Works › On Interpretation, Books I–II
Volume 1 · pp. 453–456
Chapter VII. In What Way There Is Opposition Of Contrariety And Contradiction.
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CAPUT VII. Qualiter est oppositio contrarietatis et contradictionis.
Quia omnis consequentia secundum oppositionem variatur, sicut in ante habitis dictum est, et oppositio secundum aliquos accipitur in rebus contrariis, sicut contraria sunt bonum et malum, justum et injustum, album et nigrum. Diximus autem nos in praehabitis, quod sumenda est secundum oppositionem affirmationis et negationis: ideo oportet nos hic quaerere qualiter sumenda sit oppositio, ne ignorata oppositione fiat error in consequentiis.
Accipiamus ergo nomen contrarii large, ita quod comprehendat contradictionem et contrarietatem stricte dictam, et quaeramus utrum contraria est affirmatio negationi sive oratio orationi, quamvis non differant per affirmationem et negationem: quia si contraria sunt quae de rebus contrariis enuntiantur, affirmatio erit contraria affirmationi, et negatio negationi, sicut statim in sequentibus erit manifestum. Ponamus autem hoc in exemplis, ut facilius intelligatur. Quaeramus ergo, utrum illi enuntiationi quae dicit, quoniam omnis homo justus est, sit illa contraria quae opponitur ei secundum modum negationis ejusdem praedicati de eodem subjecto, sicut illa quae dicit, quoniam nullus homo justus est, aut ista non sit ejus contraria, sed potius illa quae contrariam rem enuntiat de eodem subjecto, sicut si diceretur, omnis homo justus est, esse contraria isti quae dicit, omnis homo injustus est. Et in singularibus similiter contingit quaeri, sicut cum dicitur: Callias justus est, utrum illi contraria sive contradictoria est illa quae dicit, Callias justus non est, quae idem praedicatum negat de eodem subjecto: vel illa quae contrarium enuntiat de eodem subjecto, sicut cum dicitur, Callias justus est, Callias injustus est. Quaeramus ergo, quae illarum alteri sit contraria.
Ponamus ergo primo rationes ad hoc, quod oppositiones contrarietatis sumendae sunt penes res contrarias. Sicut enim dictum est in primo hujus scientiae libro apud logicum (qui significationes nominum accipit ab institutione facta ad placitum et ad conceptum instituentis) ea quae sunt in voce, sequuntur ea quae sunt in anima: et conceptus qui sunt in anima, causantur a rebus extra: et sic erit opinio sive conceptus contraria opinioni quae est de rebus contrariis relatis ad idem subjectum: et haec opinio quae dicit, quoniam omnis homo justus est, contraria est ei quae dicit, quoniam omnis homo est injustus. Si ergo ea quae sunt in voce, ut diximus, sequuntur ea quae sunt in anima, tunc videtur quod similiter sit in affirmationibus quae sunt in voce, quod contrarietas in eis sumenda sit secundum res contrarias. Si autem in anima non sit opinio contraria opinioni quae est de contraria re, tunc etiam una affirmatio non est contraria alteri, propter hoc quod est de re contraria. Sed potius affirmationi erit contraria illa negatio quae dicta est, sicut nullus homo justus est, erit contraria ad hanc, omnis homo justus est.
Et quia ea quae sunt in voce, sequuntur ea quae sunt in anima immediate, propter hoc oportet quaerere quae opinio vera sit quae falsae opinioni sic contrariatur. Opinionem ergo hic large vocamus quemlibet animae conceptum sive verum sive falsum, qui sit de rebus apprehensis in anima. Oportet autem quaerere, utrum opinio affirmans aliquid de aliquo sit contraria negationi, quae negat idem de eodem quod affirmavit affirmatio: aut non sit illi contraria, sed ei quae contrariam rem de eodem opinatur. Dico autem in exemplis ponendo hoc modo, est quaedam opinio sive conceptus de bono, quod bonum est, et haec est opinio vera. Alia est conceptio boni etiam, quoniam bonum non est bonum, et haec est falsa opinio. Est etiam alia falsa quae est de bono, quoniam malum est: ex quo ergo duae falsae sunt. Quaeramus quae illarum contraria est opinioni quae dicit et concedit de bono, quoniam bonum est.
CHAPTER VII. In what way there is opposition of contrariety and contradiction.
Because every consequence is varied according to opposition, as was said in the preceding matters, and opposition according to some is taken in contrary things, as good and evil, just and unjust, white and black are contraries. But we said in the preceding matters that it must be taken according to the opposition of affirmation and negation; therefore here we must ask how opposition must be taken, lest, when opposition is unknown, error occur in consequences.
Therefore let us take the name of contrary broadly, so that it comprehends contradiction and contrariety strictly so called, and let us ask whether an affirmation is contrary to a negation, or a speech to a speech, although they do not differ through affirmation and negation; because if contraries are those things which are enunciated about contrary things, an affirmation will be contrary to an affirmation, and a negation to a negation, as will immediately be manifest in what follows. But let us posit this in examples, so that it may be more easily understood. Therefore let us ask whether to that enunciation which says, "every man is just," that one is contrary which is opposed to it according to the mode of negation of the same predicate about the same subject, as that which says, "no man is just," or whether that is not its contrary, but rather that which enunciates a contrary thing about the same subject, as if it were said that "every man is just" is contrary to that which says "every man is unjust." And in singulars it can similarly be asked, as when it is said, "Callias is just," whether contrary or contradictory to it is that which says "Callias is not just," which denies the same predicate of the same subject, or that which enunciates a contrary thing of the same subject, as when it is said, "Callias is just," "Callias is unjust." Therefore let us ask which of those is contrary to the other.
Therefore first let us posit arguments for this, that oppositions of contrariety must be taken according to contrary things. For, as was said in the first book of this science, for the logician, who takes the significations of names from the institution made at pleasure and according to the concept of the institutor, those things which are in voice follow those things which are in the soul; and the concepts which are in the soul are caused by things outside. And thus an opinion or concept will be contrary to an opinion which is about contrary things referred to the same subject; and this opinion which says that every man is just is contrary to that which says that every man is unjust. Therefore if those things which are in voice, as we said, follow those things which are in the soul, then it seems that it is similar in affirmations which are in voice, that contrariety in them must be taken according to contrary things. But if in the soul there is not an opinion contrary to an opinion which is about a contrary thing, then also one affirmation is not contrary to another because it is about a contrary thing. But rather contrary to an affirmation will be that negation which has been stated, as "no man is just" will be contrary to this, "every man is just."
And because those things which are in voice follow immediately those things which are in the soul, on account of this one must ask what true opinion it is which is contrary in this way to a false opinion. Therefore here we broadly call opinion any concept of the soul, whether true or false, which is about things apprehended in the soul. But one must ask whether an opinion affirming something of something is contrary to the negation which denies the same thing of the same thing which the affirmation affirmed, or whether it is not contrary to it, but to that which opines a contrary thing about the same thing. But I speak by positing this in examples in this way: there is a certain opinion or concept about good, that good is, and this is a true opinion. There is also another conception of good, namely that good is not good, and this is a false opinion. There is also another false one which is about good, namely that it is evil. Since, therefore, there are two false opinions, let us ask which of them is contrary to the opinion which says and grants about good that good is.
Dicamus ergo quod arbitrari quod in hoc diffiniantur et determinantur opiniones, quod contrariae sint, propter hoc quod de rebus contrariis sint, est falsum: quod sic probatur1. Et supponamus, quod verum vero non contrariatur, et quod unum uni est contrarium primo et immediate. Opinio enim de bono, quoniam bonum est, et opinio de malo, quoniam malum est, sunt opiniones de rebus contrariis: et tamen fortassis sunt ambae una in specie, et forma unitatis, quamvis materialiter sint diversae. Sed in hoc quantum ad propositam intentionem non est vis: quia sive sint ambae una opinio, sive plures, constat quod ambae verae sunt: verum autem vero non contrariatur. Cum ergo sint de rebus contrariis, patet quod contrariae opiniones sive conceptiones non determinantur per hoc quod contrariorum sunt, hoc est, de rebus contrariis: sed magis determinantur per hoc quod contrariae, hoc est, per modum contrarii se habent ad invicem secundum affirmationem et negationem, ut scilicet negatio idem de eodem neget, quod affirmat affirmatio. Si ergo opinio vera est bono, quoniam bonum est: et quaeratur, quae sit ejus contraria: quamvis multas secundum rem habeat contrarias, tamen nulla est ponenda esse ejus contraria, nisi illa quae dicit, quoniam bonum non est bonum, et negat idem de eodem. Quod autem multae sint secundum res contrarias, ex hoc apparet quoniam de bono possumus opinari quod bonum est album, vel quid inhonestum, vel quid turpe, vel quid inutile, vel quid non expediens, vel non expetibile, vel aliud quodcumque, quod nec bonum est nec bonum esse potest. Infinita enim talia possunt concipi de bono, et quae sunt bona, et quae non sunt bona, sicut jam ostensum est. Bonum enim honestum est, expetibile est, finis est, utile est: et talia infinita vere de bono opinari possunt.
Aliquis potest etiam opinari, quod bonum malum est, et non expediens, et inhonestum: et talia infinita quae nec bono conveniunt, nec possunt convenire. In omnibus his nulla erit contraria, nisi illa quae negat idem praedicatum de eodem subjecto, et dicit quoniam bonum non bonum est.
### Marginal Labels - 455: Solutio quaestionis textus quoad enuntiationes.
Determinando autem istam quaestionem, utrum scilicet in rebus contrariis, vel in modo enuntiandi contrario attenditur contrarietas in enuntiationibus, dicimus quod oppositio contrarietatis vel contradictionis attenditur penes ea in quibus est prima fallacia sive falsitas. Et dico primam quae per se est et non per aliud: quod enim per aliud est, hoc accidit et non contingit per se et primo. Prima autem falsitas est in oppositione affirmationis et negationis in enuntiationibus. Est enim prima fallacia sive falsitas ex quibus fiunt generationes rerum contrariarum. Generationes autem primo et per se fiunt in terminis, qui differunt per affirmationem et negationem: homo enim fit ex non homine, et album ex non albo, et musicum ex non musico. Et quod generatio in aliquibus fit ex contrario, hoc est per accidens: album enim non fit ex nigro, nisi quia accidit nigro non album esse. Et hujus ratio est: quia generatio fit ex privatione: privatio autem per negationem enuntiatur. Ex oppositis ergo fiunt generationes: et ergo primo et per se fallacia sive falsitas est ex opposito per affirmationem et negationem: et illa oppositio quae est contrariarum rerum enuntiatarum de eodem, est fallacia sive falsitas, quae accidit per illam quae est inter affirmationem et negationem. Si ergo dicamus de bono, quod bonum est; et dicamus quod bonum malum non est, hoc quod dicimus, quod bonum bonum est, per se est et primo: quia praedicatum non solum conceptum est cum subjecto, sed etiam cum subjecto est idem, et ideo per se et primo. Sed quum dicimus quod bonum non est malum, non negatur de ipso malum, nisi propter hoc quod bonum est bonum, et bonum est malo contrarium. Et ideo simul in eodem esse non possunt: et ideo non propter se et primo negatur malum de bono, sed propter aliud: et ideo per accidens: bono enim accidit malum non esse, propter hoc quod bonum est bonum2. In unoquoque autem genere illud quod secundum se est verum, magis est verum quam illud quod secundum accidens est verum: et magis est falsum quod secundum se est falsum, quam illud quod secundum accidens est falsum. Et cum contraria et contradictoria sint eorum quae maxime distant in vero et falso: et erit opinio vera quae est boni, quoniam bonum est bonum, ei opinioni quae est boni, quoniam bonum non est bonum, maxime contraria. Oportet ergo quod secundum affirmationem et negationem ejusdem de eodem accipiatur tam contrarietas quam contradictio. Illa enim quae est de bono, quoniam non bonum est, secundum se et primo falsa est: illa quae dicit de bono, quod malum est, est falsa per accidens: magis ergo erit falsa de eo quod bonum est, quae est negationis, quam ea quae est, quod bonum contrarium aliquod bono est ut malum: falsa autem magis est quae circa singula (quae sunt partes subjecti) habet oppositionem contrariam. Sunt enim contraria quae plurimum distant secundum idem subjectum3.
Therefore let us say that to judge that opinions are defined and determined in this, that they are contrary because they are about contrary things, is false; and this is proved thus1. And let us suppose that true is not contrary to true, and that one thing is contrary to one thing first and immediately. For the opinion about good, that good is, and the opinion about evil, that evil is, are opinions about contrary things; and yet perhaps they are both one in species and form of unity, although materially they are diverse. But in this there is no force as to the proposed intention, because whether they are both one opinion or many, it is established that both are true; but true is not contrary to true. Since, therefore, they are about contrary things, it is clear that contrary opinions or conceptions are not determined through this, that they are of contraries, that is, about contrary things, but are rather determined through this, that as contraries, that is, according to the mode of contrariety, they are related to one another according to affirmation and negation, namely so that negation denies the same thing of the same thing which affirmation affirms. Therefore if the true opinion is about good, namely that good is, and it is asked which is its contrary, although according to the thing it has many contraries, nevertheless none must be posited to be its contrary except that which says that good is not good and denies the same thing of the same thing. But that there are many according to contrary things is apparent from this, that about good we can opine that good is white, or something dishonorable, or something base, or something useless, or something not advantageous, or not desirable, or anything else which neither is good nor can be good. For infinitely many such things can be conceived about good, both things which are good and things which are not good, as has already been shown. For good is honorable, desirable, an end, useful; and infinitely many such things can truly be opined about good.
Someone can also opine that good is evil, and not advantageous, and dishonorable, and infinitely many such things which neither belong to good nor can belong to it. In all these there will be no contrary except that which denies the same predicate of the same subject and says that good is not good.
### Marginal Labels - 455: Solution of the question of the text with respect to enunciations.
But in determining that question, namely whether contrariety in enunciations is attended to in contrary things or in a contrary mode of enunciating, we say that the opposition of contrariety or contradiction is attended to according to those things in which there is the first fallacy or falsity. And I call first that which is through itself and not through another; for what is through another occurs by accident and does not happen through itself and first. But the first falsity is in the opposition of affirmation and negation in enunciations. For the first fallacy or falsity is that from which generations of contrary things are made. But generations first and through themselves are made in terms which differ through affirmation and negation; for man comes to be from non-man, and white from non-white, and musical from non-musical. And that generation in some things comes to be from a contrary, this is by accident; for white does not come to be from black except because not-white happens to black. And the reason of this is that generation comes to be from privation; but privation is enunciated through negation. Therefore generations come to be from opposites; and therefore first and through itself fallacy or falsity is from the opposite through affirmation and negation; and that opposition which is of contrary things enunciated about the same thing is a fallacy or falsity which occurs through that which is between affirmation and negation. Therefore if we say about good that good is, and we say that good is not evil, this which we say, that good is good, is through itself and first, because the predicate has not only been conceived with the subject, but is also the same as the subject, and therefore through itself and first. But when we say that good is not evil, evil is not denied of it except on account of this, that good is good and good is contrary to evil. And therefore they cannot be in the same thing at the same time; and therefore evil is not denied of good on account of itself and first, but on account of another, and therefore by accident; for it happens to good not to be evil on account of this, that good is good2. But in each genus that which is true according to itself is more true than that which is true according to accident, and that which is false according to itself is more false than that which is false according to accident. And since contraries and contradictories are of those which are most distant in true and false, the true opinion which is about good, namely that good is good, will be most contrary to that opinion which is about good, namely that good is not good. Therefore contrariety as much as contradiction must be taken according to affirmation and negation of the same thing about the same thing. For that which is about good, that it is not good, is false according to itself and first; that which says about good that it is evil is false by accident. Therefore that which is of negation will be more false about that which is good than that which is that some contrary to good, as evil, belongs to good; but that is more false which, concerning singulars which are parts of the subject, has contrary opposition. For contraries are those which are most distant according to the same subject3.
Quod si etiam detur, quod altera harum (illa scilicet quae dicit, quoniam bonum malum est) etiam est contraria illi quae dicit, quoniam bonum est bonum: tamen ex praemissis sequitur, quod illa quae contrariatur ei per modum contradictionis, est magis contraria quam illa quae enuntiat de bono contrarium secundum esse: magis enim contraria primo et per se contraria est. Et sic inter istas duas, bonum est bonum, et bonum non est bonum, est prima contrarietas. Altera autem quae est, quod bonum malum est, non est contraria, nisi quia est implicita huic quae dicit, quoniam bonum non est bonum: quia ex hoc quod bonum non est bonum, ei quod non est bonum, accidit esse malum: et sic non est contraria nisi per aliud: et hoc est per accidens esse contrarium. Cum enim dicit bonum esse malum, necesse est quod opinetur ideo accidere esse malum, quia non est bonum: et si esset bonum, non accideret ei esse malum.
But if it is also granted that the other of these, namely that which says that good is evil, is also contrary to that which says that good is good, nevertheless from what has been premised it follows that that which is contrary to it by the mode of contradiction is more contrary than that which enunciates a contrary about good according to being; for that which is first and through itself contrary is more contrary. And thus between these two, good is good and good is not good, there is the first contrariety. But the other, which is that good is evil, is not contrary except because it is implicated in this which says that good is not good, because from the fact that good is not good, being evil happens to that which is not good; and thus it is not contrary except through another, and this is to be contrary by accident. For when it says that good is evil, it is necessary that one opine that to be evil happens to it because it is not good; and if it were good, being evil would not happen to it.
Amplius si in aliis quae non habent contrarium, est accipere contrarium secundum res contrarias: tunc etiam in istis quae habent contrarium, bene dictum est: quia contraria secundum res contrarias accipiuntur. Si enim est ars generalis contrariam enuntiationem accipiendi, oportet quod ubique in omni materia uno et eodem modo accipiantur: et ideo aut ubique erunt contraria, aut nusquam. In his vero in quibus non est contrarium secundum rem, sicut substantiae, oportet accipere contrarium per affirmationem et negationem, sicut de ea quae est ejus opinio, quae putat sive opinatur hominem non esse hominem, quae est contraria ei quae opinatur hominem esse hominem. Si ergo in tali materia per affirmationem et negationem sumitur contrarietas in enuntiationibus, sequitur quod in omnibus contrarietas secundum contradictionem affirmationis et negationis accipiatur4.
Amplius similiter se habent in veritate opinio boni quae dicit, quod bonum bonum est, et opinio quae dicit de non bono, quod non bonum est. Et similiter ad has se habet in falsitate opinio dicens, quod bonum non est bonum: et quae dicit, quod non bonum bonum est. Quaeramus ergo quae sit contraria huic verae opinioni quae dicit, quod non bonum non est bonum: ea enim quae dicit, quoniam non bonum malum est, non potest ejus esse contraria: haec enim, quod non bonum non est bonum, et illa quae dicit, quod non bonum malum est, aliquando sunt simul verae: vera autem opinio verae non contrariatur: quia verum vero non potest esse contrarium: quoddam autem non bonum est malum, sicut injustitia non bonum est, quod malum est. Et ideo si essent contrariae quae dictae sunt, contingeret contrarias esse simul veras: quod nunquam esse potest in aliqua materia. Adhuc autem illi opinioni verae quae dicit, quod non bonum non bonum est, nec ista potest esse contraria quae dicit, quod non bonum non malum est. Hae enim duae etiam sunt simul verae: indifferens enim est, est non bonum, et est malum. Relinquitur ergo ex omnibus his, quod illi verae opinioni quae est non boni, quod non est, contraria sit haec quae dicit, quod non bonum bonum est. Similiter et illi quae dicit, quod bonum bonum est, contraria est illa quae dicit, bonum non bonum est: et sic per oppositionem affirmationis et negationis de eodem et secundum idem est accipienda contrarietas
Moreover, if in other things which do not have a contrary it is possible to take a contrary according to contrary things, then also in those things which have a contrary it has been well said that contraries are taken according to contrary things. For if there is a general art of taking a contrary enunciation, they must be taken everywhere in every matter in one and the same way; and therefore either everywhere there will be contraries, or nowhere. But in those things in which there is not a contrary according to the thing, such as substances, it is necessary to take the contrary through affirmation and negation, as about that opinion of it which thinks or opines that man is not man, which is contrary to that which opines that man is man. Therefore if in such matter contrariety in enunciations is taken through affirmation and negation, it follows that in all things contrariety is taken according to contradiction of affirmation and negation4.
Moreover, the opinion of good which says that good is good and the opinion which says of non-good that non-good is non-good have themselves similarly in truth. And similarly to these in falsity has itself the opinion saying that good is not good, and the one which says that non-good is good. Therefore let us ask what is contrary to this true opinion which says that non-good is not good. For that which says that non-good is evil cannot be its contrary, because this, that non-good is not good, and that which says that non-good is evil, are sometimes true together; but true opinion is not contrary to true opinion, because true cannot be contrary to true. But some non-good is evil, as injustice is non-good, which is evil. And therefore if those which have been stated were contrary, it would happen that contraries are true together, which can never be in any matter. Moreover, to that true opinion which says that non-good is non-good, neither can this be contrary which says that non-good is non-evil. For these two are also true together: for it is indifferent that it is non-good and it is evil. Therefore from all these things it remains that to that true opinion which is of the non-good, that it is not, this is contrary which says that non-good is good. Similarly also to that which says that good is good, that one is contrary which says that good is not good. And thus by opposition of affirmation and negation of the same thing and according to the same thing contrariety must be taken.
Notes
- Opinions are not contrary because they are about contrary things, but because we do not opine them in a contrary mode; and in this appears the solution of the question of the text with respect to opinions. (Opiniones non sunt contrariae quia de contrariis rebus; sed quia non eas opinamur contrario modo: et in hoc apparet solutio quaestionis textus quoad opiniones.) ↩
- Whence it follows that this proposition, "good is good," is truer than this, "good is not evil," because the former is true through itself and first, while the latter is only true through another, that is, by reason of the former. (Unde sequitur quod ista propositio, bonum est bonum, est verior quam ista, bonum non est malum, quia prior est vera per se et primo, dum posterior est tantum vera per aliud, id est, ratione primae.) ↩
- It further follows that this proposition, "good is not good," is more false than that one, "good is evil," because the second is not false except by reason of the first. (Sequitur adhuc quod haec propositio, bonum non est bonum, est magis falsa quam ista, bonum est malum; quia secunda non est falsa nisi ratione primae.) ↩
- If contrary is taken for something common to the truly contrary and the contradictory, as D. Albert says at the end of this chapter, this argument seems to be nothing, because nothing can be assumed which does not have a contrary in this way. It is answered that here he does not take contrary broadly in that way at the beginning of this argument, because he is speaking about incomposites, when he says "in those which do not have a contrary," etc. But D. Albert says that contrary here is taken broadly, and he understands this about contrary as it belongs to complex things, namely for a contrary proposition; and the sense is that contrary, that is, a contrary proposition, is taken for what is common to a truly contrary proposition and to a contradictory proposition. Jammy. (Si contrarium capiatur pro quodam communi ad vere contrarium et contradictorium, ut dicit D. Albertus in fine hujus cap., ista ratio nulla videtur esse; quia nihil est assumere quod non habeat contrarium hoc modo. Respondetur quod hic non capit contrarium illo modo large in principio hujus rationis: quia loquitur de incomplexis, dum dicit in his quae non habent contrarium, etc. D. Albertus autem dicit contrarium hic accipi large, et hoc intelligit de contrario prout convenit complexis, scilicet pro propositione contraria: et sensus est, quod contrarium, id est, propositio contraria, capitur pro communi ad propositionem vere contrariam et ad contradictoriam. JAMMY.) ↩
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