Volume 2 · pp. 311–313
TREATISE II, CHAPTER I. On the locus from disparates.
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TRACTATUS II.
DE DETERMINATIONE PROBLEMATIS DE INESSE PER REI EXTRINSECA.
CAPUT I.
De determinationis ejusdem problematis per locum a disparatis.
Sic autem determinato problemate de accidente sive inesse ut accidens per inspectionem ad intrinseca eorum quae sunt in problemate, sicut subjectum et praedicatum: nunc, ut magis abundemus, docendum est qualiter terminatur inspiciendo ad extrinseca eorumdem. Et quia extrinseca magis inter omnia sunt opposita, videndum est qualiter terminari habeat problema de accidente respiciendo ad opposita. Quia vero locus a disparatis reduci habet ad locum ab oppositis, cum omne oppositum sit disparatum et non convertitur, ideo in loco a disparatis est inspiciendum in hoc tractatu.
Dicemus igitur, quoniam eorum accidentium quae insunt subjectis ut praedicata, aliae res quidem insunt ex necessitate cum modo necessitatis determinatae, vel sine modo necessitatis secundum rei necessitatem propositae. Aliae autem insunt ut in pluribus, sicut ea quae insunt contingenter secundum contingens natum. Secundo etiam cum modo vel sine modo contingentis propositae. Aliae vero res sunt positae inesse secundum contingens ad utrumlibet, sicut illae quae sunt de contingenti infinito vel cum modo vel sine modo propositae: tunc tamen quod est sine habitudine praedicati ad subjectum sicut de tali contingenti: haec omnia inter se ad invicem sunt disparata, ita quod constructo uno destruitur reliquum de eodem, nec aliquod unum est susceptibile horum simul. Considerandum ergo si praedicatum quod de necessitate inest, ut in pluribus ponat respondens inesse, aut e converso quod ut in pluribus inest, ponat ex necessitate inesse, sive ponat contrarium ejus, quod est vel inest in paucioribus, ex necessitate inesse: contingens enim in pluribus et contingens in paucioribus contraria sunt secundum modum: quaecumque ergo horum ponat ut ex necessitate inesse, vel e converso id quod inest ex necessitate, contingenter ponat inesse, sive id contingens sit ad utrumlibet sive natum, semper dat locum argumentationis opponenti, ut per locum a disparatis in contrarium arguatur. Quod patet per singula. Nam si quod ex necessitate est vel inest ponatur ut in pluribus esse vel inesse, tunc manifestum quoniam dicendo ut in pluribus vel in paucioribus inesse, dicit non omni inesse: cum id tamen quod necessario inest, omni inest: necessitas enim praedicati cum subjecto secundum inesse, causat quod praedicatum inest secundum totam communitatem suam subjecto, ut omnis homo de necessitate est animal: et hoc est in omnibus in quibus praedicatum est de substantia subjecti. Propter quod peccavit respondens cum dixit quod in pluribus inest, omni inesse: cum non insit omni secundum quod inest ut in pluribus tantum: quoniam ut in pluribus inesse cum sit determinatio ejusdem contingentis nati, etiam disparatum est ab omni inesse: et ut cum praecisione accipiatur, ut dicatur tantum ut in pluribus inesse, quod confirmatur a diffinitione contingentis nati.
Similiter autem et per locum a majori patet, quod peccavit si contingens ut in paucioribus, quod est contrarium ei quod est ut in pluribus, ex necessitate dixit inesse: semper enim contingens quod est ut in paucioribus, est contrarium ei quod est ut in pluribus: quia contingens natum secundum aliquid est dispositum vel ad aliquid adest dispositum: sed contingens infinitum non est dispositum: et ideo de eodem dici non possunt, sed de disparatis et contrariis. Cujus exemplum est, ut si de contingenti nato ut in pluribus sunt pravi homines, et haec, sunt pravi homines, est de contingenti nato, dicetur bonos homines ut in paucioribus. Propter quod etiam amplius magis peccavit, qui contingens ut in paucioribus dixit ex necessitate inesse, quam qui contingens ut in pluribus dixit ex necessitate inesse. Propter quod amplius magis peccavit si bonos homines ex necessitate esse dixit, quam ille qui pravos esse dixit ex necessitate: quia in pluribus sunt pravi homines ex contingenti nato, in VII Ethicorum probatur, ubi ostenditur qualiter violentia incontinentiae licet secundum sensibilem animam adveniat, ligat rationem ita ut non videat quemadmodum oporteat eam videre: eo quod violentior sit motus incontinentiae quam rationis, quamvis ipse incontinens habeat rationem.
TREATISE II.
ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROBLEM CONCERNING BEING-IN THROUGH THE EXTRINSIC THINGS OF THE MATTER.
CHAPTER I.
On the determination of the same problem through the locus from disparates.
Thus, then, once the problem concerning accident or being-in as accident has been determined by inspection toward the intrinsic things of those things that are in the problem, such as subject and predicate, now, so that we may have more abundance, it must be taught how it is terminated by inspecting the extrinsic things of the same. And because, among all extrinsic things, opposites are the greater, one must see how the problem concerning accident has to be terminated by looking to opposites. But because the locus from disparates has to be reduced to the locus from opposites, since every opposite is disparate and is not converted, therefore in this treatise one must inspect in the locus from disparates.
Therefore we shall say that, of those accidents which are in subjects as predicates, some things are in from necessity with a determined mode of necessity, or without a mode of necessity according to the necessity of the proposed matter. But other things are in as in the majority of cases, as those things that are in contingently according to a natural contingent. Secondly, they also are proposed with a mode or without a mode of the contingent. But other things are posited to be in according to the contingent toward either alternative, as those things which belong to infinite contingency, either proposed with a mode or without a mode; then, however, what is without relation of predicate to subject is as concerning such a contingent. All these things are disparate among themselves in relation to one another, so that when one is constructed, the remaining one concerning the same thing is destroyed, nor is any one thing receptive of these simultaneously. Therefore one must consider whether the respondent posits that the predicate which is in of necessity is in as in the majority of cases, or conversely posits that what is in as in the majority of cases is in from necessity, or posits that its contrary, which is or is in in the fewer cases, is in from necessity. For the contingent in the majority of cases and the contingent in the fewer cases are contraries according to mode. Therefore whatever of these he posits as being in from necessity, or conversely posits contingently to be in that which is in from necessity, whether that contingent is toward either alternative or natural, he always gives a locus of argumentation to the opponent, so that through the locus from disparates one may argue to the contrary. This is plain in each case. For if what is or is in from necessity is posited to be or to be in as in the majority of cases, then it is manifest that by saying that it is in as in the majority of cases or in the fewer cases, he says that it is not in every one, since nevertheless what is necessarily in is in every one. For the necessity of the predicate with the subject according to being-in causes the predicate to be in the subject according to its whole community, as every human being is of necessity an animal; and this is in all cases in which the predicate is of the substance of the subject. On account of this the respondent erred when he said that what is in in the majority of cases is in every one, since it is not in every one according as it is in only in the majority of cases; for being-in as in the majority of cases, since it is a determination of the same natural contingent, is also disparate from being-in every one, and it is to be taken with precision, so that it is said to be in only as in the majority of cases, which is confirmed from the definition of the natural contingent.
Similarly also through the locus from the greater it is plain that he erred if he said that the contingent as in the fewer cases, which is contrary to what is as in the majority of cases, is in from necessity. For the contingent which is as in the fewer cases is always contrary to that which is as in the majority of cases, because the natural contingent according to something is disposed or is present as disposed toward something, but the infinite contingent is not disposed; and therefore they cannot be said of the same thing, but of disparate and contrary things. An example of this is that if concerning the natural contingent as in the majority of cases evil human beings exist, and this, evil human beings exist, is of the natural contingent, good human beings will be said to be as in the fewer cases. On account of this he erred still more who said that the contingent as in the fewer cases is in from necessity than he who said that the contingent as in the majority of cases is in from necessity. On account of this he erred still more if he said that good human beings exist of necessity than the one who said that evil human beings exist of necessity, because in the majority of cases human beings are evil by natural contingency, as is proved in Ethics VII, where it is shown how the violence of incontinence, although it comes according to the sensible soul, binds reason so that it does not see in the way it ought to see, because the motion of incontinence is more violent than that of reason, although the incontinent person has reason.
Similiter dat locum argumentationis respondens et peccat, si dedit id quod ad utrumlibet est, vel utrumque oppositorum aequaliter, ut contingens infinitum, dixit inesse ex necessitate vel ut in pluribus inesse, neque id quod inest ad utrumlibet, inest ut in pluribus: neque quod inest ut in pluribus, inest ad utrumlibet: sed sunt disparata. Hoc autem peccatum contingit cum modo necessitatis et contingentis utriusque apposito, ut dictum est.
Contingit etiam in problematibus et propositionibus, quae secundum esse et habitudinem praedicati ad subjectum sunt tales, quamvis ipse respondens non dixerit eas determinatas cum modo necessitatis vel utriusque contingentis in sermone, ita quod determinat sermonem utrum ut in pluribus vel ex necessitate praedicatum insit subjecto. Sit enim res de qua proponitur propositio ut in pluribus: tunc disputare contingit ad oppositum, ac si dixerit id respondens esse ex necessitate propter similitudinem ejus quod est in pluribus, cum eo quod est ex necessitate: ut si aliquis dixerit pravos esse exhaeredandos, quod est in pluribus secundum habitudinem realem praedicati ad subjectum, et dixerit hoc non determinans per modum necessitatis: tunc contra talem positionem disputare contingit, sicut si apposuisset modum necessitatis: propter hoc quod praedicatum similiter se habet ad omne contentum sub subjecto, et ideo de omni inesse videtur: de omni autem inesse relinquitur a necessario inesse: quoniam modus est praedicati determinatio, et non determinatio compositionis: si enim determinat compositum, neque cadunt de omni, neque cadunt etiam semper in tempore sicut in propositione modali: sicut quando est determinatio praedicati, causat totalitatem tam subjecti quam temporis: cum enim dicitur quod omnis homo de necessitate est animal, oportet quod homo omni tempore sit animal, et quod quaelibet pars subjectiva hominis sit animal.
[Marginal label, printed page 312: Objectio.]
Si autem aliquis objiciat, dicendo quod si ex necessitate inesse, semper causat omni inesse: tunc cum ista propositio, omnis homo de necessitate est animal, convertitur in hanc, quod animal de necessitate est homo: et sic omne animal est homo.
[Marginal label, printed page 312: Solutio.]
[Marginal label, printed page 312: Quomodo ex necessitate inesse non semper causat omni inesse.]
Dicendum quod propositio conversa in quantum stat sub conversione, non est propositio dialectica, sed est principium reductionis: et ideo de tali propositione non oportet quod ex necessitate inesse causatur omni inesse et semper: sed propositio dialectica est, in qua praedicatum quod est accidens, vel genus, vel proprium, vel diffinitio, refertur ad subjectum quod est species: et in omni tali necessarium causat totalitatem subjecti et temporis sive sit de necessitate cum modo, sive sit talis secundum rem et sine modo: si enim homo est animal, omnis homo est animal: ex quo genus de specie praedicatur. Contingens autem ut accidens praedicatur de subjecto, neutrum horum potest causare totalitatem.
Likewise the respondent gives a locus of argumentation and errs if he grants that what is toward either alternative, or either of the opposites equally, as the infinite contingent, is in from necessity or is in as in the majority of cases. For neither what is in toward either alternative is in as in the majority of cases, nor what is in as in the majority of cases is in toward either alternative; rather, they are disparates. But this fault happens when a mode of necessity and of each contingent has been added, as has been said.
It also happens in problems and propositions which according to being and the relation of predicate to subject are such, although the respondent himself has not said them determined with a mode of necessity or of either contingent in speech, such that he determines the speech whether the predicate is in the subject as in the majority of cases or from necessity. For let the thing concerning which the proposition is proposed be as in the majority of cases. Then one can dispute toward the opposite as if the respondent had said that it is from necessity, because of the likeness of what is in the majority of cases with what is from necessity. Thus if someone said that evil persons are to be disinherited, which is in the majority of cases according to the real relation of the predicate to the subject, and said this without determining it through the mode of necessity, then one can dispute against such a position as if he had added the mode of necessity, because the predicate has itself similarly to everything contained under the subject, and therefore seems to be in every one. But being-in every one is left behind by necessary being-in, since the mode is a determination of the predicate and not a determination of composition. For if it determines the composite, they neither fall under every nor do they also fall always in time, as in a modal proposition; just as when it is a determination of the predicate, it causes the totality both of subject and of time. For when it is said that every human being is of necessity an animal, it is necessary that human being be animal at every time, and that any subjective part whatever of human being be animal.
[Marginal label, printed page 312: Objection.]
But if someone objects by saying that if being-in from necessity always causes being-in every one, then since this proposition, every human being is of necessity an animal, is converted into this, that animal is of necessity human being, thus every animal is a human being.
[Marginal label, printed page 312: Solution.]
[Marginal label, printed page 312: How being-in from necessity does not always cause being-in every one.]
It must be said that the converted proposition, insofar as it stands under conversion, is not a dialectical proposition, but is a principle of reduction; and therefore concerning such a proposition it is not necessary that being-in from necessity is caused as being-in every one and always. But a dialectical proposition is one in which the predicate, which is accident, or genus, or proper, or definition, is referred to the subject, which is species; and in every such proposition the necessary causes the totality of subject and time, whether it is of necessity with a mode or whether it is such according to the thing and without a mode. For if human being is animal, every human being is animal, from the fact that genus is predicated of species. But the contingent as accident is predicated of subject, and it can cause neither of these totalities.
Amplius autem tertia consideratio trahitur a disparatis, quod peccavit respondens si idem sub alia voce etiam ipsi inesse ut accidens posuit: idem enim etiam inesse ut praedicatum necessitate cohaerentiae: quamvis forte ponat illud ut alterum, non tamen sit: eadem enim essentia aliis et aliis nominibus nominatur. Quemadmodum peccavit Philosophus sic nomine Prodicus, qui dividebat voluptatem: haec enim omnia unius et ejusdem voluptatis nomina sunt: et haec dicere et accidere voluptati, est dicere idem et accidere sibi. Sed voluptas haec refertur ad quietantia desiderium et pascentia ipsum.
[Marginal label, printed page 313: Gaudium, laetitia, quid.]
Gaudium est dilatatio cordis in conceptu boni, quod est voluptas. Jucunditas autem per effectum hilaritatis redundans in corpore gesticulatio. Laetitia autem quae a loco dicitur, nominat eamdem voluptatem prout est dilatatio temperati caloris et spiritus et sanguinis. Si ergo aliquis respondentium ei quod est gaudere, dicit accidere id quod est laetari, idem dicit sibi accidere.
Et est notandum, quod idem accidentale potest accidere ei cui est idem, sed non secundum quod est idem, sed secundum quod est ei accidentale alterius generis quam id cui accidit. Et sic patet solutio ad id quod objici posset, quod nihil accidit etiam ipsi: quia aliter substantia esset accidens alicui. Adhuc autem notandum quod quatuor modi superiori divisione innuuntur, licet tres expresse ponantur in divisione disparatarum, etiam necessario inesse unus: contingenter inesse, tres etiam, in pluribus, in paucioribus, et ad utrumlibet. Quia omne quod inest ex inhaerentia naturali et substantiali, aut inest contingenter: et si inest ex inhaerentia naturali et substantiali, tunc inest necessario: quia necessitas causat et totalitatem subjecti, ita quod inest omni, et totalitatem temporis, ita quod inest semper, quod est de ratione ipsius cui inest: quae ratio fundatur in substantia quae subjectum non relinquit. Si autem inest accidens ab accidente communi: aut inest cum dispositione inclinante ad illud: aut inest ei, ita quod non est dispositum ad illud. Et si est dispositum ad illud: aut dispositio est fortis et fere ad necessitatem inclinans, et sic est contingens in pluribus: aut non est fortis, sed inchoata tantum, et sic est contingens in paucioribus. Et sic quatuor sunt, et de necessitate inhaerens, et contingens in pluribus, et contingens in paucioribus, et contingens secundum potentiam et non secundum actum inhaerens, quod est contingens ad utrumlibet.
Fiunt ergo partiales considerationes duodecim, quamvis Aristoteles non ponit nisi unam in communi. Potest enim id quod est necessarium, poni ut contingens ad utrumlibet: et id quod est contingens ad utrumlibet, poni ut necessarium: et sunt duae considerationes. Et potest necessarium poni ut contingens in pluribus, et e converso: et sunt iterum duae. Et potest necessarium poni ut contingens in paucioribus, et e converso: et sic sunt iterum duae. Et sic videlicet fiunt in universo comparatione primi ad reliqua tria, et e converso in quibus fit peccatum in sic vel sic ponendo. Et quod necessarium ponitur ut contingens alii, et e converso contingens ut necessarium: ideo fieri potest, quod omne quod contingens est uni, alicui alii est necessarium simpliciter. Contingens in pluribus
Moreover, a third consideration is drawn from disparates: that the respondent erred if he posited the same thing under another word to be in even that very thing as accident. For the same thing is also in as predicate by necessity of coherence; although perhaps he posits it as another, nevertheless it is not another, for the same essence is named by different names. In this way the philosopher Prodicus erred, who divided pleasure; for all these are names of one and the same pleasure, and to say these and to say that they happen to pleasure is to say that the same happens to itself. But this pleasure is referred to things quieting desire and feeding it.
[Marginal label, printed page 313: What joy and gladness are.]
Joy is a dilation of the heart in the conception of good, which is pleasure. But pleasantness, through the effect of cheerfulness overflowing in the body, is gesticulation. Gladness, however, which is named from place, names the same pleasure as it is a dilation of tempered heat and spirit and blood. Therefore if someone among the respondents says that being-glad happens to rejoicing, he says that the same thing happens to itself.
And it must be noted that the same accidental can happen to that to which it is the same, but not according as it is the same, but according as it is accidental to it from another genus than that to which it happens. And thus the solution is plain to what could be objected, that nothing happens even to itself, because otherwise substance would be an accident to something. Furthermore it must be noted that four modes are indicated in the division above, although three are expressly placed in the division of disparates: one is to be in necessarily; three also are to be in contingently, namely in the majority of cases, in the fewer cases, and toward either alternative. For everything that is in from natural and substantial inherence either is in contingently; and if it is in from natural and substantial inherence, then it is in necessarily, because necessity causes both the totality of subject, so that it is in every one, and the totality of time, so that it is in always, which belongs to the account of that in which it is. This account is founded in substance, which does not leave the subject. But if an accident is in from a common accident, either it is in with a disposition inclining to it, or it is in it in such a way that it is not disposed to it. And if it is disposed to it, either the disposition is strong and inclining almost to necessity, and thus it is contingent in the majority of cases, or it is not strong but only begun, and thus it is contingent in the fewer cases. And thus there are four: what inheres of necessity, the contingent in the majority of cases, the contingent in the fewer cases, and the contingent inhering according to potency and not according to act, which is the contingent toward either alternative.
Therefore twelve partial considerations are made, although Aristotle posits only one in common. For what is necessary can be posited as contingent toward either alternative, and what is contingent toward either alternative can be posited as necessary; and these are two considerations. And the necessary can be posited as contingent in the majority of cases, and conversely; and these are again two. And the necessary can be posited as contingent in the fewer cases, and conversely; and thus these are again two. And thus, namely by comparison of the first to the remaining three and conversely, six are made in the whole, in which a fault occurs in positing thus or thus. And because the necessary is posited as contingent to another, and conversely the contingent as necessary, it can therefore happen that everything that is contingent to one thing is simply necessary to some other thing. The contingent in the majority of cases
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