Volume 2 · pp. 301–304
CHAPTERS IV-VI. On amphibological multiplicity and on parts of being.
A marker with ≈ is an approximate page boundary, placed by measure of the text; the page photographs remain the authority. In the paired views, clicking a page marker brings that page into view.
ostenderimus, quoniam uni alicui inest secundum unum sensum multiplicitatis inest, interimemus nulli inesse, sive secundum nullum sensum verum esse. Sed construentibus, hoc est, construere volentibus universale ex particulari, praeconfitendum, hoc est, praeconfessione respondentis utendum et in negativa et in affirmativa, ut quod confiteatur respondens, quod sicut est in uno, ita est in aliis: vel sicut non est in uno, ita non est in aliis: et hoc est ideo, quia non aliter ex uno particulari infertur universale universaliter distributum. Praeconfitendum ergo si uni inest, omni inesse. Et si similis sit propositio, hoc est quod sicut se habet in uno, ita se habeat in omnibus propositio posita: non enim sufficit disputasse si uni inest, omni inesse, nisi ex praeconfessione: ut si ostendatur quoniam anima unius hominis est immortalis, quod sequitur quoniam omnis hominis anima est immortalis.
Hoc autem non semper faciendum in universalibus problematibus, sed in aliquibus quando non facile est unam dictarum rationum dicere vel ostendere, secundum quam singularia respiciunt universale, sicut faciliter potest ostendere geometer unam communem rationem, quod omnis triangulus rectilineus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Sic ergo procedendum, quando respondentem latet aequivocum in propositione proposita.
Si autem respondentem non lateat aequivocum quod multipliciter dicitur, tunc ut respondens negandi vel concedendi non habeat occasionem ab opponente, tunc dicendum est vel distinguendum multiplex secundum omnem sensum, et contingit interimere si concedit respondens secundum omnem sensum, et construere si negaverit respondens. Cujus exemplum est, si quaeritur, si opportunum est expediens vel bonum sive honestum. Si hoc negaverit respondens, vel tentandum ambo interimere de proposito problemate si ea concesserit respondens, si opportunum neque bonum est neque expediens. Si autem non contingit utrumque, hoc est, in utroque sensu construi vel destrui, tunc alterum inest, hoc est, quod in altero sensu est verum, id autem non inest, hoc est, in alio sensu falsum est. Eadem autem ratio est, etsi plura sint in quae dividatur, hoc est, si in plures quam in duos dividitur sensus, id quod est multiplex: secundum enim omnes sensus distinguendum est, et secundum omnes sensus est construendum vel destruendum, si fieri potest: vel secundum aliquem construendum vel destruendum si secundum omnem sensum construi vel destrui non potest, propter superius assignatam rationem. Secundum enim modum totius universalis construi vel destrui habet multiplex aequivocationis: quia sicut totum universale se habet ad sua significata: et ideo sicut totum universale construitur ex sui parte, et sic multiplex construitur ex suo significato: et sicut interimitur universale universaliter sumptum si alicui uni non inest, et sicut interimuntur nulli si alicui uni inest, sic multiplex secundum omnem sensum esse verum destruitur si secundum unum sensum verum non est, et secundum nullum sensum esse verum destruitur si secundum unum aliquem sensum verum est. Propter quod etiam similia sunt in construendo vel destruendo totum universale universaliter sumptum, et totum multiplex. Sic ergo proceditur multiplicari secundum aequivocationem.
CAPUT V.
Qualiter procedendum sit in multiplici amphibologico.
[Marginal label, printed page 301: Quomodo haec propositio, disciplina est una plurium, est multiplex.]
Rursum quoque in his quae sunt secundum aequivocationem, dicuntur multipliciter, sed alio modo, accidentali tamen multiplicitate, sicut secundum amphibologiam: sicut dicitur disciplina una plurium: hoc enim secundum multiplicitatem amphibologiae dicitur: multipliciter enim dicitur disciplina una plurium, ut quod plura sint unius finis totius disciplinae, et ejus quando est ad finem: sic enim unius est ut finis, et alterius ut ejus quando est ad finem: ut medicina dicitur una disciplina plurium, quia est disciplina sanitatem faciendi, ut finis, et cibandi et diaetandi, ut ejus quod est ad finem: et sic est plurium quae non in una penitus habitudine construuntur, et hoc quod est disciplinam unam esse plurium. Dicitur etiam una disciplina plurium velut amborum finium: et tunc genitivus plurium ratione suppositorum in una dependentia se habet ad nominativum, qui est, una disciplina est plurium. Vel ad accusativum, quando dicitur unam disciplinam esse plurium. Sic dicitur, contrariorum eadem disciplina, ut medicina sanorum et aegrorum: et sic enim disciplina una speculativa plurium est quae aequaliter contraria, ut fines in periculosis considerare: quamvis disciplina practica non sit nisi unius ut finis, et alterius per accidens ut caveatur. In speculativis autem nihil magis unum contrariorum est finis altero: quia per speculationem non potest finite cognosci unum contrariorum, nisi cognoscatur alterum. Aut etiam dicitur una disciplina plurium: quia est unius, ut ejus cujus est per se, et alterius, ut ejus cujus est per accidens: sicut disciplina, quoniam triangulus habet tres angulos aequos duobus, etc.; quae disciplina relata ad subjectum plurium est, quia est trianguli et aequilateri: sed trianguli secundum se, aequilateri per accidens, quoniam accidit triangulo esse triangulum aequilaterum, et contingit triangulo per id quod est consequens esse totum trianguli. Quaecumque autem totum esse sequuntur, accidunt 1: eo quod non sunt de substantia illorum quorum esse sequuntur, quamvis in seipsis sint substantialia. Sed quod accidens quidem dicunt opponi ad per se et non ad subjectum, et vocant ipsum accidens ad visendum quamvis substantiale sit ad essendum: quia non per se, sed per extraneum participat praedicatum, cognoscimus, quod aequilaterus habet tres aequos duobus rectis, per hoc quod est triangulus, et non per hoc quod est aequilaterus.
we have shown that it is in some one thing according to one sense of the multiplicity, we shall destroy that it is in none, or that it is true according to no sense. But for those who construct, that is, who wish to construct a universal from a particular, one must have it confessed beforehand, that is, use the respondent's prior confession in both the negative and the affirmative, so that the respondent confesses that as it is in one, so it is in the others; or as it is not in one, so it is not in the others. And this is because otherwise from one particular a universally distributed universal is not inferred. Therefore it must be confessed beforehand that if it is in one, it is in every one. And if the proposed proposition is similar, that is, that as it has itself in one, so the posited proposition has itself in all, for it does not suffice to have disputed that if it is in one, it is in every one, except from prior confession; as if it is shown that the soul of one human being is immortal, that it follows that the soul of every human being is immortal.
But this is not always to be done in universal problems, but in some cases when it is not easy to state or show one of the said accounts according to which the singulars regard the universal, as a geometer can easily show one common account, that every rectilinear triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. Thus therefore one must proceed when the equivocal thing in the proposed proposition is hidden from the respondent.
But if the equivocal thing that is said multiply is not hidden from the respondent, then, so that the respondent may not have an occasion for denying or conceding from the opponent, the multiple must then be stated or distinguished according to every sense; and it happens to destroy if the respondent concedes according to every sense, and to construct if the respondent denies. An example of this is if it is asked whether the opportune is expedient or good or honorable. If the respondent denies this, one must try to destroy both concerning the proposed problem, if the respondent has conceded them, that the opportune is neither good nor expedient. But if both cannot be done, that is, if it cannot be constructed or destroyed in each sense, then the other is in, that is, what is true in the other sense, but this is not in, that is, it is false in the other sense. But the same account holds even if there are more things into which what is multiple is divided, that is, if it is divided into more senses than two: for it must be distinguished according to all senses, and must be constructed or destroyed according to all senses, if this can be done; or it must be constructed or destroyed according to some sense if it cannot be constructed or destroyed according to every sense, on account of the reason assigned above. For the multiple of equivocation has being constructed or destroyed according to the mode of the whole universal: because as the universal whole has itself to its significates, so the multiple is constructed from its own significate; and as the universal taken universally is destroyed if it is not in some one thing, and as belonging to none is destroyed if it is in some one thing, so for the multiple to be true according to every sense is destroyed if it is not true according to one sense, and for it to be true according to no sense is destroyed if it is true according to some one sense. On account of this, constructing or destroying the whole universal taken universally and the whole multiple are also similar. Thus therefore one proceeds concerning what is multiplied according to equivocation.
CHAPTER V.
How one must proceed in the amphibological multiple.
[Marginal label, printed page 301: How this proposition, discipline is one of many, is multiple.]
Again also in those things which are according to equivocation, they are said multiply, but in another way, nevertheless with accidental multiplicity, as according to amphibology. Thus it is said: discipline is one of many. For this is said according to the multiplicity of amphibology. For discipline is said to be one of many in several ways: as that many things are of one end of the whole discipline, and of that when it is toward the end; for thus it is of one as end, and of another as of that which is toward the end. Thus medicine is called one discipline of many, because it is a discipline of producing health as end, and of feeding and dieting as of that which is toward the end; and thus it is of many things that are not constructed in altogether one relation, and this is what it means for one discipline to be of many. One discipline of many is also said as it were of both ends; and then the genitive plural many, by reason of the supposita, has itself in one dependence to the nominative, which is, one discipline is of many. Or it has itself to the accusative, when one says that one discipline is of many. Thus it is said that there is the same discipline of contraries, as medicine of healthy and sick persons; and thus also one speculative discipline is of many things which considers contraries equally as ends in perilous matters, although practical discipline is only of one as end and of another per accidens as what is to be avoided. But in speculative matters one of the contraries is no more an end than the other, because through speculation one contrary cannot be finitely known unless the other is known. Or one discipline of many is also said because it is of one as of that of which it is through itself, and of the other as of that of which it is per accidens; as the discipline that the triangle has three angles equal to two, and so forth. This discipline, referred to subject, is of many, because it is of triangle and equilateral, but of triangle according to itself, and of equilateral per accidens, since it happens to triangle to be an equilateral triangle, and it happens to triangle through that which is consequent to be the whole of triangle. But whatever things follow the whole being are accidents 1, because they are not of the substance of those things whose being they follow, although in themselves they are substantial. But that they say that accident is opposed to per se and not to subject, and they call it accident with respect to being seen although it is substantial with respect to being, because it participates in the predicate not through itself but through something extraneous, we know in this: that equilateral has three angles equal to two right angles through the fact that it is a triangle, and not through the fact that it is equilateral.
Sic ergo amphibologice dicitur ad multiplex: nec dicitur, quod hic multiplex sit non secundum aequivocationem, eo quod nihil sit aequivocum: quia hoc esset falsum: cum unum nomen unius per se et alterius propter aliquid, vel unius per se et alterius per accidens, non possit esse nisi aequivoce. Sed dicitur non secundum aequivocationem: quia multiplicitas hic non consideratur in aequivocis, sed in diversa dependentia generum quae est plurium ad nominationes vel accusationes praecedentes.
Usus autem hujus considerationis in destruendo quidem problema quod oportet destruere, multiplex secundum quemlibet sensum est: quia si nullo modo secundum quemlibet sensum est una disciplina plurium, tunc universaliter destructa erit propositio quae dicit disciplinam esse plurium: tunc enim manifestum est quoniam omnino, hoc est, universaliter, non erit una disciplina plurium. In construendo autem sufficit uno aliquo modo disciplinam unam plurium esse. Exemplum propositionis propositae proprie loquendo non est multiplex: sed nomine multiplicis extenso, multiplex dicitur propositio, quae plures causas habet veritatis, cujus veritas non destruitur nisi omnibus modis et causis veritatis destructis. Construatur autem veritas, causa una constructa veritatis ejusdem.
In talibus autem multiplicibus quae non latent respondentem, utile est dividere sive distinguere multiplex quoties dicitur secundum omnem modum suae multiplicitatis, ne respondens negandi habeat occasionem, aliquo modo non divisim accepto. Sed si construere volumus propositionem, addendi et accipiendi sunt a nobis omnes sensus veri, ut accipiamus quaecumque contingunt et vera sunt: et dividendum est propositionem in ea tantum quae vera sunt, hoc est, in sensus multiplicitatis veros, omittendo sensus falsos: quia sic accipimus quaecumque utilia sunt ad construendum: quia sensus falsus ad construendum non est utilis. Si autem destruere volumus, accipiendi sunt omnes sensus multiplicitatis falsi, ita quod accipiamus ex sensibus multiplicitatis ea quae non contingunt et falsa sunt, et reliqua quae sensus veri relinquamus: quia verum non valet ad destruendum, cum ex vero non sequitur nisi verum. Taliter autem faciendum est in multiplici, quod non latet respondentem: quia aliter negabitur propositio propter multiplex indivisum.
Thus therefore it is said amphibologically with respect to the multiple; nor is it said that this multiple is not according to equivocation because nothing is equivocal, for this would be false, since one name of one thing through itself and of another on account of something, or of one thing through itself and another per accidens, cannot be except equivocally. But it is said not according to equivocation because the multiplicity here is not considered in equivocal things, but in the diverse dependence of genera, which is the dependence of many to the preceding nominatives or accusatives.
But the use of this consideration in destroying a problem which must be destroyed is this: the multiple is according to any sense whatever, because if in no way according to any sense there is one discipline of many, then the proposition which says that discipline is of many will be destroyed universally; for then it is manifest that altogether, that is, universally, there will not be one discipline of many. But in constructing, it suffices that in some one way there is one discipline of many. The example of the proposed proposition, speaking properly, is not multiple; but by an extended name of the multiple, a proposition is called multiple when it has several causes of truth, whose truth is not destroyed unless all the modes and causes of truth have been destroyed. But the truth is constructed when one cause of the same truth has been constructed.
But in such multiple things which are not hidden from the respondent, it is useful to divide or distinguish how many times the multiple is said according to every mode of its multiplicity, lest the respondent have an occasion of denying because some mode has not been accepted divisively. But if we wish to construct the proposition, all true senses must be added and accepted by us, so that we accept whatever things happen and are true; and the proposition must be divided only into those things which are true, that is, into true senses of multiplicity, omitting false senses, because in this way we accept whatever things are useful for constructing; for a false sense is not useful for constructing. But if we wish to destroy, all false senses of the multiplicity must be accepted, so that from the senses of the multiplicity we accept the things that do not happen and are false, and leave the remaining things which are true senses, because the true has no force for destroying, since from the true nothing follows except the true. But one must act in this way in a multiple that is not hidden from the respondent, because otherwise the proposition will be denied on account of an undivided multiple.
Haec autem multiplicitas non consideratur tantum in his quae sunt plurium, sed etiam in hoc quod est unius. Unde esse hoc hujus, vel non esse hoc hujus, eadem multiplicitate multipliciter dicitur: et ex eisdem locis considerationis est construendum et destruendum. Et si propositio formato problemate dicat disciplinam hanc hujus esse: aut erit hujus ut finis, aut ut alicujus eorum quae sunt ad finem: aut alicujus essentiae dicitur ut ejus cujus est per se, aut ut ejus cujus est per accidens. Similiter etiam dicitur in negativa quae dicitur hoc non esse hujus aliquo modorum prius dictorum. Eadem autem ratio est in alio exemplo quo desiderium dicitur hujus, et eadem ratio in aliis omnibus quaecumque dicuntur vel pluraliter vel singulariter, hoc hujus est ubi desiderium horum vel hujus et eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut cognoscere medicinam vel cibum ad sanitatem ordinatum. Est etiam desiderium aliquorum ut unius per se et alterius per accidens, velut in vino vel vini desiderium est in eo quod amicus dulcis: hujus enim est desiderium quidem vini per accidens, sed est dulcis per se ut finis: non enim appetit vinum quia vinum est, sed appetit idem quia dulce est: talis enim per se dulce desiderat, vinum autem per accidens: accidens: si enim austerum esset, jam non desiderabit illud amicus dulcis. Patet ergo quod per accidens desiderat vinum per hoc quod accidit vina dulcia esse. Cum enim omnia relativa dicantur alicujus vel aliquorum, patet quod maxime utilis est locus hic et consideratio ab eo sumpta in his quae sunt ad aliquid sive relativa alicujus vel aliquorum: omnia enim quae sunt ad aliquid et sunt de numero relativorum, pene talia sunt. Et dico pene propter quaedam relativa quae expresse determinant sua correlativa: et ideo in talibus non potest esse talis multiplicitas.
Si autem obscuritas sit in proposito non ex multiplici, sed ex nomine ignoto, transferre oportet propositionem in nomine illo ad aliud nomen idem significans quod sit notius vel evidentius quam primum: sicut si dicatur, quod certum in opinione hominum non est notum, proponitur planum: planum enim in notitia est, quod leviter cognoscitur a quolibet: et si dicatur investigari, ponet pro eo perquirere, quia aliter saepe respondens negandi accipit occasionem pro non noto nomine pro evidentiori facto quod dictum est, in proposito facilius argumentabilis propositio sive problema: quia respondens faciliter consentis in id quod evidenter notum. Est autem hic locus sive consideratio ab expositione nominis tracta, ad utrumque habens potestatem communis ad destruendum et construendum.
[Marginal label, printed page 303: Quomodo diversimode multiplici utuntur dialecticus et sophista.]
Et attende quod quamvis hic locus sit a transumptione quae extrinsecus est, tamen hic ponitur inter locos intrinsecos a substantia rei tractos: eo quod non sumitur hic a transumptione ut dispositio medii ad inferendum, sive ut locus a quo trahatur argumentum, sed ut idoneitas quaedam opponentis. Adhuc etiam intelligendum, quod multiplici utitur sophista, prout et etiam dialecticus: sed sophista utitur eo prout est dispositio medii ad decipiendum, sed dialecticus prout est in altera extremitatum ad inferendum illud.
But this multiplicity is considered not only in those things which are of many, but also in this, that it is of one. Hence for this to be of this, or for this not to be of this, is said multiply with the same multiplicity; and it must be constructed and destroyed from the same loci of consideration. And if a proposition, once the problem has been formed, says that this discipline is of this, then either it will be of this as end, or as of one of those things that are toward the end; or it is said to be of some essence as of that of which it is through itself, or as of that of which it is per accidens. Similarly also in the negative, which says that this is not of this, it is said according to one of the previously stated modes. The same account is in the other example by which desire is said to be of this, and the same account is in all other things whatever that are said either plurally or singularly, this is of this, where desire is of these or of this and of those things that are toward the end, as knowing medicine or food ordered to health. There is also desire of some things as of one through itself and of another per accidens, as in wine, or desire of wine, it is in this, that the sweet is a friend. For desire indeed is of wine per accidens, but is of the sweet through itself as end; for he does not seek wine because it is wine, but he seeks the same thing because it is sweet. For such a person desires the sweet through itself, but wine per accidens: the accident; for if it were austere, the lover of the sweet would no longer desire it. Therefore it is plain that he desires wine per accidens through the fact that it happens that wines are sweet. For since all relatives are said to be of some one or of some things, it is plain that this locus and the consideration taken from it is especially useful in those things which are toward something, or relatives of some one or of some things. For all things which are toward something and are of the number of relatives are almost such. And I say almost because of certain relatives which expressly determine their correlatives; and therefore in such things there cannot be such multiplicity.
But if the obscurity in the proposed point is not from a multiple but from an unknown name, one must transfer the proposition in that name to another name signifying the same thing which is more known or more evident than the first. Thus if it is said that what is certain in the opinion of human beings is not known, plain is proposed; for in knowledge the plain is what is lightly known by anyone. And if it is said to be investigated, he will put in place of it to seek out, because otherwise the respondent often takes an occasion of denying on account of an unknown name. When a more evident thing has been made from what has been said, the proposition or problem is more easily arguable in the proposed matter, because the respondent more easily consents to that which is evidently known. But this locus or consideration is drawn from the exposition of the name, having a common power toward each, to destroying and to constructing.
[Marginal label, printed page 303: How the dialectician and the sophist use the multiple in diverse ways.]
And attend that although this locus is from transumption, which is extrinsic, nevertheless here it is placed among the intrinsic loci drawn from the substance of the thing, because here it is not taken from transumption as a disposition of the middle for inferring, or as the locus from which an argument is drawn, but as a certain suitability of the opponent. Furthermore one must understand that the sophist uses the multiple, just as also the dialectician does; but the sophist uses it insofar as it is a disposition of the middle for deceiving, while the dialectician uses it insofar as it is in one of the extremes for inferring that.
Extremum autem infertur dupliciter ut convertibile, ita quod stet pro eodem pro quo stat medium: et est locus dialecticus a convertibili dictus: vel infertur alio modo, et est locus sophisticus. Adhuc autem cum dicitur, quod ex uno sensu probato infertur aliquid esse multiplex, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo si inferatur pro eodem sensu pro quo stet medium: tunc non sequitur quod multiplex sit. Si autem pro alia significatione pro qua non stat medium: tunc non utamur quod multiplex in uno sensu probatum est. Adhuc quod si protervus est respondens, non est discedendum ab opponente multiplex: quia destructo multiplici protervus respondens magis proterviet: sed quando non est protervus, discedendum, quia ex hoc expeditur opus commune.
CAPUT VI.
De transactione problematis de inesse per inspectionem ad locos intrinsecos, quae sunt partes esse vel esse incompletum.
Ad cognoscendum autem sive ostendendum problema de inesse, cujus exemplum sit, si problema fiat, an contraria eidem insunt, et velimus ostendere quoniam contraria insunt eidem subjecto, eo quod nata sunt fieri circa idem secundum simpliciter inesse sive secundum simplicem inhaerentiam: considerandum est primo consideratione in genere ejus cui ponuntur inesse, hoc non consequens ad subjectum, considerationes hic trahemus a locis intrinsecis, quae sunt substantia rei incompleta. Hi simpliciter post locum a diffinitione, quae totum esse rei dicit, sunt ponendi. Inter hos prima consideratio sumitur a genere, quod est essentiale et non convertibile. Consequens prius non est, quam antecedens causa ipsius per esse et essentialiter praedicatur de subjecto. Sic ergo volentes ostendere, quod aliquid essentialiter inest accidenti sive speciei, quoniam essentialiter contraria sunt vera sive circa idem in genere subjecti, accipiemus primo considerationem. Verbi gratia, si velimus ostendere quoniam circa sensum secundum actum et secundum agere factum est rectitudo et peccatum: sentire autem est in genere ejus quod est judicare: judicare quidem circa diversa et circa aliud est, scilicet circa recte et non recte, et essentialiter et per se convenit hoc ei quod est judicare, secundum quod est a principiis informantibus judicium: quia sic omne judicare vel recte vel non recte sequitur, ita quod etiam circa sensum in agere est recte et peccatum: et sic in hoc consideratio est sumpta ex genere circa speciem deducto: quoniam hoc quod essentialiter et per se inest generi, probatur inesse speciei, per genus illud quod est essentialiter species participat: nam judicare est genus ejus quod est sentire: et ideo pars ejus quod est judicare, probatur inesse ei quod est sentire: quia sentire est quoddam judicare: sicut habere tres aequos duobus, etc., probatur inesse isosceli, per hoc quod est triangulus: nam qui sentit, judicat aliquo modo.
[Marginal label, printed page 304: Quomodo intelligendum quod circa sensum est rectitudo et peccatum.]
Est autem intelligendum de sentire sensus communis qui componit et dividit signata particularia, et componendo et dividendo judicat de ipsis per mixtionem aestimativae potentiae aestimantis nocivum vel conveniens in acceptis per sensum componentem et dividentem: et non est intelligendum de sentire sensus particularis, quia iste non peccat in proprio sensato. Haec autem in principio philosophiae, in secundo de Anima 2, habent probari, et ex logicis probari non possunt: quamvis ex logicis disputari possint ad problema de simpliciter inesse speciei, quia essentialiter inest generi.
Rursum autem consideratio trahitur ex specie ad probandum aliquid inesse generi simpliciter: generaliter enim verum
But an extreme is inferred in two ways: as convertible, so that it stands for the same thing for which the middle stands, and this is called the dialectical locus from the convertible; or it is inferred in another way, and this is a sophistical locus. Moreover, when it is said that from one proven sense something is inferred to be multiple, this can be in two ways. In one way, if it is inferred for the same sense for which the middle stands; then it does not follow that it is multiple. But if it is for another signification for which the middle does not stand, then we do not use the fact that the multiple has been proved in one sense. Furthermore, if the respondent is obstinate, one must not withdraw from the opponent a multiple, because when the multiple has been destroyed, the obstinate respondent will behave more obstinately; but when he is not obstinate, one must withdraw, because by this the common work is expedited.
CHAPTER VI.
On the transaction of the problem concerning being-in through inspection toward intrinsic loci, which are parts of being or incomplete being.
But for knowing or showing a problem concerning being-in, of which let the example be, if a problem is made whether contraries are in the same thing, and we wish to show that contraries are in the same subject, because they are naturally apt to come to be about the same thing according to being-in simply or according to simple inherence, one must first consider with a consideration in the genus of that in which they are posited to be in. Since this is not consequent to the subject, we shall here draw considerations from intrinsic loci, which are the incomplete substance of the thing. These must simply be placed after the locus from definition, which states the whole being of the thing. Among these, the first consideration is taken from genus, which is essential and not convertible. The consequent is not prior to the antecedent, since the cause of it is predicated of the subject through being and essentially. Therefore, wishing to show that something is essentially in an accident or species, because contraries are essentially true, or about the same thing in the genus of subject, we shall first take a consideration. For example, if we wish to show that rectitude and fault have been made about sense according to act and according to acting, then sensing is in the genus of that which is to judge. But to judge is indeed about diverse things and about another, namely about rightly and not rightly; and this belongs essentially and through itself to that which is to judge, according as it is from principles informing judgment, because thus every judging follows either rightly or not rightly, so that also about sense in acting there is rectitude and fault. And thus in this the consideration is taken from a genus brought down around a species: because that which is essentially and through itself in the genus is proved to be in the species through that genus which the species essentially participates. For judging is the genus of what sensing is; and therefore a part of what judging is is proved to be in what sensing is, because sensing is a certain judging; just as having three angles equal to two right angles, and so forth, is proved to be in an isosceles triangle through the fact that it is a triangle; for one who senses judges in some way.
[Marginal label, printed page 304: How it is to be understood that there is rectitude and fault about sense.]
But this must be understood about the sensing of the common sense, which composes and divides the particular signs, and by composing and dividing judges concerning them through a mixture of the estimative power estimating the harmful or fitting in the things received through the sense composing and dividing; and it must not be understood about the sensing of a particular sense, because that sense does not err in its proper sensible. But these things have to be proved in the beginning of philosophy, in the second book On the Soul 2, and they cannot be proved from logical matters, although from logical matters they can be disputed toward the problem concerning being-in simply of a species, because it is essentially in the genus.
Again, a consideration is drawn from species for proving that something is in a genus simply: for it is generally true
If a page does not appear, its photograph has not been uploaded yet.