Volume 1 · pp. 260–262
Chapter IX
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undique terminatur in puncto uno. Curvitas autem ex duabus semper componitur formis: habet enim formam concavam subtus, et habet formam convexam exterius, et ideo omne curvum compositæ est formæ. Figuras autem habet tot, quot habet curvitates, quia tot habet terminationes ad angulos divisos. Tale etiam est quod his simile est, sicut circulare, vel sphæricum, et generaliter loquendo rotundum: omnia enim hæc formam habent concavi ad interius, et figuram convexi ad exterius. Quod hæ autem qualitates sint secundum quod talium sunt formæ et figuræ, probatur ex hoc quod secundum unumquodque talium id dicitur quale quod informatum est ex his, sicut patet inductione et exemplo: triangulum enim vel quadrangulum vel rotundum esse quale aliquid dicitur. Similiter autem et rectum vel curvum esse qualis habet prædicationem. Et similiter est in aliis secundum formam vel figuram hoc modo dictis.1
Rarum autem et spissum et asperum et lene fortasse putabuntur apud aliquos qualitates principaliter significare: quamvis a linea habent ad hoc quod qualitatem principaliter significant: significant enim primo positionem, et secundario qualitatem partium in loco et in toto positarum, et ideo non pertinent ad divisionem eorum in qua ponuntur ea quæ principaliter sunt in qualitate: hæc enim (ut dictum est) quamdam positionem partium in toto et loco primo principaliter significant quodammodo et non qualitatem: spissum enim sive densum dicitur, eo quod partes materiales ad se invicem sunt propinquæ positione: rarum vero per oppositum dicitur, eo quod partes materiales ad se invicem distant in toto: et hæc duo sic secundum positionem partium intrinsecarum sic dicuntur: Lene autem et asperum secundum positionem quamdam partium exteriorum: lene quidem eo quod in rectum vel æque secundum lineam vel superficiem sibi partes jacent exteriores et una super alteram non eminet: asperum vero per oppositum hujus dicitur, ideo quod una quidem extremarum partium in linea vel superficie superiore est super aliam eminendo porrecta, alia vero est inferior et simul super alia est depressa. Positiones igitur dicuntur primo, et si qualitates dicuntur, hoc est secundario. Hæ igitur sunt quatuor species qualitatis quæ communiter inveniuntur.
Et fortasse alii quidam modi qualitatum apparebunt: quia quale multipliciter dicitur de substantiali et accidentali qualitate, et ideo multi sunt ejusdem modi: sed quia maxime et principalius dicuntur qualitates et quales hi qui dicti sunt modi, concludatur ergo generaliter quod species vel genera qualitatum sunt quæ prædicta sunt.
CAPUT IX.
De dubitationibus quæ sunt circa quartam speciem qualitatis.
Est autem in his dubitatio, cum forma sit principium substantiæ uniuscujusque, qualiter possit esse species qualitatis: potius enim reducenda est ad genus substantiæ, quam qualitatis.
Adhuc autem cum figura sit de mathematicis, nihil autem sit mathematicum nisi quantitas discreta vel continua: videtur figura esse aliquid in genere quantitatis et non qualitatis.
Adhuc autem nihil ens videtur addere forma vel figura super quantitatem, quia quod lineæ sic in acutum vel rectum angulum jungantur, non addit quanto ens sed rationem: et sic videtur quod non sunt species in genere qualitatis.
Adhuc autem quod de aspero et leni dictum est, omnino contradicit ei quod dictum est in sex principiis de situ vel positione, ubi dicitur quod asperum et lene,
it is bounded outwardly on every side in one point. But curvature is always composed from two forms; for it has a concave form beneath, and it has a convex form outwardly, and therefore every curved thing is of composite form. But it has as many figures as it has curvatures, because it has as many terminations toward divided angles. Such also is what is similar to these, as circular, or spherical, and, speaking generally, round; for all these have the form of the concave inwardly and the figure of the convex outwardly. But that these are qualities according as they are forms and figures of such things is proved from this, that according to each of such things that which has been informed from these is called quale, as is clear by induction and example: for to be triangular or quadrangular or round is said to be some quale. Similarly, to be straight or curved has predication as quale. And similarly it is in other things said in this way according to form or figure.1
But rare and dense and rough and smooth will perhaps be thought among some to signify qualities principally, although they have from line that they signify quality principally; for they signify first position, and secondarily the quality of parts placed in place and in the whole, and therefore they do not pertain to the division of those things in which those things are placed which are principally in quality. For these, as has been said, first and principally signify in a certain way a certain position of parts in the whole and in place, and not quality; for dense or thick is said because the material parts are near to one another in position. But rare is said through the opposite, because the material parts are distant from one another in the whole; and these two are thus said according to position of intrinsic parts. But smooth and rough are said according to a certain position of exterior parts: smooth indeed because the exterior parts lie to themselves straight or equally according to line or surface, and one does not project over another; but rough is said through the opposite of this, because one of the extreme parts in a line or surface, being higher, is stretched out projecting over another, but another is lower and at the same time is depressed beneath another. Therefore they are called positions first, and if they are called qualities, this is secondarily. Therefore these are the four species of quality which are commonly found.
And perhaps some other modes of qualities will appear, because quale is said in many ways concerning substantial and accidental quality, and therefore there are many modes of the same; but because those modes which have been said are most of all and more principally called qualities and quales, therefore let it be concluded generally that the species or genera of qualities are those which have been said before.
CHAPTER IX.
Concerning the doubts which concern the fourth species of quality.
Now there is a doubt in these things: since form is the principle of the substance of each thing, how can it be a species of quality? For it should rather be reduced to the genus of substance than of quality.
Further, since figure is among mathematical things, but nothing is mathematical except discrete or continuous quantity, figure seems to be something in the genus of quantity and not of quality.
Further, form or figure, as a being, seems to add nothing above quantity, because that lines are joined thus into an acute or right angle does not add a being to a quantum but an account; and thus it seems that they are not species in the genus of quality.
Further, what was said about rough and smooth altogether contradicts that which was said in the Six Principles about situation or position, where it is said that rough and smooth,
et rarum et densum, non positiones dicunt sed qualitates circa positiones dictas.
Ulterius quæritur qualiter numerus specierum qualitatis accipiatur?
Sed ad hæc et similia dicendum est quod forma dicitur secundum id quod forma secundum rationem et substantiam: et sic forma est principium esse et substantiæ in omni eo quod est: et quia substantia vera est, propter hoc forma est principium esse et substantiæ veræ, et secundum aliquid est principium aliorum quo est unumquodque eorum. Dicitur enim forma quasi foris manens secundum nomen, et sic modus continentiæ in terminatione linearum et superficierum dicitur forma, et hæc forma est species qualitatis.
Ad hoc autem quod de mathematica objicitur, Dicendum, quod figura non ratione figuræ mathematica est, sed ratione quantitatis cujus est qualitas, et ab ipsa absolvi non potest. Vel potest dici, sicut dictum est, quod figura est mathematica secundum quod est quantitas terminata: secundum autem quod est terminatio quanti, sic est qualitas, et hoc modo non consideratur a mathematico.
Ad hoc autem quod dicitur, quod figura nihil addit supra quantitatem, Dicendum quod falsum est: addit enim modum qualitatis qui non est quantitas, qui est acutum, vel rectum, vel hebes in angulis, vel rotundum, vel planum: quæ non sunt rationes tantum, sed sunt res: unde etiam aliter et aliter immutant proprium sensum tactus: omnis autem immutatio sensus proprii est per qualitatem.
Ad hoc autem quod de sex principiis objicitur, Dicendum quod sicut dictum est, asperum et lene, et densum et rarum, positiones dicunt partium materiæ interius et exterius, sed secundario dicunt qualitates: quia sic vel sic agunt in sensum, et hoc consideratur in libro sex principiorum; et ideo dicuntur qualitates, quia lene est quod suaviter immutat, asperum quod immutat cum punctione, et densum est quod visu non penetratur, rarum autem quod ubique est pervium: et ideo in comparatione ad sensum ita dicuntur qualitates, sed tamen quia positio causa est, quod sic vel sic sensus istos immutent, ideo illa principaliter sunt positiones, secundario qualitates.
and rare and dense, do not say positions but qualities concerning the positions said.
Further, it is asked how the number of the species of quality is taken.
But to these and similar things it must be said that form is said according to that by which form is according to reason and substance; and thus form is the principle of being and of substance in everything which is; and because it is true substance, on account of this form is the principle of being and of true substance, and according to something it is the principle of other things by which each of them is what it is. For form is said, as to the name, as if remaining outside, and thus the mode of containing in the termination of lines and surfaces is called form, and this form is a species of quality.
To this, moreover, which is objected concerning mathematics, it must be said that figure is not mathematical by reason of figure, but by reason of quantity of which it is a quality, and it cannot be separated from it. Or it can be said, as has been said, that figure is mathematical according as it is terminated quantity; but according as it is the termination of a quantum, in this way it is quality, and in this way it is not considered by the mathematician.
To this, moreover, which is said, that figure adds nothing above quantity, it must be said that it is false; for it adds a mode of quality which is not quantity, which is acute, or right, or obtuse in angles, or round, or plane; these are not accounts only, but are things; hence also they alter the proper sense of touch in one way and another; but every alteration of a proper sense is through quality.
To this, moreover, which is objected concerning the Six Principles, it must be said that, as has been said, rough and smooth, and dense and rare, say positions of the parts of matter inwardly and outwardly, but secondarily they say qualities, because they act thus or thus upon sense, and this is considered in the book of the Six Principles; and therefore they are called qualities, because smooth is what alters sweetly, rough what alters with pricking, and dense is what is not penetrated by sight, but rare what is passable everywhere; and therefore in comparison to sense they are called qualities in this way, but nevertheless because position is the cause that they alter these senses thus or thus, therefore those are principally positions, secondarily qualities.
Ad hoc autem quod quæritur, penes quid istæ species qualitatis accipiantur, Dicendum quod numerus et ordo sic simul accipi possunt: aut enim accipitur penes formale principium substantiæ, aut penes materiale, ex quo omne accidens accipi habet penes modum substantiæ a qua causatur. Si autem accipitur penes principium formale, hoc non potest esse nisi duobus modis: aut enim accipitur penes modum quo perficit forma materiam, aut penes modum quo forma principium est agendi in composito quod perfectum est. Si primo modo, forma non habet se ad materiam nisi ut dispositio vel habitus, et penes hunc modum est prima species accepta qualitatis. Si autem secundo modo est, a forma effluunt potentiæ naturales, et sic est secunda species qualitatis accepta. Illæ ergo potentiæ aut accipiuntur in se aut secundum quod propria activa inferunt eis proprias passiones. Et primo modo est iterum secunda species qualitatis: secundo autem modo tertia inducitur species qualitatis. Si vero ex parte materiæ sumatur quæ per se est corporea, et necesse est quod sit secundum relationem ad formam quæ continet et terminat materiam, tunc inducitur quarta species quæ est forma vel circa aliquid constans figura. Et istæ sunt quatuor species qualitatis, secundum quas aliquid ut frequentius quale dicitur, et a quibus proprie accipitur modus iste prædicamenti qui est proprius qualitatis. Si qui autem alii modi qualitatis inveniuntur, facile reducuntur ad istos.
Secundum quod Antiqui hanc ultimam qualitatis speciem uno communi nomine vocaverunt compositionem: sed quia duos actus includit, unum ad intus qui est formæ, alterum ad extra qui est figuræ,
To this, moreover, which is asked, according to what these species of quality are taken, it must be said that number and order can thus be taken together: for either it is taken according to the formal principle of substance, or according to the material principle, from which every accident has to be taken according to the mode of the substance by which it is caused. But if it is taken according to the formal principle, this can only be in two modes: for either it is taken according to the mode by which form perfects matter, or according to the mode by which form is the principle of acting in the composite which has been perfected. If in the first mode, form does not stand toward matter except as disposition or habit, and according to this mode the first species of quality is taken. But if it is in the second mode, natural potencies flow from form, and thus the second species of quality is taken. Therefore those potencies are taken either in themselves or according as proper active things introduce their own proper passions to them. And in the first mode it is again the second species of quality; but in the second mode the third species of quality is brought in. But if it is taken from the side of matter, which through itself is corporeal, and it is necessary that it be according to relation to the form which contains and terminates matter, then the fourth species is brought in, which is form or figure standing around something. And these are the four species of quality, according to which something is more frequently called quale, and from which this mode of the predicament, which is proper to quality, is properly taken. But if any other modes of quality are found, they are easily reduced to these.
According as the Ancients called this last species of quality by one common name, composition; but because it includes two acts, one inward, which belongs to form, another outward, which belongs to figure,
Notes
- See in the Six Principles, chapter On Position. (Vide in sex principiis, cap. de Positione.) ↩
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