Chapter X

it so that it is relative in act; and therefore in this way it is defined not through itself but toward it, just as in being and quiddity it is toward it ¹, and in this mode each is defined through the remaining one. Nor nevertheless does it follow that one is better known than the other, or prior to the other, or simpler than the other, according as the being of each is bounded and determined through the remaining one; nor is it unfitting that that which is toward something is not defined like the other predicaments, because its being is not like the being of the others ².

But from these things it is manifest that hand and head and similar things, which are of the number of those things which are substances as parts of second substance, can be known definitely as to this very thing that they are according to the substantial being which is principally signified in the name, according as it is a part composing substance; and on account of this it is not necessary to know that toward which they are said, because they do not have relation except in what is connoted in the name, and not in the principal signification. And therefore in the account of head and in the account of hand, as to the principal signification, it is not to be said definitely whose this head is and whose this hand is ³, because head and hand are defined not toward that whose head it is and whose hand it is; and thus father or double cannot be defined. Or, better, on account of what follows, they are not toward something according to truth and their principal being. But if these things which are parts of second substance are not of the number of relatives, although it seems so more about them than about others, it is necessary to say that no first or second substances are toward something according to truth.

Nevertheless perhaps it is difficult, concerning relatives of this kind, to determine something confidently, that is, by a certain reason, on account of the likeness of those things which are said toward something to those things which are toward something according to truth, unless they have often been treated subtly, so that those things which are said toward something from what is connoted may be distinguished from those which are said toward something according to whole being and quiddity and according to truth. But by treating subtly, to doubt about each of these, what this or that is, will not be useless, because thus the truth is found of those things which are said toward something and of those things which are toward something according to the being of their quiddity and according to truth. On account of this Aristotle says ⁴ that those able to doubt toward either side will easily contemplate what is true and what is false in each thing.

Nevertheless it must be attended to that toward something is said in many modes, namely as toward an end and act for the sake of which it is, as the eye is toward seeing, and the axe toward cutting, and many substances are toward something. It is also said toward something as matter to form, and thus proper matter is toward proper form. And it is said toward something from what is connoted with its principal being, as head and hand. And it is said toward something according to principal and whole being, as father and double; and thus no substance is toward something, as has been said. Thus therefore the definition must be corrected: for to have in something the mode of some predicament does not make it to be a predicament, because even substantial differences have the mode of quality, and on account of this they are not of the predicament of quality.

CHAPTER X.

On the doubtful matters which are about the aforesaid things.

But there is a doubt which arises from these things which have been said: for if relatives or things toward something are whatever things, this very thing that they are, are of another, and have being from comparison toward something, then it seems that one accident in some mode has

being in two subjects, yet in such a way that it remains the same in essence; for by whatever account it is in one, by the same account it is in the other. For a father is called the father of a son, and he cannot be determined or defined by one subject.

Further, according to this it seems that two opposed relations are one relation in number, as paternity which is in the father with respect to the son, and filiation which is in the son with respect to the father.

Likewise, it seems that filiation and paternity differ only according to the termini, as the road which is from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes is the same, although it differs in termini.

Further, whatever comparisons are from the same compared things and the same cause of comparison, those are essentially the same; but paternity and filiation and universally whatever relations or correlations draw their being from the same compared things and the same cause of comparison; therefore it seems that they are the same in essence.

Further, it is asked: if paternity is a relation, to what is it referred? If it is said that it is referred to filiation, it seems to be false, because relations are generated from some motion, but motion does not occur about filiation, but about the son.

Further, the son is referred to the father by filiation; therefore if filiation also is referred, it is referred by some relation, and there is a relation of a relation, and this will proceed to infinity.

Further, by active generation the father is made father, and paternity comes to be in him; and if he generates another son, by the same account a new paternity comes to be in him, and the same account applies concerning a third, and thenceforth. Therefore it seems that many paternities come to be in the same thing according to the same. But against this is that two accidents of the same species cannot exist at the same time in the same thing according to the same, as two whitenesses cannot; for they become one accident, because neither essences nor substances can have a difference. Therefore also two or more paternities cannot exist in the same thing according to the same.

If it is said that they are distinguished with respect to diverse sons, against this is that according as they are in the father, they cannot be distinguished through this. Further, relation is an accident from its genus, because it is in a subject, and afterward is a comparison to another; therefore it has two things in itself, and thus the most general genus is composite, as it seems.

But to these and similar things it seems one must say that one accident is not in two subjects as subjects, but is one in one as in a subject, and in the other not as in a subject, but as in a terminus and end toward which its dependency is taken; just as paternity is in the father as in a subject, and in the son as in the terminus toward which its dependency is taken. And thus filiation is in the son as in a subject, but in the father as in the terminus bounding its dependency; and this is toward the father and not in the father; and thus father falls in the definition of son, and conversely. Nor is it unfitting that in this diverse mode one accident has itself to two.

To the other it must be said that two opposed relations, or correlations, are not one: for the comparison of relation in the middle of two relatives is nothing, because, as has already been said, relation is in one, as in a subject, and is not extended essentially to the other; but one depends toward it according to intellect.

And to what is objected about the same road which is from Thebes to Athens, and conversely, it must be said that it is not wholly similar, except in the termini; but it does not have an extended middle, but through extension it has only an inclination of the dependency of one toward the other, and therefore it is not wholly similar.

But to the other it must be said that paternity, and relation, and abstracts of this kind, are of the predicament of relation in genus or in species, as conceived and not as exercised; and therefore such things are referred to nothing, but by them as forms those things which are referred to one another, namely relatives, are referred: relation by relation, and father by paternity, and

of this kind, and therefore one does not go to infinity.

To the other it must be said that many paternities do not come to be in one: for since there is one principle from which the father generates, and the act of generation is one in species toward all things generated, there will be one paternity toward all; but many sons are referred by many filiations in number to that one father.

And if it is objected that when the son has died there is no father, and let us posit that one of the sons dies, then it seems always that one paternity is destroyed and remains, It must be said that this is not true; for when such a position is made, paternity is not destroyed simply, but its respect toward this is destroyed, and this is not to be destroyed simply.

And if secondly it is objected that paternity is nothing except respect, and if it is destroyed as to respect, then it seems to be destroyed simply, It must be said that this is not true: for it still remains in the cause, and therefore it has not been destroyed simply; for I say that it remains in the cause reduced to act with respect to the other sons.

To the last it must be said that relation is an accident; and thus something must be added to accident through which it becomes an accident of this genus; and thus every most general genus is composed from two intelligibles, on account of which most general genera are called species of being. Hence also properties are not assigned to them except insofar as they are species of being, because every property is caused by species, as Boethius says; but species has two understandings, as has often been said in the science On Universals.