Works › On Interpretation, Books I–II
Volume 1 · pp. 411–413
Treatise V. On The Attribute Of The Parts Of Enunciation Which Is Opposition. Chapter I. That To Every Affirmation A Negation Is Opposed, And Conversely.
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TRACTATUS V. DE PASSIONE PARTIUM ENUNTIATIONIS QUAE EST OPPOSITIO.
CAPUT I. Quod omni affirmationi negatio est opposita, et e converso.
Contingit autem enuntiare et id quod verum est esse, sicut enuntiatur Deum esse. Contingit autem etiam enuntiare id quod verum est, non esse, ut si dicam Deum non esse, enuntio id quod est, non esse. Contingit etiam enuntiare aliquando id quod non est, esse, ut si dicam chimaeram esse. Et iterum contingit enuntiare quod non est, non esse, ut si dicam chimaeram non esse. Dicit enim Avicenna quod ista quatuor sic diversificantur: quia contingit quod est enuntiare esse, in affirmativa enuntiatione. Et contingit quod est, non esse enuntiare in ejusdem negativa. Et contingit enuntiare quod non est, esse in affirmativa negativae opposita. Et contingit enuntiare quod non est, non esse in negatione negationi opposita, ut nullus homo albus est, non nullus homo albus est. Sic ergo tali modo affirmando et negando de esse et non esse contingit enuntiativam facere orationem. Et sicut haec diversitas contingit circa enuntiationes quae sunt de praesenti, sic contingit circa alia tempora quae sunt extra praesens quae sunt praeteritum et futurum. In omni enim differentia temporis enuntiativa oratione omne quod quis affirmaverit, negare contingit. Et omne quod quis negaverit, contingit enuntiativa oratione affirmare: et hoc est secundum oppositionem in genere acceptam. Manifestum ergo est, quod omni affirmationi negatio est opposita, et omni negationi opposita est affirmatio secundum quodlibet genus oppositionis: quia hoc est verum tam in contradictione, quam in contrarietate.
Ex hoc patet quid est oppositio. Est enim oppositio (secundum quod est passio enuntiationis, et secundum quod hic intenditur de oppositione) affirmatio et negatio oppositae. Et quia negatur in una quod in alia affirmatur, ideo in communi aliquando utraque oppositio dicitur contradictio quando species pro genere ponitur propter rationem quam diximus1. Cum autem dicimus, quod oppositio est affirmatio et negatio oppositae, dico oppositionem esse, quando est unius et ejusdem praedicati de eodem subjecto non aequivoce accepto. Et omnia talia attenduntur circa oppositionem, quaecumque in elenchis attendenda esse determinavimus, quando loquebamur de elencho qui syllogismus est contradictionis. Et quae attendenda sunt circa sophisticas importunitates: quia importunus fortius instat. Et ideo oportet quod oppositio sit ejusdem de eodem, et circa idem et secundum idem, eodem tempore. Tunc enim vera est oppositio quamvis de elencho adhuc non sit determinatum, cum ea quae dicta sunt attenduntur penes elenchum: et ideo jam secundum rationem elenchi sunt declarata et determinata quae sunt de ratione elenchi. Ista ergo est oppositio quae accidit circa partes enuntiationis.
Haec autem oppositio dicitur multipliciter secundum universale et particulare, affirmativum et negativum. Subjectorum enim in enuntiationibus et praedicatorum sunt haec quidem universalia, ista vero singularia. Dico autem exponendo, quod universale est subjectum vel praedicatum quod de pluribus natum est praedicari et inesse: quia universale est, quod est in multis et de multis: singulare vero est, quod non est sic, sed ab ipso nulla est praedicatio, quemadmodum in ante habitis dictum est. Verbi gratia ut homo quidem universale est subjectum vel praedicatum: quia natum est esse in pluribus et dici de pluribus. Plato enim est de numero eorum quae sunt singularia, quia non aptum natum est dici de pluribus et esse in pluribus: et ideo aliud est universale subjectum et praedicatum, et aliud est singulare. Cum autem enuntiatio fiat de quolibet et quolibet modo, necesse est quod aliquando enuntietur de aliquo, quod insit aliquod praedicatum alicui subjecto secundum omnem modum quo ei potest inesse et non inesse: necesse est ergo, quod aliquoties enuntietur inesse aliquid alicui aliorum quae sunt universalia subjecta, ut si aliquid enuntiatur esse homo. Aliquoties autem necesse est enuntiare inesse aliquid alicui eorum quae sunt singularia, ut si aliquid enuntiatur inesse Platoni.
TREATISE V. ON THE ATTRIBUTE OF THE PARTS OF ENUNCIATION WHICH IS OPPOSITION.
CHAPTER I. That to every affirmation a negation is opposed, and conversely.
Now it is possible to enunciate also that which is true to be, as it is enunciated that God is. It is also possible to enunciate that which is true not to be, as if I say that God is not, I enunciate that which is, not to be. It is also possible sometimes to enunciate that which is not to be, as if I say that a chimera is. And again it is possible to enunciate that which is not not to be, as if I say that a chimera is not. For Avicenna says that these four are diversified in this way: because it is possible to enunciate that which is to be, in an affirmative enunciation. And it is possible to enunciate that which is not to be, in the negative of the same. And it is possible to enunciate that which is not to be, in an affirmative opposed to the negative. And it is possible to enunciate that which is not not to be, in a negation opposed to a negation, as "no white man is," "not no white man is." Therefore in such a way, by affirming and denying concerning being and non-being, it is possible to make an enunciative speech. And just as this diversity occurs around enunciations which are about the present, so it occurs around other times which are outside the present, which are past and future. For in every difference of time, by an enunciative speech it is possible to deny everything that someone has affirmed. And everything that someone has denied, it is possible to affirm by an enunciative speech; and this is according to opposition taken in the genus. Therefore it is manifest that to every affirmation a negation is opposed, and to every negation an affirmation is opposed according to any genus of opposition; because this is true both in contradiction and in contrariety.
From this it is clear what opposition is. For opposition, insofar as it is an attribute of enunciation and insofar as opposition is intended here, is opposed affirmation and negation. And because in one what is affirmed in the other is denied, therefore in common sometimes either opposition is called contradiction, when the species is put for the genus on account of the account which we have stated1. But when we say that opposition is opposed affirmation and negation, I say that there is opposition when it is of one and the same predicate about the same subject, taken not equivocally. And all such things are considered around opposition, whatever we determined must be considered in Refutations, when we were speaking of the refutation which is a syllogism of contradiction. And those things must be considered around sophistical annoyances, because the annoying man presses more strongly. And therefore opposition must be of the same concerning the same, and around the same thing and according to the same thing, at the same time. For then the opposition is true, although concerning the refutation it has not yet been determined, since the things which have been said are considered with respect to the refutation; and therefore now according to the account of a refutation those things have been declared and determined which belong to the account of a refutation. Therefore this is the opposition which occurs around the parts of enunciation.
But this opposition is said in many ways according to universal and particular, affirmative and negative. For of subjects and predicates in enunciations, these are universal and those are singular. But I say, by way of exposition, that a universal is a subject or predicate which is naturally apt to be predicated of many and to be in many; because a universal is what is in many and of many. But a singular is what is not so, but from it there is no predication, as was said in what preceded. For example, man is a universal subject or predicate, because it is naturally apt to be in many and to be said of many. For Plato is of the number of those things which are singular, because he is not naturally fit to be said of many and to be in many; and therefore a universal subject and predicate is one thing, and a singular is another. But since enunciation is made about anything and in any mode, it is necessary that sometimes it be enunciated about something that some predicate belongs to some subject according to every mode in which it can belong and not belong to it; therefore it is necessary that sometimes it be enunciated that something belongs to some one of those which are universal subjects, as if something is enunciated to be a man. But sometimes it is necessary to enunciate that something belongs to some one of those which are singular, as if something is enunciated to belong to Plato.
Ex his ergo divisio sumitur oppositionum quae sunt enuntiationis. Si enim aliquis enuntiet in universali universaliter, quoniam est et non est, universaliter affirmando, et universaliter negando: tunc erunt contrariae enuntiationes. Dico autem exponendo quod in universali enuntiatio fit universaliter, quando universale subjectum est, et per signum distributivum capitur ut stet pro partibus quae divisim participant praedicatum distributum et confusum, etiam affirmando et negando, ut omnis homo albus est, nullus homo albus est. Quando autem oppositio sive contradictio fit in universalibus terminis non universaliter per signum distributivum distributis, non sunt contrariae enuntiationes, sed in aliud cadunt genus oppositionis. Dico autem exponendo per exemplum in universali sive de universali enuntiationem fieri et affirmando et negando, ut homo albus est, non est homo albus. Et sunt ordinandae istae propositiones sive enuntiationes ad debitum situm terminorum, qui est subjecti et praedicati, ut dicatur sic, homo est albus, homo non est albus. Et quod hae indefinitae particularibus aequipollent his, scilicet quidam homo est albus, quidam homo non est albus: hae enim non sunt contrariae enuntiationes, sed subcontrariae, quia quamvis non sint contrariae propositiones, subjecta tamen et praedicata quae in eis signantur, contingit esse contraria in qualitate: quia id quod affirmatur de uno in una, negatur de eodem in altera: et talis oppositio habet modum contrariorum in qualitate. Et quia in omni oppositione sic fit, quod idem negatur de eodem in una quod de illo affirmatur in reliqua, ideo ab Aristotele saepe contradictio extenso nomine pro omni ponitur oppositione. In talibus ergo quae sunt subcontrariae cum universale sit subjectum propositionis: non tamen sine distributione utitur universaliter enuntiatione: quia sine signo universali subjectum actu non est distributum ad standum pro particularibus, quamvis de natura sit aptum natum stare pro multis in quantum appellativum sive commune est et universale.
Therefore from these things the division is taken of oppositions which belong to enunciation. For if someone enunciates in the universal universally, that it is and is not, by affirming universally and by denying universally, then they will be contrary enunciations. But I say, by way of exposition, that enunciation is made in the universal universally when the subject is universal and is taken through a distributive sign so that it stands for the parts which separately participate in the distributed and confused predicate, both by affirming and by denying, as "every white man is," "no white man is." But when opposition or contradiction occurs in universal terms not universally distributed through a distributive sign, they are not contrary enunciations, but fall into another genus of opposition. But I say, by way of exposition through an example, that an enunciation is made in a universal or about a universal both by affirming and by denying, as "white man is," "white man is not." And these propositions or enunciations must be ordered according to the due position of the terms, which is that of subject and predicate, so that it be said thus, "man is white," "man is not white." And because these indefinite propositions are equivalent to particular ones, namely to these, "some man is white," "some man is not white," they are not contrary enunciations, but subcontrary; because although they are not contrary propositions, nevertheless the subjects and predicates which are signified in them can be contrary in quality, because what is affirmed of one in one is denied of the same in the other; and such opposition has the mode of contraries in quality. And because in every opposition it happens in this way, that the same is denied of the same in one which is affirmed of it in the remaining one, therefore by Aristotle contradiction, by the name extended, is often put for every opposition. Therefore in such things which are subcontrary, although the universal is the subject of the proposition, nevertheless without distribution it does not use enunciation universally, because without a universal sign the subject is not actually distributed for standing for particulars, although by nature it is naturally apt to stand for many insofar as it is appellative or common and universal.
Hoc enim signum distributivum quod est omnis, non est universale proprie loquendo: sed est signum per quod stat pro particularibus universaliter universale, cui tale signum est adjunctum. Causa autem quare non est universale, est, quia quamvis secundum grammaticum sit nomen appellativum, hoc est, multis secundum naturae suae aptitudinem conveniens, tamen est secundum formam infinitum, nullam enim naturam unam dicit: propter quod omnis naturae communis est distributivum. Universale autem est quod est in multis et de multis suae naturae suppositis: et ideo omnis, et nullus, et hujusmodi signa universalia esse non possunt, sed sunt signa designantia utrum universale sit acceptum universaliter vel particulariter secundum sua supposita: et haec sunt verba Avicennae.
In subjecto universali signum distributivum est ordinandum: quia per divisionem subjecti praedicatum partibus attribuitur subjecti, ut divisim participent id per praedicationem et non in praedicato ponendum: quia cum praedicatum formaliter sit acceptum, non proprie dividitur, nisi alterius, hoc est, subjecti divisione: sed inaequaliter redditur subjecto et partibus ejus. Unde id quod est universale praedicari potest, ut omnis homo est animal: sed universale universaliter acceptum non potest praedicari: nulla enim vera affirmatio esse potest, in qua de universali aliquo praedicato praedicetur sive praedicatio fiat: quoniam universaliter sic patet quod falsum est, omnis homo est omne animal, et si ponatur, quod nullum animal sit nisi homo. Cum enim homo subjiciatur gratia partium suarum, et praedicata formaliter accipiantur, oportet quod quilibet homo esset omne animal, quod falsum est.
Objiciunt tamen quidam et instant per hanc, nullus homo est nullum animal: quod probatur per hoc quod ejus contradictoria est falsa, haec scilicet, non nullus homo est nullum animal: ex hac enim sequitur haec, aliquis homo est nullum animal, quae est falsa et contradictoria primae. Sed ad hoc solvere non est difficile si haec propositio, nullus homo est nullum animal, debite ordinetur sic, quod utraque negatio feratur ad compositionem sic, nullus homo nullum est animal: haec enim aequipollet huic, omnis homo non nullum animal est. Et ex hac sequitur haec, quod quilibet homo est aliquod animal, quae vera est: et in hoc sensu sua contradictoria est falsa, sicut apparet cuilibet: et sic constat quod signum universale ad praedicatum non est ponendum.
Ex omnibus quae inducta sunt in hoc capitulo, apparet quod oppositio est passio partium enuntiationis: ex quo contingit enuntiare secundum omnem modum oppositionis et contradictoriae et contrariae et subcontrariae. Nunc ergo dandae sunt leges harum oppositionum.
### Marginal Labels - 411: Oppositio. - 412: Quae sint propositiones contrariae. - 412: Quae sint subcontrariae. - 413: Objectio. - 413: Solutio.
For this distributive sign which is "every" is not a universal, properly speaking, but is a sign through which the universal to which such a sign is joined stands universally for particulars. But the cause why it is not a universal is that, although according to the grammarian it is an appellative noun, that is, agreeing with many according to the aptitude of its nature, nevertheless according to form it is infinite; for it says no one nature, on account of which it is distributive of every common nature. But a universal is what is in many and of many supposits of its nature; and therefore "every," and "none," and signs of this sort cannot be universals, but are signs designating whether the universal is taken universally or particularly according to its supposits; and these are the words of Avicenna.
In a universal subject the distributive sign must be ordered, because through the division of the subject the predicate is attributed to the parts of the subject, so that through predication they participate in it separately, and it must not be placed in the predicate; because since the predicate is taken formally, it is not properly divided except by the division of another, that is, of the subject, but it is rendered unequally to the subject and to its parts. Hence that which is universal can be predicated, as "every man is an animal"; but a universal taken universally cannot be predicated. For there can be no true affirmation in which predication is made of some universal predicate; for universally in this way it is clear that "every man is every animal" is false, even if it be posited that there is no animal except man. For since man is subjected for the sake of its parts, and predicates are taken formally, it would be necessary that each man be every animal, which is false.
Nevertheless some object and press through this: "no man is no animal"; this is proved by the fact that its contradictory is false, namely this, "not no man is no animal"; for from this follows this, "some man is no animal," which is false and contradictory to the first. But to solve this is not difficult if this proposition, "no man is no animal," is duly ordered in such a way that each negation is referred to the composition thus: "no man is no animal." For this is equivalent to this, "every man is not no animal." And from this follows this, that each man is some animal, which is true; and in this sense its contradictory is false, as is apparent to anyone; and thus it is established that a universal sign must not be put with the predicate.
From all the things which have been brought forward in this chapter, it is apparent that opposition is an attribute of the parts of enunciation: from this it is possible to enunciate according to every mode of opposition, both contradictory and contrary and subcontrary. Now therefore the laws of these oppositions must be given.
### Marginal Labels - 411: Opposition. - 412: What contrary propositions are. - 412: What subcontraries are. - 413: Objection. - 413: Solution.
Notes
- Contradiction is sometimes taken for opposition, and thus the species for the genus; and in this way it is taken here by the Philosopher according to D. Albert. But on the contrary: if this is granted, the same thing would be placed in the definition of itself, for in the expression "opposed" opposition is included. It is answered that here there is no impropriety concerning the same thing taken in diverse ways. But St. Thomas wishes contradiction here to be taken for the determinate species of opposition. Jammy. (Contradictio quandoque capitur pro oppositione, et sic species pro genere: et hoc modo capitur hic a Philosopho secundum D. Albert. Sed contra: hoc dato, idem poneretur in diffinitione sui ipsius; nam in ly oppositae includitur oppositio. Respondetur quod hic non inconvenit de eodem diversimode sumpto. S. Thomas autem vult quod contradictio hic capiatur pro determinata specie oppositionis. JAMMY.) ↩
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