Volume 1 · pp. 276–277
Chapter III
in qua fiunt secundum potentiam materiæ ad utrumque per motum et mutationem. Et primo quidem modo est oppositio ad aliquid: secundo autem modo est oppositio quæ est contrarietas. Potest etiam pluribus aliis modis sumi divisio oppositionis: et hoc quia valde facile est cuilibet consideranti naturas oppositorum, ideo pertransimus.
Ut autem sigillatim illa per exempla declarentur, unumquodque istorum oppositorum opponitur, ut relative id quod est dimidium et duplum: ut contraria autem, ut malum et bonum. Quamvis enim malum, ut Aristoteles dicit in tertio Metaphys., sit privatio boni, tamen secundum quod bonum est in habitibus et actibus sunt contraria: quia malus habitus ex malis relinquitur actibus et est qualitas quædam in anima, sicut malus actus est operatio quædam ab anima elicita, et sic contrarie opponitur malum ad bonum, prout est bonum in oppositis habitibus et actibus ad malum. Et hoc est accipere id quod est malum, et id quod est bonum: si enim accipiatur utrumque istorum formaliter, scilicet unde malum, et unde bonum, tunc forma tam in anima quam in habitu et in actu, malum ad bonum privative opponitur et in corpore et in natura tota, sicut probant similiter et Aristoteles et Dionysius: quia etiam in corpore malum privatio est, et in tota natura non est nisi privatio: sed hoc non est præsentis intentionis, sufficit enim quod bonum et malum secundum id quod sunt contraria sunt. Secundum privationem autem et habitum opponuntur, ut cæcitas opponitur visui, cæcitas enim est privatio visus in eo quod natum est habere visum. Ut affirmatio autem et negatio opponuntur, ut sedet, non sedet: quæcumque affirmatio affirmat, negatio negat, et econtra quæcumque negat negatio, affirmat affirmatio. Hi igitur figuraliter superficialiter dicti sunt modi oppositionum.
Si autem quæratur quæ sit divisio oppositionis in quatuor opposita, Dicendum quod communiter dicitur quod sit divisio sicut generis in species. Sed secundum veritatem per prius et posterius dividitur in suos modos, quia oppositio de esse et non esse sive secundum affirmationem et negationem, est plus habens de oppositione omnibus aliis. Et oppositio secundum habitum et privationem, quæ est oppositio secundum esse et non esse secundum quid, post hoc plus habet de oppositione. Oppositio autem secundum esse et non esse minus habet, et in tali oppositione plus habent ea quæ sunt actu contraria potentia esse in eodem, quam illa quæ sunt relativa quæ nec actu nec potentia possunt esse in eodem: quia quamvis actu et potentia simul esse non possint, tamen formalem contrarietatem non tantam habent quantam contraria quæ se mutuo expellunt: quia relativa se mutuo non expellunt, eo quod se in eodem non contingunt, et ideo formas non habent invicem activas et passivas. Ex his iterum patet quædam sufficientia oppositionum et ordo ipsarum, secundum quod plus vel minus habent de oppositione: quæ enim minus habent prius, et quæ plus habent posterius ordinantur.
CAPUT III.
De relative oppositis.
Dicamus ergo primo de relative oppositis, quod quæcumque ut relative opponuntur, ea ipsa quæ sunt, oppositorum sunt, et dicuntur secundum eumdem casum vel quolibet aliter ad aliud secundum eumdem casum vel diversum: ut duplum et dimidium hoc ipsum quod est utrumque ipsorum, alterius dicitur duplum, dicitur enim dimidii duplum: et hæc sunt vere ad aliquid secundum hoc ipsum quod sunt: sed etiam secundum dici disciplina quodammodo secundum alium casum dicitur disciplinati disciplina, et disciplinatus disciplina disciplinatus, et disciplina disciplinato est opposita secundum relationem, quia disciplina dicitur hoc ipsum quod est disciplinati, et
in which they come to be according to the potency of matter to each through motion and alteration. And in the first mode indeed there is opposition toward something; but in the second mode there is the opposition which is contrariety. The division of opposition can also be taken in several other modes; and because this is very easy for anyone considering the natures of opposites, therefore we pass it by.
But so that those things may be declared separately through examples, each one of these opposites is opposed, as relatively that which is half and double; but as contraries, as evil and good. For although evil, as Aristotle says in the third book of the Metaphysics, is privation of good, nevertheless according as good is in habits and acts they are contraries, because an evil habit is left from evil acts and is a certain quality in the soul, just as an evil act is a certain operation elicited by the soul, and thus evil is opposed contrarily to good, according as good is in opposite habits and acts to evil. And this is to take that which is evil and that which is good: for if each of these is taken formally, namely whence evil and whence good, then the form both in the soul and in habit and in act, evil is opposed privatively to good both in body and in the whole of nature, as Aristotle and Dionysius similarly prove, because also in body evil is privation, and in the whole of nature it is nothing except privation. But this is not of the present intention, for it suffices that good and evil according to that which they are are contraries. But according to privation and habit they are opposed, as blindness is opposed to sight, for blindness is the privation of sight in that which is naturally apt to have sight. But as affirmation and negation they are opposed, as he sits, he does not sit: whatever affirmation affirms, negation denies, and conversely whatever negation denies, affirmation affirms. These, therefore, are the modes of oppositions stated figuratively and superficially.
But if it is asked what the division of opposition into the four opposites is, it must be said that commonly it is said that it is a division as of genus into species. But according to truth it is divided into its modes by prior and posterior, because opposition concerning being and non-being or according to affirmation and negation has more of opposition than all the others. And opposition according to habit and privation, which is opposition according to being and non-being in a qualified respect, after this has more of opposition. But opposition according to being and non-being has less, and in such opposition those things which are actually contraries and are able potentially to be in the same thing have more than those things which are relative, which neither actually nor potentially can be in the same thing; because although they cannot be together in act and potency, nevertheless they do not have such great formal contrariety as contraries which expel one another, because relatives do not expel one another, because they do not touch one another in the same thing, and therefore they do not have forms active and passive with respect to one another. From these things again a certain sufficiency of oppositions and their order is clear, according as they have more or less of opposition: for the things which have less are ordered earlier, and the things which have more are ordered later.
CHAPTER III.
Concerning relatively opposed things.
Therefore let us speak first concerning relatively opposed things: that whatever things are opposed as relative, the very things which they are are of opposites, and they are said according to the same case or in any other way to another according to the same or a diverse case. Thus double and half, this very thing which each of them is, is said of another; for double is said of half. And these are truly toward something according to this very thing which they are. But also according to being said, discipline in a certain way according to another case is called the discipline of the disciplined, and the disciplined is disciplined by discipline, and discipline is opposed to the disciplined according to relation, because discipline is said to be this very thing, of the disciplined, and
disciplinatum hoc ipsum quod est secundum quod disciplinatum est stans sub forma disciplinæ, ad suum oppositum sive correlativum est, quamvis non secundum eumdem casum, quia non dicitur disciplinatum disciplinæ disciplinatum, sed disciplina disciplinatum: disciplinatum enim dicimus aliquem, non disciplinæ disciplinatum, sed disciplina disciplinatum per ablativum casum convertentiam facientes.
Concludamus igitur generaliter quod quæcumque relative opposita sunt, hoc ipsum quod sunt, aliorum dicuntur secundum genitivum, aut quomodocumque aliter dicantur ad invicem secundum aliquem alium casum. Hæc autem differunt ab omnibus aliis modis oppositionis et præcipue a contrariis: contraria enim non aliorum dicuntur, sed dicuntur contraria esse sibi vel ad se invicem: non enim dicitur bonum mali bonum, sed dicitur bonum malo contrarium, neque album dicitur nigri album, sed dicitur album nigro contrarium: ex quo patet quod hæ duæ ad invicem differunt oppositiones.
Si autem quis objiciat, dicens quod opposita se mutuo perimunt et expellunt, relativa posita se ponunt et interempta se interimunt, et sic relativa non sunt opposita. Solvendum, sicut in ante habitis dictum est, quod relativa in hoc habent virtutem et naturam oppositorum, quod se expellunt actu et potestate ab eodem susceptibili sive subjecto, et quod posita se ponant, non habent ab eo quod sunt opposita, sed habent ab eo quod a se invicem dependent secundum intellectum: quia sic utrumque est finis et terminus alterius, et sic unum non potest poni sine reliquo: quia quod ponitur esse finitum per intellectum alterius, non ponitur esse finitum ante intellectum illius, nec habet esse sine illo: hac etiam necessitate fit quod destructa se perimunt: destructo enim uno, alterum non est in esse finitum; nihil autem est actu nisi quod finitum est in esse: igitur quod non est finitum in esse, non est: quod finitum est intellectu, finitum est et in esse, quia per idem intelliguntur res per quod sunt in esse, sicut dicitur primo Physicorum 1.
Objicitur tamen contra ea quæ dicta sunt, quod contraria ut contraria ad invicem referuntur, quia contrarietas est forma relationis: et ideo quæcumque sunt contraria in quantum sunt contraria, sunt etiam relativa. Sed ad hoc dicendum sicut prius, quia contraria ut opposita ad invicem referuntur, et sunt relativa secundum genus et non secundum speciem, aut secundum individuum. Et quando dicitur quod contraria ut contraria sunt ad aliquid, locutio est duplex: ex eo quod illud quod dicitur (secundum quod) potest facere reduplicationem contrarietatis ut est oppositio, aut ut hæc oppositio in se designata. Et primo quidem modo vera est hæc, contraria ut contraria sunt relativa, sed tunc non sequitur conclusio, quod oppositio relationis sit oppositio contrarietatis. Si autem facit reduplicationem hujus contrarietatis, tunc est falsa hæc, contraria secundum quod contraria sunt relative opposita, et solvitur per interemptionem propositionis, et ideo patet quod non probat. Quamvis enim ex falso sequatur aliquando conclusio, tamen nihil probatur.
Hoc igitur est primum genus oppositionis inter quatuor quæ dicta sunt. Et cum omnia opposita nata sint fieri circa idem, hæc quæ dicuntur relative opposita, semper sunt in diversis, et non sunt nata fieri circa idem, nisi in hoc quod ad invicem referuntur et sunt ad invicem hoc ipsum quod sunt. Quod autem mutuo se expellant actu et potentia essendi in eodem, jam in ante habitis expositum est, et qualiter conveniat relativis.
the disciplined, this very thing which it is according as it is disciplined, standing under the form of discipline, is toward its opposite or correlative, although not according to the same case, because the disciplined is not said to be disciplined of discipline, but disciplined by discipline; for we say someone is disciplined, not disciplined of discipline, but disciplined by discipline, making convertence through the ablative case.
Let us conclude therefore generally that whatever things are relatively opposed, this very thing which they are is said of others according to the genitive, or however otherwise they are said to one another according to some other case. But these differ from all other modes of opposition and especially from contraries: for contraries are not said of others, but are said to be contraries to themselves or to one another; for good is not said to be the good of evil, but good is said to be contrary to evil, nor is white said to be the white of black, but white is said to be contrary to black; from this it is clear that these two oppositions differ from one another.
But if someone objects, saying that opposites mutually destroy and expel one another, while relatives when posited posit one another and when taken away take one another away, and thus relatives are not opposites. It must be solved, as was said among the things had before, that relatives have the virtue and nature of opposites in this, that they expel themselves in act and in power from the same susceptible or subject; and that when posited they posit themselves, they do not have from the fact that they are opposites, but they have from the fact that they depend on one another according to intellect, because thus each is the end and term of the other, and thus one cannot be posited without the remaining one, because what is posited to be bounded through the understanding of another is not posited to be bounded before the understanding of that one, nor does it have being without it. By this necessity also it happens that, when destroyed, they destroy themselves: for when one has been destroyed, the other is not bounded in being; but nothing is in act except what is bounded in being; therefore what is not bounded in being is not. What is bounded in intellect is also bounded in being, because things are understood through the same thing through which they are in being, as is said in the first book of the Physics 1.
Nevertheless it is objected against the things which have been said, that contraries as contraries are referred to one another, because contrariety is the form of relation; and therefore whatever things are contraries insofar as they are contraries are also relatives. But to this it must be said as before, because contraries as opposites are referred to one another, and they are relatives according to genus and not according to species, or according to individual. And when it is said that contraries as contraries are toward something, the expression is double: from the fact that that which is said, according to which, can make a reduplication of contrariety as it is opposition, or as this opposition designated in itself. And in the first mode indeed this is true, contraries as contraries are relatives, but then the conclusion does not follow, that the opposition of relation is the opposition of contrariety. But if it makes reduplication of this contrariety, then this is false, that contraries according as they are contraries are relatively opposed, and it is solved through the taking away of the proposition, and therefore it is clear that it does not prove. For although from the false a conclusion sometimes follows, nevertheless nothing is proved.
This therefore is the first genus of opposition among the four which have been stated. And since all opposites are naturally apt to come to be concerning the same thing, these things which are called relatively opposed are always in diverse things and are not naturally apt to come to be concerning the same thing, except in this, that they are referred to one another and are to one another this very thing which they are. But that they mutually expel themselves in act and potency of being in the same thing has now been explained among the things had before, and in what way it agrees with relatives.
Notes
- Text commentary 1. (Tex. com. 1.) ↩
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