Volume 2 · pp. 281–282
CHAPTERS III-IV. On distinction of the multiple in contraries and middles.
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Haec autem nominibus non dissonant in multiplicibus ipsis: quia in colore et in voce unum nomen est, et in angulis et in saporibus unum nomen est: et sic in seipsis nomine non dissonant. Nec etiam dissonant nominibus in contrariis: quia etiam contraria utriusque uno censentur: obtusum enim contrarium est utrique: quia obtusum saporibus dicitur et in angulis: sed in uno istorum alia est significatio quam in alio. Sic ergo considerandum est in habentibus contrarium in utroque sensu.
Amplius considerandum est in his quae non in utroque significato habent contrarium, si dicto de uno est contrarium, et dicto de alio non est contrarium: constat enim quod multipliciter dicitur quod sic de diversis dicitur. Cujus exemplum est, ut delectatio quaedam dicitur de potu, et quaedam dicitur de theoria, sive contemplatione intellectus in theorematis: ei enim delectationi quae est de potu convenienti, contraria est tristitia quae est a siti, sive a potu inconvenienti: ei vero delectari quod est in delectabili disciplina in contemplatione theorematis, ab eo quod est contemplari sive considerare, quoniam diameter est costae asimeter, vel aliud intellectuale theorema, nihil est contrarium: propter quod delectatio dicitur multipliciter de delectatione potus, et delectatione intellectus. Hujus vero causa est, quia intellectus non recipit contraria in virtute activa contrarietatis, quia sic materialia sunt: sed recipit species contrariorum quae non sunt contraria, sed aequaliter intellectui convenientia in quantum sub lumine intelligentiae accepta ad operationem quasi naturalem et propriam proprii et connaturalis habitus non impeditam: sensus autem recipit contraria, et maxime tactus in virtutibus agentibus in contraria.
Aliud exemplum ejusdem est ejus quod est amare, quod si accipiatur in animae animali actu sive rationabili sive sensibili agente non praesente materia, sicut est amor et concupiscentia, cui odire contrarium est, quod est voluntas sive desiderium nocendi. Ei autem amare quod est secundum corporalem actum, nihil est contrarium. Et haec non est causa quae dici consuevit: sed haec est causa, quia amare quod est secundum corporalem actum, est osculari, vel amplexari, et praecipue communiter illi nihil est contrarium. Sed in spiritualibus sive rationabilibus formae contrariae sunt: item idem secundum desiderium nocendi, et desiderium bonum intelligendi sive volendi: et ideo in spiritualibus habet contrarium. Palam ergo, quia amare est aequivoce dictum de actu carnali, et spirituali, qui est velle bonum: alius vero amor est actualis concupiscentiae: alibi autem vocatur amor amicitiae. Sic et acutum dicitur, quod veloci motu et brevi tempore penetrat, et quod subtiliter sonat: sed alia ratione in auditu et tactu plana sunt exempla. Sed hoc quod dictum est de delectatione potus et delectatione theoriae, est contra Platonis dictum, qui dixit omnem delectationem esse corporalem, et esse generationem sive impressionem convenientis in animam sensibilem: quod Aristoteles impugnat X Ethicorum ostendens, quod delectatio aequivoce dicitur de materiali, et immateriali, et propria, id est, propria et communi delectatione, quae longum est interserere et superfluum. Ad praesentem intentionem sufficit scire tali signo quod in uno sensu habet contrarium, in alio autem non, quod ipsum aequivocum.
CAPUT IV.
De distinctione multiplicis in mediis.
Amplius ad distinctionem multiplicium inveniendam non in extremis tantum considerandum est, sed etiam in mediis si huic quidem in una significatione est medium: illi autem in alia significatione accepto nihil est medium: tunc enim constat illud esse in multiplex et multipliciter dictum. Cujus exemplum est, ut albi et nigri in coloribus medium est fuscum: in voce autem inter albam vocem et nigram nihil est medium: quia vox dicitur nigra per privationem, et alba per habitum. At si forte dicatur aliquid medium, illud erit raucum, quod quasi aequaliter distat ab acuto et gravi: hoc autem aliud est medium a fusco, quemadmodum dicunt quidam vocem raucam mediam esse inter acutam et gravem, quamvis proprie loquendo non sit verum: quia medium inter contraria stat in actu completo medium perfectum: raucum autem in nullo actu stat, sed est corruptio vocis acutae, ut dictum est. Propter quod patet per talem medii inspectionem, quod aequivoce dictum est album de colore et voce. Similiter autem per eamdem consimilitudinem aequivoce est dictum et nigrum de eisdem.
But these names do not differ in the multiple things themselves; because in color and in voice there is one name, and in angles and in flavors there is one name; and thus in themselves they do not differ in name. Nor do they differ in names in their contraries, because even the contraries of both are counted by one name: for obtuse is contrary to both, because obtuse is said in flavors and in angles; but in one of these there is one signification, and in the other another. Thus therefore one must consider in things having a contrary in both senses.
Further, one must consider in those things which do not have a contrary in both signified senses, whether when said of one there is a contrary, and when said of the other there is no contrary; for it is established that what is said thus of diverse things is said multiply. An example of this is that a certain delight is said of drink, and a certain delight is said of theory, or contemplation of the intellect in theorems. For to that delight which is from suitable drink, sorrow which is from thirst or from unsuitable drink is contrary; but to the being-delighted that is in delightful discipline in contemplation of theorems, from the fact of contemplating or considering that the diameter is incommensurable with the side, or some other intellectual theorem, nothing is contrary. On account of this, delight is said multiply of delight of drink and delight of intellect. But the cause of this is that intellect does not receive contraries in the active power of contrariety, because material things are so; but it receives species of contraries which are not contrary, but equally suitable to intellect insofar as, received under the light of intelligence, they are for the almost natural and proper operation of its proper and connatural habit, not impeded. But sense receives contraries, and especially touch, in powers acting into contraries.
Another example of the same is of that which is to love: if it is taken in the animal act of the soul, whether rational or sensible, acting without matter being present, as love and concupiscence are, to which hating is contrary, which is the will or desire of harming. But to loving which is according to bodily act, nothing is contrary. And this is not the cause which is commonly said; but this is the cause, because to love according to bodily act is to kiss or embrace, and especially commonly nothing is contrary to it. But in spiritual or rational things there are contrary forms; likewise the same thing according to the desire of harming and the good desire of understanding or willing; and therefore in spiritual things it has a contrary. Therefore it is plain that to love is said equivocally of the carnal act and of the spiritual, which is to will the good; but another love is that of actual concupiscence; elsewhere, however, it is called love of friendship. Thus also sharp is said of what penetrates with swift motion and brief time, and of what sounds subtly; but in another account in hearing and touch the examples are plain. But what has been said about delight of drink and delight of theory is against Plato's saying, who said that every delight is bodily and is generation or impression of what is suitable in the sensible soul; Aristotle attacks this in Ethics X, showing that delight is said equivocally of material and immaterial, and of proper, that is, proper and common delight, which it would be long and superfluous to insert. For the present intention it is enough to know by such a sign that when in one sense it has a contrary and in another it does not, the thing itself is equivocal.
CHAPTER IV.
On the distinction of the multiple in middles.
Further, for finding the distinction of multiple things, one must consider not only in extremes, but also in middles: if for this, in one signification, there is a middle, but for that, taken in another signification, there is no middle, then it is established that that thing is in the multiple and is said multiply. An example is that of white and black in colors the middle is brown; but in voice there is no middle between white voice and black voice, because voice is called black by privation and white by habit. But if perhaps some middle is said, it will be hoarse, which as it were equally stands distant from sharp and grave; but this is another middle than brown, as certain people say that hoarse voice is middle between sharp and grave, although, speaking properly, it is not true, because a middle between contraries stands in complete act as a perfect middle, but hoarse stands in no act, but is a corruption of sharp voice, as has been said. On account of this it is plain through such inspection of the middle that white is said equivocally of color and voice. Likewise, through the same likeness, black is also said equivocally of the same things.
[Marginal label, printed page 282: Albi et nigri in coloribus septem sunt media.]
Amplius quidem alia inspectione invenitur multiplex et multiplicis distinctio, si horum in uno sensu acceptorum contrariorum plura sunt media, illorum autem in alio sensu acceptorum contrariorum est tantum unum medium, sicut patet in albo et nigro. Nam horum in coloribus acceptorum plura sunt media, quia septem, ut in libro de sensu et sensato probatur. In voce autem accepti albi et nigri est tantum unum medium, secundum quosdam raucum. Patet ergo quod album multipliciter dicitur de colore et voce.
[Marginal label, printed page 282: Non videre multipliciter dicitur: ergo et videre.]
Rursum non tantum inspiciendo in contraria et media invenitur multiplicitatis distinctio, sed etiam inspiciendo in contrarium est generalior, quam inspiciendo in contradictionem: quia contradictio non opponitur termino simplici, sed complexo. Considerando ergo in illud, inspiciendum si quod secundum contradictionem opponitur, multipliciter dicitur vel non: nam si hoc multipliciter dicitur, tunc propositum quod secundum contradictionem huic opponitur, dicitur multipliciter. Cujus exemplum est, non videre dicitur dupliciter: unum quidem dictum, non habere visum, sicut caecus dicitur non videre: alterum autem non videre dicitur non uti visu, in quo sensu aliquis clausis oculis dicitur non videre: si hoc negativum dicitur multipliciter, necessarium est et affirmativum quod est videre, multipliciter dici ad habere visum et ad uti visu. Sed quia forte objiceret aliquis, quod saepe in contradictoriis negativa est multiplex, cum tamen affirmativa non sit multiplex, ideo addendum quod hoc non est ita: quia negativa in utroque sensu habet affirmativam etiam oppositam: utrique enim non videre utroque modo dicto opponitur videre, quod est habere visum: ei autem non videre, quod est non uti visu, opponitur videre quod est uti visu: quando negativa est multiplex et non affirmativa, tunc negativa non nisi in uno sensu opponitur affirmativae.
[Marginal label, printed page 282: Quomodo sensibile et insensibile multipliciter dicuntur.]
Amplius ad inveniendum multiplex, considerandum est in his quae opponuntur secundum privationem et habitum: si enim alterum privative oppositorum multipliciter dicitur, scilicet animam in operatione sentire virtutis quod est idem quod habere sensum, et dicitur etiam secundum corpus sentire in actu operatum quod est quasi uti sensu, tunc etiam insensibile dicitur multipliciter, hoc est, non potens sentire, hoc est potentiam sensitivam vel virtutem ut organo, vel non operans secundum eam dicitur non sentire, et insensibile, non a privatione animae sensibilis in genere, sed a privatione actus, scilicet sentiendi secundum actum, et secundum habitum: hoc enim dicitur secundum animam a privatione virtutis in organo, et secundum privationem actus sensitivi organi. Quoniam autem quae nunc dicta sunt, opponuntur secundum privationem et habitum, sensibile etiam et insensibile palam est per seipsum eo quod animalia nata sunt habere utrumque sensum, etiam in habitu virtutis et in actu, et sic utroque privari possunt et sensu secundum animam sive animae organicam virtutem, et secundum corpus hoc est, secundum organa corporalis operationis et actum: et sic hac consideratione est multiplicitatis intentio.
[Marginal label, printed page 282: In colors there are seven middles of white and black.]
Furthermore, by another inspection the multiple and the distinction of the multiple is found, if of contraries accepted in one sense there are several middles, but of those contraries accepted in another sense there is only one middle, as is plain in white and black. For of these taken in colors there are several middles, namely seven, as is proved in the book On Sense and What Is Sensed. But of white and black taken in voice there is only one middle, according to some, hoarse. Therefore it is plain that white is said multiply of color and voice.
[Marginal label, printed page 282: Not seeing is said multiply; therefore seeing is also.]
Again, the distinction of multiplicity is found not only by inspecting contraries and middles, but also by inspecting contradiction; and inspecting the contrary is more general than inspecting contradiction, because contradiction is not opposed to a simple term, but to a complex one. Therefore, in considering that, one must inspect whether what is opposed according to contradiction is said multiply or not; for if this is said multiply, then the proposed thing opposed to it according to contradiction is said multiply. An example is that not seeing is said in two ways: one meaning is not having sight, as a blind person is said not to see; but another not seeing is said as not using sight, in which sense someone with closed eyes is said not to see. If this negative is said multiply, it is necessary that the affirmative, which is seeing, also be said multiply, as to having sight and as to using sight. But because perhaps someone would object that often in contradictories the negative is multiple while nevertheless the affirmative is not multiple, one must therefore add that this is not so, because the negative in both senses also has an affirmative opposed to it: for to each not seeing said in either way there is opposed seeing, which is having sight; but to not seeing which is not using sight there is opposed seeing which is using sight. When the negative is multiple and the affirmative is not, then the negative is opposed to the affirmative only in one sense.
[Marginal label, printed page 282: How sensible and insensible are said multiply.]
Further, for finding the multiple one must consider in those things that are opposed according to privation and habit. For if one of the privatively opposed things is said multiply, namely sensing according to the soul in the operation of a power, which is the same as having sense, and sensing according to the body is also said in operated act, which is as it were using sense, then insensible is also said multiply, that is, not able to sense, that is, not having sensitive potency or power as in an organ, or not operating according to it is called not sensing, and insensible, not from privation of the sensible soul in general, but from privation of act, namely of sensing according to act and according to habit. For this is said according to the soul from privation of power in an organ, and according to privation of the sensitive act of the organ. But since the things now said are opposed according to privation and habit, sensible and insensible are plain through themselves from the fact that animals are naturally apt to have both senses, both in habit of power and in act, and thus can be deprived of each, both of sense according to the soul or organic power of the soul, and according to body, that is, according to the organs of bodily operation and act; and thus by this consideration there is the intention of multiplicity.
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