Volume 2 · pp. 271–272
CHAPTER III. On position.
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CAPUT III.
De positione.
Positio autem adjuncta est problemati, et est quasi accidentale principium syllogismi dialectici. Problema enim est principium quod est circa conclusiones dialecticas, de quo neutro modo opinamur. Positio autem est de quo opinamur contrarie: et ideo hic post problema determinandum est de positione. Positio vero est opinio extranea alicujus notorum secundum philosophiam. Est vero, ut diximus, speculatio duplex. Determinata scilicet, et quiescens in uno per rationem relatam in illud 1: et haec vocatur positio. Et est speculatio indeterminata neutri adhaerens parti contradictionis: et hoc est problema proprie. Quod autem dicitur extranea, ideo dicitur quod pluribus contraria est, licet sapientibus ita videatur. Quod dicitur alicujus notorum secundum philosophiam, meo judicio est neutrius generis, hoc est, alicujus rei opinabilis quae secundum philosophiam per rationes est notificata: et hoc accipitur ab Aristotele in duodecimo primae philosophiae, ubi distinguit inter positum et fictum, dicens quod positum secundum philosophiam ponit et suppositum: fictum autem est coactum ad positionem, quia sine ratione physica est positum ad voluntatem, quod est praeter naturam positionis: quia taliter posito non ponitur neque quiescit anima ponentis.
Multi tamen et communiter omnes dicunt, quod est generis masculini sub hoc sensu, quod positio est opinio extranea alicujus Philosophi, qui notus est et approbatus et secundum philosophiam. Et prima expositio est melior, quamvis et ponens non sit notus secundum philosophiam, neque rationem positionis suae habeat in philosophia. Hujus autem exemplum est, quod dicit Antisthenes, Heracliti discipulus, quoniam non est contradicere, eo quod contradictio est oppositio ejusdem secundum idem et in eodem tempore: et cum naturaliter omnis res continue mutetur ab uno in aliud, non erit oppositio ejusdem secundum idem: et cum non possit simul assignari et negari in eodem individuali tempore, non occurrent simul affirmatio et negatio. Haec autem in quarto primae philosophiae habent determinari. Est autem sapientibus extranea haec positio. Et aliud exemplum positionis est: quoniam omnia continue moventur secundum Heracliti positionem, qui hoc posuit: quia uno moto secundum locum, proximum illi movetur cedendo illi, vel duo simul erunt in eodem loco: et eadem ratione tertium cedit secundo, et quartum tertio: et sic uno motu moventur omnia et nihil quiescit. Et de hoc in IV Physicorum habet determinari: non enim necesse est quod cedat secundum quod in se poni cedere potest per inspissationem vel compressionem alicujus: aut quoniam unum est ens, quemadmodum dicit Melissus, quod in primo Physicorum et in primo primae philosophiae habet determinari.
Bene autem dico, quod est alicujus notorum secundum philosophiam, et quod positio est ad quam et contra quam disputatur physice. Stultum autem est esse sollicitum aliquem proferre, hoc est, ut proferat, contraria contra disputando in opinionibus quolibet modo prolatis, sive sophistica ratione. Aut etiam stultum est aliquem sollicitum esse proferre rationes disputativas opinionibus illis, de quibus habemus planam et aptam in contrarium rationem, ut in positione sophistarum, ut dicitur in Timaeo Platonis: sicut dicimus, quod non omne quod est, vel factum, vel aeternum est, sicut dicunt et probant sophistae instantes sic. Nam musicum esse grammaticum, quod per accidens est factum, nec simpliciter est factum, nec est aeternum: quia, ut dicunt, quod factum est, ex materia factum est; accidens autem, maxime spirituale accidens quod est in anima, non habet materiam ex qua fiat: ergo non est factum: nec tamen aeternum, cum et inceperit et mutabile sit.
CHAPTER III.
On Position.
Position is joined to problem, and is as it were an accidental principle of the dialectical syllogism. For problem is a principle that concerns dialectical conclusions, about which we opine in neither way. But position is that about which we opine contrarily; and therefore here after problem one must determine concerning position. Position is an alien opinion of some thing among those known according to philosophy. As we said, speculation is twofold: determinate, namely, and resting in one thing through a reason referred to that thing 1, and this is called position. And there is indeterminate speculation adhering to neither part of the contradiction, and this properly is problem. But it is called alien because it is contrary to many, although it seems so to the wise. What is called "of some thing among those known according to philosophy," in my judgment, is of neither gender, that is, of some opinable thing which according to philosophy has been made known through reasons; and this is taken from Aristotle in the twelfth book of First Philosophy, where he distinguishes between what is posited and what is fictive, saying that what is posited according to philosophy posits and is supposed, but what is fictive is forced into position, because it is posited according to will without physical reason, which is outside the nature of position: because when it is posited in such a way the soul of the one positing is neither posited nor rests.
Nevertheless many, and commonly all, say that it is of masculine gender under this sense: that position is an alien opinion of some Philosopher who is known and approved and according to philosophy. And the first exposition is better, although even the one positing may not be known according to philosophy, nor may he have the reason of his position in philosophy. An example of this is what Antisthenes, the disciple of Heraclitus, says, namely that there is no contradicting, because contradiction is opposition of the same according to the same and at the same time; and since every thing is naturally changed continuously from one thing into another, there will not be opposition of the same according to the same; and since it cannot be at once affirmed and denied in the same individual time, affirmation and negation will not occur together. These matters are to be determined in the fourth book of First Philosophy. But this position is alien to the wise. And another example of position is that all things are moved continuously according to the position of Heraclitus, which he posited: because when one thing is moved according to place, the nearest thing to it is moved by yielding to it, or two things will be in the same place at once; and by the same reason a third yields to the second, and a fourth to the third; and thus by one motion all things are moved and nothing rests. And this is to be determined in Physics IV: for it is not necessary that it yield according as in itself it can be posited to yield through the condensation or compression of something; or that one is being, as Melissus says, which is to be determined in the first book of the Physics and in the first book of First Philosophy.
But I rightly say that it is of something among things known according to philosophy, and that position is that toward which and against which one disputes physically. But it is foolish for someone to be solicitous to bring forward, that is, that he bring forward, contrary arguments by disputing against opinions brought forward in whatever way, even by sophistical reason. Or it is also foolish for someone to be solicitous to bring forward disputative reasons against those opinions about which we have a plain and apt reason to the contrary, as in the position of the sophists, as is said in Plato's Timaeus: as we say that not everything that is is either made or eternal, as the sophists say and prove by pressing thus. For to be musical and grammatical, which has been made per accidens, is neither simply made nor eternal, because, as they say, what has been made has been made from matter; but an accident, especially a spiritual accident which is in the soul, does not have matter from which it is made; therefore it has not been made; and nevertheless it is not eternal, since it both began and is mutable.
[Marginal label, printed page 271: Ratio sophistica concludebat non omne quod est, esse factum vel aeternum.]
[Marginal label, printed page 272: Solutio rationis.]
Solutio autem sophisticis rationis sit, quod licet accidens non habeat materiam ex qua fiat, habet tamen materiam in qua fiat: et sic et in illa factum est et non est aeternum. Ad talia igitur sollicitari stultum est: quia hoc quod vera est positio, et non fictio, etsi aliis non videatur, eo quod est extranea opinio, videbitur tamen alicui vel de sapientibus, vel de pluribus, eo quod rationem habeat philosophiae.
[Marginal label, printed page 272: Quomodo differunt problema et positio.]
Habent igitur se ad invicem positio et problema, sicut inferius et superius: quia omnis positio problema est, sicut omne problema speculationis determinatae est problema: non autem problema positio est, quia non omnis speculatio determinata vel indeterminata, speculatio determinata est: eo quod quaedam problematum talia sunt, de quibus neutro modo opinantur, nec ad partem affirmativam, nec ad partem negativam: et haec non sunt positiones, cum positio sit problema sive speculatio determinata et quiescens in una parte contradictionis. Quoniam autem positio omnis problema sit, palam est: quoniam cum positio sit opinio extranea, et sit quorumdam opinio, et quibusdam extranea, necesse est ex his quae dicta sunt de problemate et positione, aut quod plures contrarie sapientibus circa positiones dubitare, aut utroslibet sapientes sapientibus, aut plures pluribus contrarie dubitare de positione: et cum problema sit quo contrarie opinantur, sequitur quod positio sit problema, eo quod positio sit opinio quaedam quibusdam extranea et quibusdam opinio credita.
Nunc autem in usu Philosophorum nostri temporis omnia dialectica problemata vocantur positiones, quamvis secundum rationem praedicto modo differant. Sed ad praesentem intentionem nihil differt, quolibet modo dicatur, sive uno sive alio modo. Non enim divisimus ea sive distinximus praedicto modo, ut nomen divisum a problemate positionem faciamus, sed ut non lateant nos quae eorum, hoc est, problematis et positionis, contingunt esse differentiae ad invicem. Sicut autem jam ante dictum est, non oportet omne problema nec omnem positionem quocumque modo sine ratione propositam per speculationem contendentem ad aliud considerare, sed oportet illam considerare quam dubitabiliter, hoc est, quam modo dubitationis proponet, qui est de numero eorum qui ratione indigent juvante et confortante ad fidem alterius partis contradictionis: hunc enim considerationibus dialecticis juvabimus, ut de problemate veniat ad positionem, et de ambiguo ad fidem.
Nec oportet considerare problema propositum ab his qui indigent paena in civilibus, vel indigent sensu in naturalibus. Nam in civilibus qui dubitat, utrum oportet Deum vereri et parentes honorare, indiget paena quae hac lege sancita et sacrata: et persuasivam virtutem non habent, sed coactivam, ut dicit Aristoteles X Ethicorum, et ideo indigent paena legali, qui de hoc dubitant, quia non licet de talibus dubitare. Qui vero dubitat et problema proponit, utrum nix sit alba, cum in sensu per se manifestum sit, et sensus in physicis particularibus sit certior ratione, indiget sensu.
[Marginal label, printed page 272: Nota sententiam.]
Neque vero problema est vel positio eorum quorum propinqua juxta sensum omnibus per ea demonstratio est, quia ista omnibus sunt manifesta. Nec iterum problema est de his quorum demonstratio per causam est valde longe a sensibus elongata, quia illa ignota sunt, et ratio dialectica non habetur ad ista: propinqua enim manifesta sunt, et habent demonstrationem per causam propriam.
[Marginal label, printed page 271: The sophistical reasoning concluded that not everything that is is made or eternal.]
[Marginal label, printed page 272: Solution of the reasoning.]
But the solution of the sophistical reasoning should be that, although an accident does not have matter from which it is made, it nevertheless has matter in which it is made; and thus it has been made in that matter and is not eternal. Therefore to be solicitous about such things is foolish, because that which is a true position and not a fiction, even if it does not seem so to others because it is an alien opinion, nevertheless will seem so to someone either among the wise or among the many, because it has a reason of philosophy.
[Marginal label, printed page 272: How problem and position differ.]
Therefore position and problem have themselves to one another as lower and higher: because every position is a problem, just as every problem of determinate speculation is a problem; but not every problem is a position, because not every determinate or indeterminate speculation is determinate speculation, since certain problems are such that people opine in neither way about them, neither toward the affirmative part nor toward the negative part; and these are not positions, since position is a problem or determinate speculation resting in one part of the contradiction. But that every position is a problem is plain: since position is an alien opinion, and is an opinion of certain persons and alien to certain persons, from those things which have been said concerning problem and position it is necessary either that many doubt contrarily to the wise about positions, or any wise persons doubt contrarily to wise persons, or many to many doubt contrarily about a position; and since a problem is that about which people opine contrarily, it follows that position is a problem, because position is a certain opinion alien to some and an opinion believed by others.
But now in the use of the Philosophers of our time all dialectical problems are called positions, although according to reason they differ in the aforesaid way. But for the present intention it makes no difference in whatever way it is said, whether in one way or in another. For we have not divided or distinguished them in the aforesaid way in order to make position a name divided from problem, but so that the differences of them, that is, of problem and position, which happen to exist in relation to one another, may not be hidden from us. But as was already said before, one ought not to consider every problem nor every position in whatever way proposed without reason through speculation contending toward another thing; but one ought to consider that one which he proposes doubtfully, that is, in the manner of doubt, who is of the number of those who need reason helping and strengthening toward faith in the other part of the contradiction. For we shall help such a person by dialectical considerations, so that from problem he may come to position, and from ambiguity to faith.
Nor ought one to consider a problem proposed by those who need punishment in civil matters, or need sense in natural matters. For in civil matters, the one who doubts whether God ought to be revered and parents honored needs punishment which is sanctioned and consecrated by this law; and they do not have persuasive force but coercive force, as Aristotle says in Ethics X, and therefore those who doubt about this need legal punishment, because it is not permitted to doubt about such things. But the one who doubts and proposes the problem whether snow is white, since this is manifest in itself in sense, and sense in physical particulars is more certain than reason, needs sense.
[Marginal label, printed page 272: Note the sentence.]
Nor indeed is there a problem or position concerning those things whose demonstration, being near to sense, is for all through those things, because those things are manifest to all. Nor again is there a problem concerning those things whose demonstration through the cause is very far removed from the senses, because those things are unknown, and dialectical reason is not had for those things: for things near are manifest and have demonstration through their proper cause.
Notes
- This second opinion is Alexander's. (Haec secunda opinio est Alexandri.) ↩
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