Volume 1 · pp. 255–256
Chapter VI. Concerning the third species of quality, which is passion or passible quality.
CAPUT VI.
De tertia specie qualitatis quæ est passio vel passibilis qualitas.
Tertia vero species qualitatis est quæ dicitur passio et passibilis qualitas. Hanc enim unam speciem ponimus, ideo quod formæ qualitatis non differunt, sed sunt ejusdem speciei qualitatis, et aliquando eadem numero qualitas: primo enim est passio, et postea passibilis qualitas. Quia ergo neque in qualitate, neque in quali (quod secundum eas dicitur) specie differunt, ideo dicimus eas esse species et non genus, et unam speciem hæc duo dicimus esse. Et non conjungemus ea disjunctiva conjunctione sed copulativa, ut notentur ad idem pertinere. Tamen quia passio est afficiens et cito transiens qualitas, passibilis autem qualitas est durans et radicata in subjecto, qui modi sunt oppositi, ad idem nomen non possunt reduci, eo quod hoc nomen ab oppositis rei proprietatibus imponeretur et opposita significaret: ideo duobus modis copulatis hanc speciem designamus. De qualitate enim non possumus loqui nisi sicut de accidente, quod semper in comparatione ad substantiam habet determinari, et ideo oportet quod determinetur per modos quibus est in subjecto. Sic igitur dicunt quod tertia species qualitatis est passibiles qualitates, quæ jam in subjecto radicatæ et firmatæ sunt et passiones.
Hujus autem manifestatio est inductione et exemplo. Sunt enim hujusmodi ut dulcedo, amaritudo, austeritas, sive acuitas in saporibus extremis et mediis omnibus, et qui his qui inducti sunt cognati sunt, ut salsedo, ponticitas, et sapor pinguis. Amplius autem secundum tactum calor et frigiditas, et his similia: secundum visum albedo et nigredo. Odores autem qui inferunt olfactui passionem, juxta sapores determinantur, ut dicit Aristoteles 1. Differentiæ enim sonorum non inducuntur hic 2: quia quamvis inferant passionem auditui, tamen ex primis qualitatibus (quæ primo sunt activæ et passivæ, et virtute earum agit quod agit, et patitur quod patitur) non causantur: et ideo etiam non transmutant substantiam nisi per accidens, sicut aer cum tonitru, ut dicit Aristoteles 3, scindit lignum.
Quoniam autem hæc quæ dicta sunt sensibilia, sunt qualitates, manifestum est per descriptionem quam primo dedimus de qualitate: quæcumque enim subjecta suscipiunt illa quæ ita dicta sunt qualitates, et quæcumque etiam informantur ipsis, secundum ipsa qualia dicuntur. Qualitas autem est secundum quam quales dicimur; igitur ista sunt qualitates. Hoc autem inductione probatur et exemplo, ut mel: ex hoc enim quod subjectum mellis dulcedinem suscipit, dicitur secundum hoc quale, quia dulce. Eodem modo dicitur corpus album, quia suscipit albedinem se informantem. Similiter autem se habet in cæteris omnibus quæ enumerata sunt.
Hæc autem non ideo passibiles qualitates dicuntur, quod subjecta et objecta quæ ea suscipiunt ut formas aliquid patiantur vel passa sint accidentali passione vel aliqua alia (quamvis naturali passione digestionis habitu passa sint) sed ideo dicuntur passibiles qualitates, quia passiones inferunt sensui: non enim ideo dicitur dulce, quia aliquid ab extrinseco passum sit, et quod hanc sibi impressit dulcedinem. Similiter autem est de omnibus quæ sunt hujusmodi olfactui vel gustui passionem inferentia. Similiter autem est de calore et frigore in igne vel glacie vel aqua: hæc enim omnia non ideo passibiles qualitates dicuntur, quod ea subjecta quæ suscipiunt ea, aliquid passa sint extrinsecus, sed ideo quoniam singula eorum
CHAPTER VI.
Concerning the third species of quality, which is passion or passible quality.
But the third species of quality is that which is called passion and passible quality. For we posit this as one species because the forms of quality do not differ, but are of the same species of quality, and sometimes the quality is the same in number; for first it is passion, and afterward passible quality. Therefore because they do not differ in species either in quality or in the quale which is said according to them, therefore we say that they are species and not a genus, and we say that these two are one species. And we will not join them with a disjunctive conjunction but with a copulative one, so that they may be marked as belonging to the same thing. Nevertheless, because passion is a quality affecting and quickly passing away, but passible quality is lasting and rooted in the subject, which modes are opposite, they cannot be reduced to the same name, because this name would be imposed from opposite properties of the thing and would signify opposites; therefore we designate this species by two copulated modes. For we cannot speak about quality except as about an accident, which always has to be determined in comparison to substance, and therefore it must be determined through the modes by which it is in a subject. Thus therefore they say that the third species of quality is passible qualities, which are already rooted and fixed in the subject, and passions.
The manifestation of this is by induction and example. For things of this kind are sweetness, bitterness, austerity, or sharpness in all extreme and middle flavors, and those which are akin to these which have been introduced, as saltness, ponticity, and a fatty flavor. Further, according to touch there are heat and coldness and things similar to these; according to sight, whiteness and blackness. But odors which introduce passion to smell are determined beside flavors, as Aristotle says 1. For differences of sounds are not introduced here 2, because although they introduce passion to hearing, nevertheless they are not caused from the first qualities, which are first active and passive, and by whose power what acts acts, and what suffers suffers; and therefore they also do not transmute substance except per accidens, as air with thunder, as Aristotle says 3, splits wood.
But that these sensible things which have been said are qualities is manifest through the description which first we gave of quality: for whatever subjects receive those things which are thus called qualities, and whatever are also informed by them, according to them are called qualia. But quality is that according to which we are called quales; therefore those things are qualities. And this is proved by induction and example, as honey: for from the fact that the subject of honey receives sweetness, it is called quale according to this, because sweet. In the same way a body is called white, because it receives whiteness informing it. But it has itself similarly in all the other things which have been enumerated.
But these are not called passible qualities because the subjects and objects which receive them as forms suffer something or have suffered by an accidental passion or some other one, although by the natural passion of digestion they have suffered in the manner of a habit, but they are called passible qualities because they introduce passions to sense. For it is not called sweet because something from outside has been suffered and because this impressed sweetness upon itself. But it is similar concerning all things of this kind introducing passion to smell or taste. Similarly also it is so concerning heat and coldness in fire or ice or water; for all these are not called passible qualities because those subjects which receive them have suffered something extrinsically, but because each of them
quæ dicta sunt, secundum alicujus sensus qualitatem in ipso sensu passionis alicujus ad sensus immutationem perfectiva sunt, et ideo passibiles qualitates dicuntur. Patet hoc inductione: dulcedo enim passionem quamdam secundum gustum efficit ad gustus immutationem. Sic facit calor qui passionem facit secundum tactum, et similiter aliæ qualitates tangibiles. Albedo autem et nigredo et alii colores medii non similiter passibiles qualitates dicuntur: non enim sic agunt in subjectum secundum esse materiale, quod suis qualitatibus informent visum: visus enim albi non est albus, quemadmodum gustus dulcis est dulcis, et sicut tactus calidi est calidus: et ideo in visu non perficiunt colores passibiles qualitates. Sed ostenduntur colores passibiles qualitates: quia ipsi colores qui sunt qualitates, innascuntur in nobis ex passionibus quibusdam præcedentibus in nobis. Quod non multæ colorum mutationes sunt in nobis per aliquam passionem præcedentem, est manifestum per inductionem experimenti: erubescens enim aliquis rubeus factus est, cum erubescentia sit timor in turpi perpetrato: timor autem passione et fuga cordis secundum systolem propellens sanguinem in faciem. Et similiter timens aliquis factus est pallidus, sanguine a facie ad cor retracto. Similiter unumquodque talium colorum aliqua innascitur passione: et si tales colores talibus innascuntur passionibus, probatur quod si aliquis est naturaliter aliquid similium passus, quod scilicet sanguinem diffundat in facie, vel ad cor reducat sanguinem, illum naturaliter oportet habere similem colorem illi qui passione verecundiæ vel timoris rufus vel pallidus factus est: quod ex hoc constat quod quæ affectio naturæ facta est ad verecundiam in expulsione sanguinis ad frontem circa corpus, eadem etiam causa fit etiam secundum naturalem affectionem: ita quod color naturalis sit similis ei qui ex passione animæ vel cordis naturalem recipit colorem.
Generaliter autem loquendo quæcumque qualitates sunt de numero talium casuum, hoc est, quæ ex talibus casibus passionum sumpserunt principium ab aliquibus passionibus difficile mobilibus et permanentibus in subjecto, illæ dicuntur passibiles qualitates. Quamvis enim secundum naturalem substantiam sive subsistentiam in primis complexionibus pallor aut nigredo facta est in aliquo, tamen passibiles qualitates dicuntur secundum primam qualitatis rationem: quales enim dicimur secundum tales colores sive qualitates, sive etiam inducta sint talia per accidens, sicut propter longam ægritudinem quæ facit pallorem. Aut propter æstum qui inducit ruborem qui aliquando in facie comburit sanguinem, ita quod remanet, et stantem et permanentem ruborem inducit, aut aliquid simile his: propter quod nigredo vel pallor contingit, non facile præterit, ita quod immutabile vel difficulter mutabile manet. Ista dicuntur passibiles qualitates: secundum tales enim qualitates dicimur quales simpliciter, sicut secundum eas quæ a passionibus naturalibus inducuntur.
Quæcumque vero sunt de numero talium qualitatum quæ cito transeunt et cito de facili solvuntur, dicuntur passiones: non enim secundum has dicuntur quales, sed potius aliquid passi: nullus enim simpliciter dicitur rubeus propter hoc quia ex verecundia rubeus factus est. Similiter ille cui pallor subitus propter timorem venit, non simpliciter dicitur pallidus sive qualis secundum pallorem, sed magis dicitur convenienter quod aliquid passus sit, non ad denominationem, sed ad subitam mutationem. Ea propter hujusmodi subitæ mutationes dicuntur convenienter passiones: non autem convenienter dicuntur qualitates, quia non simpliciter quales dicimur secundum eas. Hoc ergo modo se habet de passionibus et passibilibus qualitatibus corporis.
Ad similitudinem autem horum se habet etiam de passionibus et passibilibus qualitatibus quæ inducuntur secundum
which have been said are perfective, according to the quality of some sense, of some passion in the sense itself toward the alteration of sense, and therefore they are called passible qualities. This is clear by induction: for sweetness effects a certain passion according to taste toward the alteration of taste. So heat does, which makes a passion according to touch, and similarly other tangible qualities. But whiteness and blackness and other middle colors are not similarly called passible qualities; for they do not so act upon the subject according to material being that they inform sight with their own qualities. For the sight of white is not white, in the way that the taste of sweet is sweet, and as the touch of hot is hot; and therefore in sight colors do not perfect passible qualities. But colors are shown to be passible qualities because the colors themselves which are qualities are born in us from certain passions preceding in us. That many changes of colors are not in us through some preceding passion is manifest by the induction of experience: for someone blushing is made red, since blushing is fear over something shameful perpetrated; but fear, by a passion and flight of the heart according to systole, drives blood into the face. And similarly someone fearing is made pale, with the blood drawn back from the face to the heart. Similarly each such color is born from some passion; and if such colors are born from such passions, it is proved that if someone has naturally suffered something similar, namely that he diffuses blood in the face or leads blood back to the heart, he naturally must have a color similar to him who has been made red or pale by the passion of shame or fear. This is agreed from this: that the affection of nature which is made toward shame in the expulsion of blood to the forehead around the body is also made by the same cause according to natural affection, so that the natural color is similar to that which receives a natural color from a passion of the soul or of the heart.
But generally speaking, whatever qualities are of the number of such cases, that is, those which took their beginning from such cases of passions from some passions difficult to move and permanent in a subject, those are called passible qualities. For although pallor or blackness was made in someone according to natural substance or subsistence in the first complexions, nevertheless they are called passible qualities according to the first account of quality; for we are called quales according to such colors or qualities, whether such things have also been induced per accidens, as on account of a long sickness which causes pallor, or on account of heat which induces redness, which sometimes burns the blood in the face so that it remains and induces a standing and permanent redness, or something similar to these; on account of this, blackness or pallor occurs, and does not easily pass away, so that it remains immutable or mutable with difficulty. These are called passible qualities, for according to such qualities we are called quales simply, as according to those which are induced by natural passions.
But whatever are of the number of such qualities which quickly pass away and are quickly and easily dissolved are called passions; for according to these they are not called quales, but rather things having suffered something. For no one is simply called red because he has been made red from shame. Similarly, one to whom sudden pallor has come on account of fear is not simply called pale or quale according to pallor, but more fittingly is said to have suffered something, not for denomination, but for sudden change. For that reason sudden changes of this kind are fittingly called passions; but they are not fittingly called qualities, because we are not simply called quales according to them. Therefore in this mode it has itself concerning passions and passible qualities of the body.
But by the similitude of these it also has itself concerning the passions and passible qualities which are induced according to
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