Volume 1 · pp. 341–352
Book on the Six Principles, Tractate IV on When, chapters V-VI; Tractate V on Where, chapters I-V
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aliud est ex praeterito, aliud ex praesenti, aliud ex futuro.
CAPUT V.
De propriis quando quae sunt non suscipere magis vel minus, et non habere contrarium.
Proprium autem quod convenit omni et non soli ejus quod est quando, est quod inest ei quod est quando non suscipere magis et minus, sicut nec tempori convenit magis et minus suscipere. Non enim dies una magis vel minus dicitur dies quam alia, nec una hora magis vel minus tempus quam alia, et sic de aliis. Et similiter est in quando: non enim quando praeteriti dicitur magis vel minus quando, quam praesentis vel futuri: nec tempus mensuratum dicitur secundum magis et minus sicut diurnum, quam alterum: nec unum dicitur diurnius altero. Et similiter autem est de omnibus aliis. Concluditur ergo generaliter, quod omni quando inest non suscipere magis et minus. Et quia non suscipere magis et minus causatur ab eo quod est non habere contrarium, ideo etiam quando nihil habet contrarium. Et hoc est etiam proprium quando quod convenit omni et non soli.
Hoc autem sic probatur: quia unum et idem quando quantum ad substantiam nunc (ex quo relinquitur quando) est ex praesenti, et futuro, et ex praeterito: quia idem quod futurum est, efficitur praesens et praeteritum. Et hoc est propter id quod est substantia temporis, quod idem est toto tempore. De eodem autem indivisibili secundum substantiam est impossibile praedicari duas contrarietates: et cum ipsum praedicetur de se, impossibile quod habeat contrarium quod praedicetur de eodem. Amplius autem contraria in eodem nunquam in simul erunt: unum enim natum est expellere alterum de eodem susceptibili. Quando autem quod est secundum praesens, et quod est secundum praeteritum, et quod est secundum futurum, in eodem in simul erunt: quia, sicut dictum est, quando est non in tempore, sed in re temporali. Et ideo in una et eadem re est quando secundum futurum, et quando secundum praesens, et quando secundum praeteritum: et simul et semel dicitur, quod fuit futurum, et est praesens, et transit in praeteritum. Hoc autem esse non posset si esset unum quando contrarium alteri quando secundum formam et speciem. Idem enim quod est hoc fuisse, verum est quod est permansurum. Contrariorum autem ratio est nunquam in eodem simul existere, neque dici de eodem secundum idem et in eodem tempore: propter quod generaliter concluditur quod contrarietas in hoc genere quod est quando non enuntiabitur.
Marginalia Prima objectio.
Sunt tamen sophistae contra haec quae dicta sunt disputantes, dicentes tempus esse causam corruptionis in omnibus in quibus est. Ubicumque est causa corruptionis (secundum quod corruptio motus est vel mutatio) est magis et minus et contrarium. Videtur ergo quod tempori conveniat magis et minus suscipere et contrarium.
Marginalia Secunda.
Adhuc ad hoc inducunt quod tempus facit distare a principio: distare autem secundum magis et minus: tempus igitur suscipere videtur magis et minus, et per consequens quando videtur magis et minus suscipere.
Marginalia Ad primam.
Ad haec dicendum, quod valde sophistica sunt quae inducuntur: sicut enim probatum est, ita quando nec magis nec minus suscipit nec contrarium habet. Et quando dicitur quod tempus est causa corruptionis, hoc non est verum, nec Aristoteles hoc dicit simpliciter, sed quod est magis causa corruptionis quam generationis: et hoc non per se, sed per motum cujus est mensura.
one is from the past, another from the present, another from the future.
CHAPTER V.
On the properties of when, which are not to receive more or less, and not to have a contrary.
But the property which belongs to every when, but not only to when, is that it belongs to that which is when not to receive more and less, just as it does not belong to time to receive more and less. For one day is not called a day more or less than another, nor is one hour called time more or less than another, and so with the others. And it is similar in when: for the when of the past is not called more or less when than that of the present or of the future; nor is measured time said according to more and less, as daily, more than another; nor is one thing called more daily than another. And likewise it is so with all the others. Therefore it is concluded generally that it belongs to every when not to receive more and less. And because not receiving more and less is caused by not having a contrary, therefore also when has no contrary. And this also is a property of when which belongs to every when and not only to when.
But this is proved as follows: because one and the same when, with respect to the substance of now, from which when is left, is from the present, the future, and the past; because the same thing that is future is made present and past. And this is on account of that which is the substance of time, which is the same in the whole of time. But of the same indivisible thing according to substance it is impossible for two contrarieties to be predicated; and since it is predicated of itself, it is impossible for it to have a contrary that is predicated of the same thing. Further, contraries will never be at once in the same thing; for one is naturally apt to expel the other from the same susceptible thing. But the when which is according to the present, and that which is according to the past, and that which is according to the future, will be at once in the same thing, because, as has been said, when is not in time, but in a temporal thing. And therefore in one and the same thing there is when according to the future, and when according to the present, and when according to the past; and at once and together it is said that it was future, is present, and passes into the past. But this could not be if one when were contrary to another when according to form and species. For the same thing which is this to have been is true as that which is going to remain. But the account of contraries is never to exist in the same thing at once, nor to be said of the same thing according to the same and at the same time; on account of this it is generally concluded that contrariety will not be enunciated in this genus which is when.
Marginalia First objection.
Yet there are sophists disputing against these things that have been said, saying that time is the cause of corruption in all things in which it is. Wherever there is a cause of corruption, according as corruption is motion or change, there are more and less and a contrary. Therefore it seems that it belongs to time to receive more and less and a contrary.
Marginalia Second.
Further, they introduce for this that time makes a thing stand apart from its principle; but to stand apart is according to more and less. Therefore time seems to receive more and less, and consequently when seems to receive more and less.
Marginalia To the first.
To these things one must say that the things introduced are very sophistical. For as has been proved, when receives neither more nor less and has no contrary. And when it is said that time is the cause of corruption, this is not true, nor does Aristotle say this simply, but that it is more the cause of corruption than of generation; and this not through itself, but through motion, of which it is the measure.
Marginalia Ad secundam.
Et similiter etiam per motum est causa distantiae a principio constituentis: et ideo non sequitur quod tempus secundum seipsum suscipiat magis et minus, vel contrarium. Est autem notandum, quod quamvis quando non habeat contrarium, nec suscipiat magis et minus, tamen idem quod est quando, modos suscipit: qui sunt modi quidem contrarii, sicut punctum indivisibile, et idem habet modum inchoantis et modum finientis sive terminantis: praeterito enim et praesentialitas et futuritio sunt modi oppositi: sed in talibus non sunt formae et species contrariae: nec potest esse in talibus magis et ejus quod est quando: nec hic oportet determinare, quia est manifestum ex praeinductis.
Et hoc est quod proprium est ejus quod est quando, relinqui ex adjacentia temporis, et non esse in tempore, sed in re temporali secundum comparationem quam habet ad tempus vel ad temporis differentias. Et tale proprium est etiam quando succedere ad quando, sicut succedit tempus ad tempus, et alia similia his: quae omnia facile est determinare ex praedictis: quando enim, sicut dictum est, non est tempus, sed infectio quaedam vel impressio relicta in eo quod temporale est, secundum quam ad tempus vel ad differentias temporis habet referri. Et ideo conjunctas habent rationes tempus et quando.
CAPUT VI.
De subjecto ejus quod est quando.
Si autem quaeritur, in quo est ut in proprio subjecto? Dicamus quod quando quod ex tempore relinquitur, proprie est in omni eo quod incipit esse. Dico autem incipere esse per naturam sicut incipiunt esse quae generantur vel fiunt per artem vel electionem sive voluntatem; universalia enim suae habent principia inceptionis, sicut privationem et materiam. Quaecumque autem incipiunt quidem, et talia suae inceptionis non habent principia, non oportet quod insit eis quando quod est ex parte: quamvis conveniat eis quando aeternitatis et aeviternitatis per distinctionem accidentalem qua distinguitur ad temporis differentias, sicut in ante habitis dictum est. Talia autem sunt intelligentiae et substantiae corporum caelestium.
Alia vero generabilia et corruptibilia secundum suas substantias et secundum suas actiones et opera quando temporis suscipiunt, eo quod tempore variantur. Cum autem dicit Damascenus quod omne creabile variabile est, et hoc idem dicit Plato, et dicit Boetius quod omne quod est citra primum, est mutabile, non intelligitur de mutabilitate temporis vel quando, sed potius naturae quae causata est, quae ex se non habet unde sit, vel unde stare possit. Sic ergo omne quod incipit, habens suae inceptionis principia, materiam et privationem, recipit in se quando quod relinquitur ex tempore. Tale autem est omne sive universum corpus quod incipit modo praedicto: aliter enim incipiens esse, non habet principia suae inceptionis intra se: et ideo de illis non habet loqui Philosophus: quia Philosophus non determinat aliquid nisi id quod suae determinationis principia habet intra seipsum. Sic igitur universum corpus quod sic recipit, aliquando est, et est in tempore: quod probatur ex hoc, quod temporum suscipit variationem periodi caelestis: hoc enim corpus variatur in aestu aestatis ad calorem, ariditatem, et caliditatem, in vere ad calidum et humidum, et in autumno ad frigidum et siccum: propter quod tunc plantae folio defluunt, et destruuntur in hyeme ad frigidum et humidum 1. Talia enim per generationem incipientia sic secundum tempora alterationes suscipiunt: et ideo de ipsis quando denominative praedicatur.
Marginalia To the second.
And likewise also through motion it is the cause of distance from the constituting principle; and therefore it does not follow that time according to itself receives more and less or a contrary. But it must be noted that although when does not have a contrary, nor receive more and less, nevertheless the same thing which is when receives modes, which indeed are contrary modes, just as an indivisible point, and the same thing has the mode of beginning and the mode of ending or terminating. For pastness, presentness, and futurition are opposed modes; but in such things there are not contrary forms and species. Nor can there be in such things more of that which is when; nor is there need to determine this here, because it is manifest from the things previously introduced.
And this is what is proper to that which is when: to be left from the adjacency of time, and not to be in time, but in a temporal thing according to the comparison which it has to time or to the differences of time. And such a property is also that when succeeds when, just as time succeeds time, and other things similar to these; all of which are easy to determine from the foregoing. For when, as has been said, is not time, but a certain infection or impression left in that which is temporal, according to which it has to be referred to time or to the differences of time. And therefore time and when have conjoined accounts.
CHAPTER VI.
On the subject of that which is when.
But if it is asked in what it is as in its proper subject, let us say that when, which is left from time, is properly in everything that begins to be. But I say to begin to be through nature, as those things begin to be which are generated or are made by art or choice or will; for universals have the principles of their inception, such as privation and matter. But whatever things indeed begin, and do not have such principles of their inception, need not have in them when which is from a part, although the when of eternity and of aeviternity belongs to them through an accidental distinction by which it is distinguished toward the differences of time, as has been said in the foregoing. Such things are intelligences and the substances of the heavenly bodies.
But other generable and corruptible things receive temporal when according to their substances and according to their actions and works, because they are varied by time. But when Damascene says that every creatable thing is variable, and Plato says this same thing, and Boethius says that everything that is below the first is changeable, this is not understood of changeability of time or when, but rather of the nature which has been caused, which from itself does not have whence it may be, or whence it may be able to stand. Thus, therefore, everything that begins, having the principles of its inception, matter and privation, receives in itself the when which is left from time. But every or the whole body that begins in the aforesaid way is such; for if it begins to be otherwise, it does not have the principles of its inception within itself, and therefore the Philosopher does not have to speak about those things, because the Philosopher determines nothing except that which has the principles of its determination within itself. Thus, therefore, the whole body which receives in this way sometimes is, and is in time; this is proved from the fact that it receives the variation of times of the heavenly period. For this body is varied in the heat of summer toward heat, dryness, and hotness; in spring toward the hot and moist; and in autumn toward the cold and dry, on account of which then plants shed their leaves; and they are destroyed in winter toward the cold and moist 1. For such things beginning through generation receive alterations in this way according to times; and therefore when is predicated of them denominatively.
Similiter autem est etiam in anima secundum quod ipsa attingit ad corpus sic incipiens: anima enim, ut dicitur in libro de Causis, est in horizonte aeternitatis et temporis: et ideo in actionibus et passionibus suis attingit tempus, et sic etiam convenit ei quando. Hoc autem patet in animae parte speculativa, quae tamen magis separata videtur esse a corpore, quam pars motiva quae corpore utitur in motu. Secundum enim partem speculativam videmus quod quidam acutius speculantur in vere, sicut melancholici: eo quod tunc spiritus qui deferunt formas speculationis, subtiliantur et mobiles fiunt ex calido, et humectantur ex humido, ut facilius formas recipiant. E contra quidam in hyeme acutius speculantur, et illi sunt cholerici, quibus calor cholerae quando commultiplicatur, commiscet operationes, et siccitas formarum impedit bonam receptionem. Sed in hyeme vincente frigore temperatur calor operationes commiscens, ita ut non commisceat, sed bene moveat. Et humore hyemis inducente phlegma, temperatur siccitas ad bonam susceptionem et bonam retentionem ex naturali siccitate cholerae. Quidam autem in aestate acutius contemplantur, sicut phlegmatici, quorum frigus calido seu calore excellente temperatur ut bene moveat spiritus, et humor multus temperatur sicco ut et bene recipiat ex naturali humido et bene retineat ex temporali sicco. Quidam autem in autumno acutius speculantur, ut sanguinei, quibus calorem sanguinis temperat moderata autumni frigiditas. Humorem autem sanguinis exuberantem ad temperantiam restringit moderata autumni siccitas. Hae autem varietates sunt secundum varietatem instrumenti, hoc est, corporis quo pro instrumento in operationibus suis utitur anima conjuncta corpori. Sequitur enim anima conjuncta corpori, corporis complexiones.
Et ideo qui aridae, sive siccae, sive gelidae, sive frigidae sunt complexionis sive compaginis in corpore, saepe fiunt dementiores seipsis in autumno, ita quod minus valent in operationibus mentis: eo quod tempus autumni multiplicat melancholiam quae spiritus habet obscuros et tacitos, et frigore augetur frigus, ita quod sistit motum spirituum: et siccitas tunc auget siccitatem complexionis ut non sit bonae receptionis. Quibus vero sanguis principatur, in vere sunt seipsis dementiores: quia tunc calor temporis auget calorem complexionis ut minus moveat, et ideo operationes permixtas faciat: et humor temporis auget humorem complexionis ut quidem bene recipiat, sed non bene teneat. Similiter est de aliis: quia phlegmatici in hyeme fiunt dementiores propter duplex frigus temporis et complexionis, quod sistit motum spiritus et inspissat eumdem: et propter duplex humidum quod facit non bene retinere formas. Similiter autem in aliis, dummodo attendatur similitudo complexionis animalium et temporum. Erit ergo in tempore quidquid temporum suscipiens variationes, alteratur secundum temporis aut temporum qualitatem, sive illud sit in corporis complexione vel natura, sive etiam sit in operationibus vel passionibus animae.
TRACTATUS V
DE UBI.
CAPUT I.
Qualiter ubi sit praedicamentum, et quid sit ubi.
Likewise it is also so in the soul insofar as it reaches to a body beginning in this way. For the soul, as is said in the book On Causes, is on the horizon of eternity and time; and therefore in its actions and passions it reaches time, and thus when also belongs to it. This is clear in the speculative part of the soul, which nevertheless seems to be more separated from body than the motive part which uses the body in motion. For according to the speculative part we see that certain people speculate more acutely in spring, such as melancholics, because then the spirits which carry the forms of speculation are made subtle and movable from heat, and are moistened by moisture, so that they may receive forms more easily. Conversely, certain people speculate more acutely in winter, and these are cholerics, for whom, when the heat of choler is multiplied together, it mixes operations, and dryness of forms impedes good reception. But in winter, when cold is overcoming, the heat mixing operations is tempered, so that it does not mix them, but moves well. And when the moisture of winter introduces phlegm, dryness is tempered toward good reception and good retention from the natural dryness of choler. But certain people contemplate more acutely in summer, such as phlegmatics, whose coldness is tempered by outstanding heat or warmth so that it moves the spirits well, and much moisture is tempered by dryness so that it both receives well from natural moisture and retains well from temporal dryness. But certain people speculate more acutely in autumn, such as sanguine people, for whom the moderated coldness of autumn tempers the heat of blood. But the moderated dryness of autumn restrains the overflowing moisture of blood to temperance. These varieties are according to the variety of the instrument, that is, of the body which the soul joined to the body uses as an instrument in its operations. For the soul joined to the body follows the complexions of the body.
And therefore those who are of dry, or parched, or icy, or cold complexion or joining in the body often become more foolish than themselves in autumn, so that they have less strength in the operations of the mind, because the time of autumn multiplies melancholy, which has dark and silent spirits, and cold is increased by cold, so that it stops the motion of the spirits; and dryness then increases the dryness of the complexion so that it is not of good reception. But those in whom blood rules are more foolish than themselves in spring, because then the heat of the time increases the heat of the complexion so that it moves less, and therefore makes mixed operations; and the moisture of the time increases the moisture of the complexion so that it indeed receives well, but does not hold well. Similarly it is with the others, because phlegmatics become more foolish in winter on account of the double cold of time and complexion, which stops the motion of the spirit and thickens it, and on account of the double moisture which makes it not retain forms well. Likewise in the others, provided that the likeness of the complexion of animals and of times is attended to. Therefore whatever receives the variations of times and is altered according to the quality of time or times will be in time, whether that is in the complexion or nature of the body, or whether it is also in the operations or passions of the soul.
TRACTATE V
ON WHERE.
CHAPTER I.
In what way where is a category, and what where is.
Ubi vero quod causatur ab extrinsecus adjacenti, quod adjacet ei, quod non adjacet sine duratione rei, est circumscriptio corporis a loci circumscriptione procedens. Dico autem circumscriptionem corporis esse corporis quidem talem convenientiam secundum quod assignantur contento principium et medium secundum ultimum corporis continentis, ut sicut totum est in toto, ita primum sit in primo, et medium in medio, et extremum in extremo, et indivisibile in indivisibili, et compositum in composito.
Ad hoc autem intelligendum, qualiter sit et qualiter esse dicat id quod est ubi secundum quod est ubi, intelligendum est quod circumscribi est figurari, quod ex toto continetur ad figuram continentis, et e converso. Et ideo est triplex circumscriptio. Est enim circumscriptio corporis continentis, et haec est actio quaedam. Et est circumscriptio circumscripti, et est quaedam passio. Et est circumscriptio procedens et causata ab utraque istarum, et est commensuratio locati ad locum, secundum quam loco in se et in communi vel huic particulari loco comparatur. Et haec circumscriptio est ubi secundum quod est speciale praedicamentum, quia haec est una specierum entis quae est praedicamentum quando sub voce designatur: hoc enim modo omne quod est alicubi, ubi dicitur esse: et hoc esse comparatum sic ad locum in nullo aliorum praedicamentorum ponitur. Sic ergo verum est quod dicitur, quod ubi secundum quod est praedicamentum circumscriptio est a loci circumscriptione et non immediate a loco procedens. Cum igitur de tribus fiat mentio, de loco scilicet, et locato, et de loci circumscriptione, locus quidem secundum subjectum et secundum substantiam est in corpore quod capit, hoc est, quod continet et locat. Est enim ultimum corporis continentis et ambientis in quo capit id quod continet, hoc est, locatum et circumscribit: et ex hoc sequitur, quod in loco est quidquid a loco circumscribitur, ut dictum est. Sicut autem in ante habito tractatu dictum est, non in eodem secundum substantiam et subjectum est locus et ubi: locus enim est in eo quod capit et continet et circumscribit. Ubi vero est in eo quod capitur et continetur et circumscribitur, et ab alio exteriori complectitur.
Locus autem non videtur adesse vel non convenire animae, vel alicui rei incorporeae. Anima enim et aliae substantiae incorporeae nusquam est sicut in loco. Propterea quod nullum locum occupat circumscriptive, ita quod medium ejus sit in medio, et totum in toto. Omne enim quod sic occupando totum in loco toto est, locum sic occupat et implet, quod ipse locus (si est illius rei proprius locus) aliud cum illa re quidem quae eodem modo in eodem loco sit, continere non potest: et sic anima nullum locum occupat, nec implet locum aliquem. Animatum autem plenum anima prout anima est vitae et motus principium localiter potest capere, ut cibum, et potum, et aerem ad spirandum. Anima igitur in ipso corpore non est sicut locatum in loco, sed ipsa anima est in corpore sicut vitae et motus principium: nullo enim modo contingere posset, quod locus impletus aliquo implente ipsum aliud cum illo locatum corpus capere possit et complecti sive continere, nisi id quod prius occupaverat et implebat, prius cedat et aliud locum ejus subintret. Hoc autem patet per exemplum: granum enim modio adveniens ut vasi et loco, nullo modo recipitur in modio sicut in vase et loco, aere qui prius vas implebat in vase quiescente: et sic est de vino, et aqua, et cado, et oleo, et de omnibus aliis hujusmodi similibus: aere enim primo excusso granum et aliud in vase continendum recipitur utique, quia duo corpora in eodem loco esse non possunt. Quia sicut probavimus determinative in quarto Physicorum 2, si duo corpora essent in eodem loco, sequitur de necessitate quod duo corpora essent unum et idem corpus numero. Sed hoc hic supponatur: hoc enim probare est scientiae naturalis.
But where, which is caused by something extrinsically adjacent, which is adjacent to that to which it is not adjacent without the duration of the thing, is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of place. But I say that the circumscription of a body is a certain fittingness of a body, according to which beginning and middle are assigned to the contained thing according to the outermost part of the containing body, so that just as the whole is in the whole, so the first is in the first, the middle in the middle, the extreme in the extreme, the indivisible in the indivisible, and the composite in the composite.
But for understanding this, in what way that which is where is and in what way it says being insofar as it is where, one must understand that to be circumscribed is to be figured, because it is wholly contained according to the figure of the container, and conversely. And therefore there is a threefold circumscription. For there is the circumscription of the containing body, and this is a certain action. And there is the circumscription of the circumscribed thing, and it is a certain passion. And there is a circumscription proceeding and caused by both of these, and it is the commensuration of the located thing to place, according to which it is compared to place in itself and in common, or to this particular place. And this circumscription is where insofar as it is a special category, because this is one of the species of being which is a category when it is designated under a word. For in this way everything that is somewhere is said to be where; and this being compared in this way to place is placed in none of the other categories. Thus, therefore, what is said is true, that where, insofar as it is a category, is circumscription from the circumscription of place and does not proceed immediately from place. Therefore, since mention is made of three things, namely of place, of the located thing, and of the circumscription of place, place indeed according to subject and according to substance is in the body which receives, that is, which contains and locates. For it is the outermost part of the containing and surrounding body in which it receives what it contains, that is, the located thing, and circumscribes it; and from this it follows that whatever is circumscribed by place is in place, as has been said. But as was said in the preceding tractate, place and where are not in the same thing according to substance and subject; for place is in that which receives and contains and circumscribes. But where is in that which is received, contained, and circumscribed, and is embraced by another exterior thing.
But place does not seem to be present to or to belong to the soul, or to some incorporeal thing. For the soul and other incorporeal substances are nowhere as in a place, because they occupy no place circumscriptively, so that their middle is in the middle and the whole in the whole. For everything which is in a whole place by occupying in this way occupies and fills a place in such a way that the place itself, if it is the proper place of that thing, cannot contain another thing together with that thing which is in the same place in the same way; and thus the soul occupies no place and fills no place. But an animated thing filled with soul, insofar as the soul is the principle of life and motion, can receive locally, as food, drink, and air for breathing. Therefore the soul in the body itself is not as the located thing in a place, but the soul itself is in the body as the principle of life and motion. For in no way could it happen that a place filled by something filling it can receive and embrace or contain another located body together with that, unless that which first occupied and filled it first gives way and another enters its place. This is clear by example: for a grain coming into a measure as to a vessel and place is in no way received in the measure as in a vessel and place while the air which first filled the vessel remains at rest in the vessel; and so it is with wine, water, cask, oil, and all other similar things of this sort. For when the air has first been driven out, the grain and another thing to be contained in the vessel is certainly received, because two bodies cannot be in the same place. For as we have proved determinatively in the fourth book of the Physics 2, if two bodies were in the same place, it would follow of necessity that two bodies were one and the same body in number. But let this be supposed here; for to prove this belongs to natural science.
Sicut autem duo corpora non possunt simul esse in eodem loco, ita quidem nec idem corpus potest esse in locis diversis simul actu. Cujus probatio est, quia si est in uno loco ab alio separato, tunc termini illius corporis sunt in loco illo contenti, et nihil de illo est extra ipsum. Si autem hoc esset in loco alio, existerent termini ejus intra locum illum et extra illum: quod est intra unum totum et secundum se intra unum et non intra illud consistere simul et semel, quod est affirmationem et negationem de eodem simul veram esse, quod est impossibile. Ergo et hoc est impossibile, quod idem corpus in diversis locis simul possit existere.
Ex hoc autem sequitur quod anima nullatenus erit localis cum nullum locum occupet et impleat sicut locatum implet et occupat locum. Similiter omnia ea quae a corporis ratione secundum quantitatem (dicendo quod corpus est mensuratum dimensione trina) dissentiunt sive recedunt, sed sicut simplicia et indivisibilia secundum quantitatem diffiniuntur, in nullo sunt sicut in loco: carent enim omnia talia loci circumscriptione: quia non possunt assignari principium et medium et ultimum in loco. Hoc est igitur ubi secundum quod est praedicamentum vel principium.
CAPUT II.
De dubitationibus circa inducta, scilicet quod idem corpus simul possit esse in diversis locis.
Marginalia Dubitatio textus.
Potest autem aliquis movere dubitationem de his quae dicta sunt, quod non potest idem corpus in diversis locis esse simul et semel. Vox enim in auribus diversorum est simul et semel. Vox autem cum sit aer ictus, ut dicit Priscianus, sine aere nunquam et nusquam esse poterit. Ergo nec in auribus est sine aere. Ergo et aer ictus est in auribus diversorum. Cum igitur una vox formetur in aere uno et eodem modo, videbitur unus et idem aer numero esse in auribus diversorum. Aer autem corpus. Idem ergo et unum numero corpus simul et semel videtur esse in locis multis et diversis.
Marginalia Solutio textus.
Ad haec autem solventes dicimus, quod vox omnino una et eadem simul et semel in diversis aeris partibus nec formari, nec esse possit. Si ergo concedamus unam et eamdem vocem numero simul et semel sentiri in auribus diversorum, obligati etiam erimus concedere unam et eamdem particulam aeris in qua vox illa formatur, ad aures diversorum et in locis diversis simul et semel pervenire, et in auribus diversorum esse. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia impossibile est id quod est simpliciter unum et idem corpus numero, posse esse simul et totum in pluribus locis: quia impossibile est ipsum esse alicubi quam ubi est.
Marginalia Ratio quae movet D. Albertum.
Ad hoc deducti sumus, quod de duobus alterum necesse concedere est, scilicet aut quod diversa sunt quae vocante uno aliquo in auribus diversorum sentiuntur, aut quod unum et idem corpus numero in pluribus locis et diversis simul et semel inveniatur. Eligitur autem inter haec duo a quolibet recte philosophante, quod diversa sunt quae sentiuntur a diversis, et sunt diversa numero, non figura vocis et specie, nec diversa accentu sicut acumine vocis vel grossitie, sed sunt diversa numero ad unam figuram vocis quae primi vocantis vox figurata formata et uno acumine et grossitie generata, et hoc imaginabiliter et similiter unam vocem ab illa generari ad primae vocis imaginem et similitudinem: et sic diversa sunt quae sic sentiuntur, quorum tamen quodlibet sentitur imagine et similitudine vocis quae primi vocantis est: propter quod idem in auribus non sentitur.
But just as two bodies cannot be at once in the same place, so indeed the same body also cannot actually be in diverse places at the same time. The proof of this is that if it is in one place separated from another, then the termini of that body are contained in that place, and nothing of it is outside that place. But if this were in another place, its termini would exist inside that place and outside it; and this is for something to stand at once and together within one whole and, according to itself, within one and not within it, which is for affirmation and negation to be true at once of the same thing, which is impossible. Therefore this also is impossible, that the same body can exist at once in diverse places.
But from this it follows that the soul will in no way be local, since it occupies and fills no place as a located thing fills and occupies a place. Likewise all those things which dissent from or recede from the account of body according to quantity, by saying that body is measured by threefold dimension, but are defined as simple and indivisible according to quantity, are in nothing as in a place; for all such things lack the circumscription of place, because beginning, middle, and outermost cannot be assigned in place. Therefore this is where insofar as it is a category or principle.
CHAPTER II.
On the difficulties concerning the things introduced, namely that the same body could be at once in diverse places.
Marginalia Difficulty of the text.
But someone can raise a difficulty about the things that have been said, that the same body cannot be in diverse places at once and together. For voice is in the ears of diverse people at once and together. But since voice is struck air, as Priscian says, it will never and nowhere be able to exist without air. Therefore it is not in ears without air. Therefore struck air too is in the ears of diverse people. Therefore, since one voice is formed in one air and in the same way, one and the same air in number will seem to be in the ears of diverse people. But air is a body. Therefore the same and one body in number seems at once and together to be in many and diverse places.
Marginalia Solution of the text.
But in solving these points we say that one and entirely the same voice cannot at once and together either be formed or exist in diverse parts of air. Therefore if we grant that one and the same voice in number is sensed at once and together in the ears of diverse people, we will also be obligated to grant that one and the same particle of air in which that voice is formed reaches the ears of diverse people at once and together and in diverse places, and exists in the ears of diverse people. But this is impossible, because it is impossible for that which is simply one and the same body in number to be able to be at once and wholly in several places, because it is impossible for it to be somewhere other than where it is.
Marginalia Reason which moves D. Albert.
We have been led to this, that one of two things must be conceded, namely either that the things sensed in the ears of diverse people when some one person calls out are diverse, or that one and the same body in number is found at once and together in several and diverse places. But between these two, anyone philosophizing rightly chooses that the things sensed by diverse people are diverse, and are diverse in number, not in the figure and species of voice, nor diverse in accent such as in the sharpness or heaviness of voice, but they are diverse in number in relation to one figure of voice which is the formed voice of the first caller, shaped and generated with one sharpness and heaviness; and this is imaginably and similarly for one voice to be generated from that one according to the image and likeness of the first voice. And thus the things sensed in this way are diverse, although any one of them is sensed by an image and likeness of the voice which belongs to the first caller; on account of which the same thing is not sensed in the ears.
Marginalia Objectio textus.
Ex hoc autem sequitur, quod secunda et tertia, et sic deinceps vox in aere imaginatur, et similiter formata a voce primi vocantis non est immediate vox animalis ab ipso vocante animali formata: eo quod ab animali immediate non profertur: et sic sequitur, quod aliqua vox sit quae non sit animalis vox: quod est contrarium his quae in libro de Anima 3 tractantur, ubi dicitur, quod vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, etc.
Marginalia Solutio textus.
Ad hoc autem dicimus quod omnis vox est animalis vocantis: nec aliquis ab initio audivit unquam vocem cum omnia silerent animalia sive in animalium silentio: propter quod et animalis esse dicitur omnis vox, eo quod omnis vox generatur proferente et vocante aliquo animali. Originaliter autem et causaliter omnis vox quae auditur a pluribus, est animalis, et una similitudine et figura et accentu. Substantialiter autem per substantiam materiae in qua formatur, plures sunt voces formatae in omni circumciso aere. Et sic uniuscujusque animalis vox ad aures diversorum dirigitur, quae originaliter unius est, sed non contingens, sed est potius impossibile, quod una numero vox sit simul in auribus diversorum: et haec est solutio dubitationis.
Est tamen hic attendendum quod quaedam sunt in loco per se, et quaedam per aliud vel per accidens. Per se enim sunt in loco ea quae a loco in principium, medium, et ultimum, secundum loci particulas describuntur. Et haec sunt corpora in exterioribus suis continente indigentia secundum naturam, quorum motus est ad locum sicut ad generans et salvans. Per accidens autem et per aliud sunt in loco quaecumque non sunt ita circumscriptibilia, vel sunt in his, vel sunt eorum quae sic circumscribuntur per locum a circumferentibus, sicut anima et accidentia corporis. Anima enim non est in corpore sicut in loco, sed sicut principium vitae et motus. Et ideo corpus non determinatur ei sicut locus: et ideo neque est in eo sicut ubique in ipso, nec sicut ipso alicubi existens, sed est in ipso sicut in eo quo operatur operatione essentiali operationes principii vitae et motus, et secundum hoc est in toto tota. Est autem vivere multiplex, scilicet vegetari, loco moveri, sentire, et intelligere: qui sunt actus spiritualis vitae, qui fiunt spiritualibus potentiis et organis: et secundum hoc non est in toto tota, sed in uno est membro quoad unum, et in altero quoad alterum. Sic ergo anima non est in loco nisi per accidens et per aliud: quia scilicet corpus est in loco in quo ipsa est non sicut in loco, sed sicut in eo quod vivificat et movet.
Accidentia enim corporis per accidens sunt in loco et in loco per accidens secundum magis et minus: per accidens enim sicut quaedam accidentia situalia, ut linea, superficies, et generaliter quantitas, et qualitas situalis, ut albedo, sapor, et odor, et hujusmodi quae in magno sunt majora, et in parvo minora, et haec minus per accidens sunt in loco quam ea quae situalia non sunt, ut scientia, virtus, et hujusmodi.
Marginalia Objection of the text.
But from this it follows that the second and third voice, and so successively, is imaged in the air, and being similarly formed by the voice of the first caller is not immediately an animal voice formed by the calling animal itself, because it is not immediately uttered by the animal. And thus it follows that there is some voice which is not an animal voice, which is contrary to the things treated in the book On the Soul 3, where it is said that voice is sound uttered from the mouth of an animal, and so on.
Marginalia Solution of the text.
But to this we say that every voice belongs to the calling animal; nor has anyone from the beginning ever heard a voice when all animals were silent, or in the silence of animals. On this account every voice is said to be animal, because every voice is generated by some animal uttering and calling. But originally and causally every voice which is heard by many is animal and is one in likeness, figure, and accent. But substantially, through the substance of the matter in which it is formed, there are several voices formed in every delimited air. And thus the voice of each animal is directed to the ears of diverse people, which originally is of one thing; but it is not contingent, indeed it is rather impossible, that one voice in number be at once in the ears of diverse people; and this is the solution of the difficulty.
Yet here it must be attended that certain things are in place through themselves, and certain things through another or accidentally. For those things are in place through themselves which are described by place into beginning, middle, and outermost according to the particles of place. And these are bodies needing a container in their exteriors according to nature, whose motion is toward place as toward what generates and preserves. But accidentally and through another, whatever things are not circumscribable in that way are in place, or are in those things, or are of those things which are thus circumscribed by place from surrounding things, such as the soul and accidents of body. For the soul is not in body as in a place, but as the principle of life and motion. And therefore the body is not determined for it as place; and therefore it is neither in it as everywhere in it, nor as existing somewhere by it, but it is in it as in that in which it operates the essential operations of the principle of life and motion, and according to this it is whole in the whole. But to live is multiple, namely to vegetate, to be moved locally, to sense, and to understand; these are acts of spiritual life, which occur by spiritual powers and organs; and according to this it is not whole in the whole, but it is in one member with respect to one thing, and in another with respect to another. Thus, therefore, the soul is not in place except accidentally and through another, namely because the body is in the place in which the soul itself is, not as in a place, but as in that which it vivifies and moves.
For accidents of body are accidentally in place, and in place accidentally according to more and less. For certain accidents are accidental as situational, such as line, surface, and generally quantity, and situational quality, such as whiteness, taste, odor, and things of this sort, which are greater in a great thing and lesser in a small thing; and these are less accidentally in place than those which are not situational, such as knowledge, virtue, and things of this sort.
Eorum autem quae sunt per accidens in loco, sicut species visibilium quae sunt in aere, non sicut in loco, sed potius sunt in ipso sicut medio deferente. Et quia aer deferens est in loco, ideo etiam ista per accidens dicuntur esse in loco. Et quia aer deferens simul videtur esse in oculis multorum loco distantium, ideo eadem quaestio est de visis in diversis locis et in diversis oculis, quae est de auditis in auribus diversorum. Et quamvis visibile sit in aere perspicuo secundum esse spirituale, sonus autem secundum esse plus materiale, tamen secundum esse spirituale non potest unum et idem terminatum simul esse in diversis locis, nisi illud sit in diversis locis, in quo est sive secundum esse materiale sive secundum spirituale.
Marginalia Solutio quaestionis de visibili.
Sensibile enim non est substantia ut per se existere possit: sed semper oportet quod sit in aliquo sicut in subjecto. Et ideo oportet illud dubitabile solvere sicut prius, quod unum scilicet generatur ab alio ad imaginem et similitudinem ipsius: et sic originaliter est unum, materialiter autem multa, quod est in sensibus diversorum. Talia autem sunt in loco per accidens, et ideo diversificantur per materiam quando sunt in locis diversis.
Joannes autem Damascenus dicit quaedam esse in loco diffinitive: et haec quidem essentialiter non sunt in loco, sed quantum est de se sunt ubique et semper: quia nullum locum neque aliquam differentiam temporis in suo esse determinant, sicut intelligentiae, et substantiae quae dicuntur Angeli, quae quamvis ex se sibi locum non determinent, tamen per materiam circa quam operantur, ad locum referuntur. Sunt enim essentialiter ibi ubi operantur, sive sensibiliter, sive intellectualiter, sive spiritualiter operentur. Et quia haec in loco sunt gratia alterius, ideo per aliud referuntur ad locum: per aliud autem referri vocat Aristoteles per accidens. Sunt etiam in loco quae nullo istorum modorum sunt in loco, sed sunt in aliquo eorum ad quae referuntur loci principia, sicut punctum, et superficies, et linea sunt in loco. Sunt enim principia copulationis dimensionum loci ad dimensiones locati: eo quod dictum est in praedicamentis, quod particulae loci copulantur ad eumdem communem terminum ad quem et particulae locati copulantur, eo quod una numero est distantia loci et locati. His itaque modis aliquid dicitur esse in loco. Non autem hic distinguimus omnes modos quibus aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo: quia hoc magis pertinet ad quartum Physicorum, et non ad logicum.
Marginalia Quid sit per se in loco.
Sed ex dictis patet, quod aliquid per se et proprie dicitur esse in loco, quod sic refertur ad locum, quod indivisibile quo copulatur locus, sicut punctum, refertur ad indivisibile quo copulatur locatum, et longitudo loci ad longitudinem locati, et latitudo loci ad latitudinem locati, et profundum unius ad profundum alterius. Et haec circumscriptio active in loco est, vel sicut in forma: potest autem sumi sicut in formato in locato: et sic secundum eumdem comparabile est locatum ad locum. Et hanc comparationem dicit ubi secundum quod est praedicamentum.
But of those things which are accidentally in place, such as species of visible things which are in air, not as in place but rather in it as in a carrying medium. And because the carrying air is in place, therefore these also are said accidentally to be in place. And because the carrying air seems to be at once in the eyes of many people distant in place, the same question concerns things seen in diverse places and in diverse eyes as concerns things heard in the ears of diverse people. And although the visible is in transparent air according to spiritual being, but sound according to being more material, nevertheless according to spiritual being one and the same terminated thing cannot simultaneously be in diverse places, unless that in which it is, whether according to material being or according to spiritual being, is in diverse places.
Marginalia Solution of the question about the visible.
For the sensible is not a substance such that it can exist through itself; rather it must always be in something as in a subject. And therefore that doubtful point must be solved as before, namely that one thing is generated by another according to the image and likeness of it; and thus originally it is one, but materially it is many, which is in the senses of diverse people. But such things are in place accidentally, and therefore they are diversified by matter when they are in diverse places.
But John Damascene says that certain things are in place definitively; and these indeed are not essentially in place, but as much as belongs to them they are everywhere and always, because they determine no place nor any difference of time in their being, such as the intelligences and the substances which are called angels. Although these do not determine place for themselves from themselves, nevertheless through the matter around which they operate they are referred to place. For they are essentially there where they operate, whether they operate sensibly, intellectually, or spiritually. And because these are in place for the sake of another, therefore they are referred to place through another; but Aristotle calls to be referred through another to be referred accidentally. There are also things in place which are in place by none of these modes, but are in something of those to which the principles of place are referred, as point, surface, and line are in place. For they are principles of the joining of the dimensions of place to the dimensions of the located thing, because it was said in the Categories that the particles of place are joined to the same common terminus to which also the particles of the located thing are joined, because the distance of place and of the located thing is one in number. Therefore in these ways something is said to be in place. But here we do not distinguish all the modes by which something is said to be in something, because this belongs more to the fourth book of the Physics and not to the logician.
Marginalia What it is to be per se in place.
But from the things said it is clear that something is said to be in place through itself and properly when it is referred to place in such a way that the indivisible by which place is joined, such as point, is referred to the indivisible by which the located thing is joined, and the length of place to the length of the located thing, and the breadth of place to the breadth of the located thing, and the depth of one to the depth of the other. And this circumscription is actively in place, or as in a form. But it can be taken as in the thing formed, in the located thing; and thus according to the same thing the located thing is comparable to place. And where, insofar as it is a category, says this comparison.
Et sic potest quilibet advertere qualiter particulae essentiales corporis quanti locati copulantur particulis loci: puncta enim locati aptantur punctis loci, et linea lineis, et superficies superficiebus, et profunda profundis, et ut breviter dicatur, dimensiones dimensionibus, et diametri diametris. Et ex hoc patet quod duo corpora simul in eodem loco esse non possunt: quia sequitur, quod puncta et dimensiones duorum corporum efficerentur essentialiter eaedem, et sic duo corpora essent essentialiter unum corpus, quod est impossibile. Hoc autem demonstrari habet in quarto Physicorum 4. Eorum etiam quae sunt in loco per se multi sunt modi, ut in sufficientia dicit Avicenna, de quibus nos in sequentibus faciemus mentionem quantum ad praesentem spectat intentionem: eo quod eorum subtilis tractatus pertinet ad scientiam physicorum.
CAPUT III.
De divisione ejus quod est ubi, in ubi simplex et compositum.
Dividitur autem sic ubi, quod aliquod est ubi simplex, et aliud compositum. Simplex ubi est quod a simplici loco procedit, sicut est punctum simplex, linea autem et superficies quo simplicia et quo composita, trina autem dimensio simpliciter composita est. Compositum autem ubi est quod procedit a loco composito: ex quo enim ubi est circumscriptio procedens a loci circumscriptione, consequens est quod a simplici loco procedat simplex ubi, et a composito loco procedat ubi compositum. Quia vero jam in Praedicamentis ostensum est quod locus est quantitas, et nulla quantitas ita simplex est, quod non habeat quantitativas partes, ideo oportet nos determinare quid locum simplicem appellamus.
Marginalia Malus intellectus quorumdam.
Non enim hic est male intelligendum, sicut quidam male dicunt, quod locus simplex dicitur non simplex, sed quoad nos qui secundum sensum est indivisibilis a nobis. Hoc nihil est dictum in logicis nisi secundum intellectum simpliciter accedere 5. Sed dicitur quod locus simplex est origo et constitutio ejus quod est de numero continuorum. Constat autem ex his quae de quantitate in Praedicamentis dicta sunt, quod origo omnium continuorum est indivisibile simplex. Locus ergo indivisibilis simplex est indivisibile simplex, quod est origo et constitutio continuitatis loci secundum quod est quantitas. Hoc autem indivisibile dicitur locus indivisibilis: quia satis diximus quando locatum egreditur a loco ad locum, non refertur ad locum nisi quia particulae ejus ad loci terminum copulantur: et secundum hoc indivisibile locati refertur ad loci indivisibile, et divisibile locati ad loci divisibile. Locus enim compositus et totus, ut dictum est in Praedicamentis, habet particulas ad eumdem terminum copulatas, ad quem et particulae corporis locati conjunguntur sive copulantur. Et hujus causa est, quia una numero est distantia loci et locati. Hic autem terminus copulationis est punctum. Loci igitur partes copulatae juxta punctum vel in puncto necesse est fieri vel copulari. Erit itaque locus simplex, in quo punctum adjacens puncto locati adjacere constabit.
Marginalia Objectio.
Si autem aliquis objiciat quod Aristoteles non dicit punctum esse in loco: et si in loco esse diceretur, non differret locus puncti ab ipso puncto.
And thus anyone can notice in what way the essential particles of the quantified located body are joined to the particles of place: for the points of the located thing are fitted to the points of place, and line to lines, surfaces to surfaces, depths to depths, and, to speak briefly, dimensions to dimensions and diameters to diameters. And from this it is clear that two bodies cannot be at once in the same place, because it would follow that the points and dimensions of two bodies would be made essentially the same, and thus two bodies would essentially be one body, which is impossible. But this must be demonstrated in the fourth book of the Physics 4. There are also many modes of those things which are in place through themselves, as Avicenna says in the Sufficiency, concerning which we shall make mention in what follows as much as pertains to the present intention, because the subtle treatment of them belongs to the science of the physicists.
CHAPTER III.
On the division of that which is where into simple and composite where.
But where is divided thus, that one where is simple and another composite. Simple where is what proceeds from simple place, as a point is simple, but line and surface are both simple in one way and composite in another, while threefold dimension is simply composite. But composite where is what proceeds from composite place. For since where is circumscription proceeding from the circumscription of place, it follows that simple where proceeds from simple place, and composite where proceeds from composite place. But because it has already been shown in the Categories that place is quantity, and no quantity is so simple that it does not have quantitative parts, therefore we must determine what we call simple place.
Marginalia Bad understanding of certain men.
For this must not be badly understood here, as certain people badly say, that place is called simple not simply, but with respect to us, which according to sense is indivisible by us. This is nothing said in logical matters except to approach simply according to understanding 5. But it is said that simple place is the origin and constitution of that which is of the number of continuous things. But it is established from the things that have been said about quantity in the Categories that the origin of all continuous things is the simple indivisible. Therefore simple indivisible place is the simple indivisible, which is the origin and constitution of the continuity of place insofar as it is quantity. But this indivisible is called indivisible place because we have said enough that when the located thing goes out from place to place, it is not referred to place except because its particles are joined to the terminus of place. And according to this the indivisible of the located thing is referred to the indivisible of place, and the divisible of the located thing to the divisible of place. For composite and whole place, as was said in the Categories, has particles joined to the same terminus to which also the particles of the located body are joined. And the cause of this is that the distance of place and of the located thing is one in number. But this terminus of joining is a point. Therefore the parts of place, joined next to a point or in a point, must necessarily come to be or be joined. And thus there will be simple place, in which it will be established that the point adjacent to the point of the located thing is adjacent.
Marginalia Objection.
But if someone objects that Aristotle does not say that a point is in place, and that if it were said to be in place, the place of the point would not differ from the point itself,
Marginalia Solutio.
Dicitur quod non dicitur punctum esse in loco per se ut contentum: sed est in loco ut ad quem ut ad loci punctum contenti in loco referatur, et quoad hoc dicitur locus, ut patet ex ante habitis, et quia ad aliud non possunt loci particulae et locati copulari nisi ad punctum loci. Ad dictum etiam Aristotelis dicendum quod punctum non est in loco per se: et si per se esset in loco, tunc sequeretur quod idem esset punctum et locus puncti. Nos autem dicimus quod non est in loco nisi secundum quod refertur ad copulationem particularum loci et locati: et sic dicitur locus simplex, et non quod locus simplex per se sit, locus enim simplex non est, sed est oppositio in adjecto et privat rationem loci. Et ideo locus simplex est locus secundum aliquid, quia scilicet ad loci et locati refertur copulationem.
Manifestum autem est ex inductis, quod loci particulae non tantum quantitativae, sed etiam essentiales prout est quantitas, ut punctum, et linea, et superficies, claudunt, et continent, et terminant. Et sic loca simplicia punctualia vel linealia vel superficialia, sunt occupativa et contentiva et terminativa ejus quod est minimum et simplex corporis contenti et locati. Sic enim punctum ad punctum, et linea ad lineam, et superficies refertur ad superficiem, et profundum ad profundum, et diameter ad diametrum, et sic de aliis. Et haec quidem secundum distantiam loci et locati eadem sunt substantialiter, relata autem ad continens et contentum differentiam habent loci et locati. Ex his autem omnibus concluditur, quod locus non potest esse sine corpore: oportet enim quod superficies alicujus corporis ultimum sit. Et quia non potest esse vacuum, oportet quod alicujus sit sicut contenti in ipso sicut in loco. Et similiter soliditas corporea videtur non posse esse sine loco, hoc est, quin sit in aliquo sicut in loco.
Marginalia Objectio sophistica.
Et hoc sophistice quidam improbare videntur, dicentes quod omne terminatum in figura et quantitate est terminatum ad aliquid in quo finis est suae terminationis: in nullo autem quod in mundo est, finis potest esse suae terminationis: quia si intra est, essentiale est, et in ipso est esse suum: finis autem sive terminus est in quo nihil est de esse vel natura rei: oportet igitur quod terminet ad aliquid extra, et illud iterum ad aliud, et sic in infinitum, et sic infinitos mundos dixerunt extra caelum esse. Hoc autem non concordat dictis Peripateticorum. Et ideo dicendum quod non omne terminatum terminatur ad extra, sed ultimum non habet terminum nisi superficiem quae est terminus intra. Et quod ante dicitur, quod terminus intra est in quo non deficit esse terminati, Dicendum quod non oportet quod in ipso esse deficiat, sed quod deficiat ad ipsum, ita quod ultra ipsum nihil sit de esse, et ideo in ultima superficie est terminus et esse et loci.
Marginalia Solutio.
Haec autem omnia probantur primo de Caelo et Mundo, et requiruntur: quia ad scientiam istam non requiritur nisi scire quod ita sit: ex naturalibus autem pendet probatio illorum. Nos autem propter facilem doctrinam istorum adhuc dicemus de istis quae multipliciter sunt in loco, et quae per se et naturaliter sunt in loco, sicut diximus. Adhuc etiam quodammodo datur locus: et per omnia ista adhuc de loco quaedam sunt inquirenda dubitabilia ex quibus faciliter intelliguntur quae dicta sunt.
Marginalia Solution.
it is said that the point is not said to be in place through itself as contained, but is in place as that to which, as to the point of place, the contained thing in place is referred; and in this respect it is called place, as is clear from the foregoing, and because the particles of place and of the located thing cannot be joined to anything else except to the point of place. To the saying of Aristotle also one must say that the point is not in place through itself; and if it were in place through itself, then it would follow that the point and the place of the point were the same. But we say that it is not in place except according as it is referred to the joining of the particles of place and of the located thing; and thus it is called simple place, and not because simple place exists through itself, for simple place does not exist, but is an opposition in the adjective and deprives the account of place. And therefore simple place is place according to something, because namely it is referred to the joining of place and of the located thing.
But it is manifest from the things introduced that the particles of place, not only quantitative but also essential insofar as place is quantity, such as point, line, and surface, enclose, contain, and terminate. And thus simple punctual, linear, or superficial places occupy, contain, and terminate that which is the minimum and simple part of the contained and located body. For thus point is referred to point, line to line, surface to surface, depth to depth, diameter to diameter, and so with the others. And these, indeed, according to the distance of place and located thing, are substantially the same; but related to container and contained they have the difference of place and located thing. From all these things it is concluded that place cannot exist without body, for the surface of some body must be the outermost part. And because there cannot be a vacuum, it must belong to something as contained in it as in a place. And likewise corporeal solidity seems unable to exist without place, that is, without being in something as in a place.
Marginalia Sophistical objection.
And certain people seem to reject this sophistically, saying that everything terminated in figure and quantity is terminated at something in which the end of its termination is. But in nothing that is in the world can there be the end of its termination, because if it is within, it is essential, and its being is in it; but the end or terminus is that in which there is nothing of the being or nature of the thing. Therefore it must be terminated at something outside, and that again at another, and so to infinity; and thus they said that there are infinite worlds outside heaven. But this does not agree with the sayings of the Peripatetics. And therefore one must say that not everything terminated is terminated at what is outside; rather the outermost thing has no terminus except the surface which is the terminus within. And concerning what is said before, that the terminus within is that in which the being of the terminated thing does not fail, one must say that it is not necessary that being fail in it, but that it fail at it, so that beyond it there is nothing of being; and therefore in the outermost surface there is the terminus both of being and of place.
Marginalia Solution.
But all these things are proved and required in the first book On the Heavens and the World, because for this science it is required only to know that it is so; but the proof of those things depends on natural matters. But for the easy teaching of these things we shall still speak about those things which are in place in many ways, and those which are in place through themselves and naturally, as we have said. Further, place is also given in a certain way; and through all these, certain doubtful matters about place must still be investigated, from which the things that have been said are more easily understood.
CAPUT IV.
Utrum primum caelum sit in loco et qualiter diversimode sit in loco.
Marginalia Quaestio.
Cum autem dictum sit quod locus et ubi semper sunt in diversis, locus enim semper est in locante corpore, ubi autem in locato, oritur hic contentio de ultima in ascendendo sphaera, quae eadem prima est in descendendo, utrum ipsa in locante sit aliquo, vel non? Locus enim semper est in locantis corpore. Si enim non est in loco, tunc non est etiam in ubi: et si non est in ubi, tunc videtur sequi quod non moveatur in ubi et secundum locum, et hoc est contra omnes Philosophos. Si autem in loco esse dicatur ut ubi, sic videtur esse falsum: quia locus est superficies exterioris corporis quae est extra locatum: sed nihil videtur esse extra superficiem ultimae sphaerae, cum ipsa ultimus sit terminus omnium. Si dicatur quod ipsa superficies locati locus sit, hoc stare non poterit: quia jam determinatur quod locus et locatum semper diversa sunt et diversorum, et ideo superficies locati, cum ipsius locati sit, non potest esse locus, sed quoddam locati vel locatum. Confitentibus igitur aliquibus sphaeram ultimam localem esse, procul dubio confitendum est et confiteri oportet, quod ultimam sphaeram sit aliud corpus circumdans, quod ultra sphaeram locum contineat. Sed constat, quod ultra ultimam sphaeram nihil aliud est nisi praeter ipsam sphaeram et diversum ab ipsa. Oportet ergo dicere, quod ultima sphaera in alio sicut in loco non est. Extremitas ergo ultimae sphaerae non est in loco neque localis.
Et dicunt quidam extremam superficiem et locum corporis caelestis superficiem esse, et ipsam in loco non esse, quod est contra omnia quae dicta sunt: quia tunc locus est aliquid locati, cum locatum moveatur ad locum, commovebitur ad aliquid quod intra se habet, quod est impossibile et contra naturam 6. Et ideo dicunt quidam, quod hujusmodi insolitum est, et occultum est nuntiare aliquid certum de istis, cum ista propter elongationem nobis sint insensibilia.
Sciendum autem de istis, quod ea quae sunt in loco, multipliciter sunt in loco. Quaedam enim sunt in loco sicut in generante et salvante: et quia a generante et salvante motus est localis, ideo talia moventur ad locum, et sic in loco sunt mobilia motu recto, quae indigent continenti exteriori ut salventur, et sic elementa et elementata mobilia motu recto sunt in loco. Alio modo sunt in loco quaecumque sunt ut locus et vas continens et salvans quae sunt contenta ab ipso per virtutem salvantis primi, et sic sunt in loco quaecumque salvant, ut incorruptibilia existentia et in se omnia alia continentia, et sic est in loco totum corpus caeleste, quod in se salvativum est omnium aliorum, et ideo movetur circa locum. In his autem quae primo modo sunt in loco, duo sunt motus. Unus quidem ad substantiam salvantis, qui est motus a medio. Alius autem ad virtutem salvantis, qui est motus ad medium: virtus enim sphaerae caelestis non congregatur nisi in medio quod est centrum sphaerae caelestis. His itaque duobus modis sunt in loco, quaecumque moventur ad locum vel in loco. Eorum autem quae sunt in loco sicut salvantia et circumdantia, quaedam sunt sicut salvans per se, sicut prima sive ultima sphaera: quaedam autem sunt locus ut vas salvans et non per se sed per aliud, sicut sphaerae inferiores, quae habent alias extrinsecus circumdantes.
CHAPTER IV.
Whether the first heaven is in place and in what way it is in place in diverse ways.
Marginalia Question.
But since it has been said that place and where are always in diverse things, for place is always in the locating body, but where in the located thing, a dispute arises here about the last sphere in ascending, which is the same as the first in descending, whether it is in some locating thing or not. For place is always in the body of the thing locating. For if it is not in place, then it is not in where either; and if it is not in where, then it seems to follow that it is not moved in where and according to place, and this is against all the Philosophers. But if it is said to be in place as where, thus it seems to be false, because place is the surface of the exterior body which is outside the located thing. But nothing seems to be outside the surface of the last sphere, since it is the last terminus of all things. If it is said that the surface itself of the located thing is place, this will not be able to stand, because it has already been determined that place and located thing are always diverse and of diverse things; and therefore the surface of the located thing, since it belongs to the located thing itself, cannot be place, but is something of the located thing or a located thing. Therefore, if some confess that the last sphere is local, without doubt it must be confessed and one must confess that the last sphere has another surrounding body which contains place beyond the sphere. But it is established that beyond the last sphere there is nothing else except the sphere itself and something diverse from it. Therefore one must say that the last sphere is not in another as in a place. Therefore the extremity of the last sphere is not in place nor local.
And certain people say that the extreme surface and the place of the heavenly body are the surface, and that it itself is not in place. This is against all the things that have been said, because then place is something of the located thing, and since the located thing is moved to place, it will be moved together toward something that it has within itself, which is impossible and against nature 6. And therefore certain people say that something of this sort is unusual, and that to announce anything certain about these things is hidden, since on account of distance these things are insensible to us.
But one must know about these matters that the things which are in place are in place in many ways. For certain things are in place as in something generating and preserving; and because local motion is from what generates and preserves, therefore such things are moved to place, and thus those things are movable in place by rectilinear motion which need an exterior container so that they may be preserved, and thus the elements and things composed of elements, movable by rectilinear motion, are in place. In another way, whatever things are as place and a vessel containing and preserving the things which are contained by it through the virtue of the first preserving thing are in place; and thus whatever things preserve are in place, as incorruptible existing things and things containing all other things in themselves; and thus the whole heavenly body is in place, which in itself is preservative of all other things, and therefore is moved about place. But in those things which are in place in the first way, there are two motions: one toward the substance of the preserving thing, which is motion from the middle; the other toward the virtue of the preserving thing, which is motion to the middle, for the virtue of the heavenly sphere is not gathered except in the middle which is the center of the heavenly sphere. Therefore in these two ways whatever things are moved to place or in place are in place. But of those things which are in place as preserving and surrounding, certain things are as preserving through themselves, such as the first or last sphere; but certain things are place as a preserving vessel, and not through themselves but through another, such as the lower spheres, which have other things surrounding them extrinsically.
Secundum hoc ergo dicendum, quod prima sphaera est in loco ut primus locus et vas, et hoc est in loco, quia refertur ad locum, hoc est, ad loci distantiam sicut primum salvativum et omnium generativum secundum formam, et non sic refertur ad locum sicut habens extrinsecus circumdans, virtute cujus sit salvativum et generativum. Et haec est vera solutio hujus quaestionis.
Marginalia Objectio.
Ad hoc autem quod objicitur, quod locus et ubi sunt in alio et in alio,
Marginalia Solutio.
Dicendum quod hoc intelligendum est de his quae sunt in loco sicut salvante et continente: in his enim salvans et continens non possunt esse idem cum salvato et contento. In his autem quae sunt in loco, hoc est, referuntur ad locum sicut salvantia et continentia, non est generaliter verum, sed est verum in his quae salvant et continent non per seipsa: in his autem quae per seipsa ita non est verum, sed etiam sunt locus plus quam locatum, et ut locus quidem ad rationem loci referuntur.
Marginalia Objectio.
Ad hoc autem quod objicitur ita moveri in loco vel secundum locum,
Marginalia Solutio.
Dicendum quod verum est, sed aliud est moveri in loco, vel secundum locum, aliud est moveri ad locum. Haec enim vel ideo moventur, quia moventur in loci distantia undique aequaliter circa medium: vel moventur secundum locum, quia moventur secundum loci differentias et situs, quae sunt ante et retro secundum situm polorum, et a dextro et sinistro secundum distantiam Orientis et Occidentis, et hujusmodi. Non autem moventur sic in loco, quod ad locum aliquem moveantur. His itaque modis sunt in loco, quaecumque per se in loco esse dicuntur. Nec oportet quod prima sphaera quae per se habet loci rationem et non locati, habeat extra se continens in quo sit sicut in loco continentis: nec propter hoc ibitur in infinitum, quia statur in prima sphaera quae per se continet et salvat.
CAPUT V.
De proprietatibus ubi, quae sunt non suscipere magis et minus et non habere contrarium.
Caret autem ubi intensione et remissione, ita quod non dicitur secundum magis et minus. Et hoc probatur ex hoc quod non dicimus inter ea quae in loco sunt, alterum altero magis esse in loco: non enim magis est in loco quod est sursum, quam quod deorsum: nec magis est in loco quod movetur circulariter, quam id quod movetur motu recto. Sed aliter et aliter dicitur esse in loco non secundum magis et minus. Quamvis ergo unum secundum quantitatem majorem locum possideat quam reliquum, non tamen magis est in loco unum quam alterum: quanto enim aliquid magis fuerit formale quam alterum, ut superiora quam inferiora, tanto possidet majorem locum, sicut aqua excedit quam terra, et aer quam aqua, et ignis quam aer, et caelum maximum obtinet locum: magis enim et minus secundum intensionem et remissionem dictum, non dicitur secundum ubi vel secundum aliquam quantitatem, sed dicitur secundum qualitatem quae potest intendi ex propriis secundum sui subjecti causas, vel remitti. Hoc igitur modo ubi proprium est (quod convenit omni sed non soli) magis et minus non suscipere.
Similiter autem proprium erit ubi non habere contrarium. Hoc proprium convenit omni et semper, sed non soli. In loco autem esse (quod est causa ejus quod est ubi) contrarietas non est. Quod autem nulli alii sit contrarium, per se manifestum est, quia contraria sunt in eodem genere. Alia autem a loco non sunt in eodem genere cum loco. Probatur autem etiam hoc, quia si habet contrarium, hoc erit secundum quod Antiquis visum est, quod sursum ad deorsum sit contrarium propter hoc quod multum distare videtur id quod est sursum esse ab eo quod est deorsum, quemadmodum maxime distare videntur sursum et deorsum. Propter hoc contrarietas quae est in ubi, maxime videtur pluribus circa sursum esse et circa deorsum. Sursum enim esse ubi est, et deorsum esse similiter etiam ubi est. In his ergo maxime videtur contrarietas in ubi: et quantitatis contrarietas maxime videtur esse circa locum.
According to this, therefore, one must say that the first sphere is in place as first place and vessel; and this is to be in place, because it is referred to place, that is, to the distance of place, as the first preservative and generative of all things according to form, and it is not referred to place as having something extrinsically surrounding it by virtue of which it would be preservative and generative. And this is the true solution of this question.
Marginalia Objection.
But to what is objected, that place and where are in one thing and another,
Marginalia Solution.
one must say that this must be understood of those things which are in place as in something preserving and containing; for in these the preserving and containing thing cannot be the same as the preserved and contained thing. But in those things which are in place, that is, are referred to place as preserving and containing, it is not generally true, but is true in those which preserve and contain not through themselves. But in those which do so through themselves it is not true in this way; rather they are place more than located thing, and as place they are referred to the account of place.
Marginalia Objection.
But to what is objected, that they are moved in place or according to place in this way,
Marginalia Solution.
one must say that it is true, but to be moved in place or according to place is one thing, and to be moved to place is another. For these are moved either because they are moved in the distance of place equally from every side around the middle; or they are moved according to place because they are moved according to the differences and positions of place, which are before and behind according to the position of the poles, and from right and left according to the distance of East and West, and things of this sort. But they are not moved in place in such a way that they are moved to some place. Therefore in these ways whatever things are said to be in place through themselves are in place. Nor is it necessary that the first sphere, which through itself has the account of place and not of located thing, have outside itself something containing it in which it would be as in the place of a container. Nor on account of this will one go to infinity, because one stops at the first sphere, which through itself contains and preserves.
CHAPTER V.
On the properties of where, which are not to receive more and less and not to have a contrary.
But where lacks intension and remission, so that it is not said according to more and less. And this is proved from this, that among those things which are in place we do not say that one is more in place than another; for what is above is not more in place than what is below, nor is what is moved circularly more in place than what is moved by rectilinear motion. But to be in place is said in one way and another, not according to more and less. Therefore although one thing according to quantity possesses a greater place than another, nevertheless one is not more in place than the other. For the more formal something is than another, as higher things than lower things, the more it possesses a greater place, as water exceeds earth, air exceeds water, fire exceeds air, and heaven obtains the greatest place. For more and less, said according to intension and remission, is not said according to where or according to any quantity, but is said according to quality which can be intensified or remitted from proper causes according to the causes of its subject. Therefore in this way the property of where, which belongs to every where but not only to it, is not to receive more and less.
Likewise it will be a property of where not to have a contrary. This property belongs to every where and always, but not only to where. But in being in place, which is the cause of that which is where, there is no contrariety. And that there is contrary to no other thing is manifest through itself, because contraries are in the same genus. But things other than place are not in the same genus with place. This is also proved because, if it has a contrary, this will be according to the view of the Ancients, that above is contrary to below on account of this, that what it is to be above seems to stand far apart from what it is to be below, just as above and below seem to stand apart most of all. On account of this, contrariety which is in where seems to many to be especially about being above and about being below. For to be above is where, and to be below likewise is where. Therefore in these contrariety in where seems especially to exist; and the contrariety of quantity seems especially to be about place.
Si autem sursum et deorsum concedant esse contraria, sequitur inconveniens, quod scilicet in eodem numero simul contingit esse duo contraria: sursum enim et deorsum diversis respectibus sunt in eodem loco vel ubi. Idem enim locus numero est sursum et deorsum ad diversa sumptus vel comparatus, sicut patet in exemplo: quia turris altitudo sursum est ad nos comparata aspicientibus ab imo in sublime: comparata autem ad sphaerae caelestis altitudinem est inferius et deorsum. Amplius ex hoc sequitur, quod idem sibimetipsi erit contrarium. Si enim sursum et deorsum contraria sunt, cum idem numero locus sursum et deorsum sit, colligitur per syllogismum idem sibimet esse contrarium. Nulla igitur contrarietas est in ubi. De his autem omnibus patet (quae dicta sunt) quod contraria sunt secundum formas suas absolutas contraria, et hoc non variatur in ipsis per respectum ad hoc vel ad aliud. Et ideo si sursum et deorsum contraria essent, essent in eis formae contrariae, quae in eodem esse non possunt, sive comparentur ad diversa, sive non comparentur. De his tamen omnibus quantum ad logici spectat intentionem, in libro Praedicamentorum in tractatu de Quantitate, satis determinatum est. Et his igitur patet de omnibus propriis ejus quod est ubi.
Marginalia Objectio.
Si autem quaerat aliquis quare hic non designatur proprie proprium ejus quod est ubi, et similiter in quando, cum proprium commune cognoscatur ex eo quod est vere proprium, et sic ponendum esset verius proprium quam commune,
Marginalia Solutio.
Dici potest, sicut dictum est in tractatu de Quando, quod scilicet proprie proprium ubi intelligitur satis ex praedictis, quod scilicet convenit ei aequale esse ad id in quo est, hoc est, ad corpus, quod est causa ubi per circumscriptionem, quod ubi est circumscriptum, et convenit ei aequale esse ad id ex quo sicut ex causa procedit, et alia hujusmodi quae facile est assignare.
Marginalia Aliter.
Posset tamen dici in ambobus his principiis, quando scilicet et ubi, quod substantia eorum in comparatione est considerata: et non multum substantiae habet in ratione, et minus habet in esse naturali: et ideo in substantia istorum non multa radicantur proprie propria sicut in illis quae habent absolutas essentias: et ideo maxime substantia habet talia propria, et quantitas post substantiam, et post quantitatem qualitas, et ad aliquid habet ea secundum dici. Alia autem non habent de propriis hujusmodi, et ideo non ponuntur. Et ideo puto quod haec ratio vera est, quia hic proprie propria non ponuntur. Et haec de Ubi dicta sufficiant.
But if they grant above and below to be contraries, an inconvenience follows, namely that two contraries can be at once in the same thing in number; for above and below, by diverse respects, are in the same place or where. For the same place in number is above and below, taken or compared to diverse things, as is clear in an example: the height of a tower, compared to us looking from below upward, is above; but compared to the height of the heavenly sphere, it is lower and below. Further, from this it follows that the same thing will be contrary to itself. For if above and below are contraries, since the same place in number is above and below, it is gathered by syllogism that the same thing is contrary to itself. Therefore there is no contrariety in where. But concerning all these things it is clear, the things that have been said, that contraries are contrary according to their absolute forms, and this is not varied in them through respect to this or to that. And therefore if above and below were contraries, there would be contrary forms in them, which cannot exist in the same thing, whether they are compared to diverse things or not compared. Nevertheless concerning all these things, so far as pertains to the intention of the logician, enough has been determined in the book of the Categories, in the tractate on Quantity. And therefore from these things it is clear concerning all the properties of that which is where.
Marginalia Objection.
But if someone asks why the proper property of that which is where is not designated here, and likewise in when, since the common property is known from that which is truly proper, and thus the truer property should be posited rather than the common one,
Marginalia Solution.
it can be said, as was said in the tractate on When, that the proper property of where is sufficiently understood from the foregoing, namely that it belongs to it to be equal to that in which it is, that is, to body, which is the cause of where through circumscription, because where is circumscribed, and it belongs to it to be equal to that from which it proceeds as from a cause, and other things of this sort which are easy to assign.
Marginalia Otherwise.
Yet it could be said in both these principles, namely when and where, that their substance is considered in comparison, and it has not much of substance in its account, and has less in natural being; and therefore in the substance of these things many proper properties are not rooted as in those things which have absolute essences. And therefore substance especially has such properties, and quantity after substance, and after quantity quality, and relation has them according to being said. But the others do not have properties of this sort, and therefore they are not posited. And therefore I think that this account is true, because proper properties are not posited here. And let these things said about Where suffice.
Notes
- Understand this whole thing with respect to what-it-is, but not with respect to whether-it-is; for abstract substances are considered by the natural philosopher with respect to whether-it-is, as is clear in Physics 1, final comment. JAMMY. (Hoc totum intellige quantum ad quid est, non autem quantum ad si est: nam substantiae abstractae considerantur a naturali quantum ad si est, ut patet 1 Physic. com. ultim. JAMMY.) ↩
- On text-comment 76. (Super tex. com. 76.) ↩
- In book 2, text-comment 87. (In 2, tex. com. 87.) ↩
- On text-comment 76. (Super tex. com. 76.) ↩
- That is, to posit that exposition is to proceed lightly according to understanding. (Id est, ponere illam expositionem est incedere leviter secundum intellectum.) ↩
- D. Albert attributes this opinion, in Physics 4 on text-comment 43, to Gilbert Porretanus himself, and in this matter he refutes him. (Hanc opinionem attribuit D. Albertus (4 Physic. super tex. com. 43) ipsi Gilberto Porretano, et in hac ipsum redarguit.) ↩
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