Book on the Six Principles. Tractate I. On Form, chapters I-VI

BOOK ON THE SIX PRINCIPLES.

TRACTATE I

ON FORM.

CHAPTER I.

Why this book is called the book of the six principles.

Although concerning the order of predicables it has already been determined in the Categories sufficiently, so far as belongs to the intention of the logician, nevertheless for easier teaching, so that concerning each thing it may be known what things are predicated, and in what way each predicable in genus and species and individual is ordered to one common thing (which is their principle), we shall again determine specially concerning the six, concerning which in the book of the Categories there was only a brief treatment and by way of example. But as in the book of the Categories we have followed and pursued the knowledge of Aristotle, so in this book we follow Gilbert Porretanus, who discovered and composed those things (which are said about the six principles) for an easier understanding of the things which seemed to have been stated succinctly in the book of the Categories; although they could have been omitted, nevertheless on account of the usefulness of students we have undertaken this labor. Therefore we also explain these things with the others for the instruction of students.

It is asked, however, why these six are called principles, when the other four, concerning which it was said in the book of the Categories, have been called categories. Many indeed have assigned many reasons: for according to the doctrine of Porretanus the ten first genera are the ten principles of things, in which every resolution stands, and which, by their essentiality, are constitutive of the first essences, and which by the scope of their commonness contain all things that can be ordered to the determination of predicate and subject. Concerning their coordination, as we have said, one must treat in the first part of logic, because reason does not gather except the things which it has set before itself, nor does it compose except the things which it has first ordered according to the ratio of comparable things. On this account the ratio by which ordering takes place was first handed down in Porphyry. But ordering insofar as it is in ordered things is handed down in the science of the book of the Categories, and in the science of the six principles, and in the science of divisions. But since every ordering of subjects and supposits is toward one thing and stands in one thing, that in which the ordering stands at the summit is the first and the principle of all the others. But genus is called so insofar as it is the first formable subject for the determination of all the things contained in the form of species and individual. But principle is said insofar as it is the first thing constituting and essencing all things which are of its coordination, in which it itself is contained according to act and understanding, as principling their essences.

But although all the most general things are called so in this way, nevertheless certain things are called genera more and more properly, and certain things rather principles. For substance, quality, and quantity are called genera more, because absolutely in these the things contained by them are contained in act and understanding; this is proper to genus according as genus is that under which species is placed. But principles are so called as a consequence, because they do not principle simply and with respect to being, but rather conversely with respect to being they are principled by their inferiors. Relation, however, is a genus in this way as the others are, and not so properly as the others can be or can be called a principle, because according to being it is always founded in something else, and more often it is founded in other genera and in the things of other genera.

But the remaining six are not properly called genera, because they are not said to be simply contained in others according to act and understanding as something that belongs to their ratio, as is clear by induction of each of them. For action does not say what is contained in the substance of others, nor does passion, nor where, nor when, nor position, nor habit: but they are said in some way to stand in the manner of a principle of that of which they are. For action, since it is in act, says the principle from which an agent effects that which it does. Likewise passion, since it is in the patient, says that by which the patient is moved to the form of the agent, and it does not say what exists as belonging to the ratio of some substance; and therefore passion by its own name does not say a genus, but a principle. The same is true of where, because it proceeds from place, and place is not a principle except of that which is in place; but the located thing is compared to place when it is in where. Therefore, since where belongs to extrinsic things, but genus belongs to the intrinsic things of substance, it is named more as a principle than as a genus. In the same way it is with when, which proceeds from time. But time is the number of motion; motion, however, is the act of that which is moved, leading it to the form of the mover. And therefore when, which is in that which is in time, by comparison to time, likewise does not name anything of substance that would be as a genus, but names a principle through motion, of which it is the measure. Position, however, says the ordering of parts in place and in the whole, and it says a principle more than a genus, because motion and action and passion, transforming the things in which they operate, are the cause of the order of parts to the form of the whole; and therefore position does not say what the positioned thing is, but according to its own name, which is position, it says the principle of the essence of the whole which is principled from the position of the parts in the whole and in place. Habit, however, in relation to that of which it is the habit, says nothing that is the what of the haver, according as a genus is the what of that of which it is the genus, but it says the principle of preservation of the haver. And on account of this, while the others say principles with respect to the being of the things of which they are, this last says the principle of preservation. Therefore they are rather called principles than genera. On this account also they are rather forms, that is, remaining outside, than they are essences.

These things, however, can be understood thus. For the six are principles either for being or for well-being. If for being: either from the part of the agent, and thus it will be action; or from the part of that which is acted upon; and this in two ways, namely according as it is receiving the act of the agent, or according to the effect which follows the act of the agent. If in the first way: either according to the very action which the patient receives, and thus it is passion; or according to the measure adjacently present from without, or according to the effect which action makes in the substance and parts of the patient. If according to the adjacent measure: either it is according to the measure of action or passion according as it is of this, and thus it is when; or according to the measure of the thing suffered, or of that which suffers, and thus it is where. But if it is according to the effect which the agent makes in the patient itself, then it is position, because from the action of the agent and the passion of the patient the parts are situated in the thing suffered for the reception of the form which the agent impresses, and one is made above, another below, one on the right, and another on the left, according as the power of the agent operates in it. But if it says a principle not for being, but for well-being, thus it is habit. Yet although in this way by their own names they say principles, nevertheless the things signified by their own names predicate principles of their coordination insofar as being is signified by their names, and the things contained in act and understanding in that of which they are predicated are called genera. Therefore by their own names they are called principles, and the things which they signify are genera.

But if someone asks in what way this science, which is about the six principles, is one, one must say that these six are united in the intention of principle, and so nothing prevents one science from being about the six.

But as in other matters, so also in these, the mode of philosophy must be held. For it belongs to the philosopher, as Aristotle says, to accept only demonstrative discourse, so that namely passions and differences may be demonstrated of the subject and of the parts of the subject, for having perfect knowledge of the things that are handed down. And therefore also the definitions of each must be set down, from which, as from means, everything that must be taught may be proved. For in this way the soul is perfected according to its contemplative part, which is the ultimate of its happiness, as Aristotle teaches ¹.

But what certain people say about art, namely whether philosophy proceeds in the manner of art, is foolish, because art is only in things made upon exterior matter, since Aristotle says ² that art is a principle productive with reason, and in this way to make is not to act.

CHAPTER II.

What form is, and in what way it is treated here.

Therefore, wishing to determine concerning the six principles, all of which are forms and as it were extrinsic to those things of which they are, because they are not of the being and substance of those things of which they are, and form is called, as Plato says, as though remaining outside, we must begin from the determination of form, so that it may be known from what, as from a first genus, they receive their origin. For Boethius says at the beginning of On the Trinity that those things are not properly called forms except those which are separate; but those which are in matter are properly called images, because they are produced in relation to those forms by assimilation and imitation. But all these things which we call principles are outside the substance of the agent, and passion is nothing of the substance of the patient; and it is similar concerning when and where, neither of which is anything of the nature of those things which are where and when. Position, however, is extrinsic on this account, because it says the order of parts in place, and this is outside the substance of the parts and of the whole. But concerning habit there is no doubt that it belongs to extrinsic things. Therefore, since all these remain outside, all these, according to the name of form, participate in the predication of form, and as they are called principles, so also they are called forms.

But form spoken of in this way cannot be determined unless form is defined generally and by the definition one arrives at the intention of the form about which the intention is. Therefore, speaking generally about form, we say, according as the logician ought to speak about form, that form is something contingent to composition, consisting in a simple and invariable essence; for we define form by a logical definition. For speaking logically, form is an intention which gives the formal being of the whole, and the very notion of the whole, as has been said in the science concerning Universals. But I say that it says the being of the whole, whether this being is substantial or accidental, whether it is potential or actual being, as animal says the potential being of the whole, and rational says the actual being of the whole human. But human says the whole composed from both; white, however, says the accidental being of the whole; and risible says the accidental being of the nature and species as a whole.

But this kind of being is nothing other than contingent to composition, that is, to the composite or from composition, because if it were contingent to a part of the composition or of the composite, it would not be predicable of the whole, nor could it be called the notion of the being of the whole. And I say contingent, not because this form always continges, or comes to the composite accidentally, according to that which is form, because in this way there is species, or accident, or property, or difference, or genus, and therefore it does not always contingently belong, but sometimes is substance. But it is contingent for this reason, because the mode of receiving it as it is the notion of the whole is always accident and always contingent. For there is a universal which is before the thing, and this is the cause of the thing per se or accidentally. And there is a universal which is in the thing, and this is the substance of the thing or of the accident inclined toward substance. And there is a universal which is after the thing, and this is the universal separated from the thing itself by understanding, and this is contingent to the thing and is accidental to the thing; for this is nothing other than the reception of the universal form without this here and without this now. This reception of the thing is simple and separated from the particular and from particulars; and in this way form is called the universal which the understanding orders in genus and species, and whose coordination it reduces to a category or to a principle. And in this way form is the formal being of the whole received through understanding, which cannot be received in the ratio of a form that is the form of a part, because this form belongs to matter in the particular and is not predicable of the whole. Thus, therefore, form taken in common with respect to the substantial or accidental being of the whole, predicable of the whole and not of a part, is form which is contingent to composition.

But what is added, that it consists in a simple essence, is added for this reason, because although such being is of a composite whole, nevertheless it is received from the part of form and not from the part of matter. But it is not received from the part of form insofar as the part is a part of the composite, but it is received from form insofar as form is the cause of the whole being, encompassing the whole and terminating it to being. And because that form is nothing except form, although it is of the whole, therefore it has no principle of composition in itself, but is a simple essence, although it is not the essence of a simple thing, but of a composite. For in this way matter is not a simple essence, because matter at least potentially has part and part; but form has part and part neither potentially nor actually. And therefore this belongs to form and not to matter.

But if it is objected that species is form and nevertheless has a part, because it has genus and difference, we say that those parts are not divided in the species, because the same thing which is in the genus is as confused and indeterminate, and in the species specified and determined. But genus says it as confused, difference as determining, and species as determined; and these do not differ in formal being, although they belong to different things, just as the determinable nature differs from the nature of the determining thing and from the nature of the determined thing. Difference is determining and does not determine except through the formal which is in act, and it determines the formal which is in potency. And determined species says nothing except the formal thus determined. And if it said anything else, genus would not be predicated of species, nor would difference be predicated of species; and therefore it is established that these three say the same formal thing. And because difference is in the genus by potency, and to be by potency in another according to the potency of the formal cause is to be in it according to inchoation, and the inchoation of form and perfection are the same in the substance of form, diverse in being, therefore one and the same thing is in potency and in act. And therefore that definition is one and many; and in this respect, according to substance, essence is simple, although those things are in it which differ in nature according to them. And therefore it is said that form consists in simple essence.

But it is invariable, because nothing is varied according to mutation except matter or a subject composed from matter and form; but form, insofar as it is universal form, is neither of these, and therefore in itself it is an immutable essence. It is varied accidentally, however, when sometimes according to the being which is in this or in that, it is generated or corrupted. But we are not speaking here about the variation which is according to accident. It is proved in another way also that form which is a universal, whether it is accidental or substantial, is contingent to the composite and is not the composite. For such form is not composition or a composite, because each composite, coming to another composite, makes something greater either according to essence or according to quantity. But form coming to composition makes something greater least of all; therefore form is not a composite, but is contingent either to the composition or to the composite ³. But that form coming to the composite does not make something greater is proved both in accidental form and in substantial form. In accidental form, because in the fact that something is white it is not said to have been made greater or lesser than if it were not white, but it is said only to have been altered. But in substantial forms, because in the fact that body and soul conjoined is a human being, it is not said to have been made greater or lesser, but perfected in the form of the species.

Yet this has a difficulty: because a universal form coming to something is a certain essence, and therefore that to which it comes seems to be increased according to essence. To this one must say that the universal is posterior to that of which it is the universal, although the universal nature itself is prior to that of which it is predicated; and insofar as it is universal it has only intentional being, or, as Boethius says, notional being. This is not being according to nature, and therefore as a notion it adds nothing essential to that which exists according to nature. But this is plain to understand from those things which have often been said in the science concerning Universals.

But since concerning certain other things which are universal forms the same thing can be put forward, namely that in this they are simple essences, because they are not composed of matter and form, as in the soul of a human being, which is not composed in this way, therefore in the definition it was said, consisting in invariable essence. For in the soul of a human being, according to the sensitive part which is in it, alteration of contrariety is found according to the motion of passions, such as of sadness and joy; for although the motions of the passions of joy and sadness are conjoined and not of the soul as of a subject, as Aristotle says ⁴, nevertheless, as Averroes says, in these the soul suffers together with the body, and thus is varied in some way, and therefore it is not form as we speak here about form.

Further, since, as certain people say, there is something which is a subject for the simple, and is subject to no variation, as they say in the case of that which is the soul of the world, which they say is both simple and invariable, therefore, so that I might separate and divide this form about which we speak here from all others, I added contingent to composition. For what and of what sort the soul of the world is is long and difficult to determine, and belongs to the first Philosopher according to that part in which he determines about primary and universal causes. Nevertheless we say briefly that it is not the first cause, nor is it some intelligence, but the mover of the first movable thing, which is for itself the principle of life and motion in all things, as is said in the book On Causes; and this soul is not contingent to composition or to a composite, but is the form of one thing, which is the first heaven. On account of this, it cannot be a form which is universal being, because a universal is a form contingent to the composite, and is not the form of a part, as has often been said. Therefore the definition previously introduced and given of form will be a term; for that definition is called a term which includes the terms of the being of that defined thing. For this definition will be seen to contain neither something superfluous nor something less than suffices for declaring the being of form, if someone wishes to investigate subtly and not superstitiously.

Yet this must be noted: the things that have been said are not true of substantial form, nor of accidental form, but are true of form which is a universal, whether it is substance or accident, insofar as it is predicable as genus, or difference, or property, or accident in whatever genus or principle of predicables.

CHAPTER III.

On the difficulty whether form is variable.

It has, however, a difficulty occasioned from the things said before. For we are speaking of form insofar as it is common to the accidental and substantial, and insofar as it is a universal predicable either in what or in quale, because it is signified as the notion of the whole being of a thing, according as even speech is a form, and whiteness is predicated of that whiteness, and according as formal reason and opinion is a form of the soul, predicated of this or that reason or opinion. Therefore, in saying about such form that it is invariable, there seems to be an objection in many cases. For it seems that many forms are variable or mutable into contraries. For the same speech is receptive of truth and falsity: "me to be sitting" is wholly true while I sit, and the same is false while I do not sit. Likewise also the same whiteness is receptive of clarity and obscurity. And the formal reason or one opinion seems receptive of that truth which is in the thing and of falsity which is not in the thing, although all these are forms, notions of the whole being, and predicable of the whole; and thus they are contingent to composition.

But to this it is said, as has been said, that form consists in invariable essence. And what is said about whiteness is not as it is said. For the same whiteness, according to that which is form, is not receptive of clarity and obscurity; rather, there are two whitenesses in the subject, of which one is clearer and the other more obscure from the opacity and clarity of the subject. For it makes no difference to say clear whiteness and to say a subject or receiver that is clear, since whiteness according to the being of whiteness has itself as one and the same in the same way. For it is obscured and clarified from the obscurity or clarity of the subject; and that which is more obscure by it is not the same whiteness in number as that which is clearer. And similar to this is what is said in the fifth book of the Physics ⁵, that the same health is not in the morning and in the evening, because in the humors of the animal the same equality does not remain, although the receptive subject of health is the same in the morning and in the evening, yet not under the same form of health.

Likewise also, in the same way, reason or opinion and one speech in number is not receptive, according to a mutation of itself, of truth and falsity, namely that which is in the thing or is not, but rather, as the Philosopher says ⁶, speech which is in voice is the mark and sign of the passions which are in the soul, which passions have been brought into the soul from the forms of things conceived. And therefore truth in reason or in the mind or opinion is the adequation of things or opinions or concepts. And falsity in the mind or opinion is the inequality of the mind and things. And similarly truth in speech is the adequation of the sign signifying a thing in voice and of the thing signified. And therefore it is changed from true into false not according to its own mutation, but as signs are changed through the mutation of those things to which they are referred. Therefore in the fact that the thing signified is or is not, in this the mind or opinion and speech are true or false without any variation of opinion or speech. And Boethius gives an example of this: when one thing remains immobile and another crosses to the opposite side, the one who previously was left is made right, without any variation of his own, from the change alone of the other which is referred to him, as right or left according to position. But concerning these things we have spoken elsewhere.

Yet it must be understood here that there is a twofold truth in speech. For there is the truth of the sign insofar as the sign is referred simply to the act of the sign, and not to signifying this or that, as a true sign is said to be one that does not fail in the act of signifying. And this truth, as Anselm proves, speech does not lose because of the change of the thing signified. For this speech, "me to sit," is a true sign of this, that I sit, whether I sit or do not sit; for it always signifies that I sit, and in this it does not fail, because it signifies this rightly and truly, because it received this to signify insofar as it is a sign. For a true sign is what rightly signifies that which it has to signify, and in this it does not fail. But there is another truth in the sign related to signifying this and adequate to it, as this speech, "I sit," is adequate to the thing while I sit; and this is changed by the change of the thing itself, and of this we speak here, and not of the first. For the first remains immobile while the sign remains. On account of this certain people also thought that the first truth is truth, and one and the same in all true signs, although this is doubtful; since a sign is right and true when it signifies that which, in the first truth instituting and ordering all things, it received to signify, and thus the sign becomes the rightness of the sign related to the first exemplary cause of itself. Nevertheless relation can be numbered beginning from the first truth, and thus it is one; it can also be numbered from the part of the related signs, and thus it falls into multitude, and thus it is numbered simply. Therefore simply it is many, and according to something it is one.

CHAPTER IV.

What the substantial is, and consequently what the accidental is.

But since every form which is a whole and the notion of a whole, and which is predicated of something, is either substantial or accidental, we must here speak of what the substantial is, and consequently also determine what the accidental is. Therefore we say that the substantial according to its name is that which has the mode of substance in that to which it is substantial; and this sometimes is substance, and sometimes is not substance according to matter, yet it has the mode of substance. It is substance, indeed, when it is in the genus of substance, as animal is both substance and substantial to human, and human is both substance and substantial to Socrates. And similarly rational is substantial to human and to Socrates. But sometimes it is not substance while having the mode of substance, as color stands to whiteness, and as quality stands to color, or the disgregative of sight stands to whiteness, and as being an extremity of the transparent stands to whiteness, and as being an extremity of the transparent stands to color. For genus is substantial as matter, and difference is substantial as form. Yet substantial is said otherwise, namely of what is in something as a per se cause, as risible is called substantial to human because it is in the nature of human as a per se cause; and that is neither substance, nor does it have the mode of substance in constructing substance, but insofar as it belongs to inhere inseparably, it has the mode of substance. Further, in a fourth way, what is present in the definitive ratio in place of a difference is called substantial, although it is nothing of the essence and being of the thing itself, as nose is substantial to snub, eye to bleary-eyed, shin to lame, and back to hunchbacked, and generally substance to its proper accident.

And because in this way something which is not substance is sometimes called substantial, yet has some mode of substance, therefore Boethius says that the substantial is a middle between substance and accident. But it is not a middle said by the denial of both extremes according to its own proper nature and entity, because such a middle cannot exist, since everything that is is substance or accident according to the nature of its own entity. Rather, it is a middle because something participates in both, as we have said, for it has the nature of accident and the mode of substance.

But in opposite modes the accidental is said, namely that a nature sometimes is substance and has the mode of accident, as something extraneous which is in or belongs by the favor of another, as a sixth finger, which, although it is substance, nevertheless because it does not come to be through the formation of the hand, but through abundance of matter, is therefore accidental. There is also accidental what has the nature and mode of accident, as the whiteness of Socrates; or what inheres and not through a per se and proper cause.

Therefore, since substantial and accidental are said in these modes, we say that the substantial is what confers being upon composition, that is, upon a composite from a certain composition. But I say that it confers being, as genus or matter does, and as difference or form does upon the composite, which is composed from genus and difference or from matter and form. And I say from a certain composition, because true composition is indeed from matter and form, which are divided from one another by nature, and neither is the principle of the other. But a certain composition, and not simply composition, is from genus and difference, because difference, just as in inchoation, is essentially in the genus, and the genus is its principle from which it is drawn out by the agent intellect; and on account of this it does not make an absolute composition. And therefore the defined thing from genus and difference is one and not many, for the same thing is in potency and in act, nor is difference another essence except what is contained in the formal potency of the genus. This, therefore, is the substantial in most cases, and it is impossible for this to be absent from that thing to which it is substantial. But this is clear in formal things, as reason inheres in human and sense in animal, or things similar to these in others. And in accidental things, indeed, an example is that in continuous things the continuous is line, surface, and body; and the discrete in discrete things is speech and number. But if what has been said is substantial, namely what confers being on a thing and what cannot be absent from a thing, then among substantial things one is as matter, and one as form, as body is substantial to human as matter, soul is substantial to human as form, and as body is substantial to human, so also soul similarly is. And because logical or rational composition corresponds to natural composition, therefore reason or rational would be substantial to human, and animal as genus likewise. These things, however, have been expounded elsewhere in the science of the book which is inscribed On Categories. But it was fitting to say something about these here, because through these we receive how certain principles have to be ordered in the six principles, and certain ones excluded from the coordination of such things. For whatever things depend in such a way upon some principle that the principle confers being upon them, and that their being cannot exist without that principle, without doubt these belong to the coordination of such principles. But the things which do not regard them except perhaps accidentally are ordered to another as to genus and principle; or perhaps according to one thing they are in one, and according to another thing they are in another. For nothing prevents one and the same thing from being in diverse categories according to the diverse things that are in it; of these one perhaps is substantial, but the remaining one accidental, as a white two-cubit body, which, insofar as it is body, is in substance; but insofar as it is white, is both quale and quality; and insofar as it is two cubits, is in the category of quantity. And this has already often been determined elsewhere, both in the Isagoges and in the Categories. Therefore for this cause the substantial and accidental have been introduced here by us.

CHAPTER V.

On the origin of forms, whether they are from nature or from the operation of art.

But it seems that a certain form, whether it is substantial or accidental, which is taken as a universal and as the same with the whole of which it is predicated, is produced by nature; but a certain form is produced by act or by the operation of art. For reason or rational form is produced by nature in the rational thing itself. Likewise also the things which are in the forms of accidents: for color is a natural form produced by nature. And likewise another passion in the genus of quality, such as color, odor, and flavor, and things of this kind, and health and sickness; for in all such cases it is clear that these forms, both substantial and accidental, are from nature. But other forms are from act or from our operation, such as house, cup, bed, and things of this kind. In certain cases there is a doubt whether they begin from nature or from act or work of art, as in the figure of incision, as when a stone or a Hector is sculpted. For in such cases the ratio of doubt is that because such figures are from nature, this seems from the fact that art in such things adds nothing to matter, and therefore what was in it by nature remains; because what art does in such things consists wholly in taking away and separating certain parts from the subject. And because it adds nothing from the work of art, it does not seem to be from the work of art in the figured thing. And therefore such figures seem to be from nature and not from art.

But to this one must say that in such cases this is the subject of the figure, and the matter of the figures is not from act or from the work of art. But that the figures are sensed and appear is from act or from the operation of art. For that which is in matter is wholly from nature, to which nothing has been added by art. But a thing separated from it is added. And if from those things which are natural in the whole some things are separated and nothing is added to them, the things which are left are natural and are from nature. Therefore such a figure, according to all the things which are in it, seems to be from nature. But that it is sensed by sight as terminated by lines in this way or that way cannot be except from act and the operation of art, because nature did not make such a termination of lines. But what is said has the same force as if it were said that the matter of the figure is from nature, and the figure itself, insofar as figure is the termination of quantity, is from act or from the operation of art. And this is the truth, because although art adds nothing material, nevertheless by separating it contributes to the being of the figure, to whose formal being the separation of parts contributes more than the placing-on of some matter, because we do not say that a figure is such a what that has matter from which it is, but only matter in which it is. But to the formal being of figure, removal or separation of material parts contributes more than the gathering of some material parts.

But although we speak thus about the figure of incision which consists in the separation of the parts of the subject, nevertheless it is established that whatever of such figures is of conjunction and not only of separation, as we speak of the figure of a house, of a bed or of a tripod and things of this kind, because in these art operates something by way of placing-on, these are from act and are from the operation of art, not of nature. Thus, therefore, one must speak concerning the figure of incision, which is produced into act by incision of parts alone. Thus, therefore, the things that are like a figure of incision are manifest. And therefore Empedocles said that in all things which receive form from art, nature is matter, but form is an accident ⁷. If the wood of a bed is planted, a bed will not sprout, but wood will. Therefore, since nature is that from which the sprouting thing sprouts, the nature will be the wood, and not the form of art which is in the bed.

But such a determination does not hold in common or universal things, which are in many and are of many, and which are predicated of them. For the common or universal essence of those things which are in many, predicated of them, cannot be from the operation of art, because it is impossible for such an essence to be from the operation of art, since every form of art is an accident; but such a form is substantial and inheres per se in those things of which it is the form. Further, such a common form does not seem to be made by nature, for this reason, that the things which are produced by the potency of nature seem to be made by the act of one creating and generating, and take their principle from the one creating or generating. But what belongs to one creating and generating is then always particular and not universal. Therefore they are not from the work of nature, as we see. But if it is said that creatures are universal and common forms of this sort, immediately it can be plain to anyone that this is not true, because since the term of creation or generation is not universal but particular, nothing can be assigned in the way of reason, nothing in the way of example, as to how the common thing has been created or generated. Therefore it is necessary to say that forms of this kind are natural and perfected by nature, and not by the operation of art or by proposal.

But it seems one must say that nature operates hiddenly in such things, and this is a particular nature: in the agent and patient, indeed, it intends this one and produces it; but the universal nature which orders this one to divine being intends the simple and universal. And because universal nature operates in the particular, therefore since particular nature produces this one, and because this one is a human being, universal nature produces this one in human, and so in other cases. And in this way, consequently, that which is universal is produced, although it is not universal according as it exists in this thing, as was said in the science concerning Universals. But a universal is in aptitude for existing in many or in several things. But when matter is actually divided through generation, it is made in many things in act, and nature does this hiddenly.

But nature is said to operate hiddenly in these things for two causes. One of them is that acts always belong to particulars. And therefore a particular nature operating is manifest. But when a particular nature operates, it operates only by the power of the universal nature which is hidden in it, and is considered only by understanding; and thus universal nature is operating hiddenly. The second cause is that what is operated by nature is a particular manifest to the senses; but that by which that thing has the form of species and nature is hidden and consequently generated, and therefore this one generates this one, and this is manifest. But because this generating one is a human being, therefore this one generated is a human being, because otherwise generation would not be univocal; and this is hidden with respect to us, received only by understanding; and therefore we say that nature operates hiddenly in such things. For just as from the conjunction of many things having one ratio of unity (as many horses or many humans) a certain constitution of discreteness is effected, which is formed from the prior things from which that conjunction is made and which exceeds the discrete quantity of each one of them, so that all together are of greater quantity than each single one of them; so from the discreteness of singulars which are one in species or genus, when they are compared with one another in the form in which they are essentially similar, one thing common to all is understood. Yet this is whole in the singulars, and exceeds the predication of the prior singulars in this, that any singular is predicated of one alone, but that thing which is their likeness is predicated of many. On account of this every such commonness is natural, because it proceeds from singularity, that is, from the essential likeness of singulars. And thus singularity in one is a like cause of commonness. But nature is the cause of such a singular. And therefore nature is the cause of commonness, because whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused by that cause in some way. But singularity is coequal with creation or generation, because the term of generation and creation is a singular.

But those speculating subtly find nature operating in the operations or actions of art, because in animals lacking reason we find nature attaining to the work of art, as in the little dwellings of bees and the nests of swallows; and nature has this insofar as it is the work and instrument of intelligence. Thus also we find the first creator of all creatures operating in the creature. And we grasp this from the very act of the creator. For we see that by a certain number and proportion he established all nature, which proportion belongs only to the wisdom of the creator. For that intelligence operates toward this proportion of this or that nature, it does not have insofar as it is intelligence, but has insofar as it is divine; for this is the wisdom of him who disposes, produces, and orders all things by their proper proportions. But let these things, said thus far by us for the explanation of the things said, suffice. For these matters belong to another and higher inquiry; indeed they also belong to that part of first philosophy which is about universal and first causes.

CHAPTER VI.

On the division of predicable forms, concerning which there is intention here.

But with these things thus determined concerning predicable forms, the division of forms must be received, so that it may be known concerning which forms there is intention in this book. Therefore let us say that form which is universal, whether substantial or accidental, is one kind in a subject as an accident, and is said of another as of a subject, which is its subjective part, and is said or predicated in what, as indeed science is in a subject, in the soul, in the same way as an accident is in a subject, and is said of a subject, as of grammar, which is a species of science and a subjective part. And such a form is a universal accident compared in quale to the subject in which it is, and compared in what to the species which is subject to it. But a certain form is in a subject as an accident, and is said or predicated of no subject or subjective part, as the whiteness of Socrates. And likewise whatever forms are like individuals: for these are compared indeed to the subject in which they are, and they are predicated of it in quale; but they cannot be compared to that which underlies them, because nothing underlies an individual, since it itself is the ultimate thing underlying. But certain of such forms are said of a subject, yet are in no subject, as substantial forms which are not in a subject as an accident, because they confer toward being and are part of that which is the being of a thing. They are said of a subject, however, because they are predicated in substantial quale, as difference is, or in what, as genus is. And an example of this form is rational and mortal, and the other substantial differences.

But of those forms which indeed are in a subject as accidents and are unsayable of a subject, because they contain nothing substantial as a subject for themselves, as individual accidental forms do, some are sensible, that is, perceptible by a proper or common sense; others are insensible, which are perceptible by no proper or common sense. For the sensible is what is comprehended by some sense, as the whiteness of Socrates, or the taste of this thing, or heat, or also striking. These are perceived according to the sense of touch; or striking, which is this or that sound; or sweetness, or odor, or anything of such things, which is perceived by proper or common sense, as magnitude, or figure, motion, or rest, number, or something of such things. But insensible things are those which are comprehended not by sense, but by simple reason or understanding, as teaching and discipline, which are in the soul according to understanding. And likewise also virtue, whether intellectual, moral, or even economic. For none of such things is perceptible by sense. But simply or universally nothing which is of the number of those things which are said of a subject, or which is universal as universal, is sensible. For a universal, insofar as it abstracts from this and from that, exists only in the understanding. And therefore Boethius says that the particular exists while it is sensed, the universal while it is understood. But all these things have to be determined and declared in the matters that belong to the soul.

But from these things which have now been set down here by division, it is manifest that certain things which are of the number of particular forms are situated somewhere according to a determinate part in the subject in which they are, as blackness is in the pupil of the eye. But certain of such particular forms are of such a sort that it is difficult to assign according to what part of the subject they are situated, as science, paternity, and like things, as filiation. Unless perhaps it is said that they are situated in the complexion of generating and composing things. For paternity certainly is a form of relation which inheres according to the whole, and not according to a part. The cause of this is that it is born into the generator from the act of active generation. But the act is of the whole and not of a part. Likewise filiation is according to the whole to the one who is born, on account of passive generation, which belongs to the whole. Nevertheless these are situated according to cause and not according to subject in the complexion of the generator, which complexion is the cause of the complexion of the seed; and according to cause they are situated in the composition of the generators, which composition is attended to in the position and order of the members in which seed is manifested for generation, as are the members which are called seminal vessels. But science, received according to act, has no position; but received according to aptitude, it is situated in the complexion of the knower, because people of subtle humors and spirits are more apt for knowing. On account of this Alexander also said that the potential intellect is a certain preparation in the body ⁸. Nevertheless some say that science is situated in the whole and not in a part, because in it there is the understanding receiving as the light of intelligence and the phantasm from which it receives; and thus it is said to be in the whole which pertains to the one understanding, because it is neither without soul, nor without body, nor without intelligence. But concerning these things we need not be much concerned here, because they are not to the purpose.

But this must be noticed: each of the things that have been said is a certain notation or mark or name of an incomposite thing which is in voice. For each of them is the mark of an incomposite voice, and is not signified by a composite speech. But what is thus marked by an incomposite voice will either be subsistent, that is, substance, or contingent to another, that is, accident. But of those things which are contingent, that is, which befall a subject, each one either comes to substance extrinsically, that is, through an extrinsic cause; or it is considered simply according to being and cause within substance, as within the substance to which it inheres, line, surface, and body which is in threefold dimension are considered according to being and cause. For quantity is caused by matter and belongs to things measuring intrinsically. Likewise also it is so concerning qualities, which are caused by form and dispose substance intrinsically. But of those things which are contingent upon substance or come to substance extrinsically according to substance, they are either act which is to act, or to suffer or passion, or disposition or position, or to be somewhere or where, or in delay or when, as formerly, yesterday, today; because, as Priscian says, time is the measure of mutable things, and as when is caused by time, or is taken according to having. For there are not more extrinsic accidents of substance, and therefore there are only six principles. But this has already been proved in the preceding parts of this book. Concerning those predicables which subsist, as substance is and the things that are contained in the genus of substance, there has been sufficient disputation and determination in the book which is called or inscribed On Categories. Likewise also concerning those things which do not come extrinsically, but exist only according to cause and being in those things in which they are through existence, and similarly concerning something, which more often arises through intrinsic things. But concerning the remaining things which more frequently come to substance through extrinsic things, which also for that reason do not have the name of predicables, but of principles, because they do not predicate something inhering simply, but something that stands in some way toward another, it will be spoken continuously in what follows.