Volume 1 · pp. 268–269
Chapter XIII
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Positio autem Platonis non habet hic probari nec improbari, sed in prima philosophia. Hic autem dici potest, quod si additione boni divini fieret intensio in qualitate, difficile esset valde dicere qualiter addendum ei (cui additur) conjungeretur: et tamen illud quod augetur, augetur per additum aliquid. Adhuc difficile esset invenire qualiter differt augens ab aucto, vel utrum virtus augens esset in augente vel in eo quod augetur, et alia multa difficilia sunt circa illud, quamvis theologizantes hanc opinionem sequi videantur.
Quod autem dicunt Epicurei, probabilius dictum fuit, quamvis in hoc non perfectum sit, quod dicunt secundum partes quantitativas subjecti magis et minus in qualitate esse, cum videamus parvum albius esse quam magnum, sicut margarita fulgens albior est multa cerusa. Media ergo Peripateticorum opinio vera est et tenenda: ad hanc enim pauciora sequuntur inconvenientia.
CAPUT XIII.
De proprie proprio qualitatis quod est secundum eam dici simile vel dissimile.
Proprie autem proprium qualitatis est (quod et omni convenit et soli) secundum qualitatem qualia similia, aut dissimilia dici. Unum enim in qualitate est simile, sicut unum in substantia est idem et unum in quantitate est æquale. Aut igitur in diversis est eadem qualitas, aut diversa. Si eadem, tunc dicuntur illa sic affecta similia. Si autem diversa, tunc dicuntur illa sic affecta dissimilia: ut etiam dicit Boetius similitudo est rerum differentium substantia et subjecto qualitas eadem. Similia igitur et dissimilia secundum solas dicuntur qualitates: simile enim et dissimile alterum alteri non est secundum aliquod aliud prædicamentum, nisi secundum illud quod est quale secundum prædicamentum qualitatis. Proprie ergo proprium qualitatis est, secundum eam simile vel dissimile alterum alteri dici.
Cum autem dicitur quod similitudo est eadem qualitas in differentibus substantia et esse, non potest accipi eadem numero qualitas: quia eadem numero qualitas non potest esse in differentibus numero, cum qualitas sicut et alia accidentia numerentur numero subjecti. Nec sufficit quod sit eadem genere, quia sic omnia essent similia: nihil enim est quod aliquam non suscipiat qualitatem. Relinquitur quod similia sunt, quorum qualitas est una specie. Unde quandocumque ostendentes erimus convenientiam diversorum in una qualitatis specie, dummodo simpliciter et non secundum quid insit utrique, ostendemus quoniam illa sunt similia. Si autem qualitas illi uni inesset secundum quid et alteri simpliciter, tunc per unam qualitatem quæ sic inesset utrique non probaretur quod illa essent similia, nisi secundum quid: quia aliter Æthiops qui est albus secundum dentes et nix quæ est alba simpliciter essent similia, quod est falsum: et ideo etiam grammaticus perfectus non est similis grammatico discipulo in grammatica, sed dissimilis, et in aliis est similiter.
But the position of Plato does not have to be proved or disproved here, but in first philosophy. But here it can be said that if intension in quality happened by the addition of divine good, it would be very difficult to say how what is to be added would be joined to that to which it is added; and nevertheless that which is increased is increased by something added. Further, it would be difficult to find how the thing increasing differs from the thing increased, or whether the virtue increasing would be in the increaser or in that which is increased, and there are many other difficult things about this, although those doing theology seem to follow this opinion.
But what the Epicureans say was said more probably, although in this it is not perfect, that they say more and less are in quality according to quantitative parts of the subject, since we see a small thing to be whiter than a large thing, as a shining pearl is whiter than much ceruse. Therefore the middle opinion of the Peripatetics is true and to be held; for fewer inconveniences follow upon this.
CHAPTER XIII.
Concerning the proper property of quality, which is for similar or dissimilar to be said according to it.
But the properly proper property of quality is, which agrees with every one and with it alone, that according to quality qualia are said similar or dissimilar. For one in quality is similar, just as one in substance is same and one in quantity is equal. Therefore either in diverse things there is the same quality, or a diverse one. If the same, then those things so affected are called similar. But if diverse, then those things so affected are called dissimilar. As Boethius also says, likeness is the same quality of things differing in substance and subject. Therefore similar and dissimilar are said according to qualities alone; for similar and dissimilar, one to another, is not according to any other predicament, except according to that which is quale according to the predicament of quality. Therefore the properly proper property of quality is that according to it one is called similar or dissimilar to another.
But when it is said that likeness is the same quality in things differing in substance and being, the same quality in number cannot be taken, because the same quality in number cannot be in things different in number, since quality, just like the other accidents, is numbered by the number of the subject. Nor is it sufficient that it be the same in genus, because in this way all things would be similar; for there is nothing which does not receive some quality. It remains that those things are similar whose quality is one in species. Hence whenever, showing, we shall have shown the agreement of diverse things in one species of quality, provided that it is present in each simply and not in a qualified respect, we shall show that those things are similar. But if quality were present in one of them in a qualified respect and in the other simply, then through one quality which was present to both in this way it would not be proved that those things were similar, except in a qualified respect; because otherwise the Ethiopian who is white according to the teeth and snow which is white simply would be similar, which is false; and therefore also the perfect grammarian is not similar to the student grammarian in grammar, but dissimilar, and it is similar in other cases.
Sed objiciunt quidam de hoc quod Boetius dicit quod species est essentialis similitudo individuorum, et genus est essentialis similitudo specierum. Ergo secundum genus et speciem aliquid dicetur simile alteri et dissimile, cum tamen genus et species non sint qualitates eorum quorum sunt genera et species. Ad quod dicendum, quod similitudo primo et per se est in qualitate et secundum qualitatem, per posterius autem in his quæ (quamvis essentialiter non sint qualitates) habent tamen modum prædicationis in quale, sicut sunt formæ substantiales. Et si dicatur quod nec genus nec species prædicatur in quale, sed in quid, Dicendum quod prædicari in quid non habent in quantum sunt formæ, sed in quantum sunt formalia vel formata per differentiam constitutivam quæ est forma. Quod autem
But some object concerning this, that Boethius says that species is the essential likeness of individuals, and genus is the essential likeness of species. Therefore according to genus and species something will be called similar to another and dissimilar, although nevertheless genus and species are not qualities of those things of which they are genera and species. To this it must be said that likeness first and through itself is in quality and according to quality, but posteriorly in those things which, although essentially they are not qualities, nevertheless have the mode of predication in quale, as substantial forms are. And if it is said that neither genus nor species is predicated in quale, but in quid, it must be said that they do not have being predicated in quid insofar as they are forms, but insofar as they are formal or formed through the constitutive difference which is form. But that
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