Volume 1 · pp. 317–328
Book on the Six Principles, Tractate I chapter VII; Tractate II on Action, chapters I-VI
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CAPUT VII.
De inventione formae ad intellectum dictorum.
Marginalia Expositio quorumdam; Improbatio expositionis; Expositio aliorum.
Ad intellectum autem omnium quae dicta sunt, sciendum est quod formae nomen et rationem primi invenerunt Stoici, et ante eos qui Philosophi fuerunt Epicurei, omnem causam ad materiam retulerunt. Videntes enim quod nihil est in materia per quod id quod formabile formatur, et quod materia formabilis formantis se formae causa esse non potest, dixerunt formas a materia esse separatas: eo quod quaecumque sunt in materia formae, in materiam inductae sunt, et ideo non possunt esse causae formationis materiae. Id enim quod per se et substantialiter et secundum seipsum causa est formationis, non est formatum, sed formans secundum seipsum: et ideo tales formas indifferenter formantes extra materiam esse posuerunt, et separatas in lumine primorum agentium intellectuum existentes: ex quibus sicut ex quodam sigillo omnium formae quae formantur, produci habent.
Has autem formas sic foris manentes et omnia formantes, cum ipso lumine agentium intellectuum expandi dixerunt super formanda: et ideo tales formas dixerunt esse principia formalia incorruptibilia, per quae vera habetur scientia et notitia rerum, sicut lumine solis color expanditur vel effunditur super colorata visibilia, secundum eos qui dicunt (sicut et verum est) quod colores non sunt in tenebris, sed in adventu luminis expanduntur super corpora terminata: propter quod etiam Pythagorici colorem epiphanium, hoc est, supereminentem nominaverunt. Hoc igitur modo dixerunt a separatis formis per intelligentiae agentis lumen formas effundi materiales, et ideo materiales formas non vere dici formas, sed verarum formarum imagines: sed tam separatas, quam imagines earum de rebus praedicari: separatas quidem, eo quod in materia lumine intelligentiae, quod penetrativum est rerum, infunduntur omnibus, et faciunt esse, et sunt principia cognitionis ipsorum: imagines autem ideo quod sunt similitudines illarum, et sunt in materia secundum esse, et mutabiles secundum mutationem materiae. Sed quod imagines sunt principia cognoscendi ea quorum formae sunt, hoc habent a formis separatis, quae stabiles et certae sunt causae rerum 1.
Talem igitur formam dicunt aliqui esse formam, quae compositioni contingit, eo quod super compositum lumine intelligentiae diffunditur: et quod haec sit quae simplici et invariabili esse consistit, quia simplex est quod in lumine intelligentiae est: et invariabile est, quod variatione materiae non variatur, quia quamvis materia varietur sub ista forma, tamen ipsa non innititur nisi lumine intelligentiae, et non variatur, sicut videmus in arte a coloratis variatis non variari colores, eo quod soli innituntur lumine, quod est in perspicuo non in quantum est elementum, vel elementatum, vel corpus mutabile secundum formam, sed secundum quod perspicuum communicat cum perpetuo superius corpore. Haec autem istorum expositio non facit ad propositum, quia talis forma non est divisibilis in substantialem et accidentalem, nec universalem et particularem.
Ideo alii dicunt, quod forma quae est compositioni contingens, est forma accidentalis. Accidens enim est quod est in aliquo quod perfectum est secundum esse, ut dicit Avicenna. Et ideo etiam accidens est, quia totum esse et perfectum consequitur. Et quia id quod perfecte est, compositum est, ideo dicunt quod haec forma non contingit nisi secundum substantiam compositioni, ut scilicet compositio secundum accidens semper sibi praesupponat compositionem secundum substantiam. Qualiter autem haec forma simplici et invariabili essentia consistat, non est facile probare: cum accidens, ut probat Aristoteles in undecimo primae philosophiae, non sit essentia, sed esse: nec omnino est simplex essentia, in cujus ratione semper est subjectum: nec invariabile omnino esse possit, quod secundum esse semper innititur ei quod continue variatur. Ideo enim dicit Aristoteles 2 quod non est eadem sanitas in mane et in vespere, quia sanitas complexioni animalis innititur, quod continue variatur propter agentium et patientium continuam actionem et passionem. Adhuc autem haec forma accidentalis non recipit divisiones formae generaliter, quae inductae sunt.
CHAPTER VII.
On the discovery of form, for the understanding of the things said.
Marginalia Exposition of certain men; Rejection of the exposition; Exposition of others.
For the understanding of all the things that have been said, one must know that the Stoics first discovered the name and account of form, and before them those Epicureans who were philosophers referred every cause to matter. For seeing that there is nothing in matter by which that which is formable is formed, and that formable matter cannot be the cause of the form forming itself, they said that forms are separated from matter: because whatever forms are in matter have been introduced into matter, and therefore they cannot be causes of the formation of matter. For that which through itself and substantially and according to itself is the cause of formation is not formed, but forming according to itself; and therefore they posited such forms, forming indifferently, to be outside matter, and to exist separated in the light of the first agent intellects: from which, as from a certain seal, the forms of all things which are formed must be produced.
But these forms thus remaining outside and forming all things, they said to be expanded with the very light of the agent intellects over the things to be formed; and therefore they said that such forms are incorruptible formal principles, through which true science and knowledge of things is had, just as by the light of the sun color is expanded or poured over colored visible things, according to those who say, as is also true, that colors are not in darkness, but at the coming of light are expanded over bounded bodies. On this account the Pythagoreans also named color epiphanium, that is, supereminent. In this way, therefore, they said that material forms are poured from separated forms through the light of the agent intelligence, and therefore that material forms are not truly called forms, but images of true forms; but that both the separated forms and their images are predicated of things: the separated forms indeed, because in matter, through the light of intelligence, which is penetrative of things, they are poured into all things and make being, and are principles of knowing those things; the images, however, because they are likenesses of those forms, and are in matter according to being, and are changeable according to the change of matter. But that the images are principles of knowing the things of which they are forms, they have this from the separated forms, which are stable and certain causes of things 1.
Therefore some say that this sort of form is the form which is contingent to composition, because it is diffused over the composite by the light of intelligence; and that this is the one which consists in simple and invariable being, because that which is in the light of intelligence is simple, and that is invariable which is not varied by the variation of matter. For although matter is varied under that form, nevertheless the form itself rests only on the light of intelligence and is not varied, just as we see in art that, when colored things are varied, colors are not varied, because they rest only upon light, which is in the transparent not insofar as it is an element, or something made of elements, or a body changeable according to form, but insofar as the transparent communicates with the perpetual higher body. But this exposition of theirs does not fit the present purpose, because such a form is not divisible into substantial and accidental, nor into universal and particular.
Therefore others say that the form which is contingent to composition is accidental form. For an accident is that which is in something that is perfect according to being, as Avicenna says. And therefore it is also an accident because it follows upon whole and perfect being. And because that which is perfectly is composite, therefore they say that this form is contingent upon composition only according to substance, so that composition according to accident always presupposes for itself composition according to substance. But in what way this form consists in a simple and invariable essence is not easy to prove, since an accident, as Aristotle proves in the eleventh book of First Philosophy, is not essence but being; nor is it altogether a simple essence, since a subject is always in its account; nor can it be altogether invariable in being, since according to being it always rests upon that which is continuously varied. For this reason Aristotle says 2 that health is not the same in the morning and in the evening, because health rests upon the complexion of the animal, which is continuously varied on account of the continuous action and passion of agents and patients. Further, this accidental form does not receive the divisions of form in general which have been introduced.
Oportet igitur dici quod forma de qua locuti sumus, sit forma quae est universale. Haec forma totius forma est, et non partis, et compositio ipsa in composito materialis est ad illam, sicut compositum ex anima rationali et corpore materiali est ad hominem: aliter enim praedicabile non esset, nisi esset intentio non partis sed totius: et haec est forma rationis et logica. Forma vero quae in physicis principium est, forma partis est et non totius. Et quia haec forma est totius, ideo diffinitio quae talis formae est, dicit quidditatem et continet in se tam potentialia quam actualia, et tam materialia relata ad formam quam formalia relata ad materiam, sicut animal rationale et mortale, animal enim potentiale et materiale est, alia autem sunt actualia sive formalia. Hoc est igitur compositioni contingere hoc modo quo dictum est ad minus compositioni ejus quod est et quo est, de quibus in libro de Causis habet plene determinari. Et haec forma consistit et est essentia lumine intelligentiae nitens, et consistens invariabilis per se vel per proprium esse suum, variata per accidens secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo. Haec etiam forma divisibilis est omni formae divisione quae determinata est. Et haec forma est, ratione cujus omne quod ordinatur in genere vel specie, rationem recipit suae coordinationis. De hac igitur intelligendum est omne quod de forma hic dictum est.
TRACTATUS II
DE ACTIONE.
CAPUT I.
An actio sit praedicamentum vel principium.
Marginalia A quo causatur actio; Prima objectio; Secunda; Tertia; Quarta; Quare actio fuit primum inter principia; Ad primam objectionem; Ad secundam; Ad tertiam et quartam; Actio est perfecti, passio autem imperfecti; Differentia inter agere et facere.
His igitur quae de forma dicuntur sic praemissis, jam de singulis quae in categoriis dicta non sunt restat dicendum. Et primum de actione quae inter alia videtur cum his quae extrinsecus substantiae accidunt convenire. Causatur enim a naturali potentia rei: naturalis autem potentia radicatur in ipsa rei substantia. Et attende quod quidam dicunt actionem non esse principium, eo quod principium nihil ponit ante se causans praecedens ipsum. Actio autem et agens et potentiam naturalem agentis ante se ponit per intellectum.
Dicunt etiam, quod Aristoteles dicere videtur 3, quod actio et passio idem sunt numero, sicut via quae est a Thebis ad Athenas eadem numero est ea quae est ab Athenis ad Thebas. Sic cum actio sit comparatio agentis ad patiens, et passio sit e contra comparatio patientis ad agens, videtur actio idem numero esse passioni. Et sic ista duo principia non sunt dicenda duo, sed unum et idem numero: diversa tamen per terminos.
Therefore it is necessary to say that the form about which we have spoken is the form which is universal. This form is the form of the whole, and not of a part, and the composition itself in the composite is material in relation to it, just as the composite from a rational soul and a material body is material in relation to human being. For otherwise it would not be predicable, unless it were an intention not of a part but of the whole; and this is the form of reason and logical form. But the form which is a principle in physical things is the form of a part and not of the whole. And because this form is of the whole, therefore the definition which belongs to such a form says the quiddity and contains within itself both potential and actual things, and both material things referred to form and formal things referred to matter, as rational and mortal animal: for animal is potential and material, but the others are actual or formal. This, therefore, is to be contingent to composition in the way that has been said, at least to the composition of that which is and that by which it is, concerning which there must be a full determination in the book On Causes. And this form consists and is an essence resting on the light of intelligence, and consisting invariable through itself or through its own proper being, but varied accidentally according to the being which it has in this or in that. This form also is divisible by every division of form which has been determined. And this is the form by reason of which everything that is ordered in genus or species receives the account of its own coordination. Therefore everything that has been said here about form must be understood of this form.
TRACTATE II
ON ACTION.
CHAPTER I.
Whether action is a category or a principle.
Marginalia From what action is caused; First objection; Second; Third; Fourth; Why action was first among the principles; To the first objection; To the second; To the third and fourth; Action belongs to the perfect, but passion to the imperfect; Difference between to act and to make.
Therefore, with these things that are said about form thus set beforehand, it remains now to speak about each of the things that have not been discussed in the Categories. And first concerning action, which among the others seems to agree with those things which befall substance extrinsically. For it is caused by the natural potency of a thing; but natural potency is rooted in the very substance of the thing. And note that certain people say that action is not a principle, because a principle posits nothing before itself as a cause preceding it. But action posits before itself, according to understanding, both the agent and the natural potency of the agent.
They also say that Aristotle seems to say 3 that action and passion are the same in number, just as the road which is from Thebes to Athens is the same in number as that which is from Athens to Thebes. Thus, since action is the comparison of agent to patient, and passion conversely is the comparison of patient to agent, action seems to be the same in number as passion. And so those two principles must not be called two, but one and the same in number, diverse nevertheless by their terms.
Adhuc quia motus est actus agentis quo movetur patiens, et est actus patientis quo movetur ab agente, videtur quod motus sit una natura actionis et passionis: et quorum una est natura, illa sunt unum, videtur ex hoc, quod actio et passio sint principium et praedicamentum unum, et quod hoc praedicamentum sit motus.
Adhuc etiam congruentius videtur esse, quod motus sit praedicamentum quam actio: quia motus sic est actus moventis secundum quem mota substantia agit, et sic videtur motus esse causa actionis in id quod subjicitur, quia si non moveret, non ageret in ipsum. Est ergo motus causa actionis, et sic principium respectu actionis. Congruentius ergo videtur dici, quod motus sit praedicamentum, quam actio vel passio.
Ad haec autem et similia dicendum est, quod actio est principium et primum inter principia, sicut dictum est, eo quod ab intrinseco formali causatur: passio autem causatur ab intrinseco materiali, et ideo posteriori modo se habet ad substantiam: et quia substantia composita ex formali et materiali consistit, et in omni natura, ut dicit Aristoteles 4, est aliquid quo est agere, et aliquid quo est pati et fieri, ideo substantiae proprium est agere et pati. Et quod dicit, quod actio ante se aliquid ponit, scilicet naturalem potentiam, Dicendum quod verum est, quod praeponit sibi naturalem potentiam secundum efficientem causam, sed non praeponit sibi eam ut formale suae communitatis principium. Efficiens autem causa, quia nihil sui ponit in effectu, nec est causa unitatis rei nec diversitatis in effectu, ideo non propter hoc impeditur quin actio possit esse principium, et sit principium formale totius illius coordinationis, quae rem suam dicunt ut facere vel agere: haec enim non in praedicamento qualitatis, sed in genere actionis coordinantur: hoc enim modo decem genera dicuntur prima rerum principia, quia sunt primae formae, ad quarum modum praedicationis omnia sibi similia reduci habent, ut in illam communem formam coordinabilia.
Quod autem objicitur, quod eadem sit actio et passio, Dicendum quod non sunt eadem nisi in materia quae est quidem in qua est actio sicut in subjecto ad quod dirigitur et ad quod terminatur actio agentis, et ipsa eadem materia quae subjectum est passionis. Propter talem autem materiae identitatem, non oportet quod idem formale principium sit actionis et passionis, in quantum unum est actio, et alterum est passio. Hoc enim impossibile est. Oppositi enim modi formales sunt actionis et passionis. Quia modus et forma actionis est sicut imprimentis et influentis: modus autem passionis est sicut impressi vel influxi: propter quod etiam voces haec significantes, diversa sunt praedicamenta vel principia 5.
Et quod objicitur de motu, Dicendum quod motus non sicut una natura et una forma est moventis et moti, nec agentis et patientis. Est enim actus perfectus prout est actus moventis et agentis: etiam est actus imperfectus prout est actus mobilis et patientis: et quia non est utriusque ut una natura, ideo non potest esse causa, quod unum sit principium vel praedicamentum actio in agente, et passio in patiente. Motus etiam in se non est unius formae et naturae: quia non est alicujus speciei entis perfectae, sed fluxus de natura in naturam, et de forma in formam, et de potentia in actum. Et ideo per unitatem naturae motus nihil probari potest de unitate vel diversitate principiorum vel praedicamentorum.
Further, because motion is the act of the agent by which the patient is moved, and is the act of the patient by which it is moved by the agent, motion seems to be one nature of action and passion; and things of which there is one nature are one. From this it seems that action and passion are one principle and one category, and that this category is motion.
Further also it seems more fitting that motion, rather than action, should be a category, because motion is the act of the mover in such a way that according to it a moved substance acts; and thus motion seems to be the cause of action into that which is subjected, because if it did not move, it would not act upon it. Therefore motion is the cause of action, and thus a principle with respect to action. Therefore it seems more fitting to say that motion is a category than that action or passion is.
But to these and similar points one must say that action is a principle and the first among the principles, as has been said, because it is caused from the intrinsic formal principle; but passion is caused from the intrinsic material principle, and therefore it is related to substance in a posterior way. And because a composite substance consists of the formal and the material, and in every nature, as Aristotle says 4, there is something by which there is acting, and something by which there is suffering and becoming, therefore to act and to suffer are proper to substance. And as for what he says, that action posits something before itself, namely natural potency, one must say that it is true that it puts natural potency before itself according to the efficient cause, but it does not put it before itself as the formal principle of its own commonness. But the efficient cause, because it puts nothing of itself in the effect and is not the cause of the unity of a thing nor of diversity in the effect, does not for this reason prevent action from being able to be a principle, and from being the formal principle of the whole of that coordination which its own thing names as to make or to act. For these are coordinated not in the category of quality but in the genus of action; for in this way the ten genera are called the first principles of things, because they are the first forms, to whose mode of predication all things similar to them must be reduced, as things coordinable into that common form.
But concerning the objection that action and passion are the same, one must say that they are the same only in matter, which is indeed that in which action exists as in the subject to which the action of the agent is directed and at which it is terminated, and the very same matter is the subject of passion. But on account of such identity of matter, it is not necessary that the same formal principle be the principle of action and of passion, insofar as one is action and the other is passion. For this is impossible. For the formal modes of action and passion are opposed. For the mode and form of action is like that of impressing and flowing in; but the mode of passion is like that of what has been impressed or flowed into. On this account also the words signifying these things are diverse categories or principles 5.
And concerning the objection about motion, one must say that motion is not as one nature and one form of the mover and the moved, nor of the agent and the patient. For it is a perfect act insofar as it is the act of the mover and agent; it is also an imperfect act insofar as it is the act of the movable and patient. And because it does not belong to both as one nature, therefore it cannot be the cause that action in the agent and passion in the patient are one principle or category. Motion also in itself is not of one form and nature, because it is not of some perfected species of being, but a flowing from nature into nature, from form into form, and from potency into act. And therefore through the unity of the nature of motion nothing can be proved about the unity or diversity of principles or categories.
Et quod objicitur per similitudinem viae duorum terminorum, quod eadem numero sit actio et passio, Dicendum quod non est simile, quia in via substantia materiae et substantia formae manet eadem, nihil habens diversum nisi terminos: motus autem secundum formam non manet idem. Unde secundum alias formas mutatur id quod denigratur et id quod dealbatur. Et similiter est quod secundum aliam formam est passum comparatum ad agens, et agens comparatum ad patiens: propter quod diversa sunt praedicamenta. Actio enim semper est perfecti, secundum quod est in agente sicut in causa et subjecto. Passio autem semper est imperfecti, secundum quod est in patiente sicut in subjecto et mobili. Ex his omnibus igitur quae dicta sunt, relinquitur quod actio sit speciale praedicamentum.
Differt autem agere ab actione in hoc, quod actio dicit actionem ut conceptam: agere autem actionem dicit ut exercitam. Et hoc modo secundo est praedicamentum. Quia sic specialem modum dicit praedicationis, qui ad alium aliquem de decem modis praedicandi reduci non potest: qui modus ut voce designatur, dat vocem primam quae est una decem vocum unius primorum generum significativa. Actio autem ut conceptus designativa, non dicit illum modum praedicationis, et ideo nomine actionis principium illud non proprie designatur, sed agere nominatur verbaliter significando, quia non designat actionem ut exercitam.
Attendendum etiam, quod quamvis agere secundum Aristotelem in sexto Ethicorum differat a facere 6: agere enim fit actione pertinente ad voluntatem vel electionem, facere autem est operari super alienam vel extrinsecam materiam: tamen prout hic sumitur agere et facere, pro eodem accipiuntur. Unum enim modum in communi habent praedicationis, ad quem ordinantur omnia praedicabilia ipsorum secundum genus et species. Omne enim illud quod procedit continue ab agente vel operante in patiens, vocatur hic actio vel agere. Et hoc est quod dicit Averroes, quod actio est effectiva comparatio agentis ad patiens. Sic enim actio est fluens operatio ab agente in patiens: et ideo quia est agentis forma fluens in patiens, ideo movetur patiens: sicut movet generans per se vel per accidens id in quo inducit formam suam: et hoc movens est agens, et motus moventis est actio ejus. Et similiter intelligens est agens, et intelligere actio est: et faciens est agens, et facere est actio ejus. Et in hoc ambitu communitatis dicit agere vel facere genus generalissimum principium quoddam: et vox ipsa significat unam primarum rerum quae communitate sua multa, ut genera, et species, et individua complectitur una coordinatione sub primo communi contenta. Cujus subalterna genera sunt agere, quando proprie accipitur quod actio est operatio electionis. Et alterum genus est facere secundum quod facere est in extrinseca materia per artem operari. Species autem sunt sicut secare ligna vel corpora, et sicut urere, et hujusmodi. Individua vero sunt sicut sectio facta a Socrate haec vel illa, et alia hujusmodi. Hoc igitur accidens praedicamentum ad nullum aliud genus est reducibile, et secundum hunc modum actio est in agente, sicut in causa, non quidem ut stans et quiescens in ipsa, sicut quantitas vel qualitas vel relatio, sed est in agente, ut procedens et fluens ab ipso continue in patiens.
Adhuc autem attendendum est, quod uniuscujusque perfecti secundum formam forma dicitur actus et ab actu nomen verbale formatur actio: et ideo actio est secundum formam agentis operatio procedens ab agente in patiens. Et ideo forma semper est principium actionis. Sic igitur accipiendum est actionis praedicamentum sive principium.
And concerning the objection through the likeness of a road of two termini, that action and passion are the same in number, one must say that it is not similar, because in a road the substance of the matter and the substance of the form remain the same, having nothing diverse except termini; but motion does not remain the same according to form. Hence what is blackened and what is whitened are changed according to different forms. And similarly what is suffered compared to the agent, and the agent compared to the patient, are according to a different form; on account of this they are diverse categories. For action always belongs to the perfect, insofar as it is in the agent as in cause and subject. Passion, however, always belongs to the imperfect, insofar as it is in the patient as in subject and movable thing. Therefore from all these things that have been said, it remains that action is a special category.
But to act differs from action in this, that action names action as conceived; but to act names action as exercised. And in this second way it is a category, because in this way it names a special mode of predication, which cannot be reduced to any other of the ten modes of predicating. This mode, as it is designated by a word, gives a first word which is one of the ten words signifying one of the first genera. But action as designating a concept does not name that mode of predication, and therefore by the name action that principle is not properly designated; rather it is named verbally as to act by signifying verbally, because it does not designate action as exercised.
It must also be attended to that although to act, according to Aristotle in the sixth book of the Ethics, differs from to make 6, for to act is done by an action pertaining to will or choice, but to make is to operate upon alien or extrinsic matter; nevertheless, as to act and to make are taken here, they are received as the same. For they have one common mode of predication, to which all their predicables are ordered according to genus and species. For everything which proceeds continuously from an agent or one operating into a patient is here called action or to act. And this is what Averroes says, that action is the effective comparison of agent to patient. For thus action is a flowing operation from agent into patient; and therefore, because it is the form of the agent flowing into the patient, the patient is moved, just as a generator through itself or accidentally moves that in which it introduces its form. And this mover is the agent, and the motion of the mover is its action. And likewise the one understanding is an agent, and to understand is an action; and the maker is an agent, and to make is its action. And within this scope of commonness, to act or to make names a certain most general genus and principle; and the word itself signifies one of the first things which, by its own commonness, embraces many things, such as genera, species, and individuals, in one coordination contained under the first common thing. Its subalternate genera are to act, when it is properly received that action is an operation of choice. And the other genus is to make, according as to make is to operate by art in extrinsic matter. But the species are, for example, to cut wood or bodies, and to burn, and things of this sort. But the individuals are, for example, this or that cutting made by Socrates, and other things of this sort. Therefore this accidental category is reducible to no other genus, and according to this mode action is in the agent as in cause, not indeed as standing and resting in it, as quantity or quality or relation does, but it is in the agent as proceeding and flowing from it continuously into the patient.
Further, it must be attended that the form of each thing perfect according to form is called act, and from act the verbal noun action is formed; and therefore action is an operation proceeding from the agent into the patient according to the form of the agent. And therefore form is always the principle of action. Thus, therefore, the category or principle of action must be understood.
CAPUT II.
Quid sit actio secundum diffinitionem.
Marginalia Prima objectio; Secunda; Tertia; Quarta; Quinta; Solutio primae; Ad secundam; Ad tertiam; Ad quartam et quintam; Objectio; Solutio; Objectio; Solutio; Objectio; Solutio.
Actio autem in tali communitate generalissima accepta a Gilberto Porretano sic diffinitur: Actio est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur. Est autem qualiscumque haec descriptio assignatio majoris declarationis quam nomen. Et cum dicitur, secundum quam, importatur modus causae formalis. Agens enim informatur actione cum actio nil sit nisi effectus processus potentiae agentis secundum formam quae est principium actionis et passionis: eo quod omnis actio ut actio transit in patiens, et omne activum hoc modo est transitivum. Quia autem in patiens transit, ideo additur, in id quod subjicitur. Subjicitur enim agenti patiens quod suam recipit actionem. Et agentis virtus praevalet super ipsum et imprimit ei per actionem formam. Et quia virtus agentis penetrat in patiens et transmutat ipsum, ideo dicitur, in patiens, et non ad patiens, vel supra patiens. Dicitur autem, agere dicimur, ut denotetur quod agens hoc modo denominatur ab actione sicut substantia denominata recipit accidentis praedicationem: et sic agens ab actione denominative dicitur et praedicatur, et est praedicatio accidentis de subjecto in quo est 7: hoc enim subjectum est causa actionis: hoc enim modo subjectum cadit in diffinitionem accidentis, ut docet Aristoteles in septimo primae philosophiae 8. Sic dicitur secans in id quod secatur: et sic dicitur urens in id quod urit, quia ustio procedit ab ipso in id quod uritur: et sic est in aliis.
Sunt tamen quidam sophistae objicientes contra inductam assignationem, dicentes quod qualitas quae est naturalis potentia, est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur: et sic videtur naturalis potentia actio esse.
Adhuc, Forma est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur: et sic forma videtur esse actio, quod est falsum.
Adhuc, Ars est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur: et ita ars actio videtur esse.
Adhuc Instrumentum, ut gladius vel fossorium, est secundum quod in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur: instrumentum ergo actio videtur esse.
Adhuc, Manus vel pes est secundum quem in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur: ergo tale membrum actio esse videtur.
Ad omnia autem haec et his similia solvitur per inductam istius assignationis explanationem, quod scilicet cum dicitur, actio est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur, hoc quod dico secundum quam notat agentis formalem denominationem, ut a secando dicitur secans, et ab urendo dicitur urens, et sic de aliis. Et in actionibus animae a docendo dicitur docens, et ab intelligendo intelligens, et sic de aliis. Hoc enim quamvis sine passione non sit, quia recipere pati est: tamen prout intelligere est processus actualis intellectus in intellectum, ista dicuntur actiones a quibus agens denominatur. Haec igitur est solutio ad praedicta: quia secundum naturalem potentiam non dicimur agere secundum actum. Sed nota quod naturalis potentia potentiale principium est actionis.
Similiter etiam solvitur id quod de forma objicitur, quod cum dicitur quod forma est secundum quam agere dicimur, hoc quod dico secundum quam, non notat id quod formaliter denominat id quod est agens secundum actum, sed notat tunc id quod perfectum est ut agere possit: et ideo forma quae est principium actionis, non denominatur agens ut est agens in effectu.
CHAPTER II.
What action is according to definition.
Marginalia First objection; Second; Third; Fourth; Fifth; Solution of the first; To the second; To the third; To the fourth and fifth; Objection; Solution; Objection; Solution; Objection; Solution.
But action, received in such most general commonness, is defined by Gilbert Porretanus thus: Action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected. This description, of whatever sort it is, is an assignment that gives greater declaration than the name. And when it is said, according to which, the mode of a formal cause is imported. For the agent is informed by action, since action is nothing except the effect of the process of the potency of the agent according to the form which is the principle of action and passion; because every action, as action, passes into a patient, and every active thing is transitive in this way. But because it passes into a patient, therefore there is added, into that which is subjected. For the patient which receives the agent's action is subjected to the agent. And the virtue of the agent prevails over it and through action impresses form upon it. And because the virtue of the agent penetrates into the patient and transforms it, therefore it is said, into the patient, and not toward the patient or upon the patient. But it is said, we are said to act, so that it may be denoted that the agent is denominated in this way from action, just as denominated substance receives the predication of an accident; and thus the agent is denominatively said and predicated from action, and this is the predication of an accident concerning the subject in which it is 7. For this subject is the cause of action; for in this way the subject falls into the definition of the accident, as Aristotle teaches in the seventh book of First Philosophy 8. Thus a cutter is said into that which is cut; and thus a burner is said into that which it burns, because burning proceeds from it into that which is burned; and so it is in other cases.
There are, however, certain sophists objecting against the introduced assignment, saying that the quality which is a natural potency is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; and thus natural potency seems to be action.
Further, form is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; and thus form seems to be action, which is false.
Further, art is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; and so art seems to be action.
Further, an instrument, such as a sword or a spade, is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; therefore an instrument seems to be action.
Further, the hand or foot is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected; therefore such a member seems to be action.
But all these and things similar to them are solved through the explanation introduced for this assignment, namely that when it is said, action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected, this phrase which I say, according to which, marks the formal denomination of the agent, as from cutting one is called cutting, and from burning one is called burning, and so with the others. And in the actions of the soul, from teaching one is called teaching, and from understanding, understanding, and so with the others. For although this is not without passion, because to receive is to suffer, nevertheless insofar as to understand is the actual process of the intellect into the understood thing, those are called actions by which the agent is denominated. This, therefore, is the solution to the foregoing, because according to natural potency we are not said to act according to act. But note that natural potency is the potential principle of action.
Likewise also what is objected about form is solved: when it is said that form is that according to which we are said to act, this phrase which I say, according to which, does not mark that which formally denominates what is an agent according to act, but then marks that which has been perfected so that it can act; and therefore the form which is the principle of action is not denominated as an agent according as it is an agent in effect.
Hoc etiam modo solvitur id quod de arte objicitur: quia ars non dicit nisi facultatem ad actionem, et non dicit id quod est actu agens.
Similiter solvitur id quod objicitur de instrumento. Instrumentum enim non facit agere agentem, nec denominat ipsum, sed dicit causam mediam coadjuvantem in actione. Et ideo hoc quod dico secundum quam, non univoce sumitur in diffinitione et objectis contra diffinitionem.
Si autem aliquis objiciat dicens quod hoc dico, secundum quam, infinitum est, et ideo non est causa notitiae sed potius ignorantiae: diffinitiones autem causa innotescendi fiunt: et sic hoc quod dico secundum quam non potest esse actionis diffinitivum, Dicendum igitur quod quia actio est unum de primis principiis, ideo non potest habere diffinitum et certum aliquid per quod diffiniatur: sed infinitum potest habere, quod tamen finite determinetur ab eis quae in oratione eadem posita sunt. Et hoc modo determinatum et diffinitum potest esse innotescendi principium.
Et si objicitur quod idem ponitur in diffinitione sui ipsius cum dicitur, actio est secundum quam agere dicimur: agere et actio in re non differunt, quamvis differant in modo significandi, Dicendum est ad hoc quod agere per modum significandi dicit actionem ut exercitam, et hoc modo notior est nobis quam sit quando significatur ut conceptus quidam: et sic diversificatum ponitur agere in diffinitione actionis.
Si autem adhuc quis objiciat dicens quod haec diffinitio non valet, cum non data sit per genus et differentiam: diffinitiones enim per genus et differentiam debent dari: attendat qui sic objicit, quod diximus istam diffinitionem non esse diffinitionem proprie, sed diximus esse qualemcumque assignationem, quae majoris declarationis est quam nomen. Tales autem assignationes non dantur per genus et differentiam, sed per alia, sicut accidentia, vel causam, vel effectum, vel signum. Et generaliter per omnia illa quibus aliquo modo innotescere potest assignatum melius et expressius, quam innotescat per nomen. Sic igitur actio est secundum quam in id quod subjicitur agere dicimur.
CAPUT III.
De divisione actionis in actionem corporis et in actionem animae.
Marginalia Quid actio animae; Actio corporis quae sit; Objectio; Solutio; Aliter; Dubium; Solutio; Dubium; Solutio; Objectio; Solutio.
Actio autem sic in genere accepta, dividitur in actionem animae et in actionem corporis, sive in actionem animalem et actionem corporalem: haec enim sunt primae et formales differentiae actionis. Et hoc modo actio animae dicitur omnis actio non corporalis, sive sit intellectus, sive sit animae, ut vivificare, movere prout anima movet motu processivo, vel vegetando, vel sensificando, hoc enim vivificare est: et talis actio est non corporalis, quia non est secundum aliquam formam corporis, et quando nominat agentem, non denominat aliqua forma corporali, sed forma vitae alicujus, ut vivens, vel dirigens, vel augens, vel aliquid tale. Actio autem corporis denominatur a corporali forma, sicut dicitur calefaciens, vel dealbans, vel aliquid tale. Istae igitur primae sunt differentiae et species actionum, omnem actionem sub se continentes. Omnis enim actio hoc modo aut est animalis, aut corporalis. Et haec sunt subalterna genera, et subalternae species hujus praedicamenti.
In this way also what is objected about art is solved, because art names only the faculty for action, and does not name that which is actually acting.
Likewise what is objected about the instrument is solved. For the instrument does not make the agent act, nor does it denominate it, but it names a middle cause helping in the action. And therefore this phrase which I say, according to which, is not taken univocally in the definition and in the objections against the definition.
But if someone objects by saying that this phrase which I say, according to which, is indefinite, and therefore is not a cause of knowledge but rather of ignorance, whereas definitions are made as causes of becoming known, and thus this phrase which I say, according to which, cannot be definitive of action, then one must say that because action is one of the first principles, it cannot have something defined and certain by which it may be defined; but it can have something indefinite, which nevertheless is determined finitely by the things placed in the same expression. And in this way, being determined and defined, it can be a principle of becoming known.
And if it is objected that the same thing is placed in the definition of itself when it is said, action is that according to which we are said to act, for to act and action do not differ in reality, although they differ in the mode of signifying, one must say to this that to act, by its mode of signifying, names action as exercised, and in this way it is better known to us than when it is signified as a certain concept; and thus to act is placed in the definition of action as diversified.
But if someone further objects by saying that this definition is not valid, since it has not been given through genus and difference, for definitions ought to be given through genus and difference, let the one who objects in this way attend that we said that this definition is not properly a definition, but said that it is an assignment of whatever sort, which gives greater declaration than the name. But such assignments are not given through genus and difference, but through other things, such as accidents, or cause, or effect, or sign. And generally they are given through all those things through which in some way the thing assigned can become known better and more expressly than it becomes known through the name. Thus, therefore, action is that according to which we are said to act into that which is subjected.
CHAPTER III.
On the division of action into action of body and action of soul.
Marginalia What action of the soul is; What action of the body is; Objection; Solution; Another way; Doubt; Solution; Doubt; Solution; Objection; Solution.
But action, received thus in genus, is divided into action of soul and action of body, or into animal action and corporeal action; for these are the first and formal differences of action. And in this way action of the soul is called every non-corporeal action, whether it belongs to the intellect or to the soul, as to vivify, to move insofar as the soul moves by progressive motion, or by vegetating, or by sensing, for this is to vivify; and such action is non-corporeal, because it is not according to some form of body, and when it names the agent, it does not denominate it by some corporeal form, but by the form of some life, as living, or directing, or increasing, or something of that kind. But action of body is denominated from corporeal form, as something is called heating, or whitening, or something of that kind. Therefore these are the first differences and species of actions, containing every action under themselves. For every action in this way is either animal or corporeal. And these are the subalternate genera and subalternate species of this category.
Differt autem actio corporis ab actione animae in hoc quod actio corporis necessario est movens ipsum in quo est sicut in causa et subjecto: et illud non est agens nisi motu suo agat: et immobile existens nihil agit, quia, sicut dicit Aristoteles 9: si non tangit, non agit, et sic non sequitur alteratio. Et quia corpus non agit nisi motu suo, oportet quod in actione corporis ipsum agens mobile sit, et ut moveatur id corpus in quo sicut in agente denominato ab ipsa actione est ipsa actio: sicut secans non secat nisi moveatur, et urens movetur ipsa ustione activa: oportet enim quod accedat ad id quod uritur, et accedere est moveri. Aliquo igitur modo moveri invenitur, quod corporali agit actione. Anima autem talia incorporalia dum agit, immobilis est et non movetur: movet tamen corpus vivificando, et movendo secundum locum in motu processivo et aliis vitae motibus est ipsa immobilis. Cujus causa est, quia essentialis sibi est omnis actio vitae, et anima per substantiam suam et secundum seipsam movet motu vitae, et non indiget ut ad aliquid moveatur quo accipiat formam vel locum secundum quem fiat motus principium: propter quod agit propria animae actione sine motu quo moveatur. Sic autem actio non est in corpore, quia corpus per seipsum non est agens principium: et ideo indiget motu quo moveatur ad formam qua fiat agens principium, et sic indiget instrumento quod ab eo qui utitur ipso, formam motus accipiat. Et ideo manus mota prius ad formam motoris movetur ut motu corporis inducat formam primi motoris in patiens. Animales autem actiones simplices sunt, quibus anima per seipsam est causa: et ideo tales actiones agens non oportet moveri animam. Haec igitur differentia est inter animae et corporis actiones.
Quod autem anima immobilis sit motu corporis, probatur inducendo. Anima enim dum agit, non movet id in quo est actio, sicut animam, sed conjunctum. Ipsa vero anima dum agit, immobilis est: et quamvis sit immobilis, tamen movet corpus motu vitae et motu secundum locum si sit perfecta anima. Anima vero in seipsa permanet immutabilis, et non movetur motu quo movet. Et ideo in suo ordine probatur esse movens principium. Non enim movetur anima secundum locum, nec secundum aliorum motuum quemquam, incrementum suscipiendo vel diminutionem, cum non sit quanta. Nec movetur recto motu de loco uno ad oppositum locum transeundo: locus enim locans corpus est, cujus superficies locans locus est, et in se non locat nisi cui principium et medium et finis assignatur secundum partes loci circumscribentis. Anima autem est non corpus, nec habens principium, medium, et finem secundum loci terminos. Non ergo potest secundum locum moveri. Et propter hoc nullam loci mutationem potest suscipere anima: non enim movetur aliquid secundum locum hoc modo nisi corpus, et movetur secundum locum in eo quod transit de loco ad locum. Non ergo aliquo modo movetur anima, nisi forte motu alterationis, qui tamen motus, ut in ante habitis diximus, non est animae, sed conjuncti, in quo tamen aliquo modo communicat anima, sicut in praehabitis determinatum est.
Objiciunt tamen quidam contra praedicta: quia superiora corpora movent inferiora, et tamen motu illo non moventur. Si autem superiora corpora movent, constat quod est motus corporis, et non movent motu corporeo. Sed ad hoc dicendum est, quod corpora superiora movent motu virtutis suorum motorum, et sic agunt mota et acta motu et actione motoris sui. Vel dicatur, quod talis motus est virtutis quae est a specie: et sic quamvis sit corporis, tamen non est qualitatis corporalis sed virtutis incorporeae. Et ideo in ipso non est necesse corpus moveri, quia non est corporalis actio, sed incorporea.
But action of body differs from action of soul in this, that action of body necessarily moves that very thing in which it is as in cause and subject; and that thing is not an agent unless it acts by its own motion; and while existing immobile it acts nothing, because, as Aristotle says 9, if it does not touch, it does not act, and thus alteration does not follow. And because a body does not act except by its own motion, it is necessary that in corporeal action the agent itself be movable, and that the body in which the action itself is, as in an agent denominated from that action, be moved: just as one cutting does not cut unless he is moved, and one burning is moved by the active burning itself; for he must approach that which is burned, and to approach is to be moved. Therefore that which acts by corporeal action is found to be moved in some way. But when the soul performs such incorporeal actions, it is immobile and is not moved; nevertheless it moves the body by vivifying, and when it moves according to place in progressive motion and in other motions of life, the soul itself is immobile. The cause of this is that every action of life is essential to it, and the soul through its own substance and according to itself moves by the motion of life, and does not need to be moved toward something by which it would receive a form or place according to which it would become the principle of motion. On this account it acts with the proper action of the soul without a motion by which it would be moved. But action is not in body in this way, because body through itself is not an agent principle; and therefore it needs a motion by which it is moved toward the form by which it becomes an agent principle, and thus it needs an instrument which receives the form of motion from the one who uses it. And therefore the hand, first moved toward the form of the mover, is moved so that by the motion of the body it may introduce the form of the first mover into the patient. But animal actions are simple actions of which the soul through itself is the cause; and therefore in such actions it is not necessary that the soul acting be moved. This, therefore, is the difference between actions of soul and actions of body.
But that the soul is immobile by the motion of body is proved by induction. For while the soul acts, it does not move that in which the action is, as if it moved the soul, but the conjoined thing. But the soul itself, while it acts, is immobile; and although it is immobile, nevertheless it moves the body by the motion of life and by motion according to place if it is a perfect soul. But the soul remains immutable in itself and is not moved by the motion by which it moves. And therefore in its own order it is proved to be a moving principle. For the soul is not moved according to place, nor according to any of the other motions, by receiving increase or decrease, since it is not quantified. Nor is it moved by rectilinear motion by passing from one place to an opposite place; for place, locating, is a body, whose locating surface is place, and it does not locate in itself except something to which a beginning, middle, and end are assigned according to the parts of the circumscribing place. But the soul is not a body, nor does it have beginning, middle, and end according to the termini of place. Therefore it cannot be moved according to place. And on account of this the soul can receive no change of place; for something is not moved according to place in this way unless it is a body, and it is moved according to place in that it passes from place to place. Therefore the soul is not moved in any way, except perhaps by the motion of alteration, which motion nevertheless, as we said in the foregoing, belongs not to the soul, but to the conjoined thing, in which nevertheless the soul somehow communicates, as was determined in the foregoing.
Yet certain people object against the foregoing, because the higher bodies move the lower bodies, and nevertheless they are not moved by that motion. But if the higher bodies move, it is established that this is a motion of body, and they do not move by corporeal motion. But to this one must say that the higher bodies move by the motion of the virtue of their movers, and thus they act moved and acted by the motion and action of their mover. Or let it be said that such motion belongs to the virtue which is from species; and thus, although it belongs to body, nevertheless it is not of corporeal quality but of incorporeal virtue. And therefore in it there is no need for body to be moved, because it is not corporeal action, but incorporeal.
Adhuc autem dubium videtur, quod videre, audire, et sapere, et imaginari, sunt animae actiones: et tamen in his omnibus movetur id in quo est actio, et non est immobile. Sed hoc leve est solvere: hujusmodi enim actiones omnes vere et secundum materiam sunt passiones: quia omnes in corpore consistunt potius quam in actione. Et cum in talibus est id quod movetur, non movetur motu physico, sed potius motu intentionis qui est motus secundum rationem.
Si quis autem quaerat, qualis sit ista divisio actionis in actionem animae et actionem corporis? Dicendum est quod si corpus non dicat nisi agens, et anima similiter, tunc divisio accidentis est in subjecta. Si autem dicat anima agens, et corpus agens formam actionis, ita quod actio animae sit actio secundum rationem animalis, corporis autem actio sit actio corporalis: tunc divisio potest esse generis in species: et sic sumitur hic. Et ideo diximus quod ista divisio dat prima subalterna genera in hoc generalissimo quod est actio. Haec est igitur divisio actionis, ita quod actio animae est agentis immobilis. Actio autem corporis est agentis moti, eo quod corpus non agit nisi motum.
Objiciunt autem quidam contra ea quae dicta sunt, dicentes quod substantia in eo quod substantia, nec est activa, nec est passiva: eo quod actio et passio sunt contrariorum, substantia autem non habet contrarium. Videtur igitur quod actio nec sit animae, nec corporis secundum quod hujusmodi. Ad hoc autem est dicendum quod (sicut ante dictum est) actio hic large sumitur, secundum quod etiam movere est agere. Actio animae idem est quod movere: et sic competit animae agere. Si autem actio sumatur stricte pro actione physica: tunc verum est quod actio est contrariorum et inter contraria. Actione ergo large accepta substantia agit: quia, sicut dicit Damascenus, nulla substantia est quae propria destituatur operatione. Et ideo probat Aristoteles quod unumquodque habet actum et actionem propriam ad quam est virtus ipsius.
CAPUT IV.
De imagine in speculo ubi videtur esse instantia contra praedicta.
Marginalia Objectio textus; Solutio objectionis.
Contra ea vero quae dicta sunt, quod scilicet non potest non corpus corpore moveri, videtur esse instantia. Habet enim dubitationem in quibusdam, utrum generaliter verum sit non corpus corpore moveri non posse: eo quod speculo (quod est corpus) immobile permanente, videtur in speculo fieri motus imaginis, quae est non corpus, ad mutationes oppositas secundum locum: videtur enim moveri a dextro in sinistrum ad motum inspectoris speculi, et a profundo ad superficiem si inspector speculi accedat et recedat a speculo. Movetur igitur non corpus motu corporis secundum locum, ita quod principium, medium, et finis assignantur ei secundum locum. Et siquidem concedatur in speculo esse imaginem sicut in recipiente et sicut in loco: tunc vel impossibile, vel valde difficile erit solvere dubitationem: quia tunc sequitur, quod motu speculi imago moveatur: quia sicut dicit Aristoteles 10, moventibus nobis moventur ea quae in nobis sunt, et vase moto necesse est moveri quod est in vase. Si autem in speculo dicatur esse imago, erit speculum locus imaginis sicut vas. Est enim locus ut locus, et est locus ut vas, sicut probatum est in quarto Physicorum 11. Si autem dicatur in speculo non esse imago, quamvis hoc aliquo modo verum sit, tamen apud imperitum vulgus, quod judicium sensus sequitur potius quam rationem, erit hic error intolerabilis, quia visus nuntiat imaginem esse in speculo.
Further, it seems doubtful that seeing, hearing, tasting, and imagining are actions of the soul; and nevertheless in all these the thing in which the action is is moved, and it is not immobile. But this is easy to solve: for actions of this sort are all truly and according to matter passions, because they all consist in body rather than in action. And when in such things there is that which is moved, it is not moved by physical motion, but rather by motion of intention, which is motion according to reason.
But if someone asks what sort of division this division of action into action of soul and action of body is, one must say that if body names only an agent, and soul likewise, then the division of an accident is into subjects. But if soul names an agent, and body as agent names the form of action, so that action of soul is action according to the account of animal, while action of body is corporeal action, then the division can be that of genus into species; and so it is taken here. And therefore we said that this division gives the first subalternate genera in this most general thing which is action. This therefore is the division of action, so that action of soul is of an immobile agent, while action of body is of a moved agent, because a body does not act unless moved.
But certain people object against the things that have been said, saying that substance insofar as it is substance is neither active nor passive, because action and passion belong to contraries, but substance does not have a contrary. Therefore it seems that action belongs neither to soul nor to body insofar as they are of this sort. To this one must say that, as was said before, action here is taken broadly, according as to move also is to act. Action of soul is the same as to move; and thus to act belongs to the soul. But if action is taken strictly for physical action, then it is true that action belongs to contraries and is between contraries. Therefore, with action accepted broadly, substance acts, because, as Damascene says, there is no substance which is deprived of its proper operation. And therefore Aristotle proves that each thing has an act and a proper action to which its virtue is ordered.
CHAPTER IV.
On the image in a mirror, where there seems to be an instance against the foregoing.
Marginalia Objection of the text; Solution of the objection.
Against the things that have been said, namely that a non-body cannot be moved by a body, there seems to be an instance. For there is a difficulty in certain cases whether it is generally true that a non-body cannot be moved by a body, because, while the mirror, which is a body, remains immobile, there seems to occur in the mirror a motion of an image, which is not a body, toward opposed changes according to place. For it seems to be moved from right to left at the motion of the beholder of the mirror, and from depth to surface if the beholder of the mirror approaches and withdraws from the mirror. Therefore a non-body is moved by the motion of a body according to place, so that beginning, middle, and end are assigned to it according to place. And if indeed it is granted that the image is in the mirror as in a receiver and as in a place, then it will be impossible, or very difficult, to solve the difficulty, because then it follows that the image is moved by the motion of the mirror; for as Aristotle says 10, when we are moved, the things which are in us are moved, and when a vessel is moved, what is in the vessel must be moved. But if the image is said to be in the mirror, the mirror will be the place of the image like a vessel. For there is place as place, and there is place as vessel, as has been proved in the fourth book of the Physics 11. But if the image is said not to be in the mirror, although this is in some way true, nevertheless among the unskilled crowd, which follows the judgment of sense rather than reason, this will be an intolerable error, because sight announces that the image is in the mirror.
Ad hanc autem dubitationem solvendam oportet uti his quae in libro de sensu et sensato subtilius declarata sunt. Lumen enim per hoc quod est forma caelestis (cujus esse spirituale est) habet virtutem conferendi esse spiritualiter perspicuo ei quod materialiter est in corpore materiali terminato. Transparens autem terminatum politum et corrasum lumen sibi incidens reflectere habet ad purum angulum. Hic ergo contingit, quod lux vel lumen imaginem abstrahit ab esse materiali, et in perspicuo dat ei esse spirituale, et hoc est esse lucis vel luminis. Incidens ergo in speculo terminato cum traducere imaginem per speculum non possit, a superficie solita speculi reflectitur: et sic apparet imago sub duobus sitibus: uno quidem luminis incidentis ab inspectore in speculum, altero vero situ luminis reflexi a speculo ad inspectorem. Et ideo imago illa est in corpore quidem inspectoris materialiter. In lumine autem perspicui quod est medium inter inspectorem et speculum, est sicut in deferente et secundum esse spirituale quod habet in lumine perspicui. In speculo autem est sicut in terminante radium incidentem, et reflectente radium reflexum ad inspectorem.
Propter quod motu speculi non movetur quia non est in ipso sicut in subjecto, sed tantum sicut in reflectente: et ideo est in ipso secundum punctum in quo fit reflexio. Et quantitas imaginis quae apparet, quantitas est intentionalis et non quantitas distensa per mensuram. Quantitatis autem intentio est indivisibilis et inest secundum indivisibile: propter quod totum hemisphaerium apparet in parvo speculo et in pupilla oculi muris, quod esse non posset si imago distensam et materialem haberet quantitatem. Cum enim in angulo radii incidentis in superficie speculi et radii reflexi a speculo non sit nisi punctum, constat quod in puncto videtur imago in speculo, cum tamen quantitas imaginis tota videatur. Et hoc esse non potest, nisi ideo quia imago quae apparet, intentio est imaginis et non imago, sicut dictum est. Et quia ad quodlibet punctum speculi talis fit reflexio, ideo imago tota videtur in qualibet speculi parte et quolibet puncto.
Causa igitur imaginis est dicenda quod est contra speculum: et illo moto imago videtur moveri. Reflexio autem fit a speculi superficie in qua non est imago, sicut in subjecto, sed sicut in puncto a quo fit reflexio. Et ideo cum movetur speculum, non movetur imago, sed in eodem situ successive puncta objiciuntur a quibus ejusdem imaginis continue fit reflexio. Et ideo imago speculi stare videtur immobilis.
Quod autem dicitur quod incredibilis error fiat in vulgo si imago in speculo non dicatur, Dici potest quod hoc verum est si nullo modo in speculo esse diceretur. Nos autem dicimus quod est in speculo per aliquem modum, scilicet sicut in repraesentante per reflexionem. Patet ergo qualiter adhuc stat in veritate inducta propositio, scilicet quod impossibile est non corpus corpore moveri. Sic ergo patet, quod alia est actio animae et alia corporis.
CAPUT V.
De proprio actionis, quod est actionem in motu esse et motum in actione, et qualiter motus sit quale et qualitas.
But to solve this difficulty one must use the things which have been more subtly declared in the book On Sense and the Sensible. For light, through the fact that it is a celestial form, whose being is spiritual, has the virtue of conferring spiritually transparent being upon that which materially exists in a terminated material body. But a terminated, polished, and scraped transparent thing has the property of reflecting the light falling upon it to a pure angle. Here, therefore, it happens that light or illumination abstracts the image from material being, and gives it spiritual being in the transparent, and this is the being of light or illumination. Therefore, when it falls upon the terminated mirror, since it cannot conduct the image through the mirror, it is reflected by the customary surface of the mirror; and thus the image appears under two positions: one, indeed, of the light falling from the beholder into the mirror, but the other position of the light reflected from the mirror to the beholder. And therefore that image is indeed in the body of the beholder materially. But in the light of the transparent thing which is the medium between the beholder and the mirror, it is as in a bearer and according to the spiritual being which it has in the light of the transparent. But in the mirror it is as in that which terminates the incident ray and reflects the reflected ray to the beholder.
On this account it is not moved by the motion of the mirror because it is not in it as in a subject, but only as in that which reflects; and therefore it is in it according to the point at which the reflection occurs. And the quantity of the image which appears is intentional quantity and not quantity extended by measure. But the intention of quantity is indivisible and inheres according to the indivisible; on account of this the whole hemisphere appears in a small mirror and in the pupil of a mouse's eye, which could not be if the image had extended and material quantity. For since in the angle of the ray falling on the surface of the mirror and of the ray reflected from the mirror there is only a point, it is established that the image is seen in the mirror at a point, although nevertheless the whole quantity of the image is seen. And this cannot be except for this reason, that the image which appears is the intention of the image and not the image, as has been said. And because such reflection occurs at any point of the mirror, therefore the whole image is seen in any part of the mirror and at any point.
Therefore the cause of the image must be said to be that which is opposite the mirror; and when that is moved, the image seems to be moved. But the reflection occurs from the surface of the mirror in which the image is not as in a subject, but as in a point from which the reflection occurs. And therefore when the mirror is moved, the image is not moved, but in the same position points are successively set before it, from which reflection of the same image occurs continuously. And therefore the image of the mirror seems to stand immobile.
But as for what is said, that an incredible error would arise among the crowd if the image were not said to be in the mirror, it can be said that this is true if it were said in no way to be in the mirror. But we say that it is in the mirror according to some mode, namely as in something representing through reflection. Therefore it is clear in what way the proposition introduced still stands in truth, namely that it is impossible for a non-body to be moved by a body. Thus, therefore, it is clear that one action belongs to the soul and another to the body.
CHAPTER V.
On the property of action, that action is in motion and motion in action, and in what way motion is a quale and a quality.
Marginalia Objectio; Solutio; Dubitatio; Solutio.
Scire autem oportet, quod ex quo motus est perfectus actus moventis, et actio est effectus processus agentis in patiens, quo movens imprimit motum in id quod movetur et actionem in id quod patitur: et sic movendo agit, et agendo movet: et sic omne quod est in motu, in actione est. In motu est secundum quod motus est actus moventis: et actio quidem a movente procedens in id quod patitur: et sic moveri a movente est actio impressa ab agente. Si quid igitur hoc modo movetur, agit necessario: quia virtute formae moventis seipsum agit ad formam agentis primi, sicut semen virtute generantis agit se ad formam primi generantis. Sic ergo generando omnis actio quamdiu est in fieri ab agente est in motu, qui est actus moventis in id quod movetur: et omnis motus qui est actus perfectus moventis, firmatur et stabilitur in actione quae est in fieri, et est id quod procedit ab agente in patiens.
Propter quod proprium actionis secundum quod est in fieri, est esse in motu, secundum quod motus continuus est processus formae moventis in id quod movetur: sicut etiam e converso proprium est motus secundum quod est actus moventis, in actione esse secundum quod actio est processus formae agentis in patiens. Sic enim separari non possunt physicus motus et actio: nec motus generaliter sumptus ab actione generaliter sumpta: quia hoc modo movere est agere, et e converso. Hoc autem palam est in omnibus actionibus his in quibus aliquid agitur sive generatur ad formam agentis: quia in omnibus his continuis processus virtutis activae et motivae in patiens et motum est actio, et motus est forma inducta post formam, ut dicit Averroes. Et sic est actio post actionem.
Sed in his quae corrumpuntur, in quibus continua est abjectio substantiae forte aliquis objiciet, quod ibi non sit actio, quamvis sit motus: quia in talibus nil agitur, ut videtur, sed potius deagitur, vel corrumpitur id quod actum fuerat. Et ideo qui destruit, in motu quidem continue est, et movet id quod destruit, sed nil agere videtur: nil enim in talibus efficit, sed potius id quod factum est destruit. Solutio autem hujus est, quod actio secundum quod est actus agentis, non exigit quid agat ad formam agentis, sed potius exigit in quid agat, hoc est, in quid imprimat suam actionem: et illam sic impressam patienti aliquando destruit, sicut quando contrarium invenit ipsum patiens ad formam agentis: et aliquando construit, sicut quando aptat patiens ad formam suscipiendam agentis: et sic destruere est et agere: et sic relinquitur verum esse quod dictum est, quod omnis actio in motu, et omnis motus in actione fundatur. Est autem hic considerandum, quod hoc quod dictum est, non est verum secundum quod motus est actus mobilis imperfectus; quia sic moveri non est agere, sed pati: et si hoc modo actus in motu esset, cum motus hoc modo sit in patiente, sequitur quod actio esset in patiente 12. Et quia id agit cui inest actio, sequeretur quod patiens esset agens, et actio esset passio: quae omnia inconvenientia sunt: et ideo inconveniens est primum, ex quo sequuntur omnia haec, scilicet quod actio sit in motu secundum quod motus est actus mobilis.
Quamvis autem actio sit in motu quodammodo, et motus in actione, tamen actio non est motus, sed quale. Hoc autem probatur ex hoc, quod quiescere est quale: propter quod etiam motus simpliciter acceptus quale quoddam est: quod patet per hoc principium, quod quaecumque contrariorum suscipiunt oppositionem, illa ejusdem generis suscipiunt praedicationem, quia contraria sunt in eodem genere. Et ideo cum quiescere sit quale in qualitate, etiam erit moveri quale in qualitate. Actio autem non est quale vel qualitas. Actio igitur non est motus.
Marginalia Objection; Solution; Doubt; Solution.
But one must know that, since motion is the perfect act of the mover, and action is the effect of the process of the agent into the patient, by which the mover impresses motion into that which is moved and action into that which suffers; and thus by moving it acts, and by acting it moves; and thus everything which is in motion is in action. It is in motion according as motion is the act of the mover; and action indeed is proceeding from the mover into that which suffers; and thus to be moved by a mover is action impressed by an agent. Therefore if something is moved in this way, it necessarily acts, because by the virtue of the moving form it acts itself toward the form of the first agent, just as seed by the virtue of the generator acts itself toward the form of the first generator. Thus, therefore, in generating, every action, so long as it is in becoming from the agent, is in motion, which is the act of the mover in that which is moved; and every motion which is the perfect act of the mover is confirmed and stabilized in action which is in becoming, and is that which proceeds from the agent into the patient.
On this account the property of action, insofar as it is in becoming, is to be in motion, according as continuous motion is the process of the moving form into that which is moved; just as also conversely it is proper to motion, insofar as it is the act of the mover, to be in action according as action is the process of the form of the agent into the patient. For physical motion and action cannot be separated in this way; nor can motion taken generally be separated from action taken generally, because in this way to move is to act, and conversely. But this is plain in all those actions in which something is acted upon or generated toward the form of the agent, because in all these the continuous process of active and motive virtue into the patient and moved thing is action, and motion is form introduced after form, as Averroes says. And thus there is action after action.
But in the things which are corrupted, in which there is continuous casting away of substance, perhaps someone will object that there is not action there, although there is motion, because in such cases nothing is acted upon, as it seems, but rather what had been acted upon is de-acted or corrupted. And therefore the one who destroys is indeed continuously in motion and moves that which he destroys, but seems to act nothing; for he effects nothing in such things, but rather destroys that which has been made. But the solution of this is that action, insofar as it is the act of an agent, does not require what it acts toward the form of the agent, but rather requires upon what it acts, that is, into what it impresses its action. And that action, thus impressed upon the patient, it sometimes destroys, as when it finds the patient itself contrary to the form of the agent; and sometimes it constructs, as when it adapts the patient for receiving the form of the agent. And thus to destroy is also to act; and thus it remains true that what has been said is so, that every action is founded in motion, and every motion in action. But one must consider here that what has been said is not true insofar as motion is the imperfect act of the movable thing; because in that way to be moved is not to act, but to suffer. And if act in motion were in this way, since motion in this way is in the patient, it follows that action would be in the patient 12. And because that acts in which action inheres, it would follow that the patient would be agent, and action would be passion; all of which are inconveniences. And therefore the first thing is inconvenient, from which all these follow, namely that action is in motion insofar as motion is the act of the movable thing.
But although action is in motion in a certain way, and motion in action, nevertheless action is not motion, but a quale. This is proved from this, that to be at rest is a quale; on account of this also motion accepted simply is a certain quale. This is clear through this principle, that whatever things receive the opposition of contraries receive predication of the same genus, because contraries are in the same genus. And therefore, since to be at rest is a quale in quality, to be moved also will be a quale in quality. But action is not a quale or quality. Therefore action is not motion.
Est autem hic attendendum, quod motus secundum quod est actus imperfecti, in omnibus est generibus: eo quod in omnibus est potentia et actus, et potentia exiens in actum movetur, et motus est actus ejus. Et cum potentia et actus sint ejusdem generis, sicut imperfectum et perfectum ejusdem naturae sunt, oportet quod motus hoc modo sumptus sit in omnibus generibus. Motus autem secundum speciem naturae quae movetur, vel ad quam est motus, consideratus est in quatuor generibus, scilicet substantia, quantitate, qualitate, et ubi. Sed motus secundum quod est forma moventis a movente procedens in id quod movetur, est qualitas secundum quam quale dicitur movens: et hoc modo dicitur hic, quod motus est qualitas: et hic est motus logice sumptus. Sic enim quies est status in forma moventis, quod est quale esse secundum motum et moventis formam.
Sed tunc quaeret fortasse aliquis, secundum quam speciem qualitatis motus sit qualitas? Non enim potest esse forma vel circa aliquid constans figura. Nec potest esse passio vel passibilis qualitas inferens vel illata, sicut cuilibet patet. Nec potest esse naturalis potentia vel impotentia, quia haec in substantialibus est radicata. Relinquitur igitur quod sit habitus vel dispositio. Et hoc quidem est verum, maxime secundum quod motus est actus perfecti, et perfectus est habitus: secundum autem quod est actus imperfecti et imperfectus, dispositio disponens et promovens ad habitum qui est actus perfectus.
CAPUT VI.
De proprio actionis, quod omnis actio efficit passionem et qualiter generatur.
Marginalia Remoter dubium.
Naturalis autem proprietas actionis quae in ipsa natura actionis fundata est, et quae omni convenit et soli et semper, est id quod actionis est passionem ex se in id quod subjicitur sibi ut patiens inferre. Dicitur autem ex se, quia secundum quod est forma agentis secundum quod agens est. Et ideo hic secundum substantiam actionis hoc convenit ei. Omnis enim actio passionis est alicujus effectiva: quia aliter non tenderet in patiens ab agente, nisi susciperetur ad transmutationem in patiente: et tale suscipere pati est, et susceptio est passio. Efficit ergo actio passionem, et omne quod per se et secundum suam substantiam passionem infert, est actio. Quamvis enim gladius et ignis passionem inferant, non tamen sunt passiones vel actiones: quia non faciunt hoc secundum substantiam suam, sed ut instrumenta, sicut in praehabitis dictum est.
Sed contingit aliquando actionem effici et causari ab actione sicut calefacere ignis causa est quod lapis ignitus calefaciat: sicut etiam patet in his quae per se moventur ut animalia quae principium sui motus habent in seipsis, et ideo per se moventur, ut dicit Aristoteles 13. Saepe enim actio animalis quod per se movetur fit effectrix ejus actionis quae est actio per aliud. Verbi gratia actio illata ab animali aliquo, sicut impulsus, vel morsus, vel alicujus impetus, causatur ab actione ipsius animalis, sicut a cursu, vel ambulatione, vel pedis percussione, vel etiam dentium compressione, vel aliquo hujusmodi: et sic actio efficit actionem. Sumit enim principium actio alteri illata, ab ea actione quam agit animal in seipso.
But it must be attended here that motion, insofar as it is the act of the imperfect, is in all genera, because in all there are potency and act, and potency going out into act is moved, and motion is its act. And since potency and act are of the same genus, just as imperfect and perfect are of the same nature, it is necessary that motion taken in this way be in all genera. But motion considered according to the species of the nature which is moved, or toward which there is motion, is in four genera, namely substance, quantity, quality, and where. But motion insofar as it is the form of the mover proceeding from the mover into that which is moved is quality, according to which the mover is called a quale; and in this way it is said here that motion is quality, and here motion is taken logically. For thus rest is a status in the form of the mover, which is to be a quale according to motion and the form of the mover.
But then perhaps someone will ask according to what species of quality motion is a quality. For it cannot be form or figure standing around something. Nor can it be passion or passible quality inferring or inferred, as is clear to anyone. Nor can it be natural potency or impotency, because this is rooted in substantial things. Therefore it remains that it is habit or disposition. And this indeed is true, especially insofar as motion is the act of the perfect, and the perfect is a habit; but insofar as it is the act of the imperfect and is imperfect, it is a disposition disposing and advancing toward the habit which is the perfect act.
CHAPTER VI.
On the property of action, that every action effects passion, and how it is generated.
Marginalia A more remote doubt.
But the natural property of action, which is founded in the very nature of action, and which belongs to every action, to it alone, and always, is that which belongs to action: to bring passion from itself into that which is subjected to it as patient. But it is said from itself because it is the form of the agent insofar as it is agent. And therefore here this belongs to it according to the substance of action. For every action is effective of some passion, because otherwise it would not tend from the agent into the patient unless it were received for transformation in the patient; and such receiving is to suffer, and reception is passion. Therefore action effects passion, and everything which through itself and according to its own substance brings in passion is action. For although a sword and fire bring in passion, nevertheless they are not passions or actions, because they do not do this according to their own substance, but as instruments, as has been said in the foregoing.
But it happens sometimes that action is effected and caused by action, as the heating of fire is the cause that an ignited stone heats; as is also clear in those things which are moved through themselves, such as animals which have the principle of their own motion in themselves, and therefore are moved through themselves, as Aristotle says 13. For often the action of an animal which is moved through itself becomes effective of that action which is action through another. For example, an action inflicted by some animal, such as a push, or bite, or some impulse, is caused by the action of that animal itself, as by running, or walking, or striking of the foot, or even compression of the teeth, or something of this kind; and thus action effects action. For an action inflicted upon another takes its principle from that action which the animal does in itself.
Et si forte aliquis diceret quod animal non agit in seipso, sed potius patitur: nil interest quantum ad propositam intentionem. Si enim dicatur pati, sequitur quod haec passio est illatio actionis. Et quod est causa causae, est causa causati, unde si passio est causa exterioris actionis, erit actio quae illius passionis effectrix est, effectiva illius exterioris actionis. Et sic habetur quod actio aliquando efficit actionem, dummodo primus animalis actus vel prima actio principium sit passionis quae exterioris actionis est effectiva. Quamvis autem actus (qui est actio pura agentis) sit primordiale principium. Pati autem (quod causatur ab actione) principium permixtum, quia et factum est et facit: factum quidem ab actione prima, faciens autem actionem exteriorem, propter quod relinquitur quod actus (qui est actio prima) et passionis et actionis est generativus. Et hujus est exemplum sicut ambulat animal, et ambulando colliditur, et collisum cornu vel pede ferit. Sic igitur contingit per accidens actionem esse factivam actionis: per se autem passionis est generativa et factiva: et ideo per hoc diffinitur quod ei per se convenit, et non diffinitur per hoc quod convenit ei per accidens. Per se autem id quod quale est et qualitas gignit et causat ex se facere, sicut patet: quia calor quale quoddam et qualitas est: et illa qualitas ex se gignit calefacere, quod est facere et agere. Propter quod nihil est activum proprie nisi qualitas, ut dicit Aristoteles: et in genere qualitatis activae qualitates sunt passiones vel passibiles qualitates, si actio proprie sumatur. Sed hoc tantum hic dicere sufficit, quod qualitas causa per se est actionis, et causatur ab ipsa, sicut dictum est.
Nec tamen sequitur quod actio sit in praedicamento qualitatis: quia quod est causa efficiens alicujus, est extra ipsum, et ideo per ipsum non ponitur in genere. Sed si esset formale principium idipsum, tunc per ipsum posset poni in genere vel in specie. Hoc ergo modo facere vel agere gignitur a qualitate: et hoc modo non est inconveniens rem unius praedicamenti a re alterius praedicamenti generari: cum tamen non propter hoc sit in eodem genere a quo causatur.
Sic enim qualitatum quarumdam particularium est effectrix positio, et etiam aliquarum quantitatum. Qualitates enim in specie consideratae, sicut asperitas, vel lene, sive lenitas, et hujusmodi, qualia sunt a qualitate dicta. Et haec causantur a positione, ex eo scilicet quod partes in superficie secundum aeque vel non secundum aeque positae sunt.
Similiter etiam a positione efficiuntur quantitates in particulari consideratae, sicut linea, superficies, et corpus: partibus enim aeque in longitudinis specie positis causatur linea. Si autem ponantur ad duos diametros longitudinis et latitudinis, fit superficies. Si autem in tres, fit corpus. Quamvis ergo non generaliter qualitas et quantitas causentur a positione, tamen particulariter quaedam qualitates et quaedam quantitates causantur a positione. Nec tamen propter hoc sunt in genere positionis, sicut in ante habitis dictum est. Universa enim haec quae dicta sunt, a situ sive positione substantiam et generationem habent.
Similiter autem quantitas est effectrix aliquando quantitatis, sicut linea corporis facit latitudinem, et trina dimensio corporis facit in corpore quod est substantia, longitudinem, latitudinem, et profunditatem. Similiter autem qualitas aliquando.
And if perhaps someone were to say that the animal does not act in itself, but rather suffers, this makes no difference as to the proposed intention. For if it is said to suffer, it follows that this passion is the bringing-in of action. And what is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused thing; hence if passion is the cause of an exterior action, the action which is effective of that passion will be effective of that exterior action. And thus it is held that action sometimes effects action, provided that the first act of the animal, or the first action, is the principle of the passion which is effective of the exterior action. Although act, which is the pure action of the agent, is the primordial principle, while to suffer, which is caused by action, is a mixed principle, because it both has been made and makes: made indeed by the first action, but making the exterior action; on account of this it remains that act, which is first action, is generative both of passion and of action. And an example of this is as when an animal walks, and by walking collides, and when collided strikes with horn or foot. Thus, therefore, it happens accidentally that action is productive of action; but through itself it is generative and productive of passion; and therefore it is defined through what belongs to it through itself, and is not defined through what belongs to it accidentally. But through itself that which is a quale and a quality begets and causes making from itself, as is clear, because heat is a certain quale and quality, and that quality from itself begets heating, which is to make and to act. On this account nothing is properly active except quality, as Aristotle says; and in the genus of active quality qualities are passions or passible qualities, if action is taken properly. But it suffices to say only this here, that quality is the per se cause of action, and action is caused by it, as has been said.
Nevertheless it does not follow that action is in the category of quality, because that which is the efficient cause of something is outside it, and therefore through it the thing is not placed in a genus. But if it were the formal principle, the very thing itself, then through it the thing could be placed in a genus or in a species. In this way, therefore, to make or to act is begotten by quality; and in this way it is not unfitting for a thing of one category to be generated by a thing of another category, although nevertheless on this account it is not in the same genus as that by which it is caused.
For thus position is effective of certain particular qualities, and also of certain quantities. For qualities considered in species, such as roughness, or the smooth, or smoothness, and things of this sort, which are called qualia from quality, are caused by position, namely from this, that parts on a surface are positioned according to equality or not according to equality.
Likewise also quantities considered in particular are effected by position, such as line, surface, and body. For when parts are positioned equally in the species of length, line is caused. But if they are placed toward two diameters, of length and breadth, a surface comes to be. But if toward three, body comes to be. Therefore, although quality and quantity are not generally caused by position, nevertheless in particular certain qualities and certain quantities are caused by position. Yet on this account they are not in the genus of position, as has been said in the foregoing. For all these things which have been said have their substance and generation from site or position.
Likewise quantity is sometimes effective of quantity, just as the line of a body makes breadth, and the threefold dimension of body makes in body, which is a substance, length, breadth, and depth. Likewise, however, quality sometimes.
Notes
- The Author seems to say the contrary of this in book 2 On the Soul, on text-comment 67. Solve this through the things he says there, through which he agrees with Avicenna and Alexander. (Hujus contrarium videtur Auctor dicere 2 de Anima, super tex. com. 67. Solve per dicta ejus ibi, per quae concordat Avicennae et Alexandro.) ↩
- Aristotle, Physics 5, text-comment 37. (Aristoteles, 5 Physic. tex. com. 37.) ↩
- Aristotle, Physics 3, text-comment 11. (Aristoteles, 3 Physic. tex. com. 11.) ↩
- The same, On the Soul 3, text-comment 17. (Id. 3 de Anima, tex. com. 17.) ↩
- Action and passion are the same in matter, although they are distinguished formally. (Actio et passio sunt idem in materia, licet formaliter distinguantur.) ↩
- Compare what D. Albert said above, in the Categories, tractate 6, chapter 1. (Confer quae dixit supra D. Albertus, in Praedicamentis, tract. 6. cap. 1.) ↩
- Here it is gathered that action is in the agent as in a subject, as he seems to allege at the end of the preceding chapter. (Hic colligitur quod actio sit in agente ut in subjecto, ut in fine cap. praecedentis videtur allegare.) ↩
- Text-comment 17. (Tex. com. 17.) ↩
- Aristotle, In book 16 On Animals. (Aristoteles, In 16 Animalium.) ↩
- Aristotle, In Topics 2. (Aristoteles, In 2 Topic.) ↩
- Comment 23. (Com. 23.) ↩
- But on the contrary, that consequent does not seem unfitting, indeed necessary, as he himself said above in this tractate, chapter 1. Consider this point, and solve it from the things said above. JAMMY. (Sed contra, istud consequens non videtur inconveniens, imo necessarium, ut dixit ipse supra in hoc tract. cap. 1. Considera in hoc, et solve ex dictis supra. JAMMY.) ↩
- Aristotle, In Physics 8, text-comment 27 and 28. (Aristoteles, In 8 Physic., tex. com. 27 et 28.) ↩
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