Volume 2 · pp. 287–289
CHAPTERS IX-XI. On the uses of the instruments.
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CAPUT IX.
De utilitate distinctionis multiplicis.
Tangendo horum instrumentorum utilitates, non oportet exponere primi: quia haec per immediatam ordinationem ut principium ordinatur ad syllogismum, et in syllogismo patet utilitas ejus. Tangendo autem utilitates secundi instrumenti dicimus, quoties dicitur unum quod est, est utile considerare ad manifestum, hoc est, ut manifestum fiat, in quo sensu accipiatur propositum, ut opponens et respondens ad idem se referant: magis enim sciet et melius quis respondentium, quid hoc est in quo sensu proponitur ab opponente, quando per distinctionem multiplicis palam factum est quot modis dicitur quod positum. Utile etiam est ad fieri, hoc est, si fiant, similiter opponentes ad eamdem rem, hoc est, ad eumdem sensum, in quo accipit respondens: et sic non fiant syllogismi ad nomen tantum, et non ad intentionem, nisi prius fiat distinctio multiplicis: si enim ex multitudine obscure sit aliud quoties dicitur, accidit non ad idem secundum rem et intentionem, et eum qui respondet, et eum qui interrogat, intentionem ferre. Si autem per distinctionem manifestum sit quoties dicitur, et ad quid respondens se ferat, hoc est, ponat, sive concedat ipsum, ridiculosus videbitur interrogans sive opponens, si non ad idem cum respondente sermonem, hoc est, rationem, faciat. Tertio autem utile est hoc instrumentum et ad non paralogizare quoad respondentem, et paralogizare quoad opponentem. Cujus probatio est, quia nos scientes quoties aliquid dicitur, non paralogizabimus respondenti, sed statim per distinctionem sciemus, si non ad idem quod positum est, sermonem, hoc est, ratiocinationem, faciat qui interrogat sive opponit. Et nos ipsi opponentes facultate hujus instrumenti poterimus paralogizare respondenti nobis. Dialecticis autem hoc aliquando necessarium, ut quando protervus est respondens, ut paralogizatus quiescat a protervia. Paralogizabimus ergo respondentem ut sit sciens quoties dicitur unumquodque in oratione vel disputatione accepta. Hoc autem quod est paralogizare protervum, non in omnibus orationibus est possibile: quoniam multiplicia fiunt de numero eorum quorum unum, hoc est, uno sensu, acceptum verum, in alio falsum: tunc enim magis patebit inconveniens conclusum.
Est autem modus hic qui est paralogizare non conveniens dialecticae disputationi: propter quod omnino et universaliter verendum est dialecticis hoc disputare, ad nomen et non ad rem referendo disputationem, nisi opponenti qui scit per experimentum proterviam respondentis, quod non possit alias propter respondentis importunitatem de proposito disputare. Sunt ergo tres dictae utilitates secundi instrumenti: quia distinctio multiplicis, aut utilis est propter propositum in se acceptum, et sic est utilitas prima: aut utilis propter propositum ad aliud comparatum: et tunc aut est comparatum ad disputationem, et sic est utilitas secunda: aut comparatur ad condisputantem, et sic est utilitas tertia.
CHAPTER IX.
On the usefulness of distinction of the multiple.
In touching the uses of these instruments, one need not explain the use of the first, because through immediate ordering it is ordered to syllogism as a principle, and its usefulness is plain in syllogism. But in touching the uses of the second instrument we say that it is useful to consider how many times that which is one is said for manifestness, that is, so that it may become manifest in what sense the proposed thing is accepted, so that opponent and respondent may refer themselves to the same thing. For each respondent will know more and better what this is, in what sense it is proposed by the opponent, when through distinction of the multiple it has been made plain in how many modes what is posited is said. It is also useful for opponents being made similarly toward the same thing, that is, toward the same sense in which the respondent accepts it; and thus syllogisms may not be made only to the name and not to the intention, unless the distinction of the multiple is first made. For if, from multitude, it is obscure how many times something else is said, it happens that both the one who responds and the one who questions carry their intention not to the same thing according to reality and intention. But if through distinction it is manifest how many times it is said, and to what the respondent bears himself, that is, posits or concedes it, the questioner or opponent will seem ridiculous if he does not make speech, that is, reasoning, toward the same thing as the respondent. Thirdly, this instrument is useful both for not paralogizing with respect to the respondent, and for paralogizing with respect to the opponent. The proof of this is that, knowing how many times something is said, we shall not paralogize the respondent, but immediately through distinction we shall know if the one who questions or opposes makes speech, that is, reasoning, not to the same thing that was posited. And we ourselves, as opponents, by the faculty of this instrument will be able to paralogize the respondent to us. But for dialecticians this is sometimes necessary, as when the respondent is insolent, so that having been paralogized he may rest from insolence. Therefore we shall paralogize the respondent so that he may be one knowing how many times each thing is said in the speech or disputation accepted. But this, to paralogize the insolent person, is not possible in all speeches, because multiples are made of the number of those of which one thing, that is, taken in one sense, is true, but in another false; for then the unsuitable conclusion will be more apparent.
But this mode, which is to paralogize, is not suitable to dialectical disputation; on account of this, dialecticians must altogether and universally fear to dispute in this way, by referring the disputation to the name and not to the thing, except for an opponent who knows by experience the insolence of the respondent, that he cannot otherwise dispute about the proposed matter because of the respondent's importunity. Therefore there are the three stated uses of the second instrument: because distinction of the multiple is either useful on account of the proposed thing accepted in itself, and thus it is the first usefulness; or useful on account of the proposed thing compared to another; and then either it is compared to disputation, and thus it is the second usefulness, or it is compared to the fellow-disputant, and thus it is the third usefulness.
CAPUT X.
De utilitate inventionis differentiarum.
Differentias autem invenire, quod est instrumentum tertium, est utile et praecipue ad syllogismos de eodem et de diverso construendos: et hoc est utilitas differentiae in quantum differentia est et divisiva. Et secundo est utile ad cognoscendum per diffinitionem unumquodque: quia per differentiarum divisionem venamur diffinitionem: et scientes ultimam differentiam constitutivam cum genere, scimus quod est species diffinita. Quod autem sit utile ad syllogismos de eodem et diverso, manifestum est ex his quae nunc dicuntur: nos enim invenientes differentiam propositorum, hoc est, inter proposita, ostendentes erimus quoniam non idem. Quod autem utile sit hoc instrumentum ad cognoscendum quid est sive diffinitionem, hoc probatur: eo quod solemus separare ab aliis omnibus, hoc est, rem talem damus quae suis differentiis separet ab aliis omnibus: hoc autem facimus convenientibus in utrisque differentiis, quae sunt tunc unum quod diffinitum. Utilitas autem prima accipitur a differentia in quantum est divisiva. Secunda autem a differentia in quantum est constitutiva.
CAPUT XI.
De utilitate speculationis similitudinis.
Similitudinis autem speculatio, quae est quartum instrumentum, utilis est ad inductivas ratiocinationes: eo quod singula quae sunt in universali forma similia, habent inducti ad universale inferendum, et haec est prima similitudo quae speculanti occurrit. Secundo autem utilis est ad syllogismos ex hypothesi: quia illi ex sensu procedunt, ut si sit in uno quod in omnibus simile. Et tertio utilis est ad assignationem diffinitionis. Haec autem per ordinem probantur. Quod autem ad inductivas rationes sit utile similitudinem inspicere, ex hoc probatur quod tunc singularia in similibus accepta, hoc est, in quo sint similia, aggredimur adducere, sive universalem propositionem concludere: hoc enim non facile, sed impossibile est sic inducere ignorantibus similia, hoc est, id in quo singularia sunt similia.
Quod autem utile sit ad syllogismos ab hypothesi probatur: quia iste procedit ex hoc consensu, quod si probabile est apud respondentem, quod quemadmodum in uno similium se habet, sic se habeat in reliquis omnibus similibus: ut si anima Socratis sit immortalis, quod anima cujuslibet hominis sit immortalis. Propter quod ex uno similium concesso, ad quodlibet aliorum poterimus disputare, si praeconfitebimur pro consensu, quod quemadmodum in his quae alii sunt similia, se habet, sic et in proposito se habere: ostendentes autem illud quod in similibus se habet, ostendentes erimus ex hypothesi quoniam in proposito sic se habebit: facimus enim sic demonstrativam ostensionem ex similibus per hypothesim inductam.
Ad diffinitionis assignationem probatur valere inspectio similium: eo quod ponentes inspicere quid in unoquoque inferiorum est idem essentiale quo omnia inferiora eadem sunt, non dubitamus in quid oporteat genus ponere, unum id quod propositum est diffinientes: et sic eadem sunt genere. Nam inter communia genus est id quod maxime praedicatur in quid de eo cujus est genus. Haec ergo diffiniendo ponemus pro genere, et sic procedimus ad diffinitiones. Similiter autem et in multum, non tamen nimium, distantibus ad diffinitiones utilis est similitudinis inspectio, ut in his quae sub eodem genere generalissimo in diversis generibus sunt non subalternatim positis. Ut gratia exempli considerabimus, quoniam idem et simili genere remoto, tranquillitas in mari, et serenitas in aere, utrumque enim quies est, in hoc sunt similia. Et quoniam idem punctum in linea et unitas in numero: utrumque enim est principium, licet non ejusdem. Quoniam in omnibus rebus diffiniendis primum quidem convenientiae genus assignantes, hoc est, primum commune assignantes pro genere, opinabimur non extranee diffinire, sed proprie.
CHAPTER X.
On the usefulness of discovering differences.
But to find differences, which is the third instrument, is useful and especially for constructing syllogisms about the same and the diverse; and this is the usefulness of difference insofar as difference is also divisive. And secondly it is useful for knowing each thing through definition, because through the division of differences we hunt out the definition; and knowing the final constitutive difference together with the genus, we know what the defined species is. But that it is useful for syllogisms about the same and the diverse is manifest from these things that are now said: for we, finding the difference of the proposed things, that is, between the proposed things, will be showing that they are not the same. But that this instrument is useful for knowing what-it-is or the definition is proved by this, that we are accustomed to separate from all other things, that is, we give such a thing which by its differences separates itself from all other things; and we do this by differences agreeing in both, which are then one thing that is defined. The first usefulness is taken from difference insofar as it is divisive. The second is from difference insofar as it is constitutive.
CHAPTER XI.
On the usefulness of the speculation of likeness.
But speculation of likeness, which is the fourth instrument, is useful for inductive reasonings, because the singulars which are similar in a universal form have what is induced for inferring the universal; and this is the first likeness that occurs to one speculating. Secondly, it is useful for syllogisms from hypothesis, because those proceed from sense, as if there is in one what is similar in all. And thirdly it is useful for assigning definition. These things are proved in order. That inspecting likeness is useful for inductive arguments is proved from this, that then we undertake to bring forward singulars accepted in similars, that is, in that in which they are similar, or to conclude a universal proposition. For this is not easy, but impossible, to induce in this way for those ignorant of similars, that is, of that in which singulars are similar.
But that it is useful for syllogisms from hypothesis is proved because this proceeds from this agreement: that if it is probable with the respondent that, in whatever way it has itself in one of the similars, so it has itself in all the remaining similars; as, if the soul of Socrates is immortal, that the soul of any human being is immortal. On account of this, from one similar conceded, we shall be able to dispute to any one of the others, if we have confessed beforehand for agreement that, in whatever way it has itself in those things which are similar to another, so also it has itself in the proposed thing. But by showing that which has itself in similar things, we shall be showing from hypothesis that it will have itself thus in the proposed thing; for thus we make a demonstrative showing from similars through an induced hypothesis.
That inspection of similars has force for the assignment of definition is proved by this, that when we posit to inspect what essential thing in each of the inferiors is the same, by which all the inferiors are the same, we do not doubt under what what-it-is one must place the genus, while defining that one thing which has been proposed; and thus they are the same in genus. For among common things, genus is that which is especially predicated in what-it-is of that of which it is the genus. Therefore, by defining, we shall place these things as genus, and thus we proceed to definitions. Likewise, in things distant much, but not too much, inspection of likeness is useful for definitions, as in those things which under the same most general genus are in diverse genera not placed subalternately. For the sake of example, we shall consider that tranquility in the sea and serenity in the air are the same and are in a similar remote genus, for each is rest; in this they are similar. And the point in line and unity in number are the same, for each is a principle, although not of the same thing. Because in all things to be defined, by first assigning the genus of agreement, that is, by assigning the first common thing as genus, we shall opine that we define not extraneously but properly.
Pene autem et omnes aliquid determinantes sive diffinientes sic ex genere incipientes, solent diffinire assignando primo: et deinde ex isto accipientes differentias. Nam unitatem sicut genus ponentes sic diffiniendo principium numeri dicunt esse, et punctum lineae, in genus utrumque ponentes modum: ergo quoniam aliquid commune utrorumque est unitatis et puncti, genus ponunt quod est principium.
[Marginal label, printed page 289: Sufficientia utilitatum quae est ex speculatione similitudinis.]
Istae autem utilitates sic accipiuntur. Requiritur enim aliquorum similitudo: aut unum similium continetur in alio ut pars in toto, aut utrumque similium continetur in alio ut in toto in quo assimilantur. Si primo modo, sic valet ad syllogismos ex hypothesi, ubi ex uno singulari infertur universale. Si autem ambo continentur in alio ut in toto: aut ipsa similia sunt in illo actualiter, et sic sumitur prima utilitas, quia singularia inducentia actu sunt in universali: aut sunt in ipso potentialiter, et sic sumitur ultima, continetur enim species potentia in genere, et inferiora in suis superioribus similiter. Ipsa autem in scientia sic accipi possunt: aut enim inferunt hujusmodi in syllogismis immediate videlicet in syllogismum, aut mediate. Si immediate, sic est primum instrumentum: quia sumptio propositionum immediata principii syllogismi est inspectio. Si autem ordinantur ad syllogismum mediate: hoc est directe, aut indirecte. Si directe: aut ordinantur ad syllogismum negativum, aut affirmativum. Primo quidem modo est instrumentum tertium: quia differentiae faciunt ad syllogismum negativum. Si secundo, sic est instrumentum quartum; quia similitudinis inspectio ordinatur ad syllogismum affirmativum, quia simile affirmatur de simili.
Instrumenta igitur per quae abundantia sumitur syllogismi dialectici, haec sunt quae dicta sunt, loci et considerationes ad quos utilia sunt, ea sunt quae dicta sunt, haec quae in sequentibus libris per singula determinabuntur. Ea autem quae contra haec quae dicta sunt objici solent, ridiculosa sunt.
But almost all persons determining or defining something, beginning thus from genus, are accustomed to define by assigning first; and then, taking differences from this. For placing unity as a genus, by defining thus they say that it is the principle of number, and point the principle of line, placing each mode into a genus. Therefore, because there is something common to both unity and point, they posit the genus, which is principle.
[Marginal label, printed page 289: Sufficiency of the uses that is from speculation of likeness.]
But these uses are accepted thus. For likeness of some things is required: either one of the similars is contained in the other as a part in the whole, or each of the similars is contained in another as in a whole in which they are assimilated. If in the first way, thus it has force for syllogisms from hypothesis, where from one singular a universal is inferred. But if both are contained in another as in a whole, then either the similars themselves are in that actually, and thus the first usefulness is taken, because the inducing singulars are actually in the universal; or they are in it potentially, and thus the last usefulness is taken, for species is contained potentially in genus, and inferiors similarly in their superiors. But these very things in science can be accepted thus: for either they infer such things immediately in syllogisms, namely into syllogism, or mediately. If immediately, thus it is the first instrument, because the taking of propositions is the immediate inspection of the principle of syllogism. But if they are ordered to syllogism mediately, this is either directly or indirectly. If directly, either they are ordered to a negative syllogism or to an affirmative one. In the first way, indeed, it is the third instrument, because differences contribute to a negative syllogism. If in the second way, thus it is the fourth instrument, because inspection of likeness is ordered to affirmative syllogism, because like is affirmed of like.
Therefore the instruments through which abundance of dialectical syllogism is taken are these things that have been said; the places and considerations for which they are useful are those things that have been said, these things that will be determined one by one in the following books. But the things that are accustomed to be objected against these things that have been said are ridiculous.
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