Volume 1 · p. 259
Chapter VIII
Secundum autem quod est in subjecto, non habet modum unum, sed diversum et compositum secundum quod denominat subjectum simpliciter, et secundum quid, hoc est, ut nunc. Oppositi autem modi eodem nomine non possunt comprehendi. Uno ergo nomine non poterat convenienter nominari, sed duobus, quæ sunt passio et passibilis qualitas.
CAPUT VIII.
De quarto genere qualitatis quod est forma, vel circa aliquid constans figura.
Quartum vero genus qualitatis est forma et circa aliquid constans figura. Hoc autem genus qualitatis, sicut in prima philosophia dicit Aristoteles, consequens est speciem substantialem in omni corporea substantia: quia sicut corporeæ substantiæ differunt speciebus, ita differunt figuris: et quorum est una species in communi, horum est in communi figura una, tam in toto quam in membris: sicut hominis figura una, et capræ, asini, et sic de aliis. Forte hoc dicitur genus non species, quia multa valde comprehendit.
Differunt autem hæc, quia modus terminationis linearum in superficie vel corpore referri potest ad intra, ad formam scilicet substantialem, quæ tam in toto quam in partibus, causa est quare dicitur vel sit membrum hoc vel illud, vel etiam totum formetur, et sic dicetur forma. Potest etiam referri ad extra, ad quantitatem scilicet sic vel sic terminatam in tales vel tales angulos, et sic dicitur figura. Unde patet quod unum et idem secundum id quod qualitas est figura et forma, sed secundum esse differt: quia relatum ad intra quod continet et terminat, est forma: relatum autem ad extra, quo talibus vel talibus angulis terminatum aptum est ad hos motus vel illos secundum hos actus vel alios, sic dicitur figura.
Oportet autem scire quod figura dicitur dupliciter: secundum id quod est quantitas terminata, et sic dicitur id quod est in genere quantitatis: est etiam figura secundum id quo est figura terminatio quantitatis, et hoc modo non dicit nisi id quod est in genere qualitatis, sed hæc qualitas est circa quantitatem posita. Forma autem quamvis idem sit subjecto, differt tamen ratione, nec dicitur forma nisi secundum quod causata est a forma substantiali actu continenti intrinseca, et ideo forma dicit id quod est qualitatis, et non quantitatis.
Hæc autem ideo genus dicuntur, quia in actibus et ratione non conveniunt: continere enim quod est formæ non convenit nisi genere cum sic vel sic angulatum esse, acuto angulo vel recto vel hebete: hoc enim non dicitur quia contineat, sed quia sic vel sic pungat vel tangat, propter quod non est convenientia speciei sed generis inter illa sic sumpta. Quia tamen hæc unum sunt in eo quod est forma et figura, propter hoc non disjunctiva conjunctione conjunguntur. Duobus autem modis nominatur et non uno: quia continere ad intra, et sic vel sic pungere extra, non sunt reducibilia in unam proprietatem cui nomen unum commune imponatur.
Dicitur autem figura, eo quod ad extra refertur: circa aliquid constans, quia in exterioribus terminationibus linearum concludit et terminat exterius in circuitu, et constant terminationes ejus ad puncta in quibus concurrunt lineæ terminatæ. Hæc ergo est ratio omnium istorum. Hæc autem proprie corporum sunt et superficierum quæ pluribus lineis terminantur.
Amplius autem adhuc in lineis etiam inveniuntur quædam quæ in hoc modo qualitatis sunt ponenda, sicut rectitudo et curvitas: rectum enim est cujus extrema tegunt media, ita quod postea videri non possunt, si rectorum extremitates directe aciebus oculorum opponantur: et hoc dictum est Platonis. Hoc autem magis est forma quam figura, quamvis rationem figuræ habeat secundum quod ad extra
But according as it is in a subject, it does not have one mode, but a diverse and composite one according as it denominates the subject simply and in a qualified respect, that is, as now. But opposite modes cannot be comprehended by the same name. Therefore it could not conveniently be named by one name, but by two, which are passion and passible quality.
CHAPTER VIII.
Concerning the fourth genus of quality, which is form, or figure standing around something.
But the fourth genus of quality is form and figure standing around something. This genus of quality, as Aristotle says in the First Philosophy, follows upon substantial species in every corporeal substance; because just as corporeal substances differ in species, so they differ in figures, and those things of which there is one species in common have in common one figure, both in the whole and in the members, as the figure of man is one, and of goat, of ass, and so concerning others. Perhaps this is called a genus, not a species, because it comprehends very many things.
But these differ because the mode of termination of lines in a surface or body can be referred inward, namely to substantial form, which, both in the whole and in the parts, is the cause why this member or that is said or is, or even why the whole is formed, and thus it will be called form. It can also be referred outward, namely to quantity terminated thus or thus into such or such angles, and thus it is called figure. Hence it is clear that one and the same thing, according to that by which it is quality, is figure and form, but differs according to being; because what is referred inward, which contains and terminates, is form; but what is referred outward, by which, terminated by such or such angles, it is apt for these motions or those according to these acts or others, is thus called figure.
But one must know that figure is said in two ways: according to that which is terminated quantity, and thus that is said which is in the genus of quantity; there is also figure according to that by which figure is the termination of quantity, and in this way it says only that which is in the genus of quality, but this quality is posited around quantity. But form, although it is the same in subject, nevertheless differs in reason, nor is it called form except according as it is caused by the substantial form actually containing the intrinsic things, and therefore form says that which belongs to quality, and not to quantity.
But these are therefore called a genus, because they do not agree in acts and reason; for to contain, which belongs to form, does not agree except in genus with being angled thus or thus, by an acute angle or a right or obtuse one. For this is not said because it contains, but because it pricks or touches thus or thus; on account of this there is not an agreement of species but of genus among those things so taken. Yet because these are one in that which is form and figure, on account of this they are not joined by a disjunctive conjunction. But it is named in two modes and not in one, because to contain inwardly, and to prick outwardly thus or thus, are not reducible into one property to which one common name may be imposed.
But it is called figure because it is referred outward; standing around something, because in the exterior terminations of lines it encloses and terminates outwardly in a circuit, and its terminations stand at the points in which the terminated lines come together. Therefore this is the reason of all these things. But these are properly of bodies and of surfaces which are terminated by several lines.
Moreover, still in lines there are also found certain things which must be placed in this mode of quality, such as straightness and curvature. For straight is that whose extremes cover the middles, so that afterward they cannot be seen, if the extremities of straight things are placed opposite directly to the sights of the eyes; and this saying is Plato's. But this is more form than figure, although it has the account of figure according as outwardly
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