Volume 2 · pp. 331–334
BOOK III OF THE TOPICS. ON CONTRACTED AND COMPARED ACCIDENT. TREATISE I. CHAPTERS I-II.
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LIBER III TOPICORUM.
DE ACCIDENTE CONTRACTO ET COMPARATO.
TRACTATUS I.
DE ACCIDENTE CONTRACTO ET COMPARATO.
CAPUT I.
De praeambulis et prooemio.
[Marginal label, printed page 331: Removet dubium.]
Dictum est in primo libro hujus scientiae, quod problema est speculatio contendens ad electionem vel fugam, et ad veritatem et scientiam: propter quod cum ea quae ponuntur in diffinitione alicujus formaliter distinguant ipsum, patet quod problema de eligendo vel fugiendo formaliter differt ab aliis problematibus: et ideo per alia principia terminandum est: et ideo substantialem librum de eo oportet introduci, et cum problemate de inesse simpliciter non potest determinari. Quia autem iterum in primo libro determinatum est, quod problematum quaedam sunt ethica, quaedam physica, quaedam logica, et problemata ethica in una forma eligendi vel fugiendi unita sunt et finita sunt ad formam unam communem, constat quod finita sunt quae hoc modo in problematibus ethicis. Physica autem et logica in una forma uniuntur, sed secundum materiam remanent infinita: et ideo patet quod infinita sunt quae in physicis et logicis ad materiam contracta quaeruntur. Propter quod substantiales libri fieri non possunt de problematibus ad materiam contractis physicis et logicis, sed de ethicis ad materiam contractis secundum rationem dictam oportet librum fieri specialem.
[Marginal label, printed page 331: Pro intentione hujus libri et causa intentionis.]
Cum autem iterum dictum sit in primo hujus scientiae, quod quaedam problemata sunt principalia, et quaedam adjuncta principalibus, ut problema de differentia adjungitur problemati de genere, et terminatur in eodem libro cum genere, eo quod differentia est generalis, et problema de accidente contracto et comparato est praedicatum accidenti, non debuit in eodem libro cum problemate de accidente terminari: quia differentiam formalem habent ad ipsum, ut dictum est: quod non habet problema de differentia ad problema de genere, quamvis genus et differentia constituantur in diversis essentiis secundum quod constituunt tertium, ut differentia, cum sit non convertibilis et generalis, cadit in intentionem generis: et quando est generalis et convertibilis, accipit in praedicando et subjiciendo speciei intentionem, et sic ad idem pertinet cum genere et specie. Accidens autem absolutum et comparatio accidentis quamvis in eadem essentia fundetur, cum alia et alia habent esse suae terminationis ad formam: quia accidens secundum esse absolutum eligendum, eligibilis vel fugibilis formam non habet: quam tamen formam habet accidens comparatum. Et haec est forma ad quam contendit problema per principia specialia differentia a principiis illis quibus habet terminari inesse ut accidens. Et ideo de hoc adjuncto praedicato oportet substantialem induci librum, cujus primum tractatum faciemus de accidente contracto et comparato: quia hoc immediate contingit post considerationem de inesse simpliciter: quia tam contractum quam comparatum in eo quod inest ut accidens, fundatur, et contractum per se et comparatum per se continentur sub hoc generali quod est contractum et comparatum: et ideo prius de accidente tam contracto quam comparato dicendum occurrit: quia per loca illius determinatur et accidens comparatum et non contractum, et etiam accidens contractum et comparatum.
His igitur sic habitis et praemissis prooemialiter, primo dicimus quod utrum duorum vel plurium nobis propositorum accidentium contractorum ad materiam, et secundum magis et minus comparatorum ad invicem, et ad nos, et sit magis et minus eligendum simpliciter vel nobis, aut quid sit melius duorum vel plurium propositorum, ex his quae in hoc libro dicenda sunt, est perspiciendum: electio enim, ut dicit Damascenus, est duobus vel pluribus propositis, hoc alteri vel alteris praeoptare. Primum autem in hoc prooemio determinetur: quoniam determinationem non facimus de plurimum distantibus in eligendo: quia scire hoc facile est, et arte non indiget: et ideo non faciemus considerationem de his, et magnam in bono et eligendo habentibus differentiam: nullus enim dubitat in talibus.
BOOK III OF THE TOPICS.
ON CONTRACTED AND COMPARED ACCIDENT.
TREATISE I.
ON CONTRACTED AND COMPARED ACCIDENT.
CHAPTER I.
On preliminaries and the proem.
[Marginal label, printed page 331: He removes a doubt.]
It was said in the first book of this science that a problem is a speculation tending toward choice or flight, and toward truth and knowledge. On account of this, since the things that are placed in the definition of something formally distinguish it, it is plain that a problem concerning what is to be chosen or fled formally differs from other problems; and therefore it must be terminated through other principles. And therefore a substantial book concerning it must be introduced, and it cannot be determined with the problem concerning being-in simply. But since again in the first book it was determined that some problems are ethical, some physical, and some logical, and ethical problems are united in one form of choosing or fleeing and are limited to one common form, it is established that those things are limited which are in this way in ethical problems. But physical and logical problems are united in one form, but according to matter they remain infinite; and therefore it is plain that infinite things are sought in physical and logical problems contracted to matter. On account of this substantial books cannot be made concerning problems contracted to physical and logical matter, but concerning ethical problems contracted to matter according to the stated account a special book must be made.
[Marginal label, printed page 331: For the intention of this book and the cause of the intention.]
But since again it was said in the first book of this science that certain problems are principal and certain ones are joined to principal problems, as the problem concerning difference is joined to the problem concerning genus and is terminated in the same book with genus, because difference is general; and the problem concerning contracted and compared accident is a predicate to accident, it should not have been terminated in the same book with the problem concerning accident, because they have a formal difference from it, as has been said. The problem concerning difference does not have this in relation to the problem concerning genus, although genus and difference are constituted in diverse essences according as they constitute a third thing; for difference, since it is not convertible and is general, falls into the intention of genus. And when it is general and convertible, it receives the intention of species in predicating and in being subjected, and thus it pertains to the same thing with genus and species. But absolute accident and the comparison of accident, although they are founded in the same essence, have the being of their termination to form with one thing and another, because accident according to absolute being, as choosable, does not have the form of the eligible or fugible, yet compared accident does have that form. And this is the form toward which the problem strives through special principles differing from those principles by which being-in as accident has to be terminated. And therefore concerning this joined predicate a substantial book must be introduced, whose first treatise we shall make concerning contracted and compared accident, because this immediately happens after the consideration concerning being-in simply. For both the contracted and the compared are founded in this, that it is in as accident, and the contracted per se and the compared per se are contained under this general thing which is contracted and compared. And therefore first it occurs that one must speak concerning accident both contracted and compared, because through its loci both compared and not-contracted accident is determined, and also contracted and compared accident.
Therefore, with these things thus had and premised proemially, first we say that whether, of two or several contracted accidents proposed to us in relation to matter and compared with one another and with us according to more and less, one is more or less to be chosen simply or by us, or what is better among two or several proposed things, must be inspected from the things that are to be said in this book. For choice, as Damascene says, when two or several things have been proposed, is to choose this before another or others. But the first point should be determined in this proem, because we do not make a determination concerning things very greatly distant in being chosen, since to know this is easy and does not need art. And therefore we shall not make a consideration concerning these, and concerning those having a great difference in the good and in the to-be-chosen; for no one doubts in such matters.
[Marginal label, printed page 332: Electio quid secundum Damascenum.] [Marginal label, printed page 332: Nullus dubitat utrum beatitudo vel divitiae sint magis appetenda.]
Cujus exemplum: quia nullus dubitat utrum beatitudo vel divitiae sint magis appetenda. Omnes enim appetunt beatitudinem quae consistit in bono sine impedimento miseriae vivere: et propter illam beatitudinem agunt quidquid agunt, ut dicunt Stoici. Divitiae autem non appetuntur nisi in quantum partes sunt beatitudini permixtae: quae pars est sufficientes esse, quia divitiae sufficientiam dare putantur: eo quod generalis fidejussor sunt futurae necessitatis, ut de numismate mensurali dicit Aristoteles secundo Ethicorum: et ideo divitiae referuntur ad beatitudinem ab his quibus appetuntur. Propter quod nulli dubitant beatitudinem plus quam divitias appetendam. De sic ergo distantibus non oportet facere artis considerationem, sed de his consideratione artis opus est, quae propinqua in forma boni et eligibilis, et de his quibus rationabiliter dubitare possumus, utrum comparatorum oportet magis bonum esse, vel magis eligendum: eo quod nullam statim et prima facie videamus alterius ad alterum praeeminentiam in bono et eligendo, sed de hoc comparato oportet habere scientiam et considerationem.
Palam ergo ex his quae dicta sunt, quoniam in his talibus ostensa per artem differentia secundum praeeminentiam in bono vel eligibili, vel una differentia sive praeeminentia, vel pluribus, si plures sint rationes praeeminentiarum, construetur et conformabitur intellectus practicus: quod est magis appetendum quod inter ea est praeeminens alteri, in primo libro in quo constructum est inesse ut accidens, quod ad veritatem et scientiam contendit, constructus est intellectus speculativus. In hoc autem tertio de eligendis construitur intellectus affectivus sive practicus, quo voluntati permixtus est.
[Marginal label, printed page 333: Ethicorum duplex est cognitio.]
Propter quod notandum quod ethicorum duplex est cognitio. Una quidem ex propriis principiis, quae sunt natura, consuetudo, voluntarium, involuntarium, electio, consilium, et hujusmodi quae ad ethicam pertinent. Alia autem speculativa rationum, quare quid eligibile sive fugibile contenditur, quae pertinent ad dialecticum: et hanc hic tradimus. Tradendo autem non faciemus considerationes per inspectionem eorum quae antecedunt vel sequuntur praedicatum vel subjectum problematis, sicut in anteriori hujus scientiae libro fecimus, sed tantum dabimus maximas eligendi regulas 1: quia illae rectificant intellectum practicum ad recte eligendi considerationem, per inspectionem eorum quae sunt in subjecto vel praedicato problematis, et magis sunt ad destruendum intellectum speculativum. Dabimus autem praecipue maximas constructivas electionis: quia per istas scietur discretive quid fugiendum et quid non eligendum. Sic ergo in hoc tertio libro Topicorum procedemus.
[Marginal label, printed page 332: What choice is according to Damascene.] [Marginal label, printed page 332: No one doubts whether happiness or riches are more to be sought.]
An example of this is that no one doubts whether happiness or riches are more to be sought. For all seek happiness, which consists in living in good without the impediment of misery; and on account of that happiness they do whatever they do, as the Stoics say. But riches are not sought except insofar as they are parts mixed with happiness; this part is to be sufficient, because riches are thought to give sufficiency, since they are a general surety of future necessity, as Aristotle says concerning measured coin in Ethics II. And therefore riches are referred to happiness by those by whom they are sought. On account of this no one doubts that happiness is to be sought more than riches. Therefore concerning things distant in this way it is not necessary to make a consideration of art; but the work of art's consideration is concerning those things which are near in the form of the good and eligible, and concerning those things about which we can reasonably doubt which of the things compared ought to be more good or more to be chosen, because we do not immediately and at first sight see a preeminence of one over the other in good and in being chosen, but concerning this compared matter it is necessary to have knowledge and consideration.
Therefore it is plain from what has been said that in such things, once the difference according to preeminence in the good or eligible has been shown through art, whether by one difference or preeminence or by several, if there are several accounts of preeminences, the practical intellect will be constructed and conformed: what is more to be sought is what among them is preeminent over the other. In the first book, in which being-in as accident was constructed, which strives toward truth and knowledge, the speculative intellect was constructed. But in this third book concerning things to be chosen, the affective or practical intellect, by which it is mixed with the will, is constructed.
[Marginal label, printed page 333: There is a twofold cognition of ethical things.]
On account of this it must be noted that there is a twofold cognition of ethical things. One is from proper principles, which are nature, custom, the voluntary, the involuntary, choice, counsel, and things of this sort which pertain to ethics. The other is a speculative cognition of the reasons why some choosable or fugible thing is contended for, which pertain to the dialectician; and this we hand down here. But in handing it down, we shall not make considerations through inspection of those things that antecede or follow the predicate or subject of the problem, as we did in the previous book of this science, but we shall only give the maxims, that is, the rules, of choosing 1, because they rectify the practical intellect for the consideration of choosing rightly, through inspection of the things that are in the subject or predicate of the problem, and are more for destroying the speculative intellect. But we shall chiefly give constructive maxims of choice, because through these one will know discretively what is to be fled and what is not to be chosen. Thus therefore we shall proceed in this third book of the Topics.
CAPUT II.
De electione per inspectionem ad eligibile et eligentem, et eligibile subjectum sive formam, etc.
Primum ergo intelligendum est, quod non dabimus maximas de praeeminentia eligendi ad non eligendum: quia haec plurimum habent differentiae distantiam: sed primo dabimus maximas ostendentes differentiam eligendi ad indifferenter se habens ad eligendum vel fugiendum: vel cum electio non sit finis, sed eorum quae sunt ad finem, possunt dari considerationes sumptae ex ipso eligendo, vel ex fine ad quem respicit electio. Respiciendo autem ad ipsum eligendum ponamus primo maximas quae omnibus notae sunt, et in quibus subtili consideratione non est opus.
Considerando ergo bonum eligendum in se damus hanc maximam, quod id quod est diuturnius, est magis bonum secundum hoc eligendum. Comparando autem bonum eligendum ad nos damus istam, quod id quod certius est bonum, quoad hoc est magis eligendum, quam id quod est minus certum vel minus diuturnum. Istae ergo sunt duae considerationes in suis maximis determinatae inspiciendo ad eligibile in se consideratum et ad nos comparatum. Sunt autem aliae maximae per inspectionem ad eligentem et non ad eligibile acceptae: et sic accipiuntur septem maximae vel una ex septem constans.
Prima quidem est, quod magis eligendum est, ubi prudens eligit: quia prudens est, qui cum ratione agendorum habet prudentiam. Secunda est, quod id est magis eligendum, quod eligit vir bonus: quia bonus est cum virtute dispositus, ut in magnis Moralibus dicit Aristoteles, et qui non solum dicto, sed etiam facto probat per amorem honestorum verba et electiones suas. Tertia est quod lex recta praecipit eligendum: lex enim recta, ut dicit Tullius, est jus scriptum praecipiens justum prohibensque contrarium. Et ideo lex recta nihil praecipit agere nisi justum et honestum. Quarta est, quod studiosi dicti circa singula magis dicunt eligendum in eo quod tales sunt, magis eligendum: studiosi enim sunt optime boni et circa singula sunt optimi, circa singula studiosi: et his credendum est, quia experientia et affectu loquuntur. Quinta est, de unoquoque de specialiter eligendis in hoc vel in isto, hoc est, quod in unoquoque genere negotii vel artis praecipiunt esse eligendum, ut ad navigandum nauta sciens, ut Calypso, et sic de aliis. Sexta, in generibus bonis ad vitam ordinatis, ut quaecumque plures dicunt eligenda: et hoc diversificatur in plures vel omnes, ut dicunt in medicina quaecumque plures vel omnes medici: quia plures vel omnes sunt experti plus quam unus. Septima est, quaecumque omnia entia appetunt: et hoc est de bono divino: omnia enim appetunt bonum divinum, et propter id agunt quidquid agunt. Hoc autem est esse secundum quod fluit esse a causa prima: hoc enim est simpliciter bonum in quantum est causa prima, et unicuique optimum in quantum a causatis est participatum. Hae considerationes sumuntur ex parte eligentis. Eligens enim per exemplum est ratio et regula electionis debitae. Aut igitur regula est habita a regente in ipsam electionem, aut regula quam eligit universaliter vel particulariter. Si universaliter: aut secundum virtutem intellectualem, vel moralem: et primo modo est prudens, secundo modo bonus. Si autem regula informante electionem ipsius: tunc est lex justa. Si autem est regens electionem per exemplum particulare: tunc sunt studiosi, et circa singula dicti: et hoc exemplum vel est in uno vel in pluribus ut plures vel omnes. In eligibilibus enim magis imitandi sunt plures vel omnes quam unus: et si est in bonis divinis, tunc regula electionis sunt omnia.
CHAPTER II.
On choice through inspection toward the eligible and the one choosing, and the eligible subject or form, etc.
First, therefore, it must be understood that we shall not give maxims concerning the preeminence of what is to be chosen over what is not to be chosen, because these have the distance of difference very greatly; but first we shall give maxims showing the difference of what is to be chosen from what has itself indifferently to being chosen or fled. Or, since choice is not of the end but of the things which are toward the end, considerations can be given which are taken from the chosen thing itself or from the end to which choice looks. But by looking to the chosen thing itself, let us first posit maxims which are known to all, and in which there is no need of subtle consideration.
Therefore, by considering the good to be chosen in itself, we give this maxim: that which is more lasting is, according to this, a better thing to be chosen. But by comparing the good to be chosen to us, we give this maxim: that which is more certainly good is, as to this, more to be chosen than what is less certain or less lasting. Therefore these are two considerations determined in their maxims by inspecting the eligible considered in itself and compared to us. But there are other maxims taken by inspection toward the one choosing and not toward the eligible; and thus seven maxims, or one consisting of seven, are received.
The first is that what a prudent person chooses is more to be chosen, because a prudent person is one who has prudence with reason concerning things to be done. The second is that what a good man chooses is more to be chosen, because the good man is disposed with virtue, as Aristotle says in the Great Morals, and he proves his words and choices not only by saying but also by deed through love of honorable things. The third is that what right law commands is to be chosen; for right law, as Tullius says, is written right commanding the just and prohibiting the contrary. And therefore right law commands nothing to be done except what is just and honorable. The fourth is that what virtuous persons named with respect to individual things say is more to be chosen, in that they are such, is more to be chosen; for virtuous persons are optimally good, and with respect to individual things the best are virtuous with respect to individual things; and they must be believed, because they speak from experience and affection. The fifth is concerning each of the things specially to be chosen in this or that, that is, what they command to be chosen in each genus of business or art, as for sailing the knowledgeable sailor, as Calypso, and so in other cases. The sixth, in good genera ordered to life, is whatever several say are to be chosen; and this is diversified into several or all, as in medicine whatever several or all physicians say, because several or all have been more experienced than one. The seventh is whatever all beings seek; and this concerns the divine good, for all things seek the divine good, and for its sake they do whatever they do. But this is being according as being flows from the first cause; for this is good simply insofar as it is the first cause, and best for each thing insofar as it is participated by caused things. These considerations are taken from the side of the one choosing. For the one choosing by example is the account and rule of due choice. Therefore either the rule is had from one ruling over the choice itself, or it is a rule which chooses universally or particularly. If universally, then either according to intellectual or moral virtue: and in the first mode it is the prudent person, in the second mode the good person. But if by a rule informing his choice, then it is just law. But if it rules choice through a particular example, then there are virtuous persons, and those named with respect to individual things; and this example is either in one or in several, as several or all. For in eligible things several or all are more to be imitated than one; and if it is in divine goods, then all things are the rule of choice.
In talibus autem quia electio regitur alio quodam eligente vel docente quid oportet eligere et non illud, ideo in talibus oportet ducere prudentem et virum bonum et studiosum circa singula, et ducere ad quidquid, hoc est, ad omne quod fuerit utile, quod dicendum est, et debere eligi ad exemplum vel dictum ipsius in communi, cum sic est differentia. Item hoc simpliciter et universaliter melius est et magis eligendum, quod dictum est eligi secundum meliorem disciplinam, ut quod praecipit eligi disciplina scientiae virtutis heroicae, alicui autem eligibilius: et id magis est eligendum quod est eligendum secundum disciplinam propriam, ut fabro quae fabrilis, et politico quae praecipit civilis. Quare oportet inspicere eligentem contradictiones eligibilis vel boni et essentiales et accidentales. In essentiales quidem in eas quae boni secundum causam.
Respiciendo ergo necessarium sive substantiam boni eligibilis, magis est eligendum quod in genere boni est fixum et stans secundum substantiam in hoc genere quod est bonum, quam id quod non secundum substantiam est fixum quid in genere boni, ut justitia est bonitas fixa et stans in genere boni ut bonitatis species, et est bonitas, ut in magnis Moralibus dicit Aristoteles, magis eligenda justo: et dico justus quod est opus justitiae, vel effectus. Et ratio electionis est, quia hoc quod est justitia, secundum sui naturam est in hoc genere quod est bonum: illud autem quod est justum sicut actio vel effectus, non est in eodem genere, sed in genere actionis, et potest esse non bonum simpliciter, ut justitiae opus quod est damnatio vel punitio. Aliquando non bonum est eligibile, ut si dicatur quod justus, ut homo justus: sed hoc non est ita evidens. Et tunc ratio electionis est: quia justitia est causa justi: et causa est magis eligibilis causato. Et quod non sit essentialis in bono sicut in genere, patet: quia sicut albus homo non est quid in genere coloris, quia non est color: ita justus homo vel justa actio, vel justitiae effectus non est bonitas, sed bonum per informationem boni: non enim secundum praedicationem in recto factam dicitur hoc genus, ita quod genus recte praedicetur de ipso quod non est in genere essentialiter sicut quid ipsius generis. Unde albus homo non est color. Similiter autem est in aliis respondendum.
Est autem in conditionibus essentialibus: cum enim bonum dividatur propriis differentiis in bonum propter se, et in bonum propter alterum, sicut sanum esse in habitu sanitatis magis eligendum, quam exercitare vel deambulare, quod fit propter sanitatem inducendam, ut motu corporis evacuetur et descendat humor ab ore stomachi: sanum enim esse propter se, exercitari autem eligitur propter aliud.
But in such cases, because choice is ruled by another certain one choosing or teaching what must be chosen and not that thing, therefore in such cases one must lead in the prudent person and the good man and the one virtuous concerning individual matters, and lead toward whatever, that is, toward everything that will be useful, which must be said, and ought to be chosen according to his example or statement in common, when the difference is thus. Likewise this is simply and universally better and more to be chosen: what has been said to be chosen according to the better discipline, as what the discipline of the science of heroic virtue commands to be chosen is more eligible to someone; and that is more to be chosen which is to be chosen according to its proper discipline, as for the carpenter what the carpenter's art commands, and for the political person what civil discipline commands. Therefore one must inspect the one choosing, the contradictions of the eligible or good, both essential and accidental. In essential ones, indeed, toward those which belong to the good according to cause.
Therefore, by looking to the necessary or substance of the eligible good, what is fixed in the genus of good and stands according to substance in this genus which is good is more to be chosen than that which is not according to substance some fixed thing in the genus of good. Thus justice is goodness fixed and standing in the genus of good as a species of goodness, and is goodness, as Aristotle says in the Great Morals, more to be chosen than the just thing; and I say the just thing which is the work or effect of justice. And the account of choice is that this which is justice according to its nature is in this genus which is good; but that which is just, as an action or effect, is not in the same genus, but in the genus of action, and can be not good simply, as a work of justice which is condemnation or punishment. Sometimes what is not good is eligible, as if what is just is spoken of as a just human being; but this is not so evident. And then the account of choice is that justice is the cause of the just thing, and the cause is more eligible than the caused thing. And that it is not essential in the good as in a genus is plain, because just as a white human being is not a what in the genus of color, because he is not color, so a just human being or just action or effect of justice is not goodness, but good through the informing of good. For according to predication made in the direct case this genus is not said, so that the genus is rightly predicated of that which is not in the genus essentially as a what of that genus. Hence a white human being is not color. Similarly, however, one must respond in other cases.
But it is in essential conditions: for since good is divided by proper differences into good for its own sake and good for another, being healthy in the habit of health is more to be chosen than exercising or walking, which is done for inducing health, so that by motion of the body the humor may be evacuated and descend from the mouth of the stomach; for to be healthy is for its own sake, but to exercise is chosen for another.
Notes
- At this word maxims in this treatise, rules is understood. (Ad hoc verbum maximas in hoc tractatu subauditur regulas.) ↩
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