Volume 1 · pp. 329–340
Book on the Six Principles, Tractate II chapter VII; Tractate III on Passion; Tractate IV on When, chapters I-IV
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Marginalia Objectio; Solutio.
facit qualitatem, et calor ignis facit calorem in aqua.
Situs autem sive positio aliquando facit pati et agere. Cujus exemplum est, quod in dispositione componibilium in corporibus quae ex contrariis primis qualitatibus mixta sunt, fit ipsorum simplicium (quae mixta sunt) continua quaedam generatio uno alterum transmutante: quam generationem sive transmutationem necessarium est consistere in motiva actione, ita quod continue unum moveat alterum, et moveatur ab illo, et continue unum agat in aliud et patiatur.
Ejus autem quod est ubi, locus causa est: cum tamen locus sit quantitas, et ubi sit aliud genus praedicamenti. Ejus autem quod est quando, causa est tempus: et haec sunt genera diversa. Similiter autem ejus quod est habere, ut indutum esse vel calceatum esse, causa est aliquo modo corpus: quia habitus mutatur a corporis figura, et quaeritur propter corpus. Et sic multipliciter res unius praedicamenti, causa est rei alterius praedicamenti. Nec tamen propter hoc effectus cum causa est in eodem genere.
Eorum vero individuorum substantiae quae non sunt in subjecto (eo quod non sunt accidentia) causa quidem quare prima sunt, est corruptio sine generatione, quia prima creata sunt: quam creationem non praecessit generatio, sed secuta est corruptio. Corruptio autem causa est talium: quia si in esse individui subsistere possent, non essent generabilia, sed in esse individui manere non possunt, ideo generabilia facta sunt. Unde generatio non fuit quidem in primis creatis, sed generatio fuit et est in his quae mox subsistunt post primorum constitutionem. Statim enim in illis fuit generationis propagatio.
Communium autem universalium quae de primis substantiis praedicantur quae sunt secundae substantiae, causa sunt ipsae primae substantiae secundum esse, a quibus nulla ex his est praedicatio: sicut omnes particulares homines sunt generatio illius hominis, qui est omnibus communis et ad omnes universalis: quamvis enim secundum actum sit in quolibet, tamen secundum quod actu communis est et actu praedicatur de multis vel de omnibus, tunc oportet quod singulis conveniat: et sic communitas a singularitate procedit, et generatur sive ex ipsa efficitur.
In omnibus autem his considerandum est, quod est aliquando generatio univoca, sicut calor generat calorem. Aliquando autem aequivoca, sicut positio generat qualitatem, et e converso. Aliquando autem generatio naturalis, sicut cum linea generat superficiem. Aliquando est generatio rationis et naturae alicujus, sicut cum commune generatur a singularium multitudine.
Omnia autem haec inducta sunt ad hoc quod sciatur non esse hoc de coordinatione principiorum vel praedicamentorum, quod attendatur ratio ordinis secundum causam efficientem, sed potius secundum hoc quod inferius claudit in se superius actu et intellectu. Talis enim ordo necessario stat in uno summo quod est coordinatorum primum principium, et stat in quibusdam ultimis, quae non sunt de intellectu alicujus.
CAPUT VII.
De propriis communibus actionis et passionis.
Consequenter his quae dicta sunt, determinanda est actio per propria, quae quidem omni conveniunt, sed nec soli conveniunt actioni: hae enim passiones quae propria sunt vere propter hoc hic postponuntur, quia vere sunt propria principia, per quae illa quae causa sunt, probari habent de actione. Determinantes autem de his dicimus, quod facere et pati recipiunt contrarietatem, et recipiunt magis et minus, sive intentionem et remissionem. Contrarietatem quidem recipiunt tam in effectu actionum, quam in substantia et forma: in effectu enim secare sive urere seu etiam eradicare, contrarium est ad plantare, et sic actio actioni contraria est in effectu: et similiter plantari et secari sunt passiones contrariae in effectu. In substantia autem actionis et forma calefacere contrarium est ad frigefacere, et exsiccare ad humida facere: et in passionibus calefieri contrarium est ad frigefieri, et exsiccari ad humida fieri. Sic etiam urere contrarium est ad humidum facere.
Marginalia Objection; Solution.
makes quality, and the heat of fire makes heat in water.
But site or position sometimes makes suffering and acting. An example of this is that, in the disposition of composable things in bodies which have been mixed from the contrary first qualities, there comes to be a certain continuous generation of the simple things themselves, which are mixed, one transforming the other. This generation or transformation must consist in motive action, so that continuously one moves the other, and is moved by it, and continuously one acts into the other and suffers.
But of that which is where, place is the cause, although place is quantity and where is another genus of category. But of that which is when, time is the cause; and these are diverse genera. Likewise, of that which is to have, as to be clothed or to be shod, the cause in some way is body, because habit is changed by the figure of the body and is sought on account of the body. And thus in many ways a thing of one category is the cause of a thing of another category. Yet on account of this the effect is not in the same genus as the cause.
But as for the individuals of substance which are not in a subject, because they are not accidents, the reason why they are first is corruption without generation, because the first things were created, and generation did not precede that creation, but corruption followed it. But corruption is the cause of such things, because if they could subsist in the being of the individual, they would not be generable; but because they cannot remain in the being of the individual, therefore they have been made generable. Hence generation was not indeed in the first created things, but generation was and is in those things which immediately subsist after the constitution of the first things. For at once in those things there was propagation of generation.
But of the common universals which are predicated of first substances and which are second substances, the first substances themselves are the causes according to being, from which there is no predication of any of these. Thus all particular humans are the generation of that human who is common to all and universal to all; for although according to act he is in each one, nevertheless insofar as he is actually common and is actually predicated of many or of all, then he must belong to each. And thus commonness proceeds from singularity, and is generated or effected from it.
But in all these things it must be considered that generation is sometimes univocal, as heat generates heat. Sometimes, however, it is equivocal, as position generates quality, and conversely. Sometimes generation is natural, as when line generates surface. Sometimes there is generation of reason and of some nature, as when the common is generated from a multitude of singulars.
But all these things have been introduced so that it may be known that the coordination of principles or categories is not this, that the account of order is attended according to efficient cause, but rather according to this, that the inferior encloses in itself the superior in act and understanding. For such an order necessarily stands in one highest thing which is the first principle of the coordinated things, and stands in certain lowest things which are not in the understanding of anything.
CHAPTER VII.
On the common properties of action and passion.
Consequently, after the things that have been said, action must be determined through properties, which indeed belong to every action, but do not belong to action alone; for the passions which are truly properties are postponed here for this reason, because they are truly proper principles through which those things that are causes must be proved concerning action. But in determining these things, we say that making and suffering receive contrariety, and receive more and less, or intension and remission. They receive contrariety both in the effect of actions and in substance and form. For in effect to cut, or to burn, or also to uproot, is contrary to planting, and thus action is contrary to action in effect; and likewise to be planted and to be cut are contrary passions in effect. But in the substance and form of action, to heat is contrary to to make cold, and to dry is contrary to to make moist; and in passions, to be heated is contrary to to be made cold, and to be dried to to be made moist. Thus also to burn is contrary to making moist.
Similiter autem actio et passio recipiunt magis et minus: calefacere enim magis et minus dicitur. Et est calefactio intensior et remissior. Similiter autem est in passione: quia calefieri et infrigidari est magis et minus intensiori et remissiori calefactione vel infrigidatione: et sic est in siccari et humidum fieri. Et similiter in passionibus illatis, sicut in tristari et gaudere dicitur magis et minus.
Si quis autem dicat tristitiam et gaudium non esse passiones quae sunt in praedicamento passionis, sed potius in qualitate, et ideo non deberent hic induci, Dicemus ad illum quod tristitia et gaudium non sunt sine motu et actione cordis et passione. Cor enim in his agit et patitur secundum motus, qui dicuntur diastoles et systoles: et secundum haec reducuntur ad genera actionis et passionis. Haec igitur de praedicamento actionis dicta sufficiant.
TRACTATUS III
DE PASSIONE.
CAPUT I.
Quid sit passio secundum quod est praedicamentum.
Marginalia Ratio ordinis.
Post principium quod est actio ponitur principium quod est passio sicut effectus post causam. Dicamus ergo quod passio quae est praedicamentum, est effectus illatioque actionis. Duo enim sunt in passione, scilicet forma agentis a patiente suscepta, et quoad hoc est passio effectus actionis. Est etiam motus secundum quod est actus imperfecti et imperfectus in patiente; et hic motus continue fluit a movente in patiens quod movetur: et quoad hoc est passio continua illatio actionis. Et haec ambo simul faciunt, quia assignatio passionis est effectus illatioque actionis. Et sicut diximus in ante habitis, haec non est vera passionis diffinitio, quia generalissima veram diffinitionem habere non possunt: sed est qualiscumque assignatio quae majoris est declarationis quam nomen. Sicut autem in praehabitis declaratum est, quod cum dicitur, actio est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur: ita dicimus hic quod passio est id quod infertur ab agente secundum quod est agens: et haec est forma agentis ut agens est: et haec variatur secundum formam agentis: et alia erit in agente per se, et alia passio in agente per accidens, et alia secundum agens univocum, et alia secundum agens aequivocum, et alia secundum actionem animae, et alia secundum actionem corporis.
Sed hoc generaliter verum est, quod passio est secundum formam agentis ut agens est. Et ideo agens et patiens in forma communicant, et forma quae est actus agentis, est passio patientis secundum quod ab agente est recepta: sed in agente est ut perfecta, in patiente est ut via ad perfectionem. Et hoc generaliter verum est, ita quod etiam verberans inferat ictum formae imaginatae ab ipso quando dedit ictum. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod in talibus est plaga ex plaga, et vulnus ex vulnere, et sic de aliis. Haec est causa quod quidem dixerunt idem esse actionem et passionem, terminis tantum differentes. Sed de hoc in priori tractatu de Actione satis dictum est.
Likewise action and passion receive more and less; for heating is said more and less. And heating is more intense and more remiss. Likewise it is so in passion, because to be heated and to be made cold is more and less by more intense and more remiss heating or cooling; and so it is in being dried and being made moist. And likewise in inflicted passions, as in being saddened and rejoicing, more and less is said.
But if someone says that sadness and joy are not passions which are in the category of passion, but rather are in quality, and therefore should not have been introduced here, we shall say to him that sadness and joy are not without motion and action of the heart and passion. For the heart in these acts and suffers according to motions which are called diastoles and systoles; and according to these they are reduced to the genera of action and passion. Therefore let these things said about the category of action suffice.
TRACTATE III
ON PASSION.
CHAPTER I.
What passion is insofar as it is a category.
Marginalia Account of the order.
After the principle which is action there is placed the principle which is passion, as effect after cause. Therefore let us say that passion, which is a category, is the effect and bringing-in of action. For there are two things in passion, namely the form of the agent received by the patient, and in this respect passion is the effect of action. There is also motion insofar as it is the act of the imperfect and imperfect in the patient; and this motion flows continuously from the mover into the patient which is moved; and in this respect passion is the continuous bringing-in of action. And these two things together make this, because the assignment of passion is the effect and bringing-in of action. And as we said in the preceding things, this is not the true definition of passion, because the most general things cannot have a true definition; but it is an assignment of whatever sort, which gives greater declaration than the name. But just as in the preceding things it was declared that when it is said, action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected, so we say here that passion is that which is brought in by the agent insofar as it is agent. And this is the form of the agent insofar as it is agent; and this is varied according to the form of the agent. And there will be one passion in the agent per se, another passion in the agent accidentally, another according to a univocal agent, another according to an equivocal agent, another according to action of soul, and another according to action of body.
But this is generally true, that passion is according to the form of the agent insofar as it is agent. And therefore agent and patient communicate in form, and the form which is the act of the agent is the passion of the patient insofar as it has been received from the agent. But in the agent it is as perfected; in the patient it is as a way to perfection. And this is generally true, so that even one striking brings in a blow of the form imagined by him when he gave the blow. And therefore Aristotle says that in such things there is stroke from stroke, and wound from wound, and so with the others. This is the cause why certain people said that action and passion are the same, differing only by their termini. But concerning this enough has been said in the preceding tractate on Action.
Est ergo passio effectus illatioque actionis, secundum quam illationem actionis quaedam quidem patiuntur quae susceptiva sive susceptibilia sunt formae agentis et actionis ad sui transmutationem: quaedam autem minime, hoc est, non passibilia, quae scilicet formae agentis et actionis ad sui mutationem non sunt susceptibilia, sicut ea quorum non est materia una, ut dicit Aristoteles: haec enim nec agunt, nec patiuntur ad invicem. Sed ea quorum est materia una communis, agunt et patiuntur ab invicem. Et ideo in illis quaedam sunt plus passibilia ab agentibus: quaedam autem minus secundum quod differentes mixtiones et complexiones ad animae actiones in diversis secundum commixtionum et complexionum differentias. Sicut enim dicit Plato, secundum merita materiae dantur et formae. Et ideo bruta meliores et magis aequales accipientia complexiones ex primarum qualitatum actionibus et passionibus, sunt animantiora, hoc est, in viribus animae et actibus potentius operantia, quam arbores minus passam ad aequalitatem habentes complexionem. Et homines eo quod optime passi sunt ad aequalitatem tactus, ita quod medium complexionis hominis et aequalitati caeli proportionatus est: adhuc est animantior bruto in virtutibus animae nobilioribus, et nobilius operans quam bruta. Et sicut semper melius ad aequalitatem passa per actionem et passionem primorum complexionantium, sic expeditiora sunt in operationibus animae. Non enim dicuntur animantiora, ita quod anima quae est substantialis forma insit secundum magis et minus, aequaliter enim asinus participat animam et homo: sed ideo dicuntur quaedam animantiora quibusdam, quae expeditius et nobilius agunt secundum animae potentiam.
Omnia autem quae in praecedenti tractatu de Actione sive generatione dicta sunt, eadem dici possunt de passione, quae est ab illa actione cujus illa passio est effectus et illatio, scilicet quod in motu firmatur, sed aliter quam actio. Actio enim firmatur in motu qui est actus mobilis et actus imperfecti: id enim quod movetur, patitur et fit vel simpliciter vel secundum aliquid, sicut id quod movetur in loco secundum quod patitur, scilicet de potentia in actum exeundo, maxime secundum quod motus localis est a generante. In aliis autem motibus patitur simpliciter et secundum subjectum. Similiter illud quod dictum est, quod est actio animae, et actio corporis, similiter est passio animae, et passio corporis: passio quidem animae est quae ab anima incipit, ut cor in motu, quoniam movet secundum systolem. Similiter est in tristitia, et gaudio, et spe: in omnibus enim his anima concipiens bonum vel malum etiam patitur in his. Passio autem corporis est sicut uri, et infrigidari, et percuti, et hujusmodi. Et ideo dicta de actione dicuntur de passione, non quidem recta appellatione, sed transmutata: ut quod vocabat activam potentiam, hoc vocet passivam: sicut mutatur appellatio quando dicitur calefacere, et quando dicitur calefieri, et urere et uri, et sic de aliis. Sic etiam est id quod dictum est, quod sicut naturalis proprietas est actionis ex se passionem inferre, ita naturalis proprietas est passionis inferri ab actione. Et sic est in omnibus aliis. Et hoc modo quaecumque dicta sunt de actione sive de generatione, omnia de passione dici possunt. Dico autem actionem generationem quamdam esse: quia in omni actione generatio est formae agentis in eo quod patitur si agit univoce. Si autem agit aequivoce, tunc est actio per accidens, et non secundum intentionem agentis: et de hoc non est curandum, quia est infinitum: nisi forte aequivocum ad univocum reducatur: et tunc eadem sunt re. Et tunc verum erit generaliter, quod agens ut agens est, formam suam imprimit in patiente.
Therefore passion is the effect and bringing-in of action, and according to this bringing-in of action certain things indeed suffer which are receptive or susceptible of the form of the agent and of action for their transformation; but certain things least of all, that is, non-passible things, namely those which are not susceptible of the form of the agent and of action for their own change, as those things of which there is not one matter, as Aristotle says. For these neither act nor suffer in relation to one another. But things of which there is one common matter act upon and suffer from one another. And therefore among those things certain ones are more passible by agents, but certain ones less, according as different mixtures and complexions are disposed for actions of the soul in diverse things according to the differences of admixtures and complexions. For as Plato says, forms also are given according to the merits of matter. And therefore brute animals receiving better and more equal complexions from the actions and passions of the first qualities are more animated, that is, more powerfully operating in the powers of the soul and in acts, than trees which have a complexion less passively brought to equality. And humans, because they have been best made passive toward the equality of touch, so that the mean of the complexion of the human is proportioned also to the equality of heaven, are still more animated than the brute in the nobler virtues of the soul and operate more nobly than brute animals. And as things are always better passively brought to equality through the action and passion of the first things that complexion, so they are more ready in the operations of the soul. For they are not called more animated in such a way that the soul, which is a substantial form, inheres according to more and less, for the donkey and the human participate in soul equally; but certain things are called more animated than certain others because they act more readily and more nobly according to the potency of the soul.
But all things which were said in the preceding tractate about Action or generation can be said the same way about passion, which is from that action whose effect and bringing-in that passion is: namely that it is confirmed in motion, but otherwise than action is. For action is confirmed in motion which is the act of the movable and the act of the imperfect; for that which is moved suffers and comes to be either simply or according to something, as that which is moved in place insofar as it suffers, namely by going out from potency into act, especially according as local motion is from a generator. But in other motions it suffers simply and according to the subject. Likewise, that which has been said, that there is action of soul and action of body, is similarly passion of soul and passion of body. Passion of soul indeed is that which begins from the soul, as the heart in motion, since it moves according to systole. It is similar in sadness and joy and hope; for in all these the soul, conceiving good or evil, also suffers in them. But passion of body is, for example, to be burned, to be made cold, to be struck, and things of this sort. And therefore the things said about action are said about passion, not indeed by a straight appellation, but by a transformed one: so that what he called active potency, this he calls passive potency, just as the appellation is changed when heating and being heated are spoken of, and burning and being burned, and so with the others. So also what has been said is this, that just as it is the natural property of action from itself to bring in passion, so it is the natural property of passion to be brought in by action. And so it is in all other cases. And in this way whatever has been said about action or generation can all be said about passion. But I say that action is a certain generation because in every action there is generation of the form of the agent in that which suffers, if it acts univocally. But if it acts equivocally, then it is action accidentally and not according to the intention of the agent; and one need not be concerned with this, because it is indefinite, unless perhaps the equivocal is reduced to the univocal; and then they are the same in reality. And then it will be generally true that the agent, insofar as it is agent, impresses its form in the patient.
CAPUT II.
De multiplicitate ejus quod dicitur passio.
Marginalia Removet dubium.
Est autem passio de numero eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur. Animae enim actionum unaquaeque passio dicitur: quas tamen secundum intentionem praedicamenti actionis sub actione locamus, sicut est amor, et odium, et tristari, et gaudere, quae omnia passibiles actiones animae vocamus: haec enim omnia passiones sunt secundum quod a conceptis sunt illatae. Concepta enim vel concepta sunt ut bona, vel concepta sunt ut mala. Si ut bona sunt concepta, aut concepta sunt ut praesentia ad usum vel fructum, aut ut absentia. Si sunt concepta ut praesentia ad usum vel fructum, dilatatur ad illa cor et diffunditur spiritus, et effunditur cor per diastolem super illa: et sic est gaudium. Si autem concipitur ut non praesens: tunc ad ipsum dirigitur cor, et erigitur spiritus, et fit passio quae spes vocatur. Si vero concipitur ut malum, ut contrarium: tunc iterum aut concipitur ut praesens et nocumentum inferens, aut ut futurum et expectatum. Si primo modo, tunc elicit passionem doloris vel tristitiae. Si autem concipitur ut futurum, tunc elicit passionem timoris. In omnibus his tamen agit anima fugiendo, vel se contrahendo, vel aperiendo, vel dilatando se ad usum vel expectationem.
Et ideo hae sunt animae passibiles actiones: et ideo sunt passibiles, quia motibus vel actionibus conceptorum innascuntur. Actiones autem sunt, quia in his agit anima in corpus et movet corpus secundum systolem et diastolem, sicut diximus. Sic igitur dicitur animae actio receptio boni vel mali inducens fugam vel apprehensionem boni vel mali concepti. Sic enim amare agere quoddam est passione amati inductum, et odire agere est passione tristabilis praesentis inductum. Et hoc modo tristari passibilis actio est, et gaudere hoc modo actio inducta est conceptu convenientis. Et hoc modo delectari est actio animae ex conjunctione convenientis cum conveniente inducta: propter quod Aristoteles in septimo Ethicorum 1 dicit delectationem esse in genere operationis. Dicit enim quod delectatio est operatio proprii et connaturalis habitus non impedita. Et hoc modo dicitur passio a Graeco πάθειν, quod Latine sonat recipere, et est passio omne quod animae infertur ex receptis sensibilibus vel aliter apprehensis ad apprehensionem vel fugam moventibus. Et sic motarum virium animae motus vel fuga quibus sic movent corpora, dicuntur passibiles actiones: et sic passio large dicitur.
Proprie autem dicitur passio 2 quod in naturam sive contra naturam agit ut contrarium et nocivum naturae, sicut id quod punit: poena enim non dicitur mala, nisi quia contraria est bono naturae et adimit illud et diminuit, sive sit natura conjuncti, sive sit natura animae, sive sit natura corporis. Et sic passio est dissolvens conjunctum, vel animae naturae contrarium vel distemperantiam vel divisionem continuitatis corporis inducens: sicut passio dicitur morbus, febris et aegritudo contraria complexioni, vel contraria compositioni corporis. Et hoc modo passio non dicitur a receptione simpliciter, sed dicitur a receptione contrarii et nocentis agentis ad corruptionem naturae vel esse secundum quod Boetius diffinit esse dicens: Esse est quod ordinem retinet servatque naturam.
CHAPTER II.
On the multiplicity of that which is called passion.
Marginalia He removes a doubt.
But passion is of the number of those things which are said in many ways. For each one of the actions of the soul is called a passion; yet according to the intention of the category of action we place these under action, such as love, hatred, being saddened, and rejoicing, all of which we call passible actions of the soul. For all these are passions insofar as they have been brought in by things conceived. For conceived things are conceived either as good or as evil. If they are conceived as good, either they are conceived as present for use or enjoyment, or as absent. If they are conceived as present for use or enjoyment, the heart is dilated toward them and the spirit is diffused, and the heart is poured out upon them through diastole; and thus there is joy. But if it is conceived as not present, then the heart is directed toward it and the spirit is raised, and the passion which is called hope comes to be. But if it is conceived as evil, as contrary, then again it is conceived either as present and bringing in harm, or as future and expected. If in the first way, then it elicits the passion of pain or sadness. But if it is conceived as future, then it elicits the passion of fear. Yet in all these the soul acts by fleeing, or by contracting itself, or by opening, or by dilating itself toward use or expectation.
And therefore these are passible actions of the soul; and therefore they are passible, because they arise from the motions or actions of things conceived. But they are actions because in these the soul acts upon the body and moves the body according to systole and diastole, as we have said. Thus, therefore, action of the soul is called a reception of good or evil inducing flight or apprehension of the conceived good or evil. For thus to love is a certain acting induced by the passion of the loved thing, and to hate is acting induced by the passion of a present saddening thing. And in this way to be saddened is a passible action, and to rejoice in this way is an action induced by the concept of a fitting thing. And in this way to be delighted is an action of the soul induced from the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting; on account of this Aristotle in the seventh book of the Ethics 1 says that delight is in the genus of operation. For he says that delight is the operation of a proper and connatural habit not impeded. And in this way passion is said from the Greek πάθειν, which in Latin sounds as to receive, and passion is everything that is brought into the soul from sensible things received, or from things apprehended otherwise, moving it to apprehension or flight. And thus the motion or flight of the powers of the soul moved in this way, by which they thus move bodies, are called passible actions; and thus passion is said broadly.
But properly passion 2 is said to be what acts upon nature or against nature as something contrary and harmful to nature, like that which punishes. For punishment is not called evil except because it is contrary to the good of nature and takes it away and diminishes it, whether it is the nature of the conjoined thing, or the nature of the soul, or the nature of the body. And thus passion is something dissolving the conjoined thing, or something introducing what is contrary to the nature of the soul, or distempering, or a division of the continuity of the body; as disease, fever, and sickness contrary to complexion or contrary to the composition of the body are called passion. And in this way passion is not said from reception simply, but is said from reception of a contrary and harmful agent toward the corruption of nature or being, according as Boethius defines being, saying: Being is that which retains and preserves order and nature.
Hanc tamen distinctionem passionis ante diffinitionem passionis non posuimus: quia secundum utrumque modum passionis convenit diffinitio, secundum quod passio est effectus illatioque actionis: passio enim, ut dictum est, prima est generatio, hoc est, primum quod ingeneratur patienti ex actione directa ad ipsum ex agente. Et quamvis forma quae ingeneratur patienti, primo sit in agente, non tamen propter hoc passio est in agente: quia secundum quod est in agente agens est, et actio est processus ejus in patiens. Sed secundum quod recepta est in patiente per actionem agentis, sic est passio et dispositio patientis. Est ergo haec forma passio in eo in quod agitur, hoc est, in eo quod suscipit actum sive actionem operantis sive agentis ut impressam sibi ab agente: percutiens enim dans ictum pati non dicitur, sed potius id quod est ut materia sive agenti subjectum quod ut patiens suscipit ictum percutientis. Et haec quae dicta sunt de passione, sufficiant. Ea enim quae relinquuntur, tractantur et tractata sunt in praecedenti tractatu qui est de Generatione vel Actione: ibi enim dictum est qualiter suscipit contrarium, et qualiter suscipit magis et minus.
TRACTATUS IV
DE QUANDO.
CAPUT I.
Quid sit quando secundum quod est principium vel praedicamentum.
Marginalia Locus quid; Tempus quid; Quae sint aeviterna; Tempus non est quando; Instans non est quando; Quid sit esse in tempore; Aetas quid.
Quando vero secundum quod est principium vel praedicamentum est id quod in eo quod tempore vel alia duratione mensuratur, ex mensurante duratione relinquitur in eo quod sic mensuratur: non enim relinquitur ex adjacentia temporis tantum, sed etiam ex adjacentia aeternitatis et aeviternitatis, ut patebit inferius: dicimus enim, Deus fuit, Deus est, Deus erit. Et in omnibus his significamus in praeterito Deum fuisse et in futuro et in praesenti quando. Quidquid igitur est, quod praedicatur in re temporali vel aeterna vel aeviterna ex duratione causatum in ipsa, vocatur quando generalissimum, sub cujus ambitu communitatis continentur et genera et species ipsius et individua, sicut genera sunt fuisse, esse, et fore. Species autem tunc fuisse, vel nunc esse, vel tunc fore. Individua autem hunc fuisse, vel hunc esse, vel hunc fore. Et ad hunc ambitum praedicationis multa reducuntur, quae nullius alterius generis per se praedicationem suscipiunt, sicut olim fuisse, dudum, jam, et futurum longinquum vel propinquum. Quia igitur hoc genus rerum sic prima voce significatum, ad nullum aliorum generum reduci potest, relinquitur quod ipsum sit per se praedicamentum et suorum coordinationum praedicabilium primum principium. Hoc igitur quando ex adjacentia temporis, vel alterius durationis esse mensurantis relinquitur.
Locus est (ut in libro de intelligibilibus dicitur) mensura entis quod non est distensum secundum durationem intelligentiae, sed totum simul in loco comprehensum accipitur per intellectum. Tempus autem est mensura entis secundum esse quod accipitur ut protensum duratione, eo quod esse est actus entis. Potentia autem essendi in omnibus protensa intelligitur ad mensuram durationis vel per se vel per aliud. Per se quidem in his in quibus esse non totum simul est, sed fit continue. Ad aliud autem in quibus esse totum simul est, quod distingui non potest nisi ad inferiora, quorum esse excedit secundum indeficientiam, sicut cum dicitur Deum fuisse qui non defuit, et Deum fore qui non deerit. Ea autem quorum totum esse simul est, quaedam sunt, quorum esse et posse et actus totum est unum simul, et horum mensura est aeternitas. Quaedam autem quorum esse quidem simul est et posse quod habent ad esse, sed agere non est simul, sicut quidam dicunt intelligentiae: sed verum exemplum et philosophicum est de corpore caelesti. Et haec dicuntur a Philosophis aeviterna, et ipsorum mensura est aevum: et ab his in his quibus istae mensurae extrinsecus adjacent, relinquitur quoddam quod comparationem talis durationis dicit ab ipsa, et illorum comparationem ad durationem: et hoc vocatur quando. Quia solum tempus inter haec tria substantialiter dividitur, et differentias accipit, penes quas ipsum quando distinguitur in species. Propter quod non per aeternitatem aut aeviternitatem, sed per tempus quando diffinitur: quia etiam aeternitas et aeviternitas non distinguuntur per formales differentias nisi ad temporis distinctionem.
Nevertheless we did not put this distinction of passion before the definition of passion, because the definition belongs to passion according to both modes of passion, according as passion is the effect and bringing-in of action. For passion, as has been said, is the first generation, that is, the first thing that is ingenerated in the patient from action directed to it from the agent. And although the form which is ingenerated in the patient is first in the agent, nevertheless on this account passion is not in the agent, because insofar as it is in the agent, it is agent, and action is its process into the patient. But insofar as it has been received in the patient through the action of the agent, thus it is passion and the disposition of the patient. Therefore this form is passion in that into which action is done, that is, in that which receives the act or action of the one operating or of the agent as impressed upon itself by the agent. For the striker giving a blow is not said to suffer, but rather that which is as matter or the subject to the agent, which as patient receives the blow of the striker. And let these things which have been said about passion suffice. For the things which remain are treated and have been treated in the preceding tractate, which is on Generation or Action; for there it has been said how it receives a contrary and how it receives more and less.
TRACTATE IV
ON WHEN.
CHAPTER I.
What when is insofar as it is a principle or category.
Marginalia What place is; What time is; What things are aeviternal; Time is not when; The instant is not when; What it is to be in time; What age is.
But when, insofar as it is a principle or category, is that which is left in that which is measured by time or by another duration from the duration measuring it in that which is thus measured. For it is not left only from the adjacency of time, but also from the adjacency of eternity and aeviternity, as will be clear below. For we say, God was, God is, God will be. And in all these we signify God to have been in the past, and when in the future and in the present. Therefore whatever is predicated in a temporal, eternal, or aeviternal thing, caused in it from duration, is called the most general when, under whose scope of commonness its genera and species and individuals are contained, just as the genera are to have been, to be, and to be going to be. But the species are then to have been, or now to be, or then to be going to be. But the individuals are this to have been, or this to be, or this to be going to be. And to this scope of predication many things are reduced which receive per se predication of no other genus, such as to have been formerly, lately, now, and the future distant or near. Therefore, because this genus of things, signified in this way by a first word, cannot be reduced to any of the other genera, it remains that it is through itself a category and the first principle of its own coordinations of predicables. Therefore this when is left from the adjacency of time, or of another duration measuring being.
Place is, as is said in the book On Intelligibles, the measure of a being which is not extended according to the duration of intelligence, but is received by the understanding as wholly at once comprehended in place. But time is the measure of being according to being, which is received as stretched out by duration, because being is the act of being. But the potency of being in all things is understood as stretched to the measure of duration, either through itself or through another. Through itself indeed in those things in which being is not wholly at once, but comes to be continuously. But toward another in those things in which being is wholly at once, which cannot be distinguished except toward lower things, whose being it exceeds according to indeficiency, as when God is said to have been, who was not absent, and God is said to be going to be, who will not be absent. But of those things whose whole being is at once, certain things are such that their being and possibility and act are all one at once, and the measure of these is eternity. But certain things are such that their being indeed is at once, and the possibility which they have for being, but their acting is not at once, as certain people say of intelligence; but the true and philosophical example is concerning the heavenly body. And these are called aeviternal by philosophers, and their measure is aevum. And from these, in those things to which these measures are extrinsically adjacent, there is left something which names the comparison of such duration from that duration itself, and the comparison of those things to duration; and this is called when. Because only time among these three is divided substantially and receives differences, according to which when itself is distinguished into species. For this reason when is defined not through eternity or aeviternity, but through time, because even eternity and aeviternity are not distinguished through formal differences except in relation to the distinction of time.
Quod autem dicitur, quod ex adjacentia temporis relinquitur, non est idem quod ex tempore adjacenti: quia ex illo modo loquendi modus infectivus temporis non determinatur: quando autem est temporis infectio quam facit in temporali, secundum quod dicimus unum fuisse et alterum esse, et unum dicimus senem et alterum juvenem, non quod senex vel juvenis quando dicant, sed ex tempore per quando, diu vel non diu fuisse causatur senectus et juventus. Dicitur autem adjacens, eo quod non est tempus aliquod intrinsecarum qualitatum, sed potius extrinsecus adjacens quae est in periodo secundum quod est mensura esse ejus quod est: et ideo dicitur adjacere et non dicitur inesse. Adjacere autem dicitur, quia undique jacet ut mensura totum esse mensurans, ita quod nulla pars esse sit cui non adjaceat, et in toto esse suam relinquit infectionem secundum substantiam alicujus quando a tempore praesenti, praeterito, vel futuro causatam. Sic ergo dicitur quando secundum quod praedicamentum est, et praedicat rem illam quam relinquit in subjecto, secundum quod ipsi subjecto adjacet mensura durationis. Et hoc est quod dicitur, quod quando est id quod ex adjacentia temporis relinquitur: ita quod tempus pro omni mensura quae adjacet extrinsecus secundum quod id quod est mensura ipsius, erit esse et non entis: esse enim est ut actus entis et non ut ens: sicut enim diximus, esse est actus entis quod est: et ideo ut est actus, refertur ad durationem, ens autem est durans et habens esse.
Et quia causa non est effectus, et quando est quod ex adjacentia temporis relinquitur, sequitur quod quando non est tempus, secundum quod tempus et quando conjunctas habent rationes diffinitivas sicut effectus et causa: sicut patet quod tempus quidem praeteritum quando non est, effectus autem praeteriti et infectio quam relinquit in eo quod est praeteritum, est quando, sicut heri fuisti, vel pridie, vel ante annum, vel olim, vel nuper, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Similiter instans quodcumque vel nunc quando non est, sed secundum actum ejus vel actus, aequale vel inaequale est, sicut dicitur tempus esse vel fuisse vel fore, et non quando: quia sic est tempus ut numerus ejus quod est in tempore: sed effectus illius temporis aequalis vel inaequalis est quando. In tempore enim esse, ut dicit Aristoteles 3, quadam parte temporis mensurari: et sic tempus inaequale si excellit, est mensuratio et secundum quod sic adjacet mensurato, sic relinquit infectionem in re temporali per motum cujus est tempus numerus. Et haec infectio secundum comparationem ad differentiam temporis ex qua relinquitur quando absolute quidem in subjecto consideratum, vocatur aetas.
But what is said, that it is left from the adjacency of time, is not the same as from adjacent time, because from that way of speaking the infective mode of time is not determined. But when is the infection of time which it makes in the temporal thing, according as we say that one thing has been and another is, and we call one old and another young, not because old or young names when, but because old age and youth are caused from time through when, by having been for a long time or not a long time. But it is called adjacent because time is not some one of the intrinsic qualities, but rather something adjacent extrinsically, which is in a period according as it is the measure of the being of that which is; and therefore it is called adjacent and is not said to inhere. But it is called adjacent because it lies all around as a measure measuring the whole being, so that there is no part of being to which it is not adjacent, and in the whole being it leaves its infection according to the substance of some when caused by present, past, or future time. Thus, therefore, when is spoken of insofar as it is a category, and it predicates that thing which it leaves in the subject, according as the measure of duration is adjacent to that very subject. And this is what is said, that when is that which is left from the adjacency of time, so that time, for every measure which is extrinsically adjacent, according as that which is its measure will be being and not a being. For being is as the act of a being and not as a being; for as we have said, being is the act of the being which is; and therefore as it is act, it is referred to duration, while the being is enduring and having being.
And because cause is not effect, and when is what is left from the adjacency of time, it follows that when is not time, according as time and when have conjoined definitive accounts as effect and cause. This is clear because past time indeed is not when, but the effect of the past and the infection which it leaves in that which is past is when, as you were yesterday, or the day before, or a year ago, or formerly, or lately, or something of this sort. Likewise any instant or now is not when, but according to its act or acts it is equal or unequal, as time is said to be or to have been or to be going to be, and not when; because thus it is time as the number of that which is in time. But the effect of that equal or unequal time is when. For to be in time, as Aristotle says 3, is to be measured by some part of time; and thus unequal time, if it exceeds, is measurement, and according as it is adjacent in this way to the measured thing, thus it leaves infection in the temporal thing through motion, of which time is the number. And this infection, considered absolutely in the subject according to comparison to the difference of time from which when is left, is called age.
Et idem instans non est tempus, sed in instanti esse relinquit quando praesentis, ut nunc esse: quamvis nunc non sit tempus vel aliqua pars ipsius, tamen quia nunc adjacet ei quod movetur, vel quod est, cujus actus esse est cui adjacet tempus: et ideo quoad adjacentiam extrinsecus non est differentia temporis. Et ideo instans quando relinquit sicut et praeteritum. Similiter et futurum tempus quando non est, sed potius id quod ut temporale futurum est: quoniam contingere necessitate motus et numeri motus necessarium est quantum est de temporis successione, secundum quod dicitur aliquid futurum esse. Sic igitur quando est quod ex adjacentia temporis relinquitur ex futuro, sicut cito, vel diu post praesens esse. Patet igitur ex his quae dicta sunt, quid sit quando secundum quod est principium vel praedicamentum.
CAPUT II.
De speciebus ac differentiis ejus quod est quando.
Marginalia Aeternitas; Divisio quando temporis.
Divisio autem ejus quod est quando multiplex est. Prima est divisio quae accipitur secundum adjacentias eorum ex quibus causatur, sicut cum dicitur quod aliud est quando aeternitatis, et aliud quando temporis. Quando quod est aeternitatis, sicut cum dicitur Deum ab aeterno fuisse, et Deum semper fore, et Deum nunc esse. Aeternitas enim quanquam sit indivisibilis et simplex et inextensa, eo quod nihil sui habet extra praesens nunc instans, et sese non movens, neque per influxum se in aliquid extendens continuum quod sit in fieri sicut motus: tamen in sui simplicitate stando non deficit, nec deest alicui praesenti, nec defuit alicui praeterito, nec deerit alicui futuro. Aeternitas tamen est mensura existentium temporalium et aeviternorum non per extensionem, sed per indeficientiam. Et ideo cujus tempus est mensura adaequata, ejus mensura est aeternitas non adaequata, sed excellens secundum principium, medium, et finem. Et hoc est in substantia omnium stantium et necessariorum secundum illum modum quo necessaria sunt. Et quia sic est mensura temporalium, ut diximus, propter hoc quando aeternitatis distinguitur per accidens in differentias temporis, et dicitur id quod est aeternum fuisse, et esse, et fore.
Sed hic attendendum est quod quando dicitur quod est Deus, vel prima causa quae necessario est caelum, et generatum illud est, hoc quod dico quando, significat quando aeternitatis: quia hoc est in mensura et aeviterni et temporalis, ut dictum est, et non potest significare quando temporis: quia tempus nulla potest esse mensura necessarii sive aeterni. Similiter quando dicimus, quando caelum est generatum, hoc ipsum quod dico quando significat quando aeviternitatis, non temporis: quia aeviternum mensura est temporalium excellens, ideo referri potest ad temporalia. Tempus autem non est mensura aeviternorum, et ideo quando temporis in aeviternis nihil significat: et sic distinguitur ad differentias temporis per indeficientiam sicut mensura superior excellens indivisa in se, distinguitur ad divisiones mensurae inferioris quae secundum se per proprium est divisibilis. Haec est ergo prima distinctio ejus quod est quando. Sicut enim aeternitas se habet ad aeternum quod omnibus modis indivisibile est et necessarium, sic se habet aeviternitas ad aeviternum: quod quidem quodammodo non est simul, quia quamvis substantia sit in nunc aeternitatis, tamen actus ejus essentialis qui est motus, est in tempore, et potentia ad motum relata est ad nunc temporis quod continue fluit. Sic igitur per illud distinguitur quando aeternitatis et quando aeviternitatis. Et attendendum quod sicut aeternitas ad tempus se habet, et nunc aeternitatis ad nunc temporis, ita se habet quando aeternitatis ad quando temporis.
And the same instant is not time, but to be in the instant leaves the when of the present, as now to be. Although now is not time or any part of it, nevertheless, because now is adjacent to that which is moved, or to that which is, whose act is being to which time is adjacent; and therefore with regard to adjacency extrinsically it is not a difference of time. And therefore the instant leaves when just as the past does. Similarly future time is not when, but rather that which as temporal is future, because according to the succession of time it is necessary for it to happen by the necessity of motion and of the number of motion, according as something is said to be future. Thus, therefore, when is what is left from the adjacency of time from the future, as soon, or long after present being. Therefore from these things that have been said it is clear what when is insofar as it is a principle or category.
CHAPTER II.
On the species and differences of that which is when.
Marginalia Eternity; Division of temporal when.
But the division of that which is when is multiple. The first is the division which is received according to the adjacencies of those things from which it is caused, as when it is said that one thing is when of eternity, and another is when of time. The when which belongs to eternity is, for example, when God is said to have been from eternity, and God always to be going to be, and God now to be. For eternity, although it is indivisible and simple and unextended, because it has nothing of itself outside the present now instant, and is not moving itself, nor extending itself by influx into some continuum which is in becoming as motion is, nevertheless, standing in its simplicity, it does not fail, nor is it absent from any present, nor was it absent from any past, nor will it be absent from any future. Yet eternity is the measure of existing temporal and aeviternal things, not through extension, but through indeficiency. And therefore, of that of which time is the adequate measure, eternity is the non-adequate measure, but one exceeding according to beginning, middle, and end. And this is in the substance of all standing and necessary things according to that mode in which they are necessary. And because it is the measure of temporal things in this way, as we have said, on this account the when of eternity is distinguished accidentally into the differences of time, and that which is eternal is said to have been, to be, and to be going to be.
But here it must be attended that when it is said that God is, or the first cause which necessarily is heaven, and that generated thing is, this phrase which I say, when, signifies the when of eternity, because this exists in the measure both of the aeviternal and of the temporal, as has been said, and cannot signify the when of time, because time can in no way be the measure of the necessary or eternal. Likewise when we say, when heaven is generated, this very phrase which I say, when, signifies the when of aeviternity, not of time, because the aeviternal is a measure exceeding temporal things; therefore it can be referred to temporal things. But time is not the measure of aeviternal things, and therefore the when of time signifies nothing in aeviternal things. And thus it is distinguished toward the differences of time through indeficiency, just as the superior measure, exceeding and undivided in itself, is distinguished toward the divisions of the inferior measure, which according to itself is divisible through what is proper to it. This, therefore, is the first distinction of that which is when. For as eternity is related to the eternal, which is in every way indivisible and necessary, so aeviternity is related to the aeviternal; which indeed in a certain way is not simultaneous, because although its substance is in the now of eternity, nevertheless its essential act, which is motion, is in time, and potency related to motion is related to the now of time, which continuously flows. Thus, therefore, through that there is distinguished the when of eternity and the when of aeviternity. And it must be attended that as eternity is related to time, and the now of eternity to the now of time, so the when of eternity is related to the when of time.
Sed notandum est quod esse rerum et eorum quae generantur et corrumpuntur, dupliciter considerari potest. Si enim consideretur secundum quod est simplex actus essentiae simplicis, tunc procul dubio indivisibile est et totum simul: et ideo est in nunc aeternitatis vel aeviternitatis, et sic non amittit aliquid in praeteritum, nec exspectat aliquid in futurum, sed simul est totum nil sui extendens extra ipsum. Si autem consideratur prout in hujusmodi est materia permixta contrariis, sic est esse fluidum, quod non est simpliciter, sed aliquid habuit in praeterito quod non habet, et aliquid habebit in futuro quod nondum habuit in praeterito vel praesenti, et sic recipit differentias temporis, et dicitur fuit, est, vel erit.
Ex his ita traditis, accedamus ad certificationem divisionis ejus quod est quando temporis. Hoc autem sic dividitur, quod est quando aliud ex eo quod abiit, hoc est, ex praeterito: aliud autem quando est ex eo quod nunc instat et quod praesens est: aliud autem ex eo quod contingere necesse est pro temporis successione, et est quando de futuro, et est quando relictum ex differentiis temporum. Ipsae autem temporum differentiae non habent quando. Dictum est etiam in categoriis, quod praeteritum et futurum quantitates sunt in genere quantitatis ut species contentae. Et dictum est ibidem, quod sunt continuae quantitates. Continuatur enim praeteritum ad praesens: et videtur innuere, quod praeteritum sit permanentiam habens: manet enim quod est continuum existenti. Sed intelligendum quod non est dictum de praeterito quod continuum est existenti, ideo quod maneat vel quod in partibus habeat aliquam permanentiam: sed ideo dictum est continuum esse ad praesens, quia in excessu suo, hoc est, in ultimo suo in quo continuum est praesenti, non praeteriit: in illo enim continuatur praesenti nunc. Similiter est de futuro quod in principio sui continuatur ad praesens nunc.
Hoc autem signum est, quod omnia quando praeterita copulantur praesenti vel per se, vel per aliud: praeteritum etiam est quod praesenti continuum est et continuatur ad praesens. Praeteritum autem imperfectum quod secundum finem non extenditur in praesens, et ad praesens non terminatur. Praeteritum autem plus quam perfectum illud quod in praeterito ad praesens terminatum est, et per praeteritum refertur ad praesens. De futuro autem dicimus relinqui quando secundum infectionem ex tempore relictam, quamvis enim futurum nondum sit, tamen ex successione quam habet ad praesens, necesse est contingere, quod quantum ad substantiam ipsius quando accipiendam tantumdem valet ac si instaret. Nulla enim quantum ad quando accipienda differentia est in eo quod manet instans, in eo quod futurum est, et in eo quod abiit in praeterito: unum enim nunc est tota substantia temporis: esse autem temporis causatur a fluxu nunc, et ideo quamlibet partem ipsius relinquit quando in eo quod est in tempore: propter quod de futuris agitur et determinatur, cum tamen futurum nondum sit, et secundum futurum aliquid dicitur, et ipsa futura sortiuntur nuncupationem et nomen existentium. Et ideo quando accipitur a futuro sicut a praesenti: quia ex ipso fluxu temporis erit certificatum futurum tempus. Sicut dicimus, cras erit navale bellum, heri obiit Socrates: haec enim quando significant. Sic ergo aliquid dicitur quando secundum id quod futurum est: ideo, sicut dicimus, futurum necessario secundum successionem nascitur de eo quod est jam praesens. Hoc etiam fluit in futurum continuo fluxu et necessario, et per necessitatem motus primi. Unde dicimus, Callias disputabit cras, vel Callias non disputabit cras, actiones nostras ad futurum tempus referentes sicut ad praesens, eo quod certi sumus de successione futuri: disputabit enim futuram significat actionem cujus actionis adhuc nihil est in substantialibus actionibus illius.
But it must be noted that the being of things, and of those things which are generated and corrupted, can be considered in two ways. For if it is considered according as it is the simple act of a simple essence, then without doubt it is indivisible and wholly at once; and therefore it is in the now of eternity or aeviternity, and thus it loses nothing into the past, nor awaits anything in the future, but is all at once, extending nothing of itself outside itself. But if it is considered insofar as in things of this kind there is matter mixed with contraries, then being is flowing, and is not simply, but has had something in the past which it does not have, and will have something in the future which it has not yet had in the past or present; and thus it receives the differences of time, and is said to have been, to be, or to be going to be.
With these things thus handed down, let us approach the certification of the division of that which is temporal when. But this is divided so that one when is from that which has gone away, that is, from the past; another when is from that which now stands near and is present; but another is from that which must happen according to the succession of time, and it is when concerning the future, and it is when left from the differences of times. But the differences of times themselves do not have when. It has also been said in the Categories that past and future are quantities in the genus of quantity as contained species. And it was said in the same place that they are continuous quantities. For the past is continued to the present; and this seems to suggest that the past has permanence, for what is continuous with an existing thing remains. But it must be understood that it was not said of the past that it is continuous with an existing thing because it remains or because it has some permanence in its parts, but it was said to be continuous to the present because in its excess, that is, in its last point in which it is continuous with the present, it has not passed away; for in that point it is continued to the present now. It is similar concerning the future, which in its beginning is continued to the present now.
But this is the sign that all past whens are joined to the present either through themselves or through another. The past also is that which is continuous with the present and is continued to the present. But the imperfect past is that which according to its end is not extended into the present, and is not terminated at the present. But the pluperfect past is that which was terminated in the past at the present, and through the past is referred to the present. But concerning the future we say that when is left according to an infection left from time; for although the future does not yet exist, nevertheless from the succession which it has to the present, it must happen that, as regards receiving the substance of when itself, it has as much force as if it were standing near. For with respect to receiving when there is no difference in that which remains standing near, in that which is future, and in that which has gone away in the past: for one now is the whole substance of time. But the being of time is caused by the flux of now, and therefore any part of it leaves when in that which is in time. On account of this future things are treated and determined, although the future does not yet exist; and something is said according to the future, and future things themselves obtain the designation and name of existing things. And therefore when is received from the future just as from the present, because from the very flux of time future time will be made certain. As we say, tomorrow there will be a naval battle; yesterday Socrates died: for these signify when. Thus, therefore, something is said when according to that which is future; therefore, as we say, the future is necessarily born according to succession from that which is now present. This also flows into the future by continuous and necessary flux, and through the necessity of the first motion. Hence we say, Callias will dispute tomorrow, or Callias will not dispute tomorrow, referring our actions to future time as to present, because we are certain of the succession of the future. For he will dispute signifies a future action, of which action there is as yet nothing in his substantial actions.
Sic ergo patet quod ex omni differentia temporis quando relinquitur: unde est in eo quod est in tempore, sicut in mensura et numero. Sic enim cum tempus sit causa corruptionis per motum qui distare facit a principio, tempus infectionem talis distantiae relinquit in re temporali. Haec igitur infectio duobus modis potest considerari. Uno quidem modo absolute secundum quod est infectio ut forma existens in subjecto existens in re temporali: et sic est aetas. Alio modo prout ipsum in quo est, comparatur per illud ad tempus vel differentiam temporis ex quo relinquitur: et sic est quando et aliquando, quae importantur, cum dicitur olim fuisse, vel ante hoc fuisse vel esse, vel postea fore. Et hoc modo quando est praedicamentum, ut in ante habitis dictum est, et secundum hoc sua communitate ambit quando ex aeternitate, et quando ex aeviternitate, et quando ex parte, et unam rem generalium praedicat, quae cum aliis dividunt generalissima in decem genera prima. Quamvis enim aeternitas sit in aeterno sicut differens per substantiam ab ipso, et non secundum rationem nominis, dicit durationem extrinsecam adjacentem: et ipsum esse indeficiens omnibus mensurari potest. Sic relinquitur ex eo modo ejus quod est quando, sicut dicimus id quod est omnibus modis, necesse est esse semper fuisse secundum esse praeteritum, et semper esse secundum esse praesens, et semper secundum esse futurum. De tempore autem in quarto Physicorum disputatum est: de aeternitate autem in libro de Causis dictum est.
CAPUT III.
De differentia inter ubi, et quando, et qualiter unum quando differt ab alio.
Marginalia Opinio quorumdam falsa.
Differt autem quando ab eo quod est ubi in hoc quod in quocumque tempus est relinquens suam infectionem, sicut in quocumque est, fuit vel fuisse vel fore vel in praesenti esse, eo quod illa quando in eodem sicut in subjecto quod denominat est quando, et in eodem fuit vel erit vel esse vel fuisse vel fore, eo quod illa quando secundum tempora illa vel tempus dicuntur. Quando enim ex instanti praesenti nunc est semper cum ipso praesenti nunc. Unde cum dicimus, quando es? respondetur, nunc sum. Quando autem quae relinquuntur ex eo quod abiit et quod futurum expectatur, nunquam sunt cum temporibus ex quibus relinquuntur, sicut patet inquirentibus a nobis et dicentibus, quando legisti, quando fuisti? notamus quando quod est cum praesenti nunc: et respondetur tempus praeteritum dicendo, tunc fui, olim fui, vel jam fui. Similiter quaerentibus nobis, et dicentibus, quando leges, vel quando eris? quando est cum praesenti nunc, et respondetur tempus futurum, sicut post annum, vel diem, vel mensem. Unde haec duo quando nunquam in simul erunt cum temporibus ex quibus relinquuntur.
Thus, therefore, it is clear that from every difference of time when is left; hence it is in that which is in time as in measure and number. For in this way, since time is the cause of corruption through motion, which makes a thing stand apart from its principle, time leaves the infection of such distance in a temporal thing. Therefore this infection can be considered in two ways. In one way, absolutely, insofar as it is infection as a form existing in a subject existing in a temporal thing; and thus it is age. In another way, insofar as that in which it is is compared through it to time or to the difference of time from which it is left; and thus it is when and sometimes, which are imported when something is said to have been formerly, or to have been or to be before this, or to be going to be afterward. And in this way when is a category, as was said in the foregoing, and according to this by its commonness it surrounds when from eternity, when from aeviternity, and when from a part, and predicates one thing of the general things, which with the others divide the most general things into the ten first genera. For although eternity is in the eternal as differing from it by substance and not according to the account of the name, it names an extrinsic adjacent duration, and indefinite being itself can be measured by all things. Thus there is left from that mode of that which is when, as we say that what exists in all ways must always have been according to past being, and always be according to present being, and always according to future being. But concerning time there has been disputation in the fourth book of the Physics; and concerning eternity there has been discussion in the book On Causes.
CHAPTER III.
On the difference between where and when, and how one when differs from another.
Marginalia False opinion of certain men.
But when differs from that which is where in this, that in whatever thing time exists leaving its infection, as in whatever thing there is, was, or to have been, or to be going to be, or to be in the present, because that when is in the same thing as in the subject which it denominates as when, and in the same thing was or will be, or to be or to have been or to be going to be, because those whens are said according to those times or time. For the when from the present instant now is always with that present now itself. Hence when we say, when are you? the answer is, now I am. But the whens which are left from that which has gone away and that future which is expected are never with the times from which they are left, as is clear when people ask us and say, when did you read, when were you? we note the when which is with the present now, and past time is answered by saying, then I was, formerly I was, or now I was. Likewise when people ask us and say, when will you read, or when will you be? the when is with the present now, and future time is answered, as after a year, or a day, or a month. Hence these two whens will never be at once with the times from which they are left.
Hoc tamen generale est, quod quando et tempus secundum quod est numerus, sunt in eodem sicut in subjecto. Ubi vero et locus a quo sicut a causa fit ipsum ubi, nunquam sunt in eodem sicut in subjecto. Ubi enim sicut in subjecto est in circumscripto et locato corpore. Locus autem, qui est ultima superficies continentis, non est in locato extenso sicut in subjecto, sed est in complectente et continente, cujus ultimum est superficies locans.
Hic est tamen attendendum quod tempus ut continuum, et ut forma extra mensurans, est in subjecto in primo motu et mobili: ut mensurans autem et numerans essentialiter in temporalibus, sicut numerus materialis, tam decem oves quam decem canes, quamvis formalis numerus et forma numeri et species sit una, sicut unum tempus est ovium temporalium, ut unum numerans vel mensurans, quamvis mensurante modo tot sunt temporalia quot quando. Et hoc modo dicitur temporale (secundum quod constat sub tempore sicut sub numero) habere quando: et quando hoc modo est in ipso sicut in subjecto: et tempus hoc modo sumptum in temporali semper est in eodem in quo est quando. Ubi autem nunquam est in eodem in quo est locus.
Sed, ut dicit Anselmus, nunc aeternitatis se habet ad nunc temporis et ad totum tempus, sicut se habet nunc temporis et ad omnem locum et ad omnia quae in loco sunt. Nunc enim temporis ut indivisibile continet locum et locata omnia quae valde divisibilia sunt: eo quod per unum quod est in omnibus mensura est eorum, et hoc est esse, cujus propria mensura est tempus, vel aeternum, vel aeviternum. Similiter nunc aeternitatis quod indivisibile est, per indeficientiam comprehendit nunc tempus, et totum praesens per hoc quod duratio fluens sicut a causa et exclusio fluet a duratione stante vel indivisibili. Et hoc est quod dicit Boetius in Consolatione philosophiae: Qui tempus ab aevo ire jubes.
Est etiam adhuc considerandum quod illud quando quod relinquitur ex eo quod est praeteritum, differt ab eo quod relinquitur ex futuro, in hoc, quia quando quod ex futuro est, praeterito est semper prius: quando autem quod est ex praeterito, est posterius quam futurum. Si autem unum et idem quando secundum substantiam temporis accipiatur, hoc est, in nunc quod est substantia: tunc quando unum et idem: primum quidem ex futuro, secundum vero ex praesenti, posterius vero ex praeterito secundum periodi circulationem, in quo futurum est, aut praesens, aut praeteritum: quemadmodum et tempus primum quod est futurum, postea praesens quando futurum advenit, deinde praeteritum cum praesens abiit. Et sicut in tempore sic est indeficientia aeternitatis quando ad temporis differentias recipit distinctionem, sive enim divisibilis secundum se mensura est, sive indivisibilis, nihil differt: quia non ex hoc relinquit quando quod est simplex vel compositum, sed ex hoc quod ut extrinsecus adjacens est esse mensura in eo quod est: sic enim suae indeficientiae relinquit impressionem in eo quod est, per quam id quod habet esse, mensurae extrinsecus adjacenti sic vel sic comparatur: et hoc est quando secundum quod est praedicamentum.
Yet this is general: when and time, insofar as time is number, are in the same thing as in a subject. But where and the place from which where itself comes to be as from a cause are never in the same thing as in a subject. For where as in a subject is in the circumscribed and located body. But place, which is the outermost surface of the containing thing, is not in the located extended thing as in a subject, but is in the embracing and containing thing, whose outermost thing is the locating surface.
Yet here it must be attended that time as continuous, and as a form measuring from outside, is in a subject in the first motion and movable thing. But as measuring and numbering essentially in temporal things, it is like a material number, both ten sheep and ten dogs, although formal number and the form of number and the species are one, just as there is one time of temporal sheep, as one numbering or measuring thing, although in the mode of measuring there are as many temporal things as there are whens. And in this way a temporal thing is said, according as it stands under time as under number, to have when; and when in this way is in it as in a subject, and time taken in this way in a temporal thing is always in the same thing in which when is. But where is never in the same thing in which place is.
But, as Anselm says, the now of eternity is related to the now of time and to all time, as the now of time is related both to every place and to all things which are in place. For the now of time, as indivisible, contains place and all located things, which are very divisible, because through one thing which is in all things, there is their measure, and this is being, whose proper measure is time, or the eternal, or the aeviternal. Likewise the now of eternity, which is indivisible, comprehends now time and the whole present by indeficiency, through this, that flowing duration, as from a cause, and exclusion flow from standing or indivisible duration. And this is what Boethius says in the Consolation of Philosophy: You command time to go from eternity.
It must also still be considered that that when which is left from what is past differs from that which is left from the future in this, that the when which is from the future is always prior to the past; but the when which is from the past is later than the future. But if one and the same when is received according to the substance of time, that is, in the now which is the substance, then when is one and the same: first indeed from the future, but second from the present, and later from the past according to the circulation of the period, in which the future is either present or past; just as time is first future, afterward present when the future arrives, and then past when the present has gone away. And as it is in time, so in the indeficiency of eternity when receives distinction according to the differences of time, for whether the measure is divisible according to itself or indivisible, it makes no difference, because it leaves when which is simple or composite not from this, but from this, that as extrinsically adjacent it is the measure of being in that which is. For thus by its indeficiency it leaves an impression in that which is, through which that which has being is compared in this way or that way to the extrinsic adjacent measure; and this is when insofar as it is a category.
Sunt tamen qui dicunt quod unum et idem est quando aeternitatis et temporis differentia per accidens, hoc scilicet quod in aeternitate ut stans, in tempore autem ut fluens continue. Sed hanc positionem opinamur esse falsam, nisi dicant nunc aeternitatis exemplariter et causaliter esse in nunc temporis. Sed tunc ex hoc non sequetur, quod sit idem nunc secundum substantiam, sed secundum formam tantum, hoc modo quo exemplum et exemplatum in forma non secundum genus vel speciem, sed secundum proportionem similia esse possunt.
CAPUT IV.
De divisione ipsius quando comparata ad tempus a quo causatur.
Marginalia Prima objectio; Secunda; Tertia; Quarta; Ad primam; Ad secundam et alias.
Sicut autem tempus est aliud compositum, aliud vero simplex: et compositum quidem est, quod est in composita actione, hoc est, quod compositae actionis est mensura: simplex vero tempus est quod procedit cum actione simplici, cujus ipsum est mensura: ita et quando quod ex adjacentia temporis relinquitur, aliud est simplex, et aliud est compositum. Simplex quidem quod in momento esse et in nunc esse dicitur. Compositum autem quod ex composito tempore relinquitur, ut in hora esse, vel in die, vel hebdomada, vel mense, vel anno, et similibus.
Haec autem quae dicta sunt, sophisticam habent calumniam. Si enim objicitur, actio est in motu, et omnis motus in actione firmatur, ut in tractatu de Actione dictum est: nullus autem motus simplex est: videbitur quod actio nulla simplex esse possit, sed omnis actio composita.
Adhuc, cum omne tempus sit continuum, et quaelibet pars continui sit continua et composita, videtur quod nullum sit simplex tempus.
Adhuc autem dicitur quod simplex tempus sit sicut in momento et in nunc esse: est autem momentum indivisibile tempus: et sic momentum nec est tempus, nec pars temporis, et sic nec erit tempus: et sequitur ulterius, quod quando non sit simplex.
Adhuc de nunc dicit Aristoteles 4 quod non est tempus, nec pars temporis, sed temporis substantia: et sic videtur habere calumniam quod hic dicitur.
Ad haec et similia dicendum est, quod est actio simplex, et actio composita. Actio enim generantis prout generatio est finis motus, et non motus, est vere actio quae est generatio, et simplex est omnino et impartibilis, et est de non esse in esse simplex et non composita mutatio. Et simpliciter est actio creantis secundum quod est creans. Et similiter dicit Averroes de illuminatione ad hunc vel ad illum locum prout est finis motus localis quo movetur illuminans, quod est actio simplex, non habens aliquam divisionem, sicut omnis continui finis simplex est, et cum quodlibet illorum vere actio sit. Quod autem inducit quod omnis actio in motu, et omnis motus in actione firmatur. Ibidem in tractatu de Actione patet solutio: hoc enim intelligas de motu secundum quod motus est actus perfecti et perfectus: hoc autem est secundum quod est actus moventis, et non ejus quod movetur. Motus autem secundum hunc modum est actus simplex, et non continuus, vel compositus: sed secundum quod est actus imperfectus, sic est continuus et compositus.
Yet there are those who say that the when of eternity and of time is one and the same, differing accidentally, namely that it is in eternity as standing, but in time as flowing continuously. But we think this position is false, unless they say that the now of eternity exists in the now of time exemplarily and causally. But then from this it will not follow that it is the same now according to substance, but only according to form, in the way in which an exemplar and what is exemplified can be similar in form, not according to genus or species, but according to proportion.
CHAPTER IV.
On the division of when itself compared to the time by which it is caused.
Marginalia First objection; Second; Third; Fourth; To the first; To the second and the others.
But just as time is one thing composite and another thing simple, and indeed composite time is that which is in a composite action, that is, that which is the measure of a composite action, while simple time is that which proceeds with a simple action, of which it itself is the measure; so also when, which is left from the adjacency of time, one is simple and another composite. Simple is what is said to be in a moment and to be in now. Composite is what is left from composite time, as to be in an hour, or in a day, or week, or month, or year, and in similar things.
But these things which have been said have a sophistical attack. For if it is objected that action is in motion and every motion is confirmed in action, as was said in the tractate on Action, but no motion is simple, it will seem that no action can be simple, but every action is composite.
Further, since every time is continuous, and any part of a continuum is continuous and composite, it seems that no time is simple.
Further, it is said that simple time is like being in a moment and in now. But a moment is indivisible time; and thus a moment is neither time nor a part of time, and so it will not be time; and it follows further that when is not simple.
Further, concerning now Aristotle says 4 that it is not time, nor a part of time, but the substance of time; and thus what is said here seems to have an attack.
To these and similar things one must say that there is simple action and composite action. For the action of a generator, insofar as generation is the end of motion and not motion, is truly an action which is generation, and it is wholly simple and impartible, and is a simple and non-composite change from non-being into being. And simply it is the action of one creating insofar as he is creating. And likewise Averroes says concerning illumination to this or that place, insofar as it is the end of the local motion by which the illuminating thing is moved, that it is a simple action, not having any division, just as the end of every continuum is simple, and each of those is truly an action. But as for what he introduces, that every action is in motion and every motion is confirmed in action, the solution is clear in the same place in the tractate on Action: for you should understand this of motion insofar as motion is the act of the perfect and is perfect; but this is according as it is the act of the mover, and not of that which is moved. But motion according to this mode is a simple act and not continuous or composite; but insofar as it is an imperfect act, in this way it is continuous and composite.
Ad hoc autem quod objicitur de tempore, dicendum quod tempus dupliciter accipitur, secundum esse scilicet, et secundum substantiam. Secundum esse quidem acceptum, verum est quod nullum est tempus simplex, sed omne tempus compositum: secundum substantiam autem est aliquod tempus simplex, nunc scilicet et momentum, quod (sicut jam ante diximus) a tempore non differt in hoc quod ex ipso quando relinquitur sicut ex tempore: et sic intelligitur cum dicitur, tempus est simplex, et quando simplex.
Quidam autem aliter dixerunt, quod actio simplex, scilicet ad nos, et non simplex quoad nos, quae repente fit, hoc est, in tempore cujus distinctio est imperceptibilis. Et similiter dicunt de tempore simplici. Et haec fuga est, et non verum quod dicunt est. Sunt enim multae actiones simplices, sicut patet per ea quae inducta sunt: et simpliciter cum verbo substantivo dicitur, sum, es, est: tamen totum suum condeclineum dicit substantiam ut actum et actionem: quae actio si accipiatur ut essentiae actio vel actus, non potest intelligi nisi simplex actio: et cum hoc actio temporalis vel simplex tempus, quod adjacentia est mensura ejus, relinquit quando. Sicut enim tempus adjacet mobili, sic ei quod movetur secundum quod unum est in toto motu, adjacet mensurans nunc: et ideo quando relinquit nunc sicut tempus: et quoad hoc quod est substantia temporis quando ex se relinquens, hoc tempus esse dicitur. Sic ergo intelligendum est quod hic dictum est.
Amplius autem adhuc et in hoc conveniunt tempus et quando, quod quemadmodum temporis partes sibi invicem sine mora, sive continue succedunt: similiter sibi ipsa quando, quae ex temporibus relinquuntur: quando enim quod est in praeterito, et quando quod est in futuro, copulative reducuntur sive copulantur ad praesens nunc, sicut partes continui copulantur ad punctum: non autem sic copularentur nisi talis esset successio ex praeterito in praesens, et ex praesenti in futurum, vel e converso futuri in praesens, et praesentis in praeteritum. Variabilis enim est successio secundum periodum: secundum actiones autem quae tempore mensurantur, est ex praeterito in praesens, et ex praesenti in futurum.
Quamvis tempus et quando in his quae dicta sunt conveniant, tamen tempus differt ab eo quod est quando: quia quod in tempore est, in eo est sicut in numero numerante: et quia numerus est mensura numerati, ideo secundum tempus aliquid est mensurabile, sicut dicimus, quod aliquis est annuus ex tempore sive mensura temporis, et aliquis diurnus, et aliquis est hebdomadalis mensurati: et aliquando sine distinctione numeri dicimus, quod motus est multus, eo quod motus ille multo tempore permaneat sive duret. Secundum quando autem nihil mensuratur, sed simpliciter quando vel aliquando esse vel fuisse vel fore dicitur: et hoc secundum idem secundum quod temporale vel variabile variatur temporale: et secundum idem etiam quando variatur: et sic.
But to what is objected about time, one must say that time is received in two ways, namely according to being and according to substance. Received according to being, it is true that no time is simple, but every time is composite; but according to substance there is some simple time, namely now and moment, which, as we have already said before, does not differ from time in this, that when is left from it as from time. And thus it is understood when it is said, time is simple, and when is simple.
Certain people, however, spoke otherwise, that action is simple, namely with respect to us, and not simple in relation to us, when it happens suddenly, that is, in time whose distinction is imperceptible. And they say likewise about simple time. And this is an evasion, and what they say is not true. For there are many simple actions, as is clear through the things that have been introduced; and simply, with the substantive verb, one says, I am, you are, he is; nevertheless its whole inflected set names substance as act and action. If this action is received as the action or act of essence, it can only be understood as simple action; and with this, temporal action or simple time, which by adjacency is its measure, leaves when. For just as time is adjacent to the movable thing, so to that which is moved, according as it is one in the whole motion, the measuring now is adjacent; and therefore when leaves now just as time does; and with respect to this, because it is the substance of time leaving when from itself, this is said to be time. Thus, therefore, what has been said here must be understood.
Moreover, time and when also agree further in this, that just as the parts of time succeed one another without delay, or continuously, so likewise the very whens which are left from times succeed one another. For when which is in the past and when which is in the future are copulatively reduced or joined to the present now, as parts of a continuum are joined to a point. But they would not be joined in this way unless there were such a succession from past into present, and from present into future, or conversely from future into present and from present into past. For succession is variable according to the period; but according to the actions which are measured by time, it is from past into present and from present into future.
Although time and when agree in these things that have been said, nevertheless time differs from that which is when, because what is in time is in it as in a numbering number; and because number is the measure of the numbered thing, therefore something is measurable according to time, as we say that someone is annual from time or the measure of time, and someone is daily, and someone is weekly as measured. And sometimes without distinction of number we say that motion is much, because that motion remains or endures through much time. But according to when nothing is measured, but simply to be when or sometime, or to have been or to be going to be, is said; and this is according to the same thing according to which the temporal or variable thing is varied as temporal; and according to the same thing also when is varied; and thus.
Notes
- Chapter 14. (Cap. 14.) ↩
- What passion properly is; and concerning this signification see Metaphysics 3, text-comment 26. (Passio proprie quid, et de hoc significato vide 3 Metaphys. tex. com. 26.) ↩
- Aristotle, In Physics 4, text-comment 115. (Aristoteles, In 4 Physic. tex. com. 115.) ↩
- Aristotle, In Physics 4, text-comment 110 and 121. (Aristoteles, In 4 Physic. tex. com. 110 et 121.) ↩
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