Volume 1 · pp. 295–297
Chapter XII. Concerning the multiplicity of that which is prior.
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CAPUT XII.
De multiplicitate ejus quod est prius.
Postquam determinatum est de oppositis quæ sunt diversorum generum, dicendum de multiplicitate ejus quod est prius. Quia penes ejus rationem fit ordo eorum quæ sunt in uno genere secundum coordinationem prædicabilium secundum quod species est sub genere et individuum sub specie. Ex hoc enim priori et posteriori proprium accipiunt modum prædicandi, qui maxime in hoc libro est attendendus. Determinatis modis prioris sunt per oppositum etiam modi posterioris determinati: quia non dicitur prius nisi respectu sui posterioris.
Dicimus igitur quod prius dicitur unum altero quadrupliciter: et in hoc quod dicitur quadrupliciter, non divisionem intelligimus in species, sed est divisio multipliciter dicta: et prius tempore magis habet de ratione prioris, et secundo et tertio et quarto habent plus secundum ordinem quo enumerabitur a nobis. Prius enim de modis prioris non dicitur æqualiter secundum unam rationem, sicut innuit Aristoteles in quinto primæ philosophiæ 1, ubi distinguit prius inter multipliciter dicta.
Primus autem modus qui et principalis et primus est, qui secundum tempus, secundum quem prius alterum altero dicitur quod est antiquius et senius eo secundum tempus. In ordine enim partium temporis prius est præteritum quod ad præsens continuatur, futuro quod adhuc expectatur ut fiat: et ideo secundum ordinem temporis prius est quod in præterito longius distat a nunc, sicut dicit Aristoteles, quod bella Mediæ fuerunt ante bella Troiæ, et bella Troiæ fuerunt ante bella Romana et priora eis: et quia hic prius est sumptum secundum rationem numerantis quod extrinsecus adjacet ut mensurans, et quidquid prius est secundum numerum mensurantis est simpliciter prius, ideo iste modus est principalis, ad cujus comparationem et proportionem sive analogiam omnes alii modi priores dicuntur. Hoc ergo modo prius dicitur, cujus tempus est in præteritum. Amplius et prius quod est senius, et hoc modo æternitas est ante tempus duratione, et ea quæ sunt æterna, sunt ante temporalia. Sunt autem secundum sui naturam æternæ rerum essentiæ, ut genera quæ sunt prima rerum principia: istis enim non potest assignari tempus ut numerus mensurans: quia in tempore esse, ut dicit Philosophus in quarto Physicorum 2, est esse in quadam parte temporis mensurandi. Sic igitur antiquiora sunt genera omnibus.
CHAPTER XII.
Concerning the multiplicity of that which is prior.
After it has been determined concerning opposites which are of diverse genera, one must speak concerning the multiplicity of that which is prior. For according to its account the order of those things which are in one genus is made, according to the coordination of predicables, according as species is under genus and individual under species. For from this, namely prior and posterior, they receive the proper mode of predicating, which is especially to be attended to in this book. Once the modes of prior have been determined, by opposition also the modes of posterior have been determined, because prior is not said except with respect to its posterior.
Therefore we say that one thing is called prior to another in four ways; and in this, that it is called in four ways, we do not understand a division into species, but it is a division of things said in many ways. And prior in time has more of the account of prior, and the second and third and fourth have more according to the order in which it will be enumerated by us. For prior, among the modes of prior, is not said equally according to one account, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth book of First Philosophy 1, where he distinguishes prior among things said in many ways.
But the first mode, which is both principal and first, is that according to time, according to which one thing is said to be prior to another because it is more ancient and older than it according to time. For in the order of the parts of time, the past which is continued to the present is prior to the future which is still expected so that it may come to be; and therefore according to the order of time that is prior which in the past stands farther away from now, as Aristotle says, that the Median wars were before the Trojan wars, and the Trojan wars were before the Roman wars and prior to them. And because here prior is taken according to the account of a numbering thing which lies outside as measuring, and whatever is prior according to the number of the measuring thing is prior simply, therefore that mode is principal, to comparison and proportion with which, or analogy with which, all other modes are said to be prior. Therefore in this way that whose time is in the past is called prior. Further, that which is older is also prior, and in this way eternity is before time in duration, and those things which are eternal are before temporal things. But the essences of things are eternal according to their nature, as genera which are the first principles of things; for to these a time cannot be assigned as a measuring number, because to be in time, as the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Physics 2, is to be in some part of measuring time. Thus, therefore, genera are more ancient than all things.
Secundo autem dicitur prius quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam. Subsistendi autem consequentiam dico, ut si unum ponatur actu subsistere secundum esse, quod alterum propter hoc necesse sit ponere subsistere secundum esse, sicut dicimus quod unum est prius duobus: duobus enim existentibus mox unum consequens est esse et subsistere: uno vero existente non est necessarium duo esse vel subsistere. Et hic modus est inter inferius et superius in coordinatione prædicabilium: quia inferius est, sicut duo, quorum alterum est id quod directe est super ipsum, et alterum differentia constitutiva: unde posito inferiori in esse ponitur suum superius: sed non convertitur, quod posito superiori in esse ponatur inferius esse necessario: quia superius concipitur in inferiori, sicut unum in duobus: sed inferius non concipitur in superiori nisi ut potentia, sicut duo in uno sunt potentia, et ideo non convertitur consequentia ab uno existente, ut necessario propter hoc sit reliquum: et inter illa prius esse videtur non id a quo convertitur consequentia, et hoc est unum: ab illo enim ad duo consequentia non convertitur.
But secondly that is called prior which is not converted according to the consequence of subsisting. But I call consequence of subsisting this, that if one thing is posited actually to subsist according to being, because of this it is necessary to posit that another subsists according to being, just as we say that one is prior to two: for when two exist, one immediately follows to be and to subsist; but when one exists, it is not necessary that two be or subsist. And this mode is between lower and higher in the coordination of predicables, because the lower is like two, of which one is that which is directly above it, and the other is the constitutive difference. Hence when the lower is posited in being, its higher is posited; but it is not converted, that when the higher is posited in being, the lower is necessarily posited to be, because the higher is conceived in the lower, as one in two; but the lower is not conceived in the higher except as potency, as two are in one in potency. And therefore the consequence is not converted from one existing, so that on account of this the remaining thing necessarily is; and among those things, what seems to be prior is not that from which the consequence is converted, and this is one; for from it the consequence is not converted to two.
Tertio autem modo dicitur prius secundum quemdam ordinem. Dico autem quemdam ordinem: quia in omni priori est ordo, et ideo ordo simpliciter non facit specialem modum prioris, sed ordo quidam, non in quantum est ordo, sed in quantum est quidam ordo. Sic ergo tertio modo dicitur prius quod est quoad nos prius, ut in disciplinis demonstrantibus et orationibus rhetoricis: in demonstrantibus enim disciplinis est prius et posterius per quemdam doctrinæ ordinem: elementa enim in geometria priora sunt his quæ per ordinem describuntur: elementa enim sunt ut punctum, linea, circulus, angulus, et hujusmodi, quæ præcedunt ordine elementali descriptiones et compositiones figurarum angularium, figuræ enim per ordinem describuntur, secundum quod ex una probatur altera, sicut triangulus, aut quadratum, vel quadrangulum, vel quadratum, aut circulus; quia centrum dicti circuli per triangulum invenitur. Sic igitur in grammatica elementa litterarum priora sunt syllabis, et syllabæ dictionibus, et dictiones orationibus: et in oratione rhetorica hoc modo proœmium prius est narratione, et narratio prior est partitione. Hic autem modus prioritatis est inter principia generum, et ipsa rerum genera quæ ex illis principiis constituuntur. Principia autem sunt potentia et actus: ens enim est quodlibet genus potentiæ, et efficitur actu illud per actum rem generis illius complentem et constituentem.
Amplius supra ea quæ dicta sunt in quibus dicitur prius secundum ipsam naturam rei, et esse videtur prius et dici secundum aliquid additum sibi quod est ad bene esse, sic quod honorabilius et melius naturaliter secundum illam additam ad esse naturam prius esse videtur: consueverunt enim plurimi, quorum judicium non potest esse in toto falsum, et ideo pro auctoritate sumendum, consueverunt, inquam, nobiliores et ex se magis ex causa dilectos priores dicere et vocare. Et attende si non ex causa diliguntur plus, non propter hoc dicerentur priores: et ideo causa facit priores et non dilectio, quia dilectio secundum se non discernit inter priores et posteriores.
Utrum autem duo æqualiter diligi possunt aut non, fatuum est quærere: quia ubi dilectio una et una ratio diligendi et æqualis sit in duobus, pro certo æqualiter diliguntur. Si autem dilectio est simpliciter, non discernunt unum a pluribus, nec plura ab uno. Hic autem modus est in prædicamentis secundum ordinem substantiæ ante aliqua, quia honorabilior et melior est omnibus. Isti ergo sunt quatuor modi prioris, qui ab Antiquis dicti sunt, et sunt magis famosi et vulgati.
Dicit autem Boetius, quod his modis quintum addidit Aristoteles qui ante tempus suum non fuit. Dicit igitur Aristoteles quod videtur præter eos quatuor modos prioris qui dicti sunt alter quintus esse modus prioris: inter illa enim quæ convertuntur secundum essentiæ consequentiam id quod alteri causa est quomodolibet secundum quodcumque genus causæ, idem digne prius dicitur illo. Causa enim actu causans et effectus convertuntur secundum essentiæ consequentiam: et in talibus posita causa ponitur effectus, vel posito effectu ponitur causa. In talibus igitur dignum est ut causa natura sive naturali ordine prior sit quam effectus. Quod autem quædam hujusmodi sint, palam est: hominem namque esse convertitur secundum essentiæ consequentiam, ad hoc quod est veram orationem esse de hoc quod est hominem esse: nam si homo est secundum rem, vera est oratio qua dicitur, quod homo est. Oratio autem nequaquam est causa ut homo sit secundum rem, sed potius res sic se habens causa est ut oratio sit: dum enim res est aut non est, vera vel falsa dicitur oratio quæ rem significat, sicut in ante habitis dictum est, et sic prius dicitur causa prius. Necesse est igitur ut nisi secundum quinque modos speciales prius alterum altero dicatur. Hic autem modus prioris est inter substantiam et accidens: quia accidens est a substantia causatum.
But in a third mode, prior is said according to a certain order. But I say a certain order because in every prior there is order, and therefore order simply does not make a special mode of prior, but a certain order does, not insofar as it is order, but insofar as it is a certain order. Thus therefore in the third mode that is called prior which is prior with respect to us, as in demonstrative disciplines and rhetorical speeches. For in demonstrative disciplines there is prior and posterior through a certain order of teaching: for elements in geometry are prior to these things which are described through order; for the elements are as point, line, circle, angle, and things of this sort, which precede, in elementary order, the descriptions and compositions of angular figures, for figures are described through order, according as one is proved from another, as triangle, or square, or quadrangle, or square, or circle; because the center of the said circle is found through the triangle. Thus therefore in grammar the elements of letters are prior to syllables, and syllables to words, and words to speeches; and in rhetorical speech in this way the proemium is prior to narration, and narration is prior to partition. But this mode of priority is between the principles of genera and the very genera of things which are constituted from those principles. But the principles are potency and act: for being is any genus whatever in potency, and it is made actually that genus through the act completing and constituting the thing of that genus.
Further, besides those things which have been said, in which prior is said according to the very nature of the thing, it seems also to be prior and to be said according to something added to itself which is for well-being, so that what is more honorable and better according to nature seems to be prior according to that nature added to being. For very many, whose judgment cannot be wholly false and therefore must be taken for authority, have been accustomed, I say, to say and call more noble things and things loved more from themselves because of a cause, prior. And attend that if they are not loved more because of a cause, they would not on account of this be called prior; and therefore the cause makes them prior and not love, because love according to itself does not discern between priors and posteriors.
But whether two things can be loved equally or not, it is foolish to ask, because where love is one and one account of loving is equal in two things, certainly they are loved equally. But if love is simply, they do not discern one from many, nor many from one. But this mode is in the predicaments according to the order of substance before some things, because it is more honorable and better than all things. Therefore these are the four modes of prior which were spoken of by the Ancients, and they are more famous and common.
But Boethius says that Aristotle added to these modes a fifth, which was not before his time. Therefore Aristotle says that, besides those four modes of prior which have been spoken of, another, fifth mode of prior seems to be: for among those things which are converted according to the consequence of essence, that which is the cause of the other in any way according to any genus of cause whatever is itself worthily called prior to that other. For the cause actually causing and the effect are converted according to the consequence of essence; and in such things, when the cause is posited, the effect is posited, or when the effect is posited, the cause is posited. Therefore in such things it is worthy that the cause be prior by nature or by natural order than the effect. But that certain things are of this sort is plain: for to be a man is converted according to the consequence of essence to this, that there is a true speech concerning this, which is to be a man; for if man is according to the thing, the speech by which it is said that man is, is true. But speech is by no means the cause that man is according to the thing, but rather the thing having itself thus is the cause that the speech is; for while the thing is or is not, the speech which signifies the thing is said to be true or false, as has been said in the things had before, and thus the cause prior is called prior. Therefore it is necessary that one thing be said prior to another only according to five special modes. But this mode of prior is between substance and accident, because accident is caused by substance.
Sunt autem et alii modi priorum sicut prius in motu, prius in spatio, vel prius in loco, et in prima philosophia distinguitur unumquodque quoties dicitur, et non hic habent determinari, quia ad prædicamentorum genera non referuntur.
Hi autem omnes referuntur, sicut dictum est: essentiæ enim entium quæ constituunt genera, referuntur ad prædicamenta: et sic aut referuntur ad suas essentias, aut ad ea quæ sunt inter genera ad invicem unum genus ad alterum. Et primo quidem est modus primus. Secundo autem modo secundus est modus. Et tertius, quia ad intrinseca potest referri genus duplex, scilicet ad intrinseca secundum esse, et sic modus tertius, vel ad intrinseca secundum ambitum continentiæ, et sic secundus est etiam ante tertium: qui in coordinatione prædicabilium est magis intentus. Secundum ordinem autem substantiæ ad alia genera duplex est ordo, scilicet secundum quod substantia comparatur aliis secundum dignitatem quam habet ad alia, et sic est quartus modus. Et secundum quod est causa aliorum, et sic est quintus modus. Nec sunt plures modi, quia non possunt esse plures modi comparationis generum secundum quod genera sunt principia prima, sub quibus fiunt prædicabilium coordinationes. Alii autem aliter dicunt, sed non est curandum.
But there are also other modes of priors, as prior in motion, prior in space, or prior in place, and in First Philosophy each is distinguished as many times as it is said; and they must not be determined here, because they are not referred to the genera of the predicaments.
But all these are referred, as has been said: for the essences of beings which constitute genera are referred to the predicaments; and thus they are referred either to their essences or to those things which are between genera in relation to one another, one genus to another. And in the first case indeed there is the first mode. But in the second mode there is the second mode. And the third, because a genus can be referred to intrinsic things in a double way, namely to intrinsic things according to being, and thus there is the third mode, or to intrinsic things according to the ambit of containment, and thus the second is also before the third, which is more intended in the coordination of predicables. But according to the order of substance to other genera, the order is double, namely according as substance is compared to others according to the dignity which it has toward others, and thus there is the fourth mode; and according as it is the cause of others, and thus there is the fifth mode. Nor are there more modes, because there cannot be more modes of comparison of genera according as genera are the first principles under which the coordinations of predicables are made. But others speak otherwise, but one need not care.
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