Volume 2 · pp. 276–279
TREATISE IV. CHAPTERS I-II.
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TRACTATUS IV.
DE QUATUOR INSTRUMENTIS HUJUSMODI IN SYLLOGISMIS DIALECTICIS.
CAPUT I.
De quatuor instrumentis in communi.
Instrumenta autem per quae abundemus syllogismis, hoc est, quae nos struunt et instruunt sive intus erudiendo conservant, ut ad omne problema terminandum syllogismis abundemus. Syllogismis dico quod est principale instrumentum disputationis dialecticae sunt quatuor. Unum quidem et primum est propositionum suppositio, hoc est, propositiones dialecticas scire sumere. Quia propositio immediatum integrale est ad syllogismum. Sumere autem scimus propositiones, quando eas abundantes ad omnem propositionem concludendam scimus invenire. Secundum est, quoties unumquodque dicitur posse dividere, et dividere et distinguere: et hoc est secundum quod in terminis, qui in propositione sunt, est acceptum: et ideo uno gradu distat a syllogismi immediato principio: propter quod secundum est: et accipitur hoc absolute in principiis simpliciter. Tertium autem est differentias unius ad alterum posse invenire, quod accipitur in principiis syllogismi comparatis ad alia secundum differentiam quae alietatis est principium. Quartum vero est similitudinis consideratio tam in syllogismo, quam in contrario et protenso secundum contradictionem et in parabola: et ideo ultimum est inter ea quae dicta sunt.
[Marginal label, printed page 276: Removet dubium.]
Quamvis ista quatuor sunt, non tamen quatuor artes de istis divisim tradendae sunt: quia tria istorum reducuntur ad artem primi: tria enim sequentia ad sumptionem propositionum, quae immediatum est principium syllogismi, reducuntur. Cujus probatio est, quia quodcumque sive quodlibet trium est facile terminandum propositionem dialecticam sumere, sicut dico patet in secundo quod est posse distinguere multiplex, ut si ponatur, quod bonum est eligendum, et potestas distinguendi quot modis dicitur bonum. Dicitur vero bonum idem quod honestum et suave sive delectabile, et dicitur bonum utile: per analogiam dicitur de istis bonum: et si quis hoc scit distinguere, facit ad facultatem sumendi propositiones. Similiter autem est in tertio quod est differentias invenire, quod similiter facit et faciliter propositiones invenire, ut si quis proponat, quoniam differt sensus a disciplina, aut negaverit illis qui dixerunt disciplinam esse cognitionem sensibilem, et verum dixerunt esse in apponendo sensibili apprehensione: considerans autem differentias sensus et disciplinae, eo quod hunc quidem sensum amittenti non est rursum sumere possibile: illam autem disciplinam amittenti rursum sumere possibile est, quia de oblivione ad scientiam est possibile devenire: et hujus differentiae et illarum differentiarum inspectione facile est propositiones sumere ad propositum. Similiter autem et quartum, quod est similitudinis inspectio, facit ad propositionum sumptionem, ut sicut se habet sanativum ad sanitatem, et euechivum ad euechiam: et qui facit similitudines propositionum proponat, quoniam similiter multas ad haec problemata propositiones sumet.
[Marginal label, printed page 277: Euechia quid.]
Est autem euechia bona carnis condensatio in interioribus et exterioribus: quia condensata caro repellit a se contraria, quod non facit caro laxa. Sic ergo reducuntur tria ad primum. Omne quod facit ad facile sumendum propositiones, ad artem sumendi propositiones reducitur. Sed multiplicis distinctio, similitudinis consideratio, differentiarum inventio, facit ad facile sumendum propositiones. Ergo reducuntur ad artem sumendi propositiones. Est autem haec et prima propositio sive propositionum sumptio quoad facultatem sumendi ab eo quod est multipliciter dictum, sive a distinctione multiplicis. Secunda autem facultas sumendi est a differentiis consideratis. Tertia vero facultas sumendi propositiones est a similibus, sive a consideratione similium. Omnes ergo tres sequentes modi habendi in syllogismis reducuntur ad primum: et ideo cum primo in eadem methodo tractandi sunt, et sic de aliis, et caetera.
TREATISE IV.
ON THE FOUR INSTRUMENTS OF THIS KIND IN DIALECTICAL SYLLOGISMS.
CHAPTER I.
On the four instruments in common.
The instruments through which we may abound in syllogisms, that is, which build us and instruct us, or preserve us by teaching inwardly, so that for terminating every problem we may abound in syllogisms. I say syllogisms because the principal instrument of dialectical disputation is syllogism; they are four. The one and first is the supposition of propositions, that is, knowing how to take dialectical propositions. For proposition is an immediate integral thing for syllogism. But we know how to take propositions when we know how to find them in abundance for every proposition to be concluded. The second is being able to divide, and to divide and distinguish, how many times each thing is said; and this is taken according as it is in the terms which are in the proposition; and therefore it is one degree distant from the immediate principle of syllogism; for this reason it is second, and this is taken absolutely in principles simply. The third is being able to find the differences of one thing from another, which is taken in the principles of syllogism compared to other things according to difference, which is the principle of otherness. The fourth is consideration of likeness, both in syllogism and in the contrary and in what is extended according to contradiction and in parabola; and therefore it is last among the things that have been said.
[Marginal label, printed page 276: He removes a doubt.]
Although these four exist, nevertheless four arts concerning these things are not to be handed down separately, because three of them are reduced to the art of the first: for the three following are reduced to the taking of propositions, which is the immediate principle of syllogism. The proof of this is that each or any one of the three is for easily taking the dialectical proposition to be determined, as, I say, is plain in the second, which is to be able to distinguish the multiple, as if it is posited that the good is to be chosen, and there is power of distinguishing in how many modes good is said. But good is said as the same as honorable and sweet or delectable, and useful good is said: good is said of these by analogy; and if someone knows how to distinguish this, it contributes to the faculty of taking propositions. Likewise it is in the third, which is finding differences, which likewise makes it possible to find propositions easily, as if someone proposes that sense differs from discipline, or denies those who said that discipline is sensible cognition, and they said something true by adding sensible apprehension. But considering the differences of sense and discipline, namely that for one who loses this sense it is not possible to receive it again, but for one who loses that discipline it is possible to receive it again, because from forgetfulness it is possible to come to knowledge, and by inspection of this difference and of those differences it is easy to take propositions for the proposed matter. Likewise also the fourth, which is inspection of likeness, contributes to the taking of propositions, as the health-making has itself to health, and the good-condition-making to good condition; and one who makes likenesses of propositions will propose many propositions similarly for these problems.
[Marginal label, printed page 277: What good condition is.]
But good condition is a good condensation of flesh in the inner and outer parts, because condensed flesh repels contraries from itself, which loose flesh does not do. Thus therefore the three are reduced to the first. Everything that contributes to easily taking propositions is reduced to the art of taking propositions. But distinction of the multiple, consideration of likeness, and discovery of differences contribute to easily taking propositions. Therefore they are reduced to the art of taking propositions. Now this first proposition, or taking of propositions with respect to the faculty of taking, is from what is said multiply, or from distinction of the multiple. But the second faculty of taking is from differences considered. The third faculty of taking propositions is from similar things, or from consideration of similar things. Therefore all three following modes of having in syllogisms are reduced to the first; and therefore they must be treated with the first in the same method, and so concerning the others, and so forth.
CAPUT II.
De propositionum sumptione, quod est propositiones dialecticas scire sumere.
Redeuntes ergo ad tractandum de singulis illorum quatuor, dicimus de primo, quod ex quo sic est, quod omnes reducuntur ad primum: ergo propositiones quidem eligendum inspiciendo ad principia essentialia et formalia propositionis dialecticae, ex ipsa propositione dialectica sumpta penes ea quae cadunt in diffinitione propositionis dialecticae, ut dialectica est propositio. Dicimus ergo quod ex dictis propositiones eligendum omnibus illis modis quoties, hoc est, quot modis, determinatum in probabili est, hoc est, quoties determinatio fit accipiendae propositionis in ipsa, propositiones, diffinitiones, vel opiniones proponenti, hoc est, quoties determinatur alicui qui proponit, opiniones, hoc est, propositiones opinabiles: ille enim vel proponit aut opiniones omnium, aut sapientium: et horum vel omnium, vel plurimorum, vel notissimorum inter sapientes. Et iste est unus modus sumendi propositiones per ea quae formaliter ponuntur in diffinitione propositionis dialecticae.
[Marginal label, printed page 277: Exempla probabilium propositionum.]
Exemplum autem quod videtur pluribus, est hoc quod dixerunt Democritus et Seneca in libro de temporibus naturalibus, quod ventus apud vulgares nihil aliud est quam motus aeris per loca in quibus est aer coarctatus. Hujus autem quod videtur pluribus, exemplum est quod verius scit aliquis aliquid, sciens illud per artem, quam per experimentum: hoc enim dicunt omnes sapientes. Hujus autem quod plures sapientes dicunt, exemplum est, ut mundum unum perfectum esse: in hoc enim plures sapientes convenerunt. Exemplum autem hujus, quod notissimis videtur inter sapientes, quod intellectus est quoddam divinum et incorporale in anima. Sic ergo sumuntur propositiones per formalia propositionis dialecticae posita in diffinitione ejus, ut sumantur praedicabiles secundum artes inventas, sicut in ante habitis dictum est.
Sumuntur etiam per formalia posita in diffinitione dialecticae propositionis: unde et contrariae probabili propositae secundum omnem differentiam probabilis sunt accipiendae: quia contrariae erunt probabiles, si probabile pro contingenti accipitur: quia quod contingit esse, contingit non esse: et quod contingit omni, contingit nulli: et probabilibus contrariae similiter sumendae sunt. Quod simpliciter contrarias vel in contrario subjecto, vel in contrario praedicato, vel in utroque similiter sumptis, vel in contrariis secundum notam contradictionis protensis in parabola, quemadmodum dictum est prius in divisione propositionis. Utile etiam est ad propositionum sumptionem, non solum sumere propositiones probabiles absolute, sed etiam sub comparatione ad electionem relatas: propter quod utile est et non solum quae in se sunt probabiles, sed etiam quae sunt similes probabilibus, ut cum sic proponitur, quod contrariorum est eadem disciplina, quoniam idem sensus est contrariorum. Et ad exemplum, quoniam videmus intus suscipientes aliquid non extra mittentes simpliciter, et videmus et secundum alios sensus fieri formas suorum objectorum intus suscipiendo: sic enim audimus et videmus intus suscipiendo, non extra mittendo aliquid, et olfacimus, etc., et similiter in omnibus aliis sensibus.
CHAPTER II.
On the taking of propositions, which is knowing how to take dialectical propositions.
Returning therefore to treating the individual ones of those four, we say concerning the first that, since it is so, that all are reduced to the first, therefore propositions indeed must be chosen by looking to the essential and formal principles of dialectical proposition, from dialectical proposition itself taken according to those things which fall in the definition of dialectical proposition, insofar as it is a dialectical proposition. Therefore we say that, from the things said, propositions must be chosen in all those modes in which what is determined in the probable is determined, that is, in as many modes as determination of a proposition to be received in it is made; propositions, definitions, or opinions for the one proposing, that is, as often as opinions, that is, opinable propositions, are determined for someone who proposes. For he proposes either opinions of all, or of the wise; and of these either of all, or of the greater number, or of the most notable among the wise. And this is one mode of taking propositions through those things that are formally placed in the definition of dialectical proposition.
[Marginal label, printed page 277: Examples of probable propositions.]
But an example of what seems so to many is this, which Democritus and Seneca said in the book On Natural Times, that wind among common people is nothing other than motion of air through places in which air has been compressed. But an example of what seems to many is that someone knows something more truly, knowing it through art than through experience; for all the wise say this. But an example of what more wise persons say is that the world is one perfect thing, for many wise persons agreed in this. But an example of this, what seems to the most notable among the wise, is that intellect is something divine and incorporeal in the soul. Thus therefore propositions are taken through the formal things of dialectical proposition placed in its definition, so that predicables may be taken according to discovered arts, as was said in the things had before.
They are also taken through the formal things placed in the definition of dialectical proposition; hence contraries to a proposed probable proposition according to every difference of the probable must also be accepted, because contraries will be probable if the probable is taken for the contingent: because what can be, can not be; and what can belong to every one can belong to none; and contraries to probable things are likewise to be taken. This is so whether they are simply contrary, or in a contrary subject, or in a contrary predicate, or similarly taken in both, or in contraries extended according to the sign of contradiction in parabola, just as was said before in the division of proposition. It is also useful for the taking of propositions not only to take propositions that are probable absolutely, but also those related under comparison to choice; on account of which what is useful is not only what is probable in itself, but also what is similar to probable things, as when it is thus proposed, that there is the same discipline of contraries, because there is the same sense of contraries. And for example, because we see things that receive something inwardly and do not simply send something outward, and we also see according to other senses that the forms of their objects are made by receiving inwardly; for thus we hear and see by receiving inwardly, not by sending something outward, and we smell, and so forth, and similarly in all the other senses.
Amplius autem sumendae sunt propositiones, non tantum penes ipsa formalia in ipsa propositione dialectica sumpta, sed etiam penes formalia aliunde sumpta: et primo quidem modo sumendae sunt propositiones quae habent probabilitatem in omnibus vel in pluribus et in quibus non videtur instantia, sed verius aliunde sumpta est: quia videntur esse verae vel in omnibus, vel in pluribus: et istae sumendae sunt ut principium syllogismi dialectici, et tanquam verae apparentes propositiones quae nullam habeant instantiam: tunc enim illis sumptis tanquam veris, qui non conspiciunt, quod in aliquo sit instantia propter quam sic non est sicut universaliter proponitur, facilius ponent sive concedent. Unde hoc ipsum est tam instrumentum sumendi propositiones, quam cautela. Adhuc eligere oportet propositiones ex quibus abundes et scriptis Philosophorum et rationibus, et facere etiam descriptiones faciendo de bono, sicut fecerunt Stoici, dicentes bonum esse quod omnes exoptant: et de animali, sicut quod est animal quod a se movetur motu locali quocumque modo. Et sumendae sunt generales et de bono omni, non de bono moris tantum: quia quanto communius scimus, tanto ad plura abundabimus: et illas descriptiones, vel scriptas vel ad similitudinem figurarum factas, debemus proponere exemplum ad respondentem; vel etiam descriptiones extra proponimus, quae quando implicite in re descripta per sermonem explicamus, et semper incipientes debemus esse in descriptionibus vel diffinitionibus, ab eo quod quid est, hoc est, a genere vel a rei substantia: quia per ista est facilius ad accidentalia rei procedere.
Assignare autem oportet juxta hunc modum et singulorum opiniones auctorum vel sapientium, ut quoniam Empedocles quatuor materialia dixit mixtorum corporum elementa, auctoritati Empedoclis innitentes: quia aliquis respondentium praesumens de auctoritate Empedoclis ponit de facili quod audit ab aliquo probabili vel probato in philosophia dictum esse. Haec autem omnia alienam quamdam habent probabilitatem.
[Marginal label, printed page 278: Propositiones et problemata tripliciter dividuntur in ethica, physica, et logica; logica large accipitur et propositiones logicae duplices sunt.]
Si autem per materiam volumus multiplicare sumptiones propositionum: tunc ut figuraliter, hoc est, superficietenus et in communi, sit complecti et congregare, sunt propositionum et problematum partes tres. Nam aliae quidem propositiones ethicae, secundum quod ethica large dicta comprehendit monasticam, oeconomicam, et civilem. Aliae sunt physicae, secundum quod physica large dicta comprehendit naturalem et metaphysicam. Aliae logicae, secundum quod logica generaliter dicta totum comprehendit trivium vel quadrivium secundum Aristotelem, quia poetriam ponit pro scientia speciali, et logica comprehendit logicam stricte dictam, cujus una pars est dialectica: quia logica stricte dicta est de syllogismo omni, tam simpliciter accepto, quam dialectico, quam demonstrativo, quam etiam sophistico: dialectica autem de syllogismo ex probabilibus. Haec ergo comprehendit et rhetoricam, et grammaticam, et poetriam. Ethicae quidem sunt, ut in exemplo declaretur hujusmodi, ut utrum oporteat parentibus magis vel legibus obedire si dissentiant: et constat quod legibus, et leges sunt ad regulam justae. Logicae autem sunt hujusmodi, ut utrum contrariorum sit eadem disciplina, vel non. Et nota dubitationis semper debet poni et ordinari ad consensum respondentis, si sint propositiones: si autem sint problemata, ad compositionem propositionis. Physicae sunt, ut utrum mundus sit aeternus. Similiter materialiter tria problemata: quia ab omni propositione problema faciens transumptivo modo.
Furthermore propositions must be taken not only according to the formal things taken in the dialectical proposition itself, but also according to formal things taken from elsewhere; and in the first mode, indeed, propositions must be taken that have probability among all or among the many and in which no instance is seen, but whose truth is taken more truly from elsewhere, because they seem to be true either among all or among the many. And these must be taken as the principle of the dialectical syllogism, and as apparently true propositions that have no instance; for then, when these have been taken as true, those who do not observe that there is an instance in something because of which it is not as it is universally proposed, will more easily posit or concede. Hence this very thing is both an instrument of taking propositions and a caution. Further, one must choose propositions from which you may abound, both from writings of Philosophers and from reasons, and also make descriptions by making them concerning the good, as the Stoics did, saying that the good is what all desire; and concerning animal, as that an animal is what is moved from itself by local motion in whatever way. And general descriptions are to be taken, concerning every good, not only concerning moral good, because the more commonly we know, the more abundantly we shall have things; and we ought to propose those descriptions, whether written or made according to likeness of figures, as an example to the respondent; or we also propose descriptions externally, which, when they are implicit in the thing described, we explain through speech. And we ought always to be beginning in descriptions or definitions from what-it-is, that is, from the genus or from the substance of the thing, because through these it is easier to proceed to the accidental things of the thing.
But according to this mode one must also assign the opinions of individual authors or wise persons, as that Empedocles said that there are four material elements of mixed bodies, relying on the authority of Empedocles, because a respondent presuming from the authority of Empedocles easily posits what he hears to have been said by someone probable or approved in philosophy. But all these have a certain alien probability.
[Marginal label, printed page 278: Propositions and problems are divided triply into ethical, physical, and logical; logic is taken broadly and logical propositions are twofold.]
But if we wish to multiply the takings of propositions through matter, then, so that it may be embraced and gathered figurally, that is, superficially and in common, there are three parts of propositions and problems. For some propositions are ethical, according as ethics broadly said comprehends monastic, economic, and civil matters. Others are physical, according as physics broadly said comprehends natural and metaphysical matters. Others are logical, according as logic generally said comprehends the whole trivium or quadrivium according to Aristotle, because he posits poetics as a special science, and logic comprehends logic strictly said, of which dialectic is one part; because logic strictly said is about every syllogism, both simply accepted and dialectical and demonstrative and also sophistical, but dialectic is about syllogism from probable things. Therefore this comprehends rhetoric, grammar, and poetics. Ethical propositions, indeed, are, as this kind may be declared in an example, such as whether one ought to obey parents more or laws if they disagree; and it is established that laws should be obeyed, and laws are according to the rule of the just. But logical propositions are of this kind, as whether there is the same discipline of contraries or not. And note that the doubt must always be placed and ordered to the consent of the respondent, if they are propositions; but if they are problems, to the composition of the proposition. Physical propositions are such as whether the world is eternal. Similarly there are materially three problems, because from every proposition one makes a problem by a transferred mode.
Sed cum sic materialem habeant differentiam, quales sunt diffinitione subtili et propria singulae dictae propositiones, non facile ex logicis est diffinitio: quia talis diffinitio vana erit: sed tentandum ea cognoscere consuetudine veritatem uniuscujusque eorum, hoc est consueta cognitione plurium, quae est per inductionem: et hoc quidem tentandum est consideranti istas divisiones propositionum secundum praedicta exempla: ad ista enim aliae relatae cognoscuntur, utrum sint ethicae, physicae, vel logicae: et per inductionem cognoscuntur esse verae. Ergo ad philosophiam quidem primam secundum veritatem et diffinitionem propriam essentialem de his pertinet negotiari: dialecticae autem pertinet negotiari de illis quoad opinionem: et ideo dialecticae inductio sufficit. Non solum autem materialia et formalia consideranda sunt in propositionum sumptione, sed etiam accidentalia, et praecipue universalitas: quia quod est categorica vel hypothetica, affirmativa vel negativa, parum vel nihil facit ad propositionum sumptionem.
Unde sumendum est quam maxime universales propositiones: ex his enim contenta omnia particularia sub illis concludi possunt, ut quoniam omnium oppositorum est eadem disciplina, et quoniam eorum quae opposita sunt non ad aliud, est eadem disciplina. Eodem modo ipsa contraria sub oppositis sumpta sunt dividenda, et distinguenda in specialia contraria, donec contingit dividere, quousque ad materialem multiplicationem stet divisio, ut quoniam boni et mali in moribus, et albi et nigri in sensibus, et calidi et frigidi in tangibilibus sensibus est eadem disciplina. Similiter autem et in aliis quae distinguere habent, faciendum est ita semper, quod ab universalissimis distinctio incipiatur, et fiat usque ad ultimum. Qualiter sumenda sunt ea quae dicta sunt, sufficiunt ad intentionem praesentem: quia singularis est et universalis ad omnia problemata, sicut in arte universali tractandum est.
But since the said propositions have such a material difference, what sort they are by subtle and proper definition is not easily a definition from logical things, because such a definition would be empty; but one must try to know them by custom, the truth of each of them, that is, by the customary cognition of many, which is through induction. And this indeed must be tried by one considering these divisions of propositions according to the aforesaid examples; for other propositions related to these are known as to whether they are ethical, physical, or logical, and through induction they are known to be true. Therefore it belongs to first philosophy to deal with these according to truth and their proper essential definition; but it belongs to dialectic to deal with them according to opinion, and therefore dialectical induction suffices. But not only material and formal things must be considered in the taking of propositions, but also accidental things, and especially universality, because whether it is categorical or hypothetical, affirmative or negative, contributes little or nothing to the taking of propositions.
Hence propositions as universal as possible must be taken: for from these all particular things contained under them can be concluded, as that there is the same discipline of all opposites, and that there is the same discipline of those things that are opposites not relative to another. In the same way the contraries themselves taken under opposites must be divided and distinguished into special contraries, until it is possible to divide, until the division stands at material multiplication, as that there is the same discipline of good and evil in morals, and of white and black in sensibles, and of hot and cold in tangible sensibles. Similarly also in the other things which must be distinguished, this must always be done, that distinction be begun from the most universal things and be made as far as the last. How the things that have been said are to be taken suffices for the present intention, because it is singular and universal for all problems, just as one must treat in the universal art.
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