Volume 1 · pp. 266–268
Chapter XII
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primis quæ sunt elementa, sic sunt potentiæ naturales consequentes esse elementorum, et ideo elementis manentibus non deserunt substantias elementorum: et hoc modo circa idem nata sunt fieri, et mutuo se invicem expellentia ab eodem.
Ex hoc autem quod in qualitate est contrarietas prima, intelligitur quod contrarietas in omnibus aliis generibus in quibus est, non est nisi in ratione qualitatis: primum vero est causa omnium aliorum in quolibet genere in quo est primum. Unde etiam in quantitate ratione motus augmenti et decrementi non est contrarietas nisi secundum qualitatem, sicut in tractatu de Quantitate dictum est. Et si contraria sunt in ubi vel in situ, oportet quod sint in eis secundum quod non absolvuntur a qualitate. De his autem disputatio pertinet ad physicum vel metaphysicum, et non ad logicum: logicus enim non considerat contraria, nisi secundum quod sunt in eodem genere maxime distantia, et non considerat ea secundum quod prima et non prima.
CAPUT XII.
De secundo proprio quod est suscipere magis et minus.
Suscipit autem qualitas magis et minus, et hæc est secunda proprietas ex ea quæ præcessit causata. Quod autem quale magis et minus suscipiat patet inductione: album enim magis et minus alterum altero dicitur secundum albedinis intensionem et remissionem, et similiter justum magis et minus alterum altero dicitur secundum intensionem justitiæ et remissionem. Hoc autem non tantum est in ipsis quæ qualia sunt sicut alba et justa, sed etiam ipsa quæ sunt qualitates (a quibus talia dicuntur qualia) suscipiunt in seipsis, sicut quæ dicuntur crementa et diminutiones in seipsis. Et dicit Boetius quod hæc fuit sententia Platonis. Hoc autem declaratur exemplo, cum, sicut dicunt, candidum quod est candor, sit candidum, contingit, ut dicunt, illum candorem magis intendi per majorem (ut dicit Nicolaus Peripateticus) luminis contrarii admixtionem.
first, which are the elements, in this way they are natural potencies following upon the being of the elements, and therefore, while the elements remain, they do not desert the substances of the elements; and in this way they are apt to come to be around the same thing, and mutually to expel one another from the same thing.
But from this, that first contrariety is in quality, it is understood that contrariety in all the other genera in which it is present is only in the account of quality; but the first is the cause of all the others in any genus in which it is first. Hence also in quantity by reason of the motion of increase and decrease there is no contrariety except according to quality, as has been said in the treatise On Quantity. And if contraries are in where or in situation, they must be in them according as they are not separated from quality. But dispute about these things belongs to the physicist or metaphysician, and not to the logician; for the logician does not consider contraries except according as they are maximally distant in the same genus, and does not consider them according as they are first and not first.
CHAPTER XII.
Concerning the second property, which is to receive more and less.
But quality receives more and less, and this is the second property caused from that which preceded. But that quale receives more and less is clear by induction: for white is said more and less, one than another, according to the intension and remission of whiteness, and similarly just is said more and less, one than another, according to the intension and remission of justice. But this is not only in those things which are qualia, such as white things and just things, but also the very things which are qualities, from which such things are called qualia, receive in themselves, as those things which are called increments and diminutions in themselves. And Boethius says that this was the opinion of Plato. But this is made clear by an example, since, as they say, when the white thing which is whiteness is white, it happens, as they say, that that whiteness is more intensified through a greater admixture, as Nicolaus the Peripatetic says, of contrary light.
Quamvis autem hoc sit quoddam qualitatis proprium, non tamen convenit omni qualitati, sed plura sunt quæ suscipiunt magis et minus, et non omnia quæ sunt qualitates: justitia enim cum sit qualitas si dicatur (secundum quod in abstracto significatur) suscipere magis et minus, potest quilibet ambigere utrum verum sit an falsum quod dicitur. Similiter autem est etiam in aliis qualitatibus quæ afficiunt per inhærentiam subjecta in quibus sunt, quando per modum abstractionis significantur, ut justitia, albedo, sanitas et hujusmodi. Quidam namque dubitant de talibus, utrum magis et minus suscipiant: quidam enim justitiam a justitia et albedinem ab albedine aiunt non multum dici secundum magis et minus, ita quod una justitia sit magis justitia quam alia, vel una albedo magis albedo quam alia: neque dicunt unam sanitatem ab alia sanitate dici secundum magis et minus. Et causa etiam dicti est, quod nomen uniuscujusque abstractorum imponitur in termino, et non potest intendi et remitti: isti autem dicunt, quod intensio et remissio secundum magis et minus accidit qualitatibus secundum quod sunt in subjecto recipiente ipsas qualitates: dicunt enim alterum altero magis et minus sanitatem et justitiam habere, secundum quod unum dicimus altero saniorem et justiorem. Sic etiam dicunt et grammaticam et alias qualitates (quæ subjecta in quibus sunt afficiunt, et ideo affectus generaliter dicuntur) secundum magis et minus inesse. Licet tamen Antiqui diversa circa ista sentiant, tamen hoc indubitanter verum est, quod subjecta (quæ secundum illos affectus qualitatum dicuntur qualia) illa procul dubio secundum quasdam qualitates recipiunt magis et minus, et in prima et in tertia specie qualitatis: hoc enim modo unus alio dicitur
But although this is a certain property of quality, nevertheless it does not agree with every quality, but there are several things which receive more and less, and not all things which are qualities. For since justice is a quality, if it is said, according as it is signified in the abstract, to receive more and less, anyone can doubt whether what is said is true or false. Similarly, moreover, it is also in other qualities which affect through inherence the subjects in which they are, when they are signified through the mode of abstraction, as justice, whiteness, health, and things of this kind. For certain ones doubt concerning such things, whether they receive more and less; for certain ones say that justice from justice and whiteness from whiteness are not much said according to more and less, such that one justice is more justice than another, or one whiteness more whiteness than another; nor do they say that one health is said from another health according to more and less. And the cause of what is said also is that the name of each of the abstract things is imposed in a boundary, and cannot be intensified and remitted. But these say that intension and remission according to more and less happen to qualities according as they are in a subject receiving those qualities; for they say that one has health and justice more and less than another, according as we say one is healthier and more just than another. So also they say that grammar and other qualities, which affect the subjects in which they are and therefore are generally called affections, are present according to more and less. Yet although the Ancients think diverse things about these matters, nevertheless this is indubitably true, that the subjects which, according to those affections of qualities, are called qualia, without doubt receive more and less according to certain qualities, both in the first and in the third species of quality; for in this way one is called
grammaticior, qui magis habet grammaticam: et sic unus dicitur justior et sanior, et sic est in multis aliis primæ et tertiæ speciei qualitatibus.
Sed non est hoc in quarta specie qualitatis: triangulus enim et quadrangulus secundum quod denominative dicta sunt a triangulatione et quadrangulatione, sic dicuntur qualia et non qualitates: et sic dicta non videntur magis et minus suscipere triangulus et quadrangulus, neque aliquod denominatum ab aliis figuris, ut circulus, vel pentagonum, vel exagonum: hæc enim non dicuntur secundum prædicationem, nisi de illis quæ diffinitionem eorum recipiunt: hæc autem omnia sunt in termino: unde omnia de quibus prædicatur circulus nomine et ratione qualitatis, æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus sunt et dicuntur circulus. Ea autem quæ sunt de numero eorum quæ circuli nomen et rationem non recipiunt, illa in quantum non sunt circulus, et non secundum magis et minus, sed æqualiter circulus negatur in ipsis. Hoc autem patet per exempla: quadratum enim et quadrangulum circuli nomen et rationem non recipiunt, sed ab utrisque negatur circulus, et ideo quadratum non magis et minus est circulus quam quadrangulus. Est enim quadratum figura quatuor lineis æqualibus et quatuor rectis angulis conclusa. Et quadrangulus est figura quatuor rectis lineis, quarum duæ oppositæ sunt æquales sibi invicem, aliis non oppositis inæquales, et quatuor rectis angulis contenta. Et neutra istarum suscipit circuli nomen. Quia circulus est figura plana, una linea contenta, in cujus medio punctum est qui vocatur centrum, a quo omnes lineæ rectæ ductæ ad circumferentiam sunt æquales. Et hæc ratio neque quadrato convenit, neque quadrangulo, quod altera parte longius est. Et ideo æqualiter et non secundum magis et minus quadratum et quadrangulum non sunt circulus, nulla enim talium figurarum recipit diffinitivam rationem circuli.
Simpliciter autem loquendo sive universaliter si utraque ista nullo modo recipiunt hujusmodi quod propositum est, hoc est, circuli rationem secundum aliquem modum, tunc sequitur quod alterum istorum non dicitur secundum magis et minus esse circulus: quia quod secundum magis et minus esse vel non esse non dicitur, aliquo modo participat nomen et rationem ejus quod participat secundum magis et minus. Concluditur ergo, quod non omnia qualia suscipiunt magis et minus. Horum itaque prædictorum proprium nihil est proprie proprium qualitatis: neutrum enim illorum convenit omni et soli et semper.
more grammatical, who has grammar more; and thus one is called more just and healthier, and so it is in many other qualities of the first and third species.
But this is not in the fourth species of quality: for triangular and quadrangular, according as they are said denominatively from triangulation and quadrangulation, are thus called qualia and not qualities; and things so said do not seem to receive more and less, triangular and quadrangular, nor anything denominated from other figures, as circle, or pentagon, or hexagon. For these are not said according to predication except of those things which receive their definition; but all these are in a boundary. Hence all things of which circle is predicated by the name and account of quality equally, and not according to more and less, are and are called circle. But those things which are of the number of those which do not receive the name and account of circle, in them, insofar as they are not circle, and not according to more and less, but equally, circle is denied. But this is clear through examples: for square and quadrangle do not receive the name and account of circle, but circle is denied of both, and therefore square is not more and less circle than quadrangle. For square is a figure enclosed by four equal lines and four right angles. And quadrangle is a figure contained by four straight lines, of which two opposite ones are equal to one another, while the other non-opposite ones are unequal, and by four right angles. And neither of these receives the name of circle. Because a circle is a plane figure contained by one line, in the middle of which there is a point which is called the center, from which all straight lines drawn to the circumference are equal. And this account agrees neither with square nor with quadrangle, which is longer on one side. And therefore equally and not according to more and less square and quadrangle are not circle, for none of such figures receives the definitive account of circle.
But speaking simply or universally, if both of these in no way receive the thing of this kind which has been proposed, that is, the account of circle according to some mode, then it follows that one of these is not said to be circle according to more and less, because that which is not said to be or not to be according to more and less in some way participates the name and account of that which participates according to more and less. Therefore it is concluded that not all qualia receive more and less. And so, among the aforesaid things, no property is properly a property of quality; for neither of them agrees with every one, and with it alone, and always.
Est autem attendendum, quod sicut dicit Boetius ab Alexandro accipiens in commento libri Prædicamentorum, fuerunt tres sectæ Antiquorum circa hoc. Plato enim qui ponebat formas, dixit intensionem et remissionem fieri in qualitatibus maxime primæ speciei, sicut circa habitus et dispositiones, quæ dona dixit esse deorum, sicut expresse legitur in libro qui Menoni ascribitur, per immissionem boni divini plus et plus, sicut albedo plus et plus est albedo, cui immittitur plus et plus de claritate luminis, et sic dixit intendi omnes virtutes. Alii autem quidam Epicurei dixerunt per incrementa partium subjecti fieri intensionem, ut albedo vel justitia fit plus et minus, quæ plus et minus occupat et informat de partibus subjecti. Media autem Aristotelis et Peripateticorum opinio est, quod intensio fiat circa qualitatem secundum inhærentiam. Qualitas inhæret subjecto dupliciter: ex parte subjecti et ex parte qualitatis. Ex parte subjecti quidem ex hoc quod plus et minus aptatur qualitati recipiendæ. Ex parte autem qualitatis dupliciter: si enim habet contrarium, tunc plus et minus intenditur secundum majorem et minorem contrarii admixtionem: si autem non habet contrarium, tunc plus intenditur secundum majorem vel minorem accessum ad naturæ terminum, cui nomen et a qua nomen imponitur: et hoc est dicere ad veram nominis impositionem.
But it must be attended to, that as Boethius says, taking from Alexander in the commentary on the book of the Predicaments, there were three sects of the Ancients concerning this. For Plato, who posited forms, said that intension and remission happen in qualities chiefly of the first species, as concerning habits and dispositions, which he said were gifts of the gods, as is expressly read in the book which is ascribed to Meno, through the sending-in of divine good more and more, just as whiteness more and more is whiteness, to which more and more of the clarity of light is sent in, and thus he said that all virtues are intensified. But certain others, the Epicureans, said that intension happens through increments of the parts of the subject, so that whiteness or justice becomes more and less, which occupies and informs more and less of the parts of the subject. But the middle opinion of Aristotle and the Peripatetics is that intension happens about quality according to inherence. Quality inheres in a subject in two ways: from the side of the subject and from the side of the quality. From the side of the subject, indeed, from this, that more and less it is adapted to receiving quality. But from the side of quality in two ways: for if it has a contrary, then more and less is intensified according to greater and lesser admixture of the contrary; but if it does not have a contrary, then it is intensified more according to greater or lesser approach to the boundary of nature, to which the name belongs and from which the name is imposed; and this is to speak according to the true imposition of the name.
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