Chapter VIII

the act made in some sensible body are indeed through sensible qualities which make sense according to act. Therefore when there is no sensible body, it is necessary that no sense be made according to act; therefore when the sensible is destroyed, sense made according to act is destroyed; therefore the sensible, when destroyed, at the same time destroys sense with itself. But sense, when destroyed, does not necessarily destroy the sensible, because with no sense existing according to act, many sensible things still exist.

And this is again clear by arguing from the lesser, because it seems less that when animal is destroyed the sensible remains not destroyed than that when sense is destroyed the sensible is destroyed; but when animal is destroyed every sense is destroyed, while the sensible still exists and remains: for many bodies still remain, hot, and sweet and bitter, and all other things that are disposed according to sensible qualities; all of these are sensible.

Further, for this same thing it contributes that sense comes to be with the sensed, or with that which has sense; for we call this the sensed. For animal comes to be together with sense, because on account of sense it is called and is animal, as Avicenna says. But the sensible is before, through nature, than animal or sense would be, because from sensibles animal and sense are generated; for fire and water and elements of this kind, from which it consists materially, are according to nature before animal exists. Therefore the sensible seems to be prior to sense.

But it must be attended to that all relatives, as has been said, are together by nature insofar as they are relatives, although they are not together according to the fact that they are simply. For those things are relatives which are prior and posterior; these indeed according to their being can never be together, nevertheless the prior in the account of prior is together with that which is posterior to it in the account of posterior, and in this mode when posited they posit themselves and when destroyed they destroy themselves.

But what has been said about the knowable and knowledge and about the sensible and sense is to be understood thus: the knowable indeed and the sensible can be taken according to the fact that they stand in substantial being, or according to the fact that they stand under the form of knowledge and of sense; and this is to say that they can be taken materially or formally. If they are taken materially, then the knowable precedes knowledge, and the sensible precedes sense, as has been said in what was had before, because the knowable is the cause of knowledge and the sensible is the cause of sense made according to act. But if these are taken formally, according as the knowable indeed stands under the form of knowledge, and the sensible under the form of sense, thus they are together by nature, and in this mode alone are they correlatives and not otherwise. And it is similar concerning cause and caused, and principle and principled, and many others.

It must also be attended to that nature, when it is said that relatives are together by nature, supposes nothing except the form of relation; hence those things are together by nature which are together according to the form or according to the nature of relation, because as to the nature of those things which are related to one another, they are not together, and according to that nature sometimes one is prior and the other posterior, as has been said concerning cause and caused, and principle and principled, and father and son, and especially in that which is prior and in that which is posterior.

Further, you should know that this argument is not valid: the knowable is said according to potency; potency is referred to act, as Aristotle says in the tenth book of the First Philosophy; therefore the knowable is referred to knowledge according to act. For many things are relatives in genus which are not relative in species, as is clear in knowledge which is referred, and grammar which is not related.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the disputation against the introduced definition of Plato and on the correction of his saying.

But it has a question or doubt, whether according to the above introduced

definition of Plato no substance is called toward something, as seems from the account of substance, which is a being subsisting through itself; and what subsists through itself is absolute, and for itself in itself, and its being is not from this, that it is toward another. Thus therefore it seems that no substance is toward something, whether it is first substance or second; whether substance is signified of the whole or of a part, by its own name it is always being through itself and is not another's.

But if this is conceded to be true, then there still remains a disputation to the opposite according to the definition introduced above, which says that those things are toward something, whatever things, this very thing that they are, are said to be of others; because if this definition is well assigned, substance seems to be toward something according to certain substances signifying a part and not a whole. The proof of this is that in first substances it is true that they are not said toward something, whether it is signified of the whole or of the parts of first substances; for some man is not called some man of someone, although by the genitive things are especially said toward something in those things which are relative ¹; nor is some ox some ox of someone, because man and ox import the account of substance in their names, and say nothing added to substance through which they are referred toward something. And therefore it is also not said grammatically, some ox of someone, nor some man of someone, because in such cases the genitive has no relation to mark according to which construction would occur. But it is similar also in the parts which are as parts of first substance: for some hand is not called some hand of someone, but is simply called the hand of someone. And the cause of this is that, although it states a substance which is part of some whole, and in the name hand, through the account of hand as it is an organ of intellect and an organ of organs, comparison to the mover of the hand is imported, through which it is made a mover, so that it is not absolute from relation, nevertheless through the fact that it is called some hand, it becomes a singular hand; and some hand is the same as this demonstrated hand, and by demonstration it is determined to that which is under sense, which, according as it is under sense, is not referred to another; and therefore it is nothing to say, some hand of someone; and this is the true cause. Nor must one care about what others say in this place.

By the same reason also some head is not called some head of someone, because although head states a substance under comparison to the mover whose head it is, nevertheless, when it is referred to this singular through the fact that it is called some head, which is the same as this head, it is said only under the accidents by which it is demonstrated; and through this it is not said toward something, because the comparison which it says in the name is not a demonstrable accident. And therefore it is not called some head of someone, but it is called someone's head without determination to this singular, on account of the comparison which the name imports when it is posited toward a singular without determination; for then it is the name of an organ or organic part which always according to the account of its name is referred toward something whose organ it is. For such things which import such comparison in their name are said toward something, as Plato said.

But it is similarly manifest in second substances which signify of the whole that they are not said toward something; and this is clear by inducing in many cases, as man is not called man of someone according to the name, because man names substance absolutely, and through the account of the name adds no comparison beyond substance which is signified in the name. And by the same reason ox is not called someone's ox under the name of ox, or wood someone's wood under the name of wood, but if this is said of someone, it will be under another name, importing comparison toward something in the mode of signifying

importing, as if possession is said, because possession imports comparison toward the possessor; for a possessor is called the possessor of a possession, and possession the possession of a possessor. Therefore in these substances it is manifest that under the names of first and second substance they are not toward something.

But in certain second substances signifying an organic part and not the whole, there is some doubt because the name of an organic part does not state substance except as standing under comparison; because this is imported in the name, it is necessary that it always be said toward something, although according to its own being, which is substantial, namely being from flesh and bones, they are not toward something. Therefore such things are said toward something and are not toward something according to that which they are, or according to the substantial being from which the name is imposed. Thus therefore head is called the head of someone, and hand the hand of someone, and the individual names of organic parts are related toward something in this way according to being said and not according to being; on account of which this will perhaps seem to someone, that the names of organic parts of second substance are toward something.

For it perhaps seems to someone that as it is in being said through the name, so it is according to being; nevertheless this is not true, as will be clear below, since this was the cause of Plato's deception, who said all such things to be toward something on account of the mode of those things which are toward something, which they import in diction. Therefore if someone concedes that the definition of those things which are toward something has been sufficiently assigned, so that it is convertible with those things which are toward something, it is either exceedingly difficult or impossible to solve that, according to that definition, some substance is toward something. For if whatever things are said toward something according to name are also toward something according to being and truth, as Plato said, it is impossible to escape that foot, hand, and head, which are second substances, are toward something, and especially if it is conceded that to be said toward something and to be toward something are the same. But if it is said that to be said toward something according to a name connoting relation is not to be toward something according to truth, it will still be difficult to solve or escape that some second substances are toward something, because the name of hand and the name of head and the name of foot and of things of this kind, although materially they state substances as that to which the name is imposed, nevertheless formally, with respect to the property from which the name is imposed, state that which is referred to another, because they state what they state through the mode of an organ and of an official member toward some act. But such a name states relation toward something, namely toward the mover whose such organ it is. Yet Boethius and Alexander seem to say that when it is said, either it is exceedingly difficult or impossible to solve, one is said for the expression of the other, as if it were said: it is exceedingly difficult and, to speak more expressly, impossible to solve.

But if it is said that the introduced definition has not been sufficiently or convertibly assigned, but must be corrected, because those things are toward something for which this very being is to stand somehow toward something and not only to be said, then perhaps something will be said. And it can be said against those things, namely that second substances as substances are not toward something except according to a certain mode which is in diction, because then these names, foot, hand, and head, principally signify parts of substance, and substance is not composed except from substances, and secondarily, through the mode of signifying, they connote with the principal signification that which is said toward something; and this indeed is true. But those things which are toward something, in their principal signification, state that whose principal being is toward something, and whose being it has from that toward which it is, and not from itself nor in itself, as father, and son, and half, and things of this kind.

But this definition differs from the other which was introduced before, because the prior definition follows all relatives, whether according to