corporalium: nam voluptatis quae est ex corpore vel ex virtutum actibus exterioribus, prohibentior est aegritudo quam foeditas.
Amplius hoc modo contingit ex similitudine monstrare eligendum magis vel minus eligendum et fugiendum quod positum est: minus enim eligendum est quod aliquis sapiens et eligit aliquando et fugit aliquando, quam quod eligendum est tantum et non fugiendum: quia hoc similius est bono et eligibili, et substantialiorem habet rationem eligendi.
Epilogatur ergo dicendo comparationes boni contracti et comparati quae sunt eligendorum ad invicem comparatorum, et qualiter faciendae sunt comparationes eligendorum, et secundum quas maximas, jam satis dictum est. In his autem nullum dubium est: quia omnes intelliguntur non simpliciter, sed quoad hoc quod considerandum, unum est melius alio: et est superfluum disputare de talibus, et disputationes sunt ad nihil utiles. Penes autem quid accipiantur, facile elicitur, et si tituli capitulorum ad invicem comparantur, et videatur secundum quid diversum singulae considerationes sub uno communi titulo convenientes accipiantur: quia ex hoc procedit considerationum multiplicatio. Et sunt adhuc multo plura, quae in talibus considerari possunt: sed haec satis ex his quae dicta sunt, possunt intelligi et de facili considerari, etc.
But if there is some good such that the same cause belongs to each of the compared goods, then one must consider in which of the two, or which one, these things are present more among the two or more compared things, and whether it is more pleasurable or better, that is, more honorable or more expedient or useful; for this will be more to be chosen.
Again, according to this a consideration is taken: of two or more goods, that which is for the sake of the better and is concluded toward it is more to be chosen. But if it did not include that better thing on account of which it is present, the consideration would not hold; for example, what is for the sake of virtue is better than what is for the sake of bodily pleasure. Similarly, by the contrary, it is so in things to be fled; for what impedes virtues is more to be fled, as illness, which impedes the exterior act of virtues, because it is more to be fled than ugliness, which consists in the removal of bodily beauties. For pleasure which is from the body or from exterior acts of the virtues is more prevented by illness than by ugliness.
Moreover, in this way it is possible from likeness to show what has been posited as more to be chosen or less to be chosen and to be fled: for what some wise person both chooses at one time and flees at another is less to be chosen than what is only to be chosen and not to be fled, because this is more similar to good and to the eligible, and has a more substantial account of choosing.
Therefore it is summed up by saying that enough has now been said concerning the comparisons of contracted and compared good, which are comparisons of things to be chosen compared with one another, and how comparisons of things to be chosen are to be made, and according to which maxims. In these matters there is no doubt, because all of them are understood not simply, but with respect to this point to be considered, namely that one thing is better than another; and to dispute about such things is superfluous, and the disputations are useful for nothing. But under what aspect they are taken is easily elicited, even if the titles of the chapters are compared with one another, and if it is seen according to what different respect the individual considerations fitting together under one common title are taken; for from this proceeds the multiplication of considerations. And there are still many more things which can be considered in such matters, but these can be understood sufficiently from the things that have been said, and considered easily, etc.
If a page does not appear, its photograph has not been uploaded yet.