Works › Sophistical Refutations, Books I–II
Volume 2 · pp. 561–572
Tractate III. Chapters III-VIII
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subjectum minoris propositionis quod accidentaliter convenit medio: accidens autem quod significatur et rei subjectae et accidenti inesse, est praedicatum majoris propositionis, quod est major extremitas, ut hic: homo est species: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates est species. Hic enim accidens homini est Socrates: accidens quod et rei subjectae et accidenti assignatur sive concluditur inesse, est species, quae concluditur de Socrate per hoc quod Socrates est homo.
Et secundum hoc in fallacia accidentis est duplex accidens quoad omnes modos ejus, scilicet unum quod accidit rei subjectae, et hoc est idem quod extraneum: et alterum quod assignatur rei subjectae et accidenti inesse, et concluditur in conclusione de accidente, et hoc est id quod non est necessarium in concludendo, sive quod non est necessarium minori extremitati inesse in comparatione ad aliquid tertium, sicut cum dico, ergo Socrates est species.
Ad hoc autem quod hoc bene intelligatur, oportet scire quod accidens rei subjectae dupliciter potest comparari. Uno modo prout res subjecta accipitur ut substantia substans secundum se firmans in se, et occasionis modo causans ut alterum sit in potentia, et sic accidens rei subjectae est vere accidens, et unum de quinque praedicabilibus quae Porphyrius ponit, et unum de quatuor praedicatis quae ponit in Topicis Aristoteles, et hujus exemplum est, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus, vel album est homo. Alio modo dicitur accidens rei subjectae secundum quod subjecta est, et hoc est omne illud quod extraneum est subjecto in quantum stat sub forma talis praedicati, ut cum dico, homo est species, homo non potest stare sub tali forma praedicabilis, nisi accipiatur homo secundum se, et non secundum quod stat pro partibus suis subjectivis, sive secundum quod accipitur in partibus suis subjectivis: et ideo Socrates accidit homini, et est extraneum ab ipso homine sic stante sub forma praedicati: et quando infertur, ergo Socrates est species, per hoc quod Socrates accidit homini, assignatur omnem speciem accidentis huic Socrati, et rei subjectae huic homini (prout in Socrate est) inesse: et ideo est fallacia accidentis.
Secundum hoc igitur in omni modo fallaciae accidentis est duplex accidens, unum scilicet in essendo quod dicitur rei subjectae inesse, et alterum in consequendo quod dicitur inesse et accidenti et rei subjectae.
Secundum hoc igitur dicere oportet, quod in praedicato considerandum primae propositionis, et in subjecto minoris: praedicatum enim majoris, aut est consequens, aut antecedens, aut convertibile, aut per accidens conveniens subjecto. Consequens, ut homo est animal: animal est genus: ergo homo est genus. Quamvis enim animal sit substantia hominis, tamen ut stat secundum se per intentionem qua genus est, non est substantia hominis, sed accidit homini quasi rei: et ideo accidit etiam accidenti animalis quod est homo: quia animal secundum quod est in homine et substantia hominis, non est genus: et sic est fallacia accidentis in praehabito paralogismo. Similiter est si praedicatum sit ut antecedens, sicut si dicam: homo est Socrates: homo est species: ergo Socrates est species. In quantum enim subjectum stat sub tali praedicato, multa accidunt ei quae non accidunt ei secundum quod absolute sumitur: et in omnibus talibus est fallacia accidentis. Si autem est praedicatum convertibile, tunc est sic: homo per se est risibile: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates per se est risibile. Vel sic: triangulo per se convenit habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis: isosceles est triangulus: ergo isosceli per se convenit habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Secundum enim quod triangulus secundum se acceptus est, sic substat huic praedicato quod est habere tres aequales duobus rectis: et sic accidit triangulo isosceles: et ideo quando assignatur isosceli inesse, assignatur idem accidenti et rei subjectae inesse. Sic etiam fit assumendo vel medio consequens sic: triangulo per se accidit habere tres aequales duobus rectis: triangulus autem est figura: ergo figurae per se accidit habere tres aequales duobus rectis. Et sic fit fallacia accidentis in praedicatis essentialibus vel antecedentibus vel consequentibus.
the subject of the minor proposition which accidentally agrees with the middle; but the accident which is signified to belong both to the subject thing and to the accident is the predicate of the major proposition, which is the major extremity, as here: man is a species; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates is a species. For here the accident to man is Socrates; the accident which is assigned or concluded to belong both to the subject thing and to the accident is species, which is concluded of Socrates through this, that Socrates is man.
And according to this, in the fallacy of accident there is a twofold accident with respect to all its modes, namely one which happens to the subject thing, and this is the same as extraneous; and the other which is assigned to belong to the subject thing and to the accident, and is concluded in the conclusion concerning the accident, and this is that which is not necessary in concluding, or that which is not necessary to belong to the minor extremity in comparison to some third thing, as when I say, therefore Socrates is a species.
But in order that this may be well understood, one must know that the accident of the subject thing can be compared in two ways. In one way, according as the subject thing is taken as a substance subsisting through itself, establishing itself in itself, and in the manner of an occasion causing the other to be in potency; and thus the accident of the subject thing is truly an accident, and one of the five predicables which Porphyry posits, and one of the four predicates which Aristotle posits in the Topics; and an example of this is as when it is said, man is white, or the white is man. In another way, the accident of the subject thing is said according as it is subjected, and this is everything that is extraneous to the subject insofar as it stands under the form of such a predicate, as when I say, man is a species; man cannot stand under such a form of the predicable unless man is taken according to itself, and not according as it stands for its subjective parts, or according as it is taken in its subjective parts; and therefore Socrates happens to man and is extraneous from man himself standing thus under the form of the predicate. And when it is inferred, therefore Socrates is a species, through this, that Socrates happens to man, every species of accident is assigned to belong to this Socrates, and to the subject thing, this man, according as it is in Socrates; and therefore it is the fallacy of accident.
According to this, therefore, in every mode of the fallacy of accident there is a twofold accident: one, namely, in being, which is said to belong to the subject thing, and another in following, which is said to belong both to the accident and to the subject thing.
According to this, therefore, one must say that consideration must be given to the predicate of the first proposition and to the subject of the minor; for the predicate of the major is either consequent, or antecedent, or convertible, or belonging per accidens to the subject. Consequent, as: man is animal; animal is a genus; therefore man is a genus. For although animal is the substance of man, nevertheless as it stands according to itself through the intention by which it is a genus, it is not the substance of man, but happens to man as to a thing; and therefore it also happens to the accident of animal, which is man, because animal according as it is in man and the substance of man is not a genus; and thus there is the fallacy of accident in the foregoing paralogism. Similarly it is if the predicate is as antecedent, as if I say: man is Socrates; man is a species; therefore Socrates is a species. For insofar as the subject stands under such a predicate, many things happen to it which do not happen to it according as it is taken absolutely; and in all such cases there is the fallacy of accident. But if the predicate is convertible, then it is thus: man per se is risible; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates per se is risible. Or thus: to a triangle per se it belongs to have three angles equal to two right angles; an isosceles is a triangle; therefore to an isosceles per se it belongs to have three angles equal to two right angles. For according as triangle is taken according to itself, thus it stands under this predicate, which is to have three angles equal to two right angles; and thus isosceles happens to triangle; and therefore when having this is assigned to an isosceles, the same thing is assigned to belong to the accident and to the subject thing. Thus also it happens by assuming the consequent with the middle in this way: to a triangle per se it happens to have three equal to two right angles; but a triangle is a figure; therefore to a figure per se it happens to have three equal to two right angles. And thus the fallacy of accident occurs in essential predicates or antecedents or consequents.
In accidentalibus fit sic: cognoscis Coriscum: Coriscus est veniens: ergo cognoscis venientem. Secundum tertiae figurae dispositionem: secundum enim quod medium (quod est res subjecta) est in se, accidit ei venientem esse, et secundum quod stat sub forma praedicati (quod est cognosci) iterum accidit ei. Potest tamen accidere oppositum: et ideo quando cognosci concluditur de veniente, assignatur rei subjectae et accidenti inesse. Idem est hic: homo currit: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates currit: Socrates enim accidit homini indefinite stanti sub forma cursus sive praedicati: et ideo quando sub homine sumit Socratem, sumit accidens: et quando concludit, ergo Socrates currit, assignat idem et accidenti et rei subjectae inesse. Sed bonus est syllogismus si sic dicamus: omnis homo currit: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates currit. Quia homo secundum quod stat sub forma cursus, essentialiter et substantialiter stat pro partibus distributum: pro partibus fit ergo distributio: et sic Socrates vel quidam homo non accidit ei: sed substantialiter stat sub ipso, et ideo quod est in medio, oportet quod insit parti medii. Sic ergo scitur quid res subjecta, et quid accidens, et quid assignatum rei subjectae et accidenti inesse.
Alii dixerunt (quod tamen ad idem redit) quod accidens in fallacia accidentis non est accidens secundum quod ex opposito dividitur contra substantiam, sed accidens a quo nominatur fallacia accidentis est medium quod accidentaliter se habet ad extrema per modum qui dictus est: et tale accidens in praemissis syllogismi aliquando subjicitur, et aliquando praedicatur secundum diversarum figurarum dispositionem. Et ideo etiam quamvis praedicati sit inesse quod est accidentis simpliciter, non dicitur haec fallacia praedicati: quia accidens non accipitur hic pro eo quod alii inest, sed pro eo quod ad aliud sicut extremum actualiter se habet et extranee, et quod non est necessarium in consequendo. Propter quod etiam non dicitur fallacia medii: quia non est fallacia ex medio, sed ex medii ad extremum accidentali habitudine: propter quod dicitur fallacia accidentis, quasi fallacia accidentalis habitudinis ad extremum.
Haec autem accidentalis habitudo (ut dicunt) potest considerari in argumento negativo et in argumento affirmativo. Si in argumento affirmativo consideretur, considerari debet si medio (secundum quod medium idem est alteri extremorum) possit inesse oppositum alterius extremi: quia si sic est, tunc est fallacia accidentis, ut hic: homo currit: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates currit. Planum enim est, quod huic medio quod est homo (secundum quod homo est in Socrate ut idem) potest convenire non currere. Et ideo est fallacia accidentis. In negativa autem argumentatione considerandum est, si medio prout est idem uni extremo, potest convenire alterum extremum vel non: si enim sic est, tunc est fallacia accidentis: ut homo non currit: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates non currit. Constat enim, quod homini secundum quod est idem Socrati, potest convenire currere quod est oppositum ad non currere. Horum autem neutrum est in bono syllogismo: si enim affirmative syllogizetur sic: omnis homo currit: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates currit: oppositum ejus quod est non currere, non potest convenire medio, hoc est, homini prout est idem minori extremitati, hoc est, Socrati, si major vera esse supponatur. Similiter in negativo: nullus homo currit: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates non currit: major extremitas non potest convenire medio, prout est idem Socrati, si prima sit vera: et ideo cum in omni bono syllogismo probetur idem rei subjectae et accidenti inesse, non tamen est fallacia accidentis: quia medium ibi per se se habet ad extrema non accidentaliter.
In accidental things it happens thus: you know Coriscus; Coriscus is coming; therefore you know the one coming. According to the disposition of the third figure: for according as the middle, which is the subject thing, is in itself, being coming happens to it; and according as it stands under the form of the predicate, which is to be known, again it happens to it. Nevertheless the opposite can happen; and therefore when to be known is concluded of the one coming, it is assigned to belong to the subject thing and to the accident. The same is here: man runs; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates runs. For Socrates happens to man standing indefinitely under the form of running or of the predicate; and therefore when he takes Socrates under man, he takes an accident; and when he concludes, therefore Socrates runs, he assigns the same thing to belong both to the accident and to the subject thing. But it is a good syllogism if we say thus: every man runs; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates runs. Because man, according as it stands under the form of running, stands essentially and substantially as distributed for the parts; therefore distribution is made for the parts, and thus Socrates or some man does not happen to it, but stands substantially under it; and therefore what is in the middle must belong to a part of the middle. Thus, therefore, it is known what the subject thing is, what the accident is, and what is assigned to belong to the subject thing and to the accident.
Others have said, which nevertheless returns to the same thing, that accident in the fallacy of accident is not accident according as it is divided by opposition against substance, but the accident from which the fallacy of accident is named is the middle which is related accidentally to the extremes in the manner that has been stated; and such an accident in the premises of the syllogism is sometimes subjected and sometimes predicated according to the disposition of diverse figures. And therefore also, although to belong belongs to the predicate, which is simply that of accident, this is not called the fallacy of predicate, because accident is not taken here for that which belongs to another, but for that which is actually and extraneously related to another as to an extreme, and which is not necessary in following. On account of this it is also not called the fallacy of the middle, because it is not a fallacy from the middle, but from the accidental relation of the middle to the extreme; on account of which it is called the fallacy of accident, as it were the fallacy of accidental relation to an extreme.
But this accidental relation, as they say, can be considered in a negative argument and in an affirmative argument. If it is considered in an affirmative argument, it must be considered whether there can belong to the middle, according as the middle is the same as one of the extremes, the opposite of the other extreme; because if it is so, then there is the fallacy of accident, as here: man runs; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates runs. For it is plain that not to run can agree with this middle, which is man, according as man is in Socrates as the same. And therefore it is the fallacy of accident. But in a negative argument one must consider whether to the middle, insofar as it is the same as one extreme, the other extreme can belong or not; for if it is so, then there is the fallacy of accident, as: man does not run; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates does not run. For it is established that running, which is opposite to not running, can agree with man according as it is the same as Socrates. But neither of these is in a good syllogism: for if one syllogizes affirmatively thus, every man runs; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates runs, the opposite of that which is not running cannot agree with the middle, that is, with man insofar as it is the same as the minor extremity, that is, Socrates, if the major is supposed to be true. Similarly in the negative: no man runs; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates does not run; the major extremity cannot agree with the middle insofar as it is the same as Socrates, if the first is true; and therefore, although in every good syllogism the same thing is proved to belong to the subject thing and to the accident, nevertheless it is not the fallacy of accident, because the middle there is related per se to the extremes, not accidentally.
Ex his patet quare fallacia accidentis dicatur fallacia medii. Si autem alterum deberet dici, competentius diceretur fallacia medii, quam fallacia praedicati. Ex hoc iterum patet, quare non dicitur fallacia subjecti et accidentis: eo scilicet quod non denominatur ab accidente quod opponitur subjecto, quia nunquam hoc subjicitur in propositione, sed potius de re subjecta: sed dicitur ab accidente quod est accidentaliter se habere medium ad extremum in comparando medium ad inferendum alterum, quod utrique et accidenti et medio inesse assignatur.
CAPUT IV. De fallacia accidentis quantum ad causam apparentiae et causam non existentiae.
Ergo dicamus quod secundum accidens (hoc est, secundum fallaciam accidentis) paralogismi sunt quantum ad causam apparentiae, quando in syllogismo dialectico similiter inesse, quod licet assignatum fuerit in majori extremitate et in consequendo rei subjectae (hoc est, medio quod subjicitur in majori propositione) et accidenti, hoc est, minori extremitati quae est ut accidens subjecti sive medii, de qua praedicatur in minori propositione: tunc enim propter hoc quod medium in parte idem est cum extremo altero, videtur extremum extremo inesse per hoc quod inest medio: et hoc non est necessarium. In talibus enim sic extremum inest medio, quod oppositum ejus potest esse, sicut in antehabito capitulo dictum est. Nam quoniam aliquando multa eidem subjecto accidunt (hoc est, accidentaliter insunt) hoc est, multa ut extrema ei uni, scilicet medio accidentaliter insunt, quae insunt ut major extremitas in omni figura, non necesse inesse omnibus praedicatis quae sunt in prima et in secunda figura medium: medium enim in prima figura praedicatur in minori propositione, et in secunda figura praedicatur in utraque propositione: in minori enim propositione semper ponitur subjectum per accidens subjecti vel medii: et tamen praedicatum non semper dicit accidens, quia si semper diceret accidens, tunc in prima figura medium semper esset accidens in paralogismis accidentis, quod non est verum: quoniam in quibusdam paralogismis e contrario accidit, ut hic: omnis aqua est naturalis: balneum est aqua: ergo balneum est naturale. Vel sic: omne aes est naturale: omnis statua est aes: ergo omnis statua est naturalis.
In tertia vero figura per hoc quod dicitur, praedicatis, intelligimus minorem extremitatem. Per hoc autem quod dicimus, de quo, accipimus medium: quia figura praedicatur minor extremitas de medio. Et sic generaliter loquendo quia multa eidem accidentaliter insunt, non necesse est in consequentia omnibus praedicatis in prima et secunda figura, et eidem de quo praedicantur haec ut de subjecto, omnia quae sic praedicatis insunt, accidentibus inesse: quia quando multa accidentaliter insunt alicui medio, ita ut secundum quod medium est idem uni extremo, possit ipsi medio oppositum alterius extremi convenire: et in negativo syllogismo secundum quod medium removetur ab uno extremo, possit eidem medio inesse aliud extremum: tunc enim quando ita est, necesse est omnia praedicata conclusionum inesse praedicatis in minori propositione, et ei de quo praedicantur, hoc est, subjectis in minori propositione: non tamen e contrario. Et hoc quidem dico propter tertiam figuram: in hac enim quamvis praedicatum propositionis majoris insit subjecto minoris, non tamen necesse est inesse praedicato ejusdem. Cujus exemplum est hoc: homo est albus: homo est niger: ergo album est nigrum. Licet enim album in majori propositione insit homini, quod est subjectum minoris propositionis, non tamen necesse est inesse in eo quod est praedicatum ejusdem.
From these things it is clear why the fallacy of accident is called the fallacy of the middle. But if the other ought to be said, it would be more fittingly called the fallacy of the middle than the fallacy of the predicate. From this again it is clear why it is not called the fallacy of subject and accident: namely because it is not named from the accident which is opposed to the subject, because this is never subjected in the proposition, but rather from the subject thing; but it is said from the accident which is that the middle is related accidentally to the extreme, in comparing the middle to infer the other, which is assigned to belong to both the accident and the middle.
CHAPTER IV. On the fallacy of accident with respect to the cause of appearance and the cause of non-existence.
Therefore let us say that paralogisms according to accident, that is, according to the fallacy of accident, are such with respect to the cause of appearance when in a dialectical syllogism there is similarly belonging, which, although it has been assigned in the major extremity and in following to the subject thing, that is, to the middle which is subjected in the major proposition, and to the accident, that is, to the minor extremity which is as the accident of the subject or middle, of which it is predicated in the minor proposition. For then, because the middle is in part the same as the other extreme, an extreme seems to belong to an extreme through this, that it belongs to the middle; and this is not necessary. For in such cases the extreme belongs to the middle in such a way that its opposite can be, as was said in the foregoing chapter. For since sometimes many things happen to the same subject, that is, belong accidentally, that is, many things as extremes accidentally belong to that one, namely the middle, which things belong as the major extremity in every figure, it is not necessary that they belong to all the predicates which are the middle in the first and second figure; for the middle in the first figure is predicated in the minor proposition, and in the second figure is predicated in both propositions; for in the minor proposition there is always posited the subject through the accident of the subject or middle; and yet the predicate does not always say accident, because if it always said accident, then in the first figure the middle would always be accident in paralogisms of accident, which is not true, since in certain paralogisms the contrary occurs, as here: all water is natural; a bath is water; therefore a bath is natural. Or thus: all bronze is natural; every statue is bronze; therefore every statue is natural.
But in the third figure, by that which is said, predicates, we understand the minor extremity. But by that which we say, concerning which, we take the middle, because in the figure the minor extremity is predicated of the middle. And thus, speaking generally, because many things accidentally belong to the same, it is not necessary in consequence that all things which thus belong to predicates should belong to all predicates in the first and second figure, and to the same of which these are predicated as of a subject, that is, to accidents, because when many things accidentally belong to some middle, so that according as the middle is the same as one extreme, the opposite of the other extreme can agree with that middle; and in a negative syllogism, according as the middle is removed from one extreme, another extreme can belong to the same middle, then when it is so, it is necessary that all predicates of conclusions belong to predicates in the minor proposition, and to that of which they are predicated, that is, to subjects in the minor proposition, but not conversely. And I say this on account of the third figure; for in this figure, although the predicate of the major proposition belongs to the subject of the minor, nevertheless it is not necessary that it belong to the predicate of the same. An example of this is: man is white; man is black; therefore white is black. For although white in the major proposition belongs to man, which is the subject of the minor proposition, nevertheless it is not necessary that it belong in that which is the predicate of the same.
Hoc autem probatur deducendo ad impossibile: quia si hoc dicam necessarium esse in consequendo, sequitur quod omnia sic erunt eadem. Hoc autem sic probatur: quia si omnia quae eidem accidunt, necesse esset inesse praedicatis et de quibus praedicantur subjectis, sequeretur quod cum superiori accidunt opposita quorum utrumque inest ipsi superiori, tunc sequeretur quod etiam esset oppositum in opposito: sed quaecumque sunt uni et eidem eadem, inter seipsa sunt eadem: et cum omnia sint eadem in ente, omnia erunt eadem inter se. Sicut si dicam: ens est substantia: ens est accidens: ergo accidens est substantia. Vel sic: substantia est ens: accidens est ens: ergo accidens est substantia. Et sic est de omnibus oppositis sive disparatis in suo communi: et sic sequitur omnia esse eadem.
Notandum ergo, quod cum in omni paralogismo accidentis oporteat ad minus esse tria, assignatum scilicet, et res subjecta, et accidens, generaliter in omni figura assignatum accidenti et rei subjectae est major extremitas. Ad inveniendum quid sit res subjecta et quid accidens, considerandum est in minori propositione quae semper continet rem subjectam et accidens: tunc enim in minori propositione aut subjectum est accidens, et praedicatum res subjecta: aut e converso praedicatum accidens, et subjectum res subjecta: termini enim minoris propositionis non nisi tripliciter se possunt habere ad invicem, scilicet aut sicut superius et inferius, aut sicut subjectum et accidens, aut sicut duo accidentia disparata ad invicem se habent. Si se habent sicut superius et inferius, sive superius praedicetur de inferiori, sive e converso, nihil differt quantum ad fallaciam accidentis: quia, sicut in antehabitis istius fallaciae dictum est, et superius accidit in inferiori, et inferius accidit in superiori: unde utrumque illorum potest esse accidens et reliquum res subjecta, et semper erit fallacia accidentis si idem assignatur et rei subjectae et accidenti inesse. Si autem termini minoris propositionis se habent ut subjectum et accidens: tunc id debet dici res subjecta quod est vere subjectum, et accidens id quod inesse dicitur illi. Si autem termini minoris propositionis se habeant ut duo accidentia disparata, tunc illud quod magis inter accidentia habet naturam subjecti, debet dici res subjecta, et reliquum debet dici accidens, et hoc semper est minor extremitas: quia de subjecto debent probari passiones: minor autem extremitas semper est de qua major probatur sive concluditur extremitas, et ideo est loco subjecti: et sic patet generaliter quid sit subjectum, quid accidens, et quid assignatum subjecto et accidenti.
CAPUT V. De formatione modorum paralogismi accidentis.
De formatione autem paralogismorum fallaciae accidentis exempla primo ponenda sunt, et postea ostendenda est formatio et modus formationis. Est autem exemplum Aristotelis tale: si ab homine Coriscus est alter, ipse est alter a se: est enim homo, ut sic formetur: ab homine Coriscus est alter: Coriscus est homo: ergo Coriscus est alter a seipso. Haec enim formatio sufficit ad deceptionem: et tunc in prima propositione hoc totum, Coriscus est alter; est major extremitas: et ab homine est medium quod subjicitur in majori propositione: et assumitur minor, Coriscus est homo, et non habet idem subjectum cum majori; et quando infertur, ergo alter est Coriscus a se, non subjicitur idem, sed potius minor extremitas: et sic habet paralogismus similitudinem cum vero syllogismo in figura. Aliter autem si sic formaretur: Coriscus est alter ab homine: Coriscus est homo: ergo Coriscus est alter a seipso: idem erit subjectum majoris et minoris propositionis, et etiam conclusionis, quae non est dispositio alicujus figurae. Si autem sic formetur; ab homine Coriscum esse alterum est verum: Coriscum esse hominem est verum: ergo verum est Coriscum esse alterum a se: non valet formatio propter hoc quod secunda figura non est in affirmativis.
But this is proved by leading to the impossible, because if I say this to be necessary in following, it follows that all things will thus be the same. But this is proved thus: because if all things that happen to the same had necessarily to belong to the predicates and to the subjects of which they are predicated, it would follow that, when opposites happen to a superior, of which each belongs to that superior, then it would follow that the opposite also would be in the opposite. But whatever things are the same as one and the same are the same among themselves; and since all things are the same in being, all things will be the same among themselves. As if I say: being is substance; being is accident; therefore accident is substance. Or thus: substance is being; accident is being; therefore accident is substance. And thus it is concerning all opposites or disparates in their common term; and thus it follows that all things are the same.
Therefore one must note that since in every paralogism of accident there must be at least three things, namely the assigned thing, the subject thing, and the accident, generally in every figure the thing assigned to the accident and to the subject thing is the major extremity. To discover what is the subject thing and what is the accident, one must consider in the minor proposition, which always contains the subject thing and the accident; for then in the minor proposition either the subject is the accident and the predicate is the subject thing, or conversely the predicate is the accident and the subject is the subject thing. For the terms of the minor proposition can be related to one another only in three ways, namely either as superior and inferior, or as subject and accident, or as two disparate accidents are related to one another. If they are related as superior and inferior, whether the superior is predicated of the inferior or conversely, it makes no difference with respect to the fallacy of accident, because, as was said in the foregoing concerning this fallacy, both the superior happens in the inferior and the inferior happens in the superior; hence either of them can be the accident and the remaining one the subject thing, and there will always be the fallacy of accident if the same thing is assigned to belong both to the subject thing and to the accident. But if the terms of the minor proposition are related as subject and accident, then that ought to be called the subject thing which is truly the subject, and the accident that which is said to belong to it. But if the terms of the minor proposition are related as two disparate accidents, then that which more among the accidents has the nature of subject ought to be called the subject thing, and the remaining one ought to be called the accident; and this is always the minor extremity, because passions ought to be proved of the subject; but the minor extremity is always that of which the major extremity is proved or concluded, and therefore it is in place of the subject. And thus it is clear generally what subject is, what accident is, and what is assigned to subject and accident.
CHAPTER V. On the formation of the modes of the paralogism of accident.
But concerning the formation of paralogisms of the fallacy of accident, examples must first be posited, and afterward the formation and the mode of formation must be shown. But Aristotle's example is such: if Coriscus is other than man, he is other than himself; for he is man, so that it is formed thus: Coriscus is other than man; Coriscus is man; therefore Coriscus is other than himself. For this formation suffices for deception; and then in the first proposition this whole, Coriscus is other, is the major extremity; and than man is the middle, which is subjected in the major proposition; and the minor is assumed, Coriscus is man, and it does not have the same subject with the major; and when it is inferred, therefore Coriscus is other than himself, the same thing is not subjected, but rather the minor extremity; and thus the paralogism has likeness with a true syllogism in figure. But otherwise if it were formed thus: Coriscus is other than man; Coriscus is man; therefore Coriscus is other than himself, the subject of the major and minor proposition and also of the conclusion will be the same, which is not the disposition of any figure. But if it is formed thus: for Coriscus to be other than man is true; for Coriscus to be man is true; therefore it is true for Coriscus to be other than himself; the formation does not hold because the second figure is not in affirmatives.
Similiter si sic formatur, sicut quidam dicunt esse formandam: omne quod est tuum, est tuus pater: iste canis est tuus: ergo est tuus pater. Ista domus est tua: ista domus est opus: ergo est tuum opus. Debet enim in figura accidentis unum attribui duobus, scilicet accidenti et subjecto, sicut in praehabitis dictum est: cum autem dicitur in majori, ista domus est tua, tuum esse quod est accidens, attribuitur subjecto, quod est domus: et quando assumitur in minori, ista domus est opus, aliud accidens quod est esse opus, attribuitur eidem: et cum infertur, ergo ista domus est tuum opus, eidem subjecto attribuitur utrumque dictorum accidentium, quod non competit, sed in conclusione deberet concludi major extremitas de minori: et si ita dicatur, hoc verum est quando concluditur syllogistice, et causa non syllogisticae conclusionis est, ut significetur quod assignatum est accidenti et subjecto, insit subjecto per rationem accidentis: unde cum dicitur, iste canis est tuus, et est pater, intelligitur quod in quantum est pater, est tuus: et ut hoc significetur, sic concluditur, ergo est tuus pater.
Sed omnibus his dimissis, dicendum est quod paralogismus accidentis non peccat contra syllogismum in quantum syllogismus est, sed contra dialecticum syllogismum in habitudine topica sive locali constitutum: et ideo secundum habitudinem sufficit formare syllogismos. Paralogismus autem accidentis cum duo in se habeat, accidens scilicet quod divisim subjecto attribuitur, et assignatum quod etiam subjecto divisim attributum est in majori propositione, intendit paralogizans haec duo conjunctim concludere de eodem: et ideo divisim praeponenda sunt in praemissis, et conjungenda in conclusione: et de quantitate et qualitate propositionum non est curandum quoad modum syllogismi, nec etiam de dispositione terminorum in figura completa, sed de apparenti locali dispositione ad inferendum conjunctim quod divisim est propositum, sicut hic: tu es in aere: aer est in turri: ergo tu es in turri. Tu cognoscis Coriscum: Coriscus est veniens: ergo tu cognoscis venientem. Causa enim apparentiae in hac fallacia est identitas accidentis et subjecti apparens, et identitas medii in parte cum extremis apparens, propter quam creditur, quod quidquid attribuitur medio, attribuatur extremis. Et causa non existentiae est diversitas vera istorum. Sic ergo, ut dictum est, formandi sunt paralogismi.
Et non ponuntur nisi duo modi: quia duo sunt quibus potest attribui assignatum: aut enim attribuitur accidenti, et putatur attribui per accidens subjecto: aut e converso attributum subjecto, attribuitur accidenti per subjectum. Exemplum primi est: Coriscus est alter ab homine: Coriscus est homo: ergo Coriscus est alter a seipso. Exemplum secundi: Coriscus est alter a Socrate: Socrates est homo: ergo Coriscus est alter ab homine.
Est autem hic notandum generaliter, quod quando ipsi medio comparato uni extremorum potest convenire oppositum alterius extremitatis (quamvis forte propositio sit vera) potest tamen esse falsa: et sic conclusio non sequitur ex praemissis: et ideo conclusio paralogismi accidentis et fallacia fit tam ex veris quam ex falsis, ut, iste est bonus et est clericus, ergo est bonus clericus. Iste est malus et est civis, ergo est malus civis, et hujusmodi.
Similarly if it is formed thus, as certain people say it must be formed: everything that is yours is your father; this dog is yours; therefore it is your father. This house is yours; this house is a work; therefore it is your work. For in the figure of accident one thing ought to be attributed to two, namely to accident and subject, as was said in the foregoing. But when it is said in the major, this house is yours, to be yours, which is the accident, is attributed to the subject, which is house; and when it is assumed in the minor, this house is a work, another accident, which is to be a work, is attributed to the same; and when it is inferred, therefore this house is your work, both of the said accidents are attributed to the same subject, which is not fitting. But in the conclusion the major extremity ought to be concluded of the minor; and if it is said thus, this is true when it is concluded syllogistically, and the cause of the non-syllogistic conclusion is that what was assigned to accident and subject is signified to belong to the subject through the account of the accident. Hence when it is said, this dog is yours and is a father, it is understood that insofar as it is a father it is yours; and so that this may be signified, it is concluded thus: therefore it is your father.
But with all these things dismissed, one must say that the paralogism of accident does not sin against syllogism insofar as it is syllogism, but against dialectical syllogism constituted in a topical or local relation; and therefore it suffices to form syllogisms according to relation. But since the paralogism of accident has two things in itself, namely the accident which is attributed dividedly to the subject, and the assigned thing which also is attributed dividedly to the subject in the major proposition, the one paralogizing intends to conclude these two conjointly of the same thing; and therefore they must be placed dividedly beforehand in the premises and joined in the conclusion; and concerning quantity and quality of propositions there is no need to care with regard to the mode of syllogism, nor even concerning the disposition of terms in a complete figure, but concerning the apparent local disposition for inferring conjointly what was proposed dividedly, as here: you are in the air; the air is in the tower; therefore you are in the tower. You know Coriscus; Coriscus is coming; therefore you know the one coming. For the cause of appearance in this fallacy is the apparent identity of accident and subject, and the apparent identity of the middle in part with the extremes, because of which it is believed that whatever is attributed to the middle is attributed to the extremes. And the cause of non-existence is the true diversity of those. Thus, therefore, as has been said, paralogisms must be formed.
And only two modes are posited, because there are two things to which the assigned thing can be attributed: for either it is attributed to the accident and is thought to be attributed through the accident to the subject, or conversely what is attributed to the subject is attributed to the accident through the subject. An example of the first is: Coriscus is other than man; Coriscus is man; therefore Coriscus is other than himself. An example of the second: Coriscus is other than Socrates; Socrates is man; therefore Coriscus is other than man.
But here one must note generally that when the opposite of the other extremity can agree with the middle itself compared to one of the extremes, although perhaps the proposition is true, nevertheless it can be false; and thus the conclusion does not follow from the premises; and therefore the conclusion of the paralogism of accident and the fallacy occurs both from true things and from false things, as: this man is good and is a cleric; therefore he is a good cleric. This man is bad and is a citizen; therefore he is a bad citizen, and things of this kind.
Propter exemplum quod ponit Aristoteles de ista, Coriscus est alter ab homine, et quod ponit in uno paralogismo pro praemissa, et in altero pro conclusione, notandum quod meo judicio haec falsa est, Coriscus est alter ab homine: quia alter notat diversitatem, et in termino circa quem ponit diversitatem, notat diversitatem formalem: et tunc patet quod propositio est falsa: et cum dicitur, Coriscus est alter a Socrate: Socrates autem homo: cum medio comparatur homo, hoc est, Socrati attribuitur homo: sic enim potest convenire Corisco alterum esse a Socrate, quum non sit idem cum Socrate.
Notandum etiam, quod in syllogismo bono duplex est medii identitas: una scilicet medii comparati ad extrema, et haec identitas aliquam admittit diversitatem: sic enim medium in parte est idem extremitati, et in parte diversum. Alia est identitas medii secundum quod medium est acceptum secundum suam substantiam secundum quod est bis positum sive iteratum in praemissis, et haec identitas non admittit diversitatem, quinimo sicut ponitur in una, secundum eamdem significationem debet poni in altera, si bonus debeat esse syllogismus, in quo habitudo localis est dialectici syllogismi.
Et contra hanc identitatem medii peccant paralogismi istius fallaciae. Unde identitas medii secundum substantiam iterati facit apparentiam: diversitas autem ejusdem secundum rationem facit defectum, ut hic: homo est species: Socrates est homo: ergo Socrates est species. Hic enim idem medium quod est homo secundum substantiam bis positum est sive iteratum: diversimode autem sumptum est secundum rationem, quia in prima stat homo secundum se, in secunda autem stat pro supposito. Hic ergo est unus modus accidentis ex diversitate medii diversificati secundum rationem.
Secundus autem modus est, quando consequens medii sumitur, et illi assignatur accidens medii, ut hic: homo est species: homo est substantia: ergo substantia est species. Et alii multi modi juxta hos possunt formari secundum compositionem antecedentis et consequentis, vel subjecti et propriae passionis, vel substantiae et accidentis, ut prius dictum est.
Quod autem quidam dicunt hoc: triangulus habet tres aequales duobus rectis: isosceles est triangulus: ergo isosceles habet tres: esse sophisticum syllogismum quoad demonstrationem, et bonum syllogismum quoad dialecticum: nihil est, sed bonus est syllogismus simpliciter, licet non demonstrativus, nec sophisticus, cum non sit in eo defectus.
CAPUT VI. De praeambulis ad sciendum de fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.
Ut facilius intelligantur ea quae de fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter dicenda sunt, praenotandum est, quod sicut dicit Aristoteles in secundo Topicorum, quod secundum quid, et quando, et ubi dicitur, et simpliciter dicitur, et non est ibi aliqua fallacia. Determinatio enim quae apponitur ad simpliciter, aut habet se ex additione ad simpliciter, aut non. Si habet se ex additione ad ipsum simpliciter, considerandum est quid addat ad simpliciter: aut enim addit rem aliquam prius non intellectam in dicto simpliciter, aut non addit rem sed rei discretionem tantum, ita quod eamdem rem significat discrete, quam simpliciter dictum significat indiscrete, ut dicitur homo simpliciter, et tamen discrete dicitur unus homo vel solus homo. Et si discretionem ejusdem rei addit tantum, tunc sequitur suum simpliciter, ut cum dicitur unus vel solus homo currit, sequitur, ergo homo currit. Si autem determinatio secundum quid addit rem aliquid quod non intelligitur in eo quod est simpliciter, considerandum est utrum sit determinatio propria ipsi simpliciter, aut non propria, sed aliena. Si enim propria, tunc ex ea iterum sequitur id quod est simpliciter, ut in Topicis dictum est, ut cum dicitur: homo albus currit: ergo homo currit. Albus enim est determinatio hominis secundum totum, et sic propria toti. Si autem est determinatio impropria toti simpliciter accepto, considerandum utrum illa determinatio sit privans totum simpliciter acceptum, aut diminuens. Si est privativa rationis quod est simpliciter, sicut homo mortuus, vel homo pictus: vel ens in opinione sive opinabile, ut chimaera quae solum in opinione est: vel in aptitudine, ut homo futurus: vel solum in praeterito, ut Caesar fuit homo: tales autem determinationes privativae sunt ejus quod est simpliciter: et ideo ex talibus determinationibus non infertur simpliciter: non enim sequitur, est homo mortuus: ergo est homo. Neque sequitur, est homo pictus: ergo est homo. Vel est ens opinabile: ergo est ens. Vel est ens in aptitudine vel in futuro vel in praeterito: ergo est ens.
On account of the example that Aristotle posits concerning this, Coriscus is other than man, and because he posits it in one paralogism for a premise and in another for a conclusion, one must note that in my judgment this is false, Coriscus is other than man, because other notes diversity, and in the term concerning which it posits diversity, it notes formal diversity; and then it is clear that the proposition is false. And when it is said, Coriscus is other than Socrates; but Socrates is man, man is compared with the middle, that is, man is attributed to Socrates; for thus being other than Socrates can agree with Coriscus, since he is not the same as Socrates.
One must also note that in a good syllogism there is a twofold identity of the middle: one, namely, of the middle compared to the extremes, and this identity admits some diversity; for thus the middle is in part the same as the extremity, and in part diverse. The other is the identity of the middle according as the middle is accepted according to its substance, according as it is twice posited or repeated in the premises; and this identity admits no diversity, indeed just as it is posited in one, according to the same signification it ought to be posited in the other, if there ought to be a good syllogism, in which local relation belongs to dialectical syllogism.
And against this identity of the middle the paralogisms of this fallacy sin. Hence the identity of the middle according to the substance of the repeated term makes the appearance; but the diversity of the same according to reason makes the defect, as here: man is a species; Socrates is man; therefore Socrates is a species. For here the same middle, which is man, according to substance is posited twice or repeated; but it is taken diversely according to reason, because in the first proposition man stands according to itself, but in the second it stands for a supposit. Here, therefore, there is one mode of accident from diversity of the middle diversified according to reason.
But the second mode is when the consequent of the middle is taken, and the accident of the middle is assigned to it, as here: man is a species; man is substance; therefore substance is a species. And many other modes alongside these can be formed according to the composition of antecedent and consequent, or of subject and proper passion, or of substance and accident, as was said before.
But what certain people say, that this, a triangle has three equal to two right angles; an isosceles is a triangle; therefore an isosceles has three, is a sophistical syllogism with respect to demonstration and a good syllogism with respect to dialectic, is nothing; rather it is simply a good syllogism, although not demonstrative nor sophistical, since there is no defect in it.
CHAPTER VI. On the preliminaries for knowing the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply.
So that those things which must be said concerning the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply may be understood more easily, one must prenote that, as Aristotle says in the second book of the Topics, what is according to something, and when, and where, is said, and what is simply is said, and there is not any fallacy there. For the determination which is added to the simply either relates itself from addition to the simply, or not. If it relates itself from addition to the simply itself, one must consider what it adds to the simply. For either it adds some thing not previously understood in what was said simply, or it does not add a thing but only the discretion of the thing, so that it signifies discretely the same thing that what was said simply signifies indiscretely, as man is said simply, and yet one man or only man is said discretely. And if it adds only discretion of the same thing, then its simply follows, as when it is said one or only man runs, it follows, therefore man runs. But if the determination according to something adds some thing which is not understood in that which is simply, one must consider whether it is a determination proper to the simply itself, or not proper, but alien. For if it is proper, then from it again that which is simply follows, as was said in the Topics, as when it is said: a white man runs; therefore a man runs. For white is the determination of man according to the whole, and thus proper to the whole. But if it is a determination improper to the whole taken simply, one must consider whether that determination deprives the whole taken simply, or diminishes it. If it is privative of the account which is simply, as dead man, or painted man, or being in opinion or opinable, as a chimera, which is only in opinion, or in aptitude, as a future man, or only in the past, as Caesar was a man: such determinations are privative of that which is simply, and therefore from such determinations the simply is not inferred; for it does not follow, it is a dead man, therefore it is a man. Nor does it follow, it is a painted man, therefore it is a man. Or it is an opinable being, therefore it is a being. Or it is a being in aptitude or in the future or in the past, therefore it is a being.
Si autem est diminuens, tunc determinat secundum partem, et tunc considerandum est utrum determinet ad partem ex qua infertur totum, ut est pars subjectiva vel per modum subjectivae partis sumpta, sicut pars in modo. Si est ad partem ex qua non infertur totum, est sicut pars integralis sumpta, ut pars in quantitate, vel pars in loco, vel pars in tempore. Sicut bene sequitur: est homo: ergo animal: ita bene sequitur: legit bene: ergo legit. Legit aliquando: ergo legit. Legit alicubi: ergo legit. Quia istae determinationes non diminuunt totum vel denominationem totius. Si autem est determinatio ad partem diminuentem totum vel denominationem totius, tunc vocatur determinatio impropria, et tunc est trahens ad partem materialem sive integralem, ex qua non infertur totum: et tunc considerandum est utrum sit ad partem denominantem totum secundum formam quam dicit determinatio, aut non. Et si est ad partem a qua denominatur totum secundum formam quam dicit determinatio 1: tunc iterum bene sequitur a secundum quid ad simpliciter, ut est crispus secundum caput: ergo est crispus, sequitur: et est simus secundum nasum: ergo est simus. Est aquilus in naso: ergo est aquilus. Quia a talibus partibus secundum tales formas totum denominatur, et est in privationibus et habitibus naturalibus. Similiter et etiam in acquisitis, ut est videns secundum oculum: ergo est videns. Est caecus secundum oculum: ergo est caecus. Est rectus in ambulando secundum pedes: ergo est rectus. Est claudus secundum pedem: ergo est claudus. Est mancus secundum manum: ergo est mancus. Et hujusmodi causa est, quia formae vel privationes a quibus fit denominatio, sunt istorum membrorum sive partium in quantum organa sunt totius corporis: et ideo ab eis fit denominatio totius. Si autem sit determinatio ad partem integralem et secundum formam quae non est in ipsa secundum quod est organum totius, sed secundum quod est pars materialis tantum, ut cum dicitur, est albus dentem vel secundum dentes, vel niger secundum pedes: tunc non potest inferri simpliciter: ut Aethiops est albus secundum dentem: ergo est albus: non sequitur. Vel cygnus est niger secundum pedes: ergo est niger. Et sic fit etiam in relatione ad aliquid, sicut cum dico: bonum est uti diaeta tali loco infirmo: ergo bonum est uti diaeta tali. Bonum est secari ne putrescat corpus: ergo bonum est secari. Utile est projicere merces in mare tempore tempestatis: ergo utile est projicere merces, et sic in omnibus facile est videre, quod est quod infert simpliciter et quod non.
But if it is diminishing, then it determines according to a part, and then one must consider whether it determines to a part from which the whole is inferred, as a subjective part is, or something taken in the manner of a subjective part, as a part in mode. If it is to a part from which the whole is not inferred, it is as an integral part taken, as a part in quantity, or a part in place, or a part in time. Just as it follows well, it is a man, therefore animal, so it follows well: he reads well, therefore he reads. He reads at some time, therefore he reads. He reads somewhere, therefore he reads. Because these determinations do not diminish the whole or the denomination of the whole. But if it is a determination to a part diminishing the whole or the denomination of the whole, then it is called an improper determination, and then it draws to a material or integral part, from which the whole is not inferred; and then one must consider whether it is to a part denominating the whole according to the form which the determination says, or not. And if it is to a part from which the whole is denominated according to the form which the determination says 1, then again it follows well from according to something to simply, as: he is curly according to the head; therefore he is curly, follows; and he is snub according to the nose; therefore he is snub. He is aquiline in nose; therefore he is aquiline. Because from such parts according to such forms the whole is denominated, and it is in natural privations and habits. Similarly also in acquired ones, as: he is seeing according to the eye; therefore he is seeing. He is blind according to the eye; therefore he is blind. He is straight in walking according to the feet; therefore he is straight. He is lame according to the foot; therefore he is lame. He is maimed according to the hand; therefore he is maimed. And the cause of this kind is that the forms or privations from which denomination is made belong to those members or parts insofar as they are organs of the whole body; and therefore from them the denomination of the whole is made. But if it is a determination to an integral part and according to a form which is not in it according as it is an organ of the whole, but according as it is only a material part, as when it is said, he is white with respect to a tooth or according to the teeth, or black according to the feet, then the simply cannot be inferred, as: an Ethiopian is white according to a tooth; therefore he is white; it does not follow. Or: a swan is black according to the feet; therefore it is black. And thus it also occurs in relation to something, as when I say: it is good to use such a diet in such a place for a sick person; therefore it is good to use such a diet. It is good to be cut lest the body putrefy; therefore it is good to be cut. It is useful to throw merchandise into the sea in time of storm; therefore it is useful to throw merchandise, and thus in all cases it is easy to see what infers simply and what does not.
His habitis, adhuc praenotandum est quod penes causam apparentiae diversae distinguuntur fallaciae, et non penes causam non existendi: quia eaedem causae non existendi possunt esse in diversis fallaciis, ut dicit Aristoteles, et non potest esse una causa apparentiae in diversis fallaciis. Unde sciendum quod identitas dicti secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter secundum rem, est causa apparentiae in hac fallacia, scilicet quia in dictione simillimum est, et quia re proximum esse videtur. Dico autem dicti, non quod haec fallacia in voce vel dicto sit secundum quod est in voce vel dicto, sed secundum quod dictio rei subjacet et significatur in eo quod est in re. In omnibus enim fallaciis et in dictione et extra dictionem oportet sermonibus uti: sed ille sermo in fallaciis extra dictionem sumitur prout sermo subjacet rei, in fallaciis in dictione sumitur sermo prout res subjacet sermoni: et ideo principium deceptionis est in sermone in fallaciis in dictione, in fallaciis autem extra dictionem sumitur prout est in re et refertur ad sermonem. Unde causa apparentiae in hac fallacia tota incompleta est, quia dictum secundum quid et dictum simpliciter sunt valde similia secundum vocem rebus subjacentem: et quod non videntur multum differre secundum rem et causam non existentiae, est diversitas rei significatae in dicto simpliciter et in dicto secundum quid.
Adhuc autem notandum, quod haec fallacia quae vocatur secundum quid et simpliciter, una est fallacia, quamvis a duobus nominata: quia quamvis in compositione et divisione sint duae fallaciae, et non una: et quamvis in locis dialecticis sint duo loci, unus a parte, et alter a toto: tamen fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter non est nisi unica fallacia et non duae, et non una duplex, ut quidam dixerunt. Et hujus causa est, quia principium decipiendi sive causa apparentiae (penes quod fallaciae habent distingui) est unum, hoc est, similitudo in dicto secundum quid et simpliciter dicto, et proximitas secundum rem, quod idem est, sive consideretur habitudo dicti secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, sive si consideretur e converso habitudo dicti simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. Et hoc non est idem in fallacia compositionis et in fallacia divisionis: sed in fallacia divisionis principium decipiendi est identitas orationis ad compositam secundum materiam vocis, et etiam in fallacia compositionis principium decipiendi est identitas orationis compositae ad divisam secundum materiam: et haec non sunt eadem si debite pronuntietur composita oratio, et si debite pronuntietur divisa: sed formalem habent differentiam in una vocis materia quae est elementa vocis: quia pronuntiationes et distinctiones habent diversas, sicut in antehabitis est manifestum. Sic autem non in hac fallacia: quia sive procedatur a secundum quid ad simpliciter, sive e converso, semper similitudo dicti secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, est causa apparentiae.
Loci autem dialectici non sic distinguuntur, sed potius penes differentias maximarum. Alia autem est habitudo partis ad totum, et alia totius ad partem: quas habitudines exprimunt et dicunt maximae: et ideo confirmant locos sive habitudines locales: et ideo non est simile de locis dialecticis et de locis sophisticis.
CAPUT VII. De fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, et differentia quid et secundum quid.
Dicentes igitur de fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, et Aristotelem sequentes primum ponemus universalem causam deceptionis in hac fallacia. Dicit enim Aristoteles quod haec fallacia fit secundum quod hoc quodcumque dicitur simpliciter, dicitur quo (hoc est, non cum determinatione contrahente ad partem) et non proprie, hoc est, cum determinatione propria quae infert simpliciter, sed contrahitur cum determinatione impropria quae non infert simpliciter dictum: et est causa universaliter deceptionis in hac fallacia secundum quod frequentissime fit, quando quod particulariter dicitur (hoc est, determinatione non propria contractum) ad partem sumitur ut simpliciter dictum, hoc est, ut cum determinatione propria, quae infert simpliciter. Et sic universalis causa decipiendi in hac fallacia est similitudo dicti secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter: eo quod determinatio impropria accipitur ut propria.
With these things had, one must further prenote that diverse fallacies are distinguished according to the cause of appearance, and not according to the cause of non-existing, because the same causes of non-existing can be in diverse fallacies, as Aristotle says, and there cannot be one cause of appearance in diverse fallacies. Hence one must know that the identity of what is said according to something to what is said simply according to thing is the cause of appearance in this fallacy, namely because in diction it is most similar, and because in the thing it seems to be proximate. But I say, of what is said, not because this fallacy is in word or in what is said according as it is in word or in what is said, but according as diction underlies the thing and is signified in that which is in the thing. For in all fallacies both in diction and outside diction one must use speeches; but that speech in fallacies outside diction is taken insofar as speech underlies the thing; in fallacies in diction speech is taken insofar as the thing underlies speech; and therefore the principle of deception is in speech in fallacies in diction, but in fallacies outside diction it is taken insofar as it is in the thing and is referred to speech. Hence the cause of appearance in this fallacy is wholly incomplete, because what is said according to something and what is said simply are very similar according to the word underlying things; and the fact that they do not seem to differ much according to the thing and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of the thing signified in what is said simply and in what is said according to something.
Further one must note that this fallacy, which is called according to qualifiedly and simply, is one fallacy, although named from two things; because although in composition and division there are two fallacies, and not one, and although in dialectical places there are two places, one from the part and the other from the whole, nevertheless the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply is only a single fallacy and not two, and not one double fallacy, as certain people have said. And the cause of this is that the principle of deceiving, or cause of appearance, according to which fallacies have to be distinguished, is one, that is, likeness in what is said according to something and what is said simply, and proximity according to the thing, which is the same whether the relation of what is said according to something to what is said simply is considered, or whether conversely the relation of what is said simply to what is said according to something is considered. And this is not the same in the fallacy of composition and in the fallacy of division; but in the fallacy of division the principle of deceiving is the identity of the speech to the composed according to the matter of the word, and also in the fallacy of composition the principle of deceiving is the identity of the composed speech to the divided according to matter. And these are not the same if the composed speech is pronounced properly, and if the divided speech is pronounced properly; rather they have formal difference in one matter of word, which is the elements of the word, because the pronunciations and distinctions are diverse, as is manifest in the foregoing. But it is not so in this fallacy, because whether the procedure is from according to something to simply, or conversely, the likeness of what is said according to something to what is said simply is always the cause of appearance.
But dialectical places are not distinguished in this way, but rather according to differences of maxims. For the relation of part to whole is one thing, and that of whole to part is another; and maxims express and state these relations, and therefore they confirm places or local relations; and therefore it is not similar concerning dialectical places and sophistical places.
CHAPTER VII. On the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, and the difference between something and according to something.
Therefore, speaking of the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, and following Aristotle, first we shall posit the universal cause of deception in this fallacy. For Aristotle says that this fallacy occurs according as whatever is said simply is said in a certain respect, that is, not with a determination contracting to a part, and not properly, that is, with a proper determination which infers simply, but is contracted with an improper determination which does not infer what was said simply; and this is universally the cause of deception in this fallacy according as it occurs most frequently, when what is said particularly, that is, contracted by a non-proper determination, is taken to a part as what was said simply, that is, as with a proper determination, which infers simply. And thus the universal cause of deceiving in this fallacy is the likeness of what is said according to something to what is said simply, because an improper determination is taken as proper.
Hoc autem primo ostenditur in processu a dicto quo vel quid ad dictum simpliciter, ut si aliquis sic arguat: quod non est simpliciter (sicut non ens) opinabile est, hoc est, in opinione est, ut chimaera est: ergo quod non est, est. Et sic formatur paralogismus: quod in opinione est, est: sed quod non est simpliciter, ut chimaera est, in opinione est: ergo quod non est, est. Causa autem defectus sive non existentiae sive falsitatis est diversitas dicti quid et dicti simpliciter: non enim idem est esse aliquid quidem dictum et esse simpliciter dictum.
Aut rursus procedendo a negatione ad affirmationem sic, ut ex eo quod non est aliquid, inferat esse simpliciter, ut dicat: asinus non est homo: ergo non est simpliciter. Et causa falsitatis est: quia non est idem aliquid non esse quid, et aliquid non esse simpliciter: non enim idem est non esse hominem, et non esse simpliciter. Tamen alicui decepto videntur haec esse eadem: eo quod dictum quid et dictum simpliciter, proxima sint in dictione relata ad rem, propter deceptionis similitudinem propriae ad non propriam, et maxime: quia parum secundum rem differunt aliquid aliquando esse quid (hoc est, determinatum ad partem) et esse aliquando simpliciter: et in negatione similiter parum differre videntur aliquid aliquando non esse, et non esse simpliciter.
Et sicut diximus parum differre aliquid esse quid et esse simpliciter, similiter parum differunt etiam id quod aliquando dicitur secundum quid, et aliquando simpliciter: est enim ad aliquid esse secundum quid, hoc est, est quid quod contrahitur a communi ad partem aliquam materialem vel integralem: aut ad partem subjectivam, ut homo, vel asinus: vel ad partem in modo, ut legere bene vel male: vel in tempore, ut aliquando, vel heri: vel in loco, ut alicubi, vel in foro: vel ad aliquid, ut divitias esse malas abutenti, vel aliquid tale. Esse tamen secundum quid proprie dicit contractionem secundum partem materialem sive integralem 2. Et hujus exemplum est, ut si aliquis sic arguat: ut si Indus vel Aethiops (cum sit simpliciter niger) albus est dentes, sive secundum dentes: est ergo albus et non albus. Et formetur sic paralogismus: Indus est niger: ergo non est albus. Et in hac argumentatione nullum est peccatum. Et addatur, Indus est albus secundum dentes: ergo est albus. Et hoc est peccatum secundum quid ad simpliciter. Et postea inferatur, ergo est albus, et non est albus. Et hoc peccatum est idem quod prius, et est argumentum a contrario, quod secundum quid inest, ad alterum contrarium. Aut si alio modo arguat quis a duobus contrariis, quorum utrumque quo (hoc est, secundum aliquam partem materialem) inest: ut si pica est alba in pectore et nigra in cauda, quod pica est simpliciter alba et nigra: et sic simpliciter insunt picae contraria. Vel etiam si scutum sit dimidium album et dimidium nigrum, quod scutum sit simpliciter album et nigrum: et sic scuto simpliciter insint contraria actu, quod est inconveniens.
Si quis objiciat, quod in hoc paralogismo (est opinabile: ergo est) magis videtur esse fallacia consequentis quam fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: eo quod valet e converso, est: ergo est opinabile. Eadem etiam est objectio de alio paralogismo. Hic enim (asinus non est homo: ergo non est) videtur esse processus a destructione antecedentis, qui processus facit fallaciam consequentis, et non fallaciam per quid et simpliciter.
But this is first shown in a procedure from what is said in a certain respect or as something to what is said simply, as if someone argues thus: what is not simply, as a non-being, is opinable, that is, is in opinion, as a chimera is; therefore what is not, is. And thus the paralogism is formed: what is in opinion, is; but what is not simply, as a chimera, is in opinion; therefore what is not, is. But the cause of defect or non-existence or falsity is the diversity of what is said as something and what is said simply; for it is not the same to be something said in a certain respect and to be something said simply.
Or again by proceeding from negation to affirmation thus, that from the fact that something is not something, one may infer being simply, as he says: an ass is not a man; therefore it is not simply. And the cause of falsity is this: that it is not the same for something not to be something and for something not to be simply; for not to be a man and not to be simply are not the same. Nevertheless to someone deceived these seem to be the same, because what is said as something and what is said simply are proximate in diction referred to thing, because of the likeness of deception of proper to non-proper, and especially because according to the thing they sometimes differ little, for something to be something, that is, determined to a part, and to be sometimes simply; and in negation similarly something sometimes not to be and not to be simply seem to differ little.
And just as we have said that to be something and to be simply differ little, similarly that which is sometimes said according to something and sometimes simply also differ little. For to be toward something is to be according to something, that is, it is something which is contracted from the common to some material or integral part; or to a subjective part, as man or ass; or to a part in mode, as to read well or badly; or in time, as at some time or yesterday; or in place, as somewhere or in the forum; or toward something, as riches are bad for one abusing them, or something such. Yet being according to something properly says contraction according to a material or integral part 2. And an example of this is as if someone argues thus: if an Indian or Ethiopian, although he is simply black, is white as to the teeth or according to the teeth, he is therefore white and not white. And let the paralogism be formed thus: an Indian is black; therefore he is not white. And in this argument there is no sin. And let it be added: an Indian is white according to the teeth; therefore he is white. And this is the sin according to qualifiedly to simply. And afterward let it be inferred: therefore he is white, and he is not white. And this sin is the same as before, and it is an argument from the contrary, which belongs according to something, to the other contrary. Or if someone argues in another way from two contraries, each of which belongs in a certain respect, that is, according to some material part, as if a magpie is white in the breast and black in the tail, that the magpie is simply white and black, and thus contraries belong simply to the magpie. Or also if a shield is half white and half black, that the shield is simply white and black, and thus contraries actually belong simply to the shield, which is inappropriate.
If someone objects that in this paralogism, it is opinable, therefore it is, there seems to be the fallacy of the consequent rather than the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, because conversely this holds: it is, therefore it is opinable. The same objection also applies concerning the other paralogism. For here, an ass is not a man, therefore it is not, there seems to be a procedure from destruction of the antecedent, which procedure makes the fallacy of the consequent and not the fallacy through qualifiedly and simply.
Sed haec solvere non est difficile: quia non est inconveniens in eodem paralogismo plures esse causas et modos deceptionis: unde opinabile distinguendum est: hoc enim dicitur aequivoce, communiter, et proprie. Communiter quidem dicitur opinabile omne id quod cadit vel cadere potest in opinione: et sic sumpto opinabili, est (in paralogismo illo qui appositus est) fallacia consequentis, sicut probat objectio. Proprie autem dicitur opinabile non ens nisi in opinione, sicut chimaera: quia sic opinabile per formam opinabilitatis opponitur alio modo enti, quam in opinione: et sic in paralogismo illo est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia non sequitur: est ens in opinione: ergo est: quia hircocervus et minotaurus est ens in opinione: et non sequitur quod simpliciter sit hircocervus sive tragelaphus vel minotaurus: et hoc modo est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, si proprie sumatur opinabile: et sic inducitur hic. Similiter in secundo paralogismo et est fallacia consequentis, et fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, secundum quod procedit a determinate non existente ad simpliciter non existens: et secundum hoc est exemplum in hac fallacia.
Si quis autem objiciat, sicut in praecedenti fallacia objectum est, quod isti paralogismi deficiunt et in modo et in figura: et sic non videntur esse paralogismi, quia similitudinem non habent cum vero syllogismo. Bona est responsio, quae in antehabitis posita est, scilicet quod peccat haec fallacia contra syllogismum probantem dialecticum, et non contra syllogismum simpliciter; quia (ut in principio hujus libri determinatum est) etiam sophisticus simpliciter est syllogismus simpliciter: eo quod habet modum et figuram: quamvis non sit syllogismus probans in dialectica: et ideo paralogismi formantur sufficienter, quando in eis exprimitur habitudo localis, quamvis non disponantur in modo et figura.
Si quis autem paralogismos ita format, primum quidem sic: omne quod est opinabile, est: chimaera est opinabile: ergo chimaera est. Et secundum sic: omne quod non est homo, non est: asinus non est homo: ergo asinus non est. Non erit conveniens formatio: quia in utroque paralogismorum prima erit figura: et sic videtur poni peccatum in materia plus quam in forma: cum fallacia ista faciat peccatum in forma, et non in materia. Possunt ergo sic formari: omne ens est: chimaera est ens opinabile: ergo chimaera est. Haec enim videtur esse prima figura, et propter similitudinem quae est inter ens simpliciter et ens opinabile, videtur quod illud quod subjicitur in majori, praedicetur in minori: et sic apparet prima figura. Secundus autem potest formari sic: omne quod non est ens, non est: asinus non est ens homo: ergo asinus non est. Quia enim haec duo, ens, et non ens homo, similia sunt, videtur quod subjectum majoris sit etiam praedicatum minoris: et sic apparet ibi figura prima. In hoc tamen parva vis est: quare responsio primo posita vera est: et hoc dicit causam, quia materia paralogismorum non est ponenda in modo et figura, sed solum in habitudine locali.
Scias autem quod paralogismi isti formati sunt secundum processum ab eo quod secundum quid ad simpliciter: eo quod causa deceptionis est similitudo dicti secundum quid ad simpliciter dictum: sic enim frequentius et magis proprie secundum causam deceptionis assignatam fit processus in hac fallacia. Potest tamen e converso fieri, scilicet secundum processum a simpliciter ad secundum quid: ut Aethiops est niger: ergo est niger secundum dentes. Vel cygnus est albus: ergo est albus secundum pedes. Et sic causa deceptionis esset similitudo dicti simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. A simpliciter autem ad secundum quid contingit procedere et affirmando et negando. Sed cum proceditur a simpliciter a quo sive secundum quid negando: tunc fit fallacia secundum quid ad simpliciter: et causa apparentiae non est alia, sed eadem cum ea quae est a secundum quid ad simpliciter, quando processus fit affirmando, ut patet hic: est opinabile: ergo est. Et hic: non est: ergo non est opinabile. In his enim processibus eadem est causa deceptionis. Si autem a simpliciter ad secundum quid processus sit affirmative, hic non potest fieri nisi altero duorum modorum: aut enim fit processus a simpliciter ad quid ad partem integralem sive materialem, aut ad partem alio modo dictam, scilicet subjectivam, aut in modo, aut in tempore, aut in loco, vel hujusmodi ad partem aliam. Si sit ad partem integralem: tunc habet causam deceptionis non eamdem quam habet processus a secundum quid ad simpliciter, sed potius aliam quae sumitur a similitudine processus a toto integro ad suam partem: sicut si dicam, est albus, ergo est albus secundum pedem: in quo processu non est eadem causa deceptionis, quae est in processu a parte ad totum: quia cum dicitur, est albus pedem, ergo est albus: causa deceptionis est similitudo dicti secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Cum autem e converso fit sic est albus: ergo est albus secundum pedem: causa deceptionis est, quia creditur quod sicut totum integrale infert suam partem, ita simpliciter inferat suum secundum quid: et hoc non est necessarium. Instantia: cygnus est albus simpliciter: et tamen non sequitur, est albus secundum pedem. Si autem sit processus a simpliciter ad partem quae est per modum partis subjectivae, non videtur habere aliquam apparentiam, sicut legit: ergo bene legit, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Est sanum: ergo tunc vel ibi est sanum.
But to solve these things is not difficult, because it is not inappropriate that there be several causes and modes of deception in the same paralogism. Hence opinable must be distinguished, for this is said equivocally, commonly and properly. Commonly, indeed, everything that falls or can fall in opinion is called opinable; and with opinable taken in this way, there is in that paralogism which has been added the fallacy of the consequent, as the objection proves. But properly, that is called opinable which is a non-being except in opinion, as a chimera, because thus the opinable through the form of opinability is opposed to being in another way than in opinion; and thus in that paralogism there is the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, because it does not follow: it is a being in opinion; therefore it is; because goat-stag and minotaur is a being in opinion, and it does not follow that simply a goat-stag, or tragelaph, or minotaur exists; and in this way there is the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, if opinable is taken properly, and thus it is introduced here. Similarly in the second paralogism there is both the fallacy of the consequent and the fallacy according to qualifiedly and simply, according as it proceeds from the determinate non-existing to the simply non-existing; and according to this it is an example in this fallacy.
But if someone objects, as was objected in the preceding fallacy, that these paralogisms fail both in mode and in figure, and thus they do not seem to be paralogisms because they do not have likeness with a true syllogism, the response is good which was posited in the foregoing, namely that this fallacy sins against a dialectical proving syllogism, and not against syllogism simply; because, as was determined in the beginning of this book, even the sophistical syllogism simply is a syllogism simply, because it has mode and figure, although it is not a proving syllogism in dialectic. And therefore paralogisms are formed sufficiently when the local relation is expressed in them, although they are not disposed in mode and figure.
But if someone forms the paralogisms in this way, the first indeed thus: everything that is opinable is; a chimera is opinable; therefore a chimera is. And the second thus: everything that is not a man is not; an ass is not a man; therefore an ass is not. It will not be a fitting formation, because in both paralogisms the first figure will be present, and thus a sin seems to be posited in matter more than in form, whereas this fallacy makes a sin in form and not in matter. Therefore they can be formed thus: every being is; a chimera is an opinable being; therefore a chimera is. For this seems to be the first figure, and because of the likeness which is between being simply and opinable being, it seems that that which is subjected in the major is predicated in the minor, and thus the first figure appears. But the second can be formed thus: everything that is not a being is not; an ass is not a being man; therefore an ass is not. For because these two, being and non-being man, are similar, it seems that the subject of the major is also the predicate of the minor, and thus the first figure appears there. Yet in this there is little force; wherefore the response first posited is true, and this states the cause, because the matter of paralogisms is not to be posited in mode and figure, but only in local relation.
But you should know that these paralogisms are formed according to the procedure from that which is according to something to simply, because the cause of deception is the likeness of what is said according to something to what is said simply; for thus the procedure in this fallacy occurs more frequently and more properly according to the assigned cause of deception. Nevertheless it can occur conversely, namely according to a procedure from simply to according to something, as: an Ethiopian is black; therefore he is black according to the teeth. Or: a swan is white; therefore it is white according to the feet. And thus the cause of deception would be the likeness of what is said simply to what is said according to something. But from simply to according to something it is possible to proceed both by affirming and by denying. But when one proceeds from simply to in a respect or according to something by denying, then the fallacy according to qualifiedly to simply occurs, and the cause of appearance is not another but the same as that which exists from according to something to simply, when the procedure occurs by affirming, as is clear here: it is opinable; therefore it is. And here: it is not; therefore it is not opinable. For in these procedures the cause of deception is the same. But if the procedure from simply to according to something is affirmative, this cannot happen except in one of two ways: for either the procedure is from simply to something, to an integral or material part, or to a part said in another way, namely subjective, or in mode, or in time, or in place, or to another part of this kind. If it is to an integral part, then it has a cause of deception not the same as the procedure from according to something to simply has, but rather another, which is taken from the likeness of the procedure from an integral whole to its part, as if I say: he is white; therefore he is white according to the foot. In this procedure there is not the same cause of deception as there is in the procedure from part to whole, because when it is said, he is white as to the foot; therefore he is white, the cause of deception is the likeness of what is said according to something to what is said simply. But when conversely it happens thus, he is white; therefore he is white according to the foot, the cause of deception is that it is believed that just as an integral whole infers its part, so simply infers its according to something; and this is not necessary. Instance: a swan is white simply, and nevertheless it does not follow, it is white according to the foot. But if the procedure is from simply to a part which is in the manner of a subjective part, it does not seem to have any appearance, as: he reads; therefore he reads well, or something of this kind. It is healthy; therefore then or there it is healthy.
Et sic patet quod processus a simpliciter ad secundum quid, et multiformis est, et aliquando aliam habet apparentiam quam processus a secundum quid ad simpliciter, aliquando nullam: et ideo raro contingit: et ideo de tali processu non ponuntur exempla, nec ab Aristotele, nec ab aliis Philosophis: cum ea quae similia, dialecticis frequenter contingere debeat ad minus.
CAPUT VIII. In quibus facile est videre deceptionem secundum quid et simpliciter, et in quibus difficile.
Hujusmodi autem deceptionem quae est secundum quid et simpliciter, in quibusdam quidem facile est considerare, in quibus, scilicet id quod est secundum quid, privans vel diminuens est id quod est simpliciter: ut est homo mortuus vel pictus: ergo est homo. Vel e converso negative: non est homo: ergo non est homo mortuus, vel homo pictus. Vel si procedat a parte materiali quae non infert suum totum secundum denominationem. Ut si aliquis opponentium sumat a respondente Aethiopem esse nigrum simpliciter, et objiciens dicat, quoniam Aethiops dentibus albus, et inferat ex hoc, quoniam albus et niger: tunc enim redarguendo respondentem putabitur disputasse, quoniam albus et non albus est, et quoniam niger et non niger est: et hoc syllogistice putabitur fecisse, cum perfecerit interrogationem admixtam redargutionis disputationem deducendo. In hac enim meta maxime perfecta est disputatio sophistica. Hoc enim facile videtur, quia sicut pars integralis non infert suum totum, ita denominatio partis non infert denominationem totius: et similiter e converso denominatio totius non infert denominationem partis: sicut Aethiops est niger: ergo est niger secundum dentes. Vel negative: cygnus non est niger: ergo non est niger secundum pedes. Unum enim est motivum in hac fallacia, sive fiat processus a secundum quid ad simpliciter, sive e converso a simpliciter ad secundum quid. Et hujus causa est, quia secundum quid non movet secundum se, nec etiam simpliciter secundum se: quia sic essent duae fallaciae: sed unum movet secundum convenientiam similitudinis ad alterum.
And thus it is clear that the procedure from simply to according to something is both multiform and sometimes has another appearance than the procedure from according to something to simply, and sometimes none; and therefore it rarely occurs; and therefore examples of such a procedure are not posited either by Aristotle or by other philosophers, since things which are similar ought at least to occur frequently for dialecticians.
CHAPTER VIII. In which things it is easy to see deception according to qualifiedly and simply, and in which things difficult.
But deception of this kind, which is according to qualifiedly and simply, in certain things indeed is easy to consider, namely in those in which that which is according to something deprives or diminishes that which is simply, as: it is a dead or painted man; therefore it is a man. Or conversely negatively: it is not a man; therefore it is not a dead man or a painted man. Or if it proceeds from a material part which does not infer its whole according to denomination. As if one of the opponents takes from the respondent that an Ethiopian is black simply, and the objector says that the Ethiopian is white in teeth, and infers from this that he is white and black; for then, by refuting the respondent, he will be thought to have disputed that he is white and not white, and that he is black and not black; and he will be thought to have done this syllogistically, when he has completed the questioning mixed with refutation by leading the disputation. For in this goal sophistical disputation is most perfect. For this is easily seen, because just as an integral part does not infer its whole, so the denomination of a part does not infer the denomination of the whole; and similarly conversely the denomination of the whole does not infer the denomination of the part, as: an Ethiopian is black; therefore he is black according to the teeth. Or negatively: a swan is not black; therefore it is not black according to the feet. For there is one motive in this fallacy, whether the procedure is made from according to something to simply, or conversely from simply to according to something. And the cause of this is that according to something does not move according to itself, nor simply according to itself either, because in that case there would be two fallacies; but one moves according to agreement of likeness to the other.
In quibusdam autem latet, et non est facile considerare: et hoc contingit frequenter in illis in quibus quando quo dicitur quid, sive secundum quid. Videtur etiam sequi simpliciter illud idem dici: in illis enim non facile est considerare, utrum contrariorum vel diversorum quae sunt secundum partes diversas eidem proprie, hoc est, simpliciter vel secundum propriam determinationem sit assignandum. Fit autem hujusmodi difficultas in his in quibus secundum partes diversas similiter sive aequaliter sunt contraria vel diversa, a quibus secundum partem integralem fit denominatio, sive secundum quid, sicut diximus de scuto dimidio albo et dimidio nigro: videtur enim in talibus, quod aut ambo simpliciter insint contraria: aut quod concedendum sit, quod neutrum insit contrarium: sicut si scutum dimidium sit album, et dimidium nigrum.
Et si objiciatur, quod omnis color vel albus, vel niger, vel medius: ergo omne coloratum vel est album, vel nigrum, vel medio colore coloratum, a conjugatis: scutum autem est coloratum: ergo vel est album, vel nigrum, vel medio colore coloratum. Non valet argumentum: quia cum dicitur: omnis color vel est albus, vel niger, vel medius, distribuitur color secundum partes subjectivas per differentias coloris divisas. Cum autem dicitur, omne coloratum, etc., habet coloratum aliam divisionem quam color: dividitur enim quantitatis divisione ejus in quo est: et ideo potest esse partim album, et partim nigrum, et neutrum simpliciter: et sic conjugatum non ejusdem divisionis cum principali: propter quod non tenet talis processus.
Ex omnibus autem quae dicta sunt, accipitur quod duo sunt modi istius fallaciae. Unus quidem, quando proceditur a quo quod est nota partis subjectivae ad simpliciter. Alius autem, quando proceditur ab eo quod est secundum quid quod est nota partis integralis ad simpliciter.
Et si objicitur, quod a parte subjectiva ad totum affirmando est bonus processus, sicut ab inferiori ad superius. Dicendum quod hoc verum est, quando quo sive pars determinata est determinatione propria, quae infert suum totum sive simpliciter: eo quod intellectu et actu est in illo. Quando autem determinatur determinatione non propria: sicut bonum est est mactare patres in Trivallis: ergo bonum est mactare patres. Vel pluit in Anglia: ergo pluit. Vel in aliquo tali quod diminuit vel privat rationem ejus quod est simpliciter: tunc non est ab inferiori directo ad superius: quia superius privatur vel diminuitur et tollitur ab inferiori per talem determinationem: et tunc incidit fallacia.
Et attende quod formali differentia non sunt plures modi hujus fallaciae quam duo qui dicti sunt, a quo ad simpliciter, vel argumentum quid ad simpliciter: quia quamvis multa sint tota sive simpliciter, ut universale, integrale, potestativum, in quantitate, in modo, et hujusmodi: tamen omnia reducuntur in modum duorum, scilicet universalis et integralis sive materialis: et ideo non fit processus, nisi vel a quo ad simpliciter, vel a secundum quid ad simpliciter: et sic duo sunt modi in genere: in speciali tamen multis modis variari possunt, sicut in antehabitis dictum est.
But in certain things it lies hidden and is not easy to consider; and this happens frequently in those in which, when in a respect something is said, something, or according to something, is said. It also seems to follow that that same thing is said simply; for in these it is not easy to consider whether one of contraries or diverse things which belong according to diverse parts to the same should properly, that is, simply or according to a proper determination, be assigned. But a difficulty of this kind occurs in those in which according to diverse parts contraries or diverse things are similarly or equally present, from which denomination is made according to an integral part or according to something, as we said concerning a shield half white and half black; for in such things it seems that either both contraries belong simply, or that it must be granted that neither contrary belongs, as if a shield is half white and half black.
And if it is objected that every color is either white, or black, or intermediate; therefore every colored thing is either white, or black, or colored with an intermediate color, from conjugates; but a shield is colored; therefore it is either white, or black, or colored with an intermediate color. The argument does not hold, because when it is said, every color is either white, or black, or intermediate, color is distributed according to subjective parts through the divided differences of color. But when it is said, every colored thing, etc., colored thing has another division than color; for it is divided by the division of quantity of that in which it is; and therefore it can be partly white and partly black, and neither simply; and thus the conjugate is not of the same division with the principal; on account of which such a procedure does not hold.
But from all the things that have been said it is received that there are two modes of this fallacy. One, indeed, when one proceeds from in a respect, which is the mark of a subjective part, to simply. But the other, when one proceeds from that which is according to something, which is the mark of an integral part, to simply.
And if it is objected that from the subjective part to the whole by affirming is a good procedure, as from inferior to superior, one must say that this is true when in a respect or the determined part is determined by a proper determination, which infers its whole or simply, because in understanding and act it is in that. But when it is determined by a non-proper determination, as: it is good to slaughter fathers among the Triballi; therefore it is good to slaughter fathers. Or: it rains in England; therefore it rains. Or in something such that diminishes or deprives the account of that which is simply; then it is not from an inferior directly to a superior, because the superior is deprived or diminished and taken away from the inferior through such a determination, and then the fallacy occurs.
And attend that by formal difference there are no more modes of this fallacy than the two which have been stated, from in a respect to simply, or an argument from something to simply; because although there are many wholes or simply things, as universal, integral, potestative, in quantity, in mode, and things of this kind, nevertheless all are reduced into the mode of two, namely universal and integral or material; and therefore a procedure is made only either from in a respect to simply, or from according to something to simply. And thus there are two modes in genus; nevertheless in species they can be varied in many ways, as was said in the foregoing.
Notes
- Note that these are called determinations of parts bordering on the whole, as D. Albert says in book 5 of the Physics, on the text, commentary 2, or accidents joined according to the manner of Burley in the Universals, chapter on accident. P. J. (Nota quod istae vocantur determinationes partium confinientium totum, ut inquit D. Albertus 5 Physicor. super tex. comm. 2, aut accidentia copulata secundum modum Burlaei in Universalibus, cap. de accidente. P. J.) ↩
- The expression 'from which' is the mark of a subjective part, but the expression 'according to something' is the mark of an integral part, as he says in the following chapter. (Ly a quo est nota partis subjectivae, sed ly secundum quid est nota partis integralis, ut dicit in cap. sequenti.) ↩
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