Volume 1 · pp. 248–250
Chapter III
quid super commune nomen dispositionis, et vocatur nomine communi dispositio: et in quantum deficit a perfecto, opponitur habitui, et ideo nomen habitus non meretur.
CAPUT III.
De dubitationibus quæ sunt circa prædicta.
Est autem in his quæ dicta sunt multa dubitatio. Est enim primum dubium, cum una species qualitatis sit una forma simplex, videtur quod unico et simplici nomine habeat nominari. Et videtur quod hæc species unum simplex nomen habere debeat, ut dicatur habitus vel dispositio tantum altero nomine, non autem dicitur habitus et dispositio tanquam utrumque nomen conveniat per copulativam conjunctionem.
Adhuc propter hoc quod est facile mobile vel difficile, videtur quod non deberet nomen geminari vel variari: quia hæc accidunt eidem, et propter accidens nomen substantiale variari non debet, ut videtur.
Adhuc autem cum ex similibus actibus similes relinquantur dispositiones et habitus, videtur quod tam habitus quam dispositio habeant causam efficientem quæ formaliter agit unum: cum autem formaliter agens non nisi ad formam suam agat in eo in quod agit et formam suam inducit, videtur quod dispositio et habitus sint unius formæ, sed a forma nomina imponuntur. Videtur igitur, quod uno nomine formali debeant nominari. Et hoc quidem concesserunt Antiqui, ut videtur Boëtius innuere, et hoc quod nos dicimus dispositionem et habitum communi nomine applicationem nominaverunt.
Ulterius etiam quæritur, cum ex dispositione fiat habitus, qualiter fiat habitus ex dispositione: quia enim ex actibus relinquuntur dispositiones, oportet quod aliquid formale relinquat primus actus et aliquid secundus, et sic deinceps: aut ergo idem est quod relinquitur ex actibus aut non est idem. Si idem, sequitur quod idem simpliciter secundum formam agatur a multis agentibus tempore divisis, quod non est intelligibile: idem enim et unum non potest habere multas causas æque propinquas secundum unum et idem genus causalitatis. Si autem diversa sunt quæ relinquuntur ex actibus, tunc quæritur quid illa uniat in una habitus substantia: hoc enim non potest facere subjectum, quia unitas subjecti non facit accidentium unitatem: quia in uno et eodem subjecto multa sunt accidentia et genere et specie differentia.
Adhuc quæratur quot actus, vel quid sive quantum tempus exigitur ad hoc quod de dispositione fiat habitus?
Adhuc secundum Aristotelem 1, cum aliquis de non sciente fit sciens, est motus quidam: in alteratione autem est motus, in quo est quale post quale, et forma post formam, et continue fluxus de potentia ad actum: et secundum hoc videtur quod operationes habitum inducentes secundum formam scientiæ vel virtutis continue alterent potentiam animæ et animam, donec veniat in actum perfectum scientiæ vel virtutis, et hoc sit ex dispositione fieri habitum, quod dispositio sit sicut motus, et habitus sit sicut finis motus, quando est in motum esse in actu perfecto. Sed si hoc conceditur, tunc videtur, quod operationes quæ disponunt, non sint continuæ sed interruptæ: et qui sic accipit habitum, non movetur motu continuo, sed interrupto: et videtur quod multoties sit in motum esse, et sic multoties in habitu, ut videtur.
Adhuc multi sunt habitus qui non fiunt ex præcedentibus dispositionibus, sicut habitus infusi et concreati: et sic non semper est habitus ex dispositione.
Adhuc ulterius quæritur de hoc quod videtur dicere Aristoteles dispositiones
beyond the common name of disposition, and it is called by the common name disposition; and insofar as it falls short of the perfect, it is opposed to habit, and therefore it does not deserve the name habit.
CHAPTER III.
Concerning the doubts which are about the things said before.
Now there is much doubt in the things which have been said. For the first doubt is that, since one species of quality is one simple form, it seems that it ought to be named with one and simple name. And it seems that this species ought to have one simple name, so that it is called habit or disposition by one name only, but it is not called habit and disposition as though each name befits it through a copulative conjunction.
Further, on account of this, that it is easily movable or difficult to move, it seems that the name ought not to be doubled or varied, because these happen to the same thing, and a substantial name ought not to be varied on account of an accident, as it seems.
Further, since from similar acts similar dispositions and habits are left behind, it seems that both habit and disposition have an efficient cause which formally acts one thing. But since that which acts formally acts only toward its own form in that upon which it acts and induces its own form, it seems that disposition and habit are of one form, but names are imposed from form. Therefore it seems that they ought to be named by one formal name. And indeed the Ancients conceded this, as Boethius seems to intimate, and what we call disposition and habit they named by the common name application.
Further it is also asked, since habit comes to be from disposition, in what way habit comes to be from disposition; for because dispositions are left behind from acts, the first act must leave behind something formal and the second something, and so in sequence. Therefore either that which is left behind from the acts is the same or it is not the same. If it is the same, it follows that the same thing simply according to form is done by many agents divided by time, which is not intelligible; for the same and one thing cannot have many equally proximate causes according to one and the same genus of causality. But if the things which are left behind from acts are diverse, then it is asked what unites them in one substance of habit; for the subject cannot do this, because the unity of the subject does not make the unity of accidents, since in one and the same subject there are many accidents differing in genus and species.
Further, let it be asked how many acts, or what or how much time, is required for habit to come to be from disposition.
Further, according to Aristotle 1, when someone from not knowing becomes knowing, there is a certain motion; but in alteration there is motion, in which there is quale after quale, and form after form, and a continuous flow from potency to act; and according to this it seems that operations inducing habit according to the form of knowledge or virtue continuously alter the potency of the soul and the soul, until it comes into the perfect act of knowledge or virtue; and this would be habit coming to be from disposition, that disposition is like motion, and habit is like the end of motion, when it is in having been moved in perfect act. But if this is conceded, then it seems that the operations which dispose are not continuous but interrupted; and one who thus receives habit is not moved by a continuous motion, but by an interrupted one; and it seems that he is many times in having been moved, and thus many times in habit, as it seems.
Further, there are many habits which do not come to be from preceding dispositions, such as infused and concreated habits; and thus habit is not always from disposition.
Further, beyond this it is asked about what Aristotle seems to say, that dispositions
esse affectiones: et videtur quod calidum et frigidum, sive calorem et frigus vocet dispositiones et habitus, quæ sunt potius in tertia specie qualitatis, quæ est passio vel passibilis qualitas. Si autem dicatur quod sunt in prima specie et in tertia secundum aliquem modum, contra hunc modum hoc est quod supra in ante habitis determinatum est, quod scilicet diversorum generum non subalternatim positorum diversæ sunt species et differentiæ: dispositio autem et habitus, et passio vel passibilis qualitas, diversa sunt qualitatis genera et non subalternatim posita.
Ad hæc autem et similia dicendum videtur, quod dispositio et habitus sunt una species et prima qualitatis, quæ facit quale secundum accidentalem denominationem. Sunt autem una species ab una forma qua informatur subjectum in specie: quia dispositio ejusdem speciei est cum habitu, sicut si dispositus sit aliquis scibili logico vel geometrico, idem scibile perfecte habet quando scientiam habet in habitu. Unde scibile in dispositione, et scibile in habitu est ejusdem formæ in scientia, et propter hoc etiam una species et non duæ sunt qualitatis habitus et dispositio. Nominatur autem duobus modis: quia ipsa non nominatur tantum quale quod talis qualitas relinquit in subjecto secundum formam: sed nominatur et hoc accidens secundum quod est id quale in subjecto, secundum hoc quod perfecte subjectum habet illud vel imperfecte. Quæ duo quia modum habent oppositum, uno nomine nominari non possunt, sed unum est imperfectum, alterum perfectum ad actum: habens enim habitum sine impedimento agit cum voluerit, dispositus autem agit impedite. Et quia, ut dictum est, ad unam formam pertinent habitus et dispositio, ideo nomina perfecti et imperfecti per copulativam conjunguntur conjunctionem, quia indifferenter per esse perfecti et imperfecti quæ in motu uno ordinantur ad unum finem: ideo dispositio materialis est ad habitum, et dispositio est actus imperfecti, habitus autem est actus perfecti et constituti. Hæc est ergo causa duorum nominum et ordinis dispositionis ad habitum, et copulationis quæ conjungit inter duo nomina.
Ad id autem quod objicitur, quod facile esse mobile vel difficile sunt accidentia qualis, secundum quod est in substantia, Dicendum quod hoc verum est, sed quia nomina ab his accidentibus imponuntur, propterea necesse fuit dari duo nomina. Et quod objicitur, quod duo sunt nomina illius qualis secundum formam, Dicendum quod hoc verum est, sed sunt nomina qualitatis illius, secundum quod quale quod dicit qualitatem illam, radicatum est in subjecto: et a talibus accidentibus sæpe fiunt impositiones nominum, maxime autem in accidentibus quorum propria nominatio et etiam diffinitio est, quod nominentur secundum quod sunt in subjecto a quo et in quo esse et nomen et diffinitionem accipiunt: et hæc est causa quod duo sunt nomina illius speciei, quæ tamen in forma unum sunt et in fine.
Ad hoc autem quod objicitur quod ex similibus actibus similes relinquuntur dispositiones et habitus, Dicendum quod verum est, et verum est etiam quod sunt unius formæ: sed non semper a forma est nominatio: quandoque enim, sicut dictum est, fit denominatio ab accidente formam consequente, et sic fit hic quando dicitur dispositio et habitus. Ad hoc quod dicitur quod Antiqui hanc speciem uno nomine applicationis nominaverunt, Dicendum quod hoc verum est, et ideo per errorem decepti istas species dixerunt non esse species qualitatis, sed dixerunt eas per modos distingui per quos efficiuntur in substantia, sive per modos per quos insunt subjecto: et quia prima species est per modum acquisitionis per ipsas subjecti operationes, et quod per operationes acquiritur, subjecto paulatim applicatur, ideo primam speciem applicationem communi nomine dispositionis et habitus notaverunt. Et quia secunda species est de potentia consequente esse substantiale,
are affections; and it seems that he calls hot and cold, or heat and coldness, dispositions and habits, which are rather in the third species of quality, which is passion or passible quality. But if it is said that they are in the first species and in the third according to some mode, against this mode there is what was determined above in what was had before, namely that of diverse genera not posited subalternately, the species and differences are diverse; but disposition and habit, and passion or passible quality, are diverse genera of quality and are not posited subalternately.
But to these and similar points it seems that it must be said that disposition and habit are one species and the first species of quality, which makes a quale according to accidental denomination. Now they are one species from one form by which the subject is informed in species, because disposition is of the same species with habit; as, if someone is disposed with a logical or geometrical knowable, he has the same knowable perfectly when he has knowledge in habit. Hence the knowable in disposition and the knowable in habit is of the same form in knowledge, and on account of this habit and disposition are also one species and not two species of quality. But it is named in two modes, because it is not named only as the quale which such a quality leaves in the subject according to form; rather, this accident is also named according as it is that quale in the subject, according to this, that the subject has it perfectly or imperfectly. And because these two have an opposite mode, they cannot be named by one name, but one is imperfect, the other perfect with respect to act; for the one having a habit acts without impediment when he has willed, but the one disposed acts with impediment. And because, as has been said, habit and disposition belong to one form, therefore the names of the perfect and imperfect are joined through a copulative conjunction, because they are indifferently through the being of perfect and imperfect things which in one motion are ordered to one end; therefore disposition is material toward habit, and disposition is the act of the imperfect, but habit is the act of the perfect and constituted. Therefore this is the cause of the two names, and of the ordering of disposition toward habit, and of the copulation which joins between the two names.
But to that which is objected, that to be easily movable or difficult to move are accidents of a quale according as it is in substance, it must be said that this is true; but because names are imposed from these accidents, it was therefore necessary that two names be given. And as to what is objected, that there are two names of that quale according to form, it must be said that this is true, but they are names of that quality according as the quale which states that quality is rooted in the subject; and from such accidents the impositions of names are often made, and especially in accidents whose proper naming and also definition is that they are named according as they are in the subject from which and in which they receive being and name and definition. And this is the cause why there are two names of that species, which nevertheless are one in form and in end.
But as to what is objected, that from similar acts similar dispositions and habits are left behind, it must be said that it is true, and it is also true that they are of one form; but naming is not always from form. For sometimes, as has been said, denomination occurs from an accident consequent upon form, and thus it occurs here when disposition and habit are said. To what is said, that the Ancients named this species by one name, application, it must be said that this is true, and therefore, deceived through error, they said that these species were not species of quality, but said that they are distinguished by the modes through which they are effected in substance, or by the modes through which they are in a subject. And because the first species is by the mode of acquisition through the operations of the subject itself, and what is acquired through operations is applied gradually to the subject, therefore they marked the first species as application by the common name of disposition and habit. And because the second species concerns potency following substantial being,
per quod efficitur aliquid potens ad agendum vel patiendum, ideo illam communi nomine naturalem aptitudinem dixerunt. Quia vero tertia est de his quæ casu agunt in sensibus passiones, vel aguntur ab illis, ideo illam speciem communi nomine vocaverunt casum. Quia autem per quartam speciem componitur substantia in partibus secundum certitudinem terminationum suæ quantitatis, ideo illam communi nomine vocaverunt compositionem. Et quamvis hoc illa ratione quæ dicta est verum sit, tamen patet quod illa nomina communia non dicunt species et formas differentes qualitate et quali quod a qualitate quale dicitur, et sic habent proprie distingui secundum quod etiam species quantitatis, et ejus quod est ad aliquid distinctæ sunt: hæc autem in modo distinguendo unum nomen habere non possunt.
Ad hoc autem quod ulterius quæritur de relatione dispositionum et habitum ex actibus sive operationibus, Dicendum quod verum est quod ex similibus actibus similes relinquuntur habitus et dispositiones. Actus autem inducunt dispositiones et habitus duobus modis. Uno modo dispositiones et habitus contrarios a subjecto quod est potentia secundum quam fit operatio removendo: et hunc modum dixerunt Socrates et Plato, qui dixerunt scientias et virtutes inesse per naturam, et per studium et exercitium depurari subjectum ut eluceat in anima quod est per naturam, sicut lapis pretiosus politione quidem nihil accipit, sed cum abstergitur ab eo quod impurum est, tunc micat in eo puritas naturalis. Hic est ergo unus modus quo contrariæ dispositiones removentur. Secundus autem modus est quo generatur in actu forma in anima, quæ est operationi formæ similis, sicut in eo quod movetur forma motoris secundum actum, quæ antequam moveret motum, non fuit in eo quod movetur nisi secundum potentiam: et sic de potentia ad speciem operationis educitur anima in dispositione et habitu.
Ad hoc autem quod quæritur utrum idem sit quod relinquitur ex primo actu cum eo quod relinquitur ex secundo, et sic deinceps, videtur secundum Aristotelem, quod idem est in substantia formæ sed diversum secundum esse: esse enim relictum ex prima operatione, magis est permixtum potentiæ quam relictum ex secunda, sicut id motu quod est juxta principium, magis in potentia est quam id quod est juxta finem. Quod autem ulterius infertur, quod unum et idem sic habet multas causas secundum genus causalitatis, Dicendum quod nihil est inconveniens dummodo illud idem sit diversum secundum esse: quia sunt diversa agentia per quæ efficitur in esse, et esse diverso quousque stet in actu ultimo: et sic in uno alterato possunt esse diversa non specie sed numero alterantia, et in uno augmentato possunt esse diversa non specie sed numero augmentantia: et hoc nihil est inconveniens. Sed quod simul in una et eadem hora sint diversa, et æque immediata secundum unum et idem genus causalitatis in idem eodem modo agentia, hoc esse non potest.
Ad hoc autem quod quæritur quot numero actus vel quantum tempus requiritur ad hoc quod ex dispositione fiat habitus, Dicendum quod non est determinare, quia subjecta non æque habilia sunt ad habitus susceptionem: et ideo in uno plura, in alio vero pauciora requiruntur.
Ad hoc quod quæritur de talis motus continuitate vel interpositione, Dicendum quod nihil prohibet motum hunc ex parte mobilis esse continuum, et ex parte motoris esse interruptum. Hoc dicit Averroes super 2 de Anima et super librum de Generatione et Corruptione 2, quod si aliquis per annum augeatur per spatium cubiti, non est necesse quod hoc qualibet septimana, et quolibet die et qualibet hora proportionaliter secundum divisionem
through which something is made able to act or to suffer, therefore they called that by the common name natural aptitude. But because the third is about these things which by chance act passions in the senses, or are acted upon by them, therefore they called that species by the common name case. And because through the fourth species substance is composed in parts according to the certainty of the terminations of its quantity, therefore they called that by the common name composition. And although this is true by that account which has been stated, nevertheless it is clear that those common names do not state species and forms differing by quality and by quale, in that from quality something is called quale, and thus they properly have to be distinguished according as also the species of quantity and of that which is toward something are distinct. But these cannot have one name in their mode of being distinguished.
But to what is asked further about the relation of dispositions and habits from acts or operations, it must be said that it is true that from similar acts similar habits and dispositions are left behind. But acts induce dispositions and habits in two modes. In one mode, by removing contrary dispositions and habits from the subject, which is the potency according to which the operation occurs; and Socrates and Plato spoke of this mode, who said that knowledges and virtues are present by nature, and that through study and exercise the subject is purified so that what is by nature may shine forth in the soul, just as a precious stone receives nothing by polishing, but when what is impure is wiped away from it, then natural purity glitters in it. Therefore this is one mode by which contrary dispositions are removed. But the second mode is that by which a form is generated in act in the soul, which is similar to the form of the operation, as in that which is moved there is the form of the mover according to act, which, before it moved the moved thing, was not in that which is moved except according to potency. And thus from potency to the species of operation the soul is led out in disposition and habit.
But to what is asked, whether that which is left behind from the first act is the same as that which is left behind from the second, and so in sequence, according to Aristotle it seems that it is the same in the substance of the form but diverse according to being; for the being left behind from the first operation is more mixed with potency than what is left behind from the second, just as that in motion which is near the beginning is more in potency than that which is near the end. But as to what is further inferred, that one and the same thing thus has many causes according to the genus of causality, it must be said that nothing is unfitting provided that same thing is diverse according to being, because there are diverse agents through which it is effected in being, and in diverse being, until it stands in ultimate act; and thus in one altered thing there can be diverse alterers not in species but in number, and in one increased thing there can be diverse increasers not in species but in number, and this is in no way unfitting. But that at the same time in one and the same hour there be diverse agents, equally immediate according to one and the same genus of causality, acting upon the same thing in the same mode, this cannot be.
But to what is asked, how many acts in number or how much time is required for habit to come to be from disposition, it must be said that it is not to be determined, because subjects are not equally fitted for the reception of habits; and therefore in one subject more are required, but in another fewer.
To what is asked about the continuity or interposition of such a motion, it must be said that nothing prevents this motion from being continuous on the part of the movable thing, and interrupted on the part of the mover. Averroes says this on book 2 of On the Soul and on the book On Generation and Corruption 2, that if someone is increased through the space of a cubit over a year, it is not necessary that this be increased proportionally in any given week, and in any given day, and in any given hour, according to the division
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