Volume 1 · pp. 234–235
Chapter VII
quibus nomina posita sunt secundum quæ fit convertentia, non fit convertentia nisi ad eadem quæ sunt, sub convenienti referantur assignatione, ut si assignentur ad ea quæ extrinseca sunt et accidunt his ad quæ sunt per se illa relata, et non assignentur ad ea ad quæ sunt referenda secundum hoc quod sunt aliorum, ut patet. Si enim servus ad hoc quod ad aliquid est indubitanter, si non referatur ad dominum ad quem dicitur et cujus est secundum hoc quod ad aliquid est, sed quia accidit domino hominem esse, referatur ad hominem, ut sic dicatur, servus hominis servus, vel dicatur, servus bipedis servus, vel alicujus talium quod accidit domino ad quæ non per se refertur secundum dependentiam quam important in nomine, non fit convertentia, eo quod ad hoc non erat conveniens assignatio: multi enim sunt homines et bipedalia non habentia servum.
Amplius si id quod est ad aliquid indubitanter, convenienter assignetur ad id ad quod est et ad quod dicitur, omnibus aliis circumscriptis et remotis quæ accidunt illi, relicto illo solummodo ad quod secundum convertentiam assignari habet, semper ad ipsum dicetur secundum convertentiam, ut si servus ad dominum dicatur, omnibus aliis circumscriptis quæ accidunt domino ad quem dicitur servus, ut circumscribantur ab eo esse bipedem, vel scientem, vel disciplinæ perceptibilem, vel hominem, vel animal, relinquatur autem hoc solum quod dominus est, tunc adhuc secundum convertentiam dicetur, servus enim domini servus est. Similiter e contra si servus assignetur ad aliquid ad quod non convenienter dicitur secundum quod servus est, omnibus aliis circumscriptis vel remotis, quæ illi accidunt ad quod non convenienter assignatus est, et solum illud remanere ponatur ad quod non convenienter relatus est, relinquitur quod non dicitur ad illud. Verbi gratia: assignetur enim servus hominis servus, et ala avis ala, et circumscribatur ab eo esse dominum, patet quod jam statim servus ad hominem non dicitur: cum enim dominus non sit, sequitur servum non esse, quia relativa posita se ponunt, et perempta se perimunt, ut in sequentibus erit manifestum. Similiter est de ave, hoc non tribuatur alæ, sed alatam esse, et sic ala est avis ut alata est et non avis. Et hoc patet per antedicta: si enim avi assignetur, tunc jam amplius non erit ala ad aliquid sive alicujus ala, nisi dicatur alati ala, et alatum ala alatum: cum enim ponitur quod nihil est alatum, sequitur quod ala nihil erit, quia hoc erit ala alterius et non suiipsius.
Ex dictis igitur concluditur, quod id quod est ad aliquid, oportet convenienter assignare ad id quod est et non ad aliud: et sic si utrique est nomen positum, facilis erit assignatio secundum convertentiam: si autem non sit nomen utrique positum relativorum, forte necessarium erit nomina fingere si ad convertentiam dici debeant relativa. Si autem sic secundum figuram appellationis et casus convenienter ad invicem reddantur sive referantur, tunc manifestum est quod omnia relativa conversim, hoc est, secundum convertentiam dicuntur ad invicem.
CAPUT VII.
De proprio relativorum quod est simul esse natura.
Ex his autem quæ dicta sunt, quod scilicet relativa ad convertentiam dicuntur, sequitur aliud proprium relativorum, quod est quod relativa sive ad aliquid videntur simul esse natura. Quod autem secundum convertentiam dicuntur, et quod simul sunt natura, differunt in hoc, quod convertentia est in hoc secundum mutuam relationem eorum ad invicem et appellatione et casu: sed simul sunt natura in hoc, quod secundum quod relata sunt, in esse et non esse, sive in ortu et occasu, ut dicit Avicenna, simul sunt, ita quod posito uno in esse secundum quod
for which names have been posited according to which convertence occurs, convertence does not occur unless they are referred to the same things that they are, under a fitting assignment, as if they are assigned to those things which are extrinsic and happen to those things to which they are per se related, and are not assigned to those things to which they must be referred according to the fact that they are of others, as is clear. For if a servant, with respect to the fact that it is indubitably toward something, is not referred to a master to whom it is said and whose it is according to the fact that it is toward something, but, because being a man happens to the master, is referred to a man, so that thus it is said, a servant is the servant of a man, or it is said, a servant is the servant of a biped, or of some such thing that happens to a master to which he is not referred per se according to the dependency which they import in the name, convertence does not occur, because toward this there was no fitting assignment; for many are men and bipeds not having a servant.
Further, if that which is indubitably toward something is fittingly assigned to that to which it is and to which it is said, with all other things that happen to it circumscribed and removed, and with only that left to which it has to be assigned according to convertence, it will always be said toward it according to convertence; as if servant is said toward master, with all other things that happen to the master to whom servant is said circumscribed, so that being biped, or knowing, or perceptible of discipline, or man, or animal are circumscribed from him, but only this is left, that he is master, then it will still be said according to convertence, for a servant is the servant of a master. Similarly, conversely, if servant is assigned to something to which it is not fittingly said according to the fact that it is servant, with all other things circumscribed or removed which happen to that to which it has not been fittingly assigned, and only that is posited to remain to which it has not been fittingly related, it is left that it is not said toward that. For example: let servant be assigned as servant of man, and wing as wing of bird, and let being master be circumscribed from him; it is clear that now immediately servant is not said toward man. For since there is no master, it follows that there is no servant, because relatives when posited posit themselves, and when destroyed destroy themselves, as will be manifest in what follows. It is similar concerning bird: this should not be attributed to the wing, but being winged, and thus a wing is of a bird as it is winged and not as it is bird. And this is clear through what was said before: for if it is assigned to bird, then now further wing will not be toward something or the wing of something, unless it is said the wing of the winged, and the winged winged by a wing; for when it is posited that nothing is winged, it follows that a wing will be nothing, because this will be the wing of another and not of itself.
Therefore from what has been said it is concluded that that which is toward something must be fittingly assigned to that which it is and not to another; and thus if a name has been posited for each, the assignment according to convertence will be easy; but if a name of the relatives has not been posited for each, perhaps it will be necessary to fashion names if relatives must be said toward convertence. But if in this way, according to the figure of appellation and of case, they are fittingly returned or referred to one another, then it is manifest that all relatives conversely, that is, according to convertence, are said toward one another.
CHAPTER VII.
On the property of relatives which is to be together by nature.
But from these things which have been said, namely that relatives are said toward convertence, there follows another property of relatives, which is that relatives, or things toward something, seem to be together by nature. But the fact that they are said according to convertence and the fact that they are together by nature differ in this: convertence consists in this, according to their mutual relation to one another and in appellation and case; but they are together by nature in this, that insofar as they are related, in being and non-being, or in rising and falling, as Avicenna says, they are together, so that when one is posited in being according to the fact that
relativum est, et positum est aliud secundum quod refertur ad illud: et destructo uno secundum quod relativum est, destruitur et aliud secundum relationem secundum quam refertur ad illud. Et in aliis pluribus hoc verum est, quia simul sunt natura secundum dictum modum: et dicitur quod posito uno ponitur et reliquum, et destructo uno destruitur reliquum. Cum enim sit duplum, sequitur quod sit dimidium, et e converso: et cum sit servus ut servus, sequitur quod sit dominus secundum quod dominus, et e converso cum dominus ut dominus est, sequitur quod sit servus ut servus. Similiter autem est in aliis: secundum hoc enim quod relativa sunt, simul se auferunt ab invicem: quia sicut posita se ponunt, sic ablata se auferunt, ut patet inductione et exemplo: cum enim sit duplum, sequitur quod sit dimidium, et cum non sit duplum, sequitur quod non sit dimidium, et e converso. Similiter autem est in omnibus aliis quæcumque talia sunt, quod secundum veritatem et secundum id quod sunt, aliorum sunt.
Et non in omnibus hoc verum esse videtur. In quibusdam enim quæ modum habent relativorum, hoc verum esse non videtur, quod sic simul sint natura, quod posita se ponant et destructa se perimant. Instantia enim esse videtur: quia cum scibile sit, non est scientia: et si sit relatum scibile ad scientiam, videtur tamen scibile non simul natura cum scientia esse, sed natura scibile prius est quam scientia: cujus probatio est, quia nos ut in pluribus non accipimus scientias de rebus, nisi rebus jam subsistentibus: eo quod non possumus reales scientias accipere, nisi ex principiis rerum intellectu acceptis, et sic oportet res scibiles prius esse, quam nostra scientia de rebus. Dico autem in pluribus sic esse: quia si aliqua scientia non est de rebus quæ extra nos sunt, sed de rebus quæ sunt a nobis, in his pro certo oportet quod scientia præcedat scibile, sicut est in ethicis, ad quorum essentiam præcedit scire et velle.
Hoc in realibus scientiis generaliter verum est, quod scibile secundum hoc quod est, videtur præcedere nostram scientiam quæ est de scibili ipso. In paucis ergo vel forte nullis potest aliquis recipere simul cum scibile esse scientiam. In paucis autem dico propter moralia: in nullis autem, quod etiam in illis aliquo modo scibile ut conceptum, quamvis non ut in esse positum, est ante scientiam.
Amplius autem hoc idem probatur alio modo: quia a scibili ad scientiam non convertitur consequentia: scibile autem sublatum simul aufert scientiam: nam si scibile non sit, scientia non est, eo quod nulla scientia est quæ non sit de aliquo scibili: si vero e converso scientia non sit, nihil prohibet adhuc scibile esse: ut enim dicit Boetius, multa sunt scibilia quorum scientiæ non sunt inventæ, sicut potest intelligi in circuli quadratura, quod etsi scibile sit, scientia tamen de ea nondum inventa est.
Amplius hoc idem probatur a minori arguendo sic: minus videtur quod animali sublato auferatur scientia, quam quod scibili sublato auferatur scientia: ergo multo magis aufertur ablato scibili: omni enim animali sublato non potest esse scientia: sed posito quod nullum sit animal et nulla sit scientia, adhuc contingit plurima esse quæ sunt de numero scibilium.
Similiter autem his habent se relativa quæ sunt circa sensum et sensibile quod ad sensum refertur. Sensibile enim prius videtur natura esse quam sensus secundum actum factus: quia de hoc sensu loquimur et non de eo qui est potentia sentientis: sensibile enim objectum agens in sensum, prius est sensu et prius secundum naturam quam sensus, et ideo sensibile interemptum simul interimit secundum actum sensum secundum actum factum. Sensus autem secundum actum factus interemptus, sensibile non interimit. Cujus causa est, quia sensus secundum actum factus non est nisi circa corpus quod sensu percipitur, et sensus secundum
it is relative, and the other is posited according to the fact that it is referred to it; and when one is destroyed according to the fact that it is relative, the other also is destroyed according to the relation according to which it is referred to it. And in many other cases this is true, because they are together by nature according to the mode stated; and it is said that when one is posited the remaining one also is posited, and when one is destroyed the remaining one is destroyed. For when there is double, it follows that there is half, and conversely; and when there is servant as servant, it follows that there is master according as master, and conversely, when master as master exists, it follows that servant as servant exists. But it is similar in other things: for according to the fact that they are relatives, they at the same time take themselves away from one another, because just as when posited they posit themselves, so when removed they take themselves away, as is clear by induction and example: for when there is double, it follows that there is half, and when there is not double, it follows that there is not half, and conversely. But it is similar in all other things whatsoever that are such, which according to truth and according to that which they are, are of others.
And this does not seem to be true in all cases. For in certain things which have the mode of relatives, this does not seem to be true, that they are thus together by nature, so that when posited they posit themselves and when destroyed they destroy themselves. For there seems to be an instance: because when the knowable exists, knowledge does not exist; and if the knowable is related to knowledge, nevertheless the knowable seems not to be together by nature with knowledge, but by nature the knowable is prior to knowledge. The proof of this is that, for the most part, we do not receive knowledges concerning things unless the things are already subsisting, because we cannot receive real knowledges except from principles of things received by intellect, and thus knowable things must exist before our knowledge concerning things. But I say that this is so for the most part, because if some knowledge is not concerning things which are outside us, but concerning things which are from us, in these it is certainly necessary that knowledge precede the knowable, as it is in ethics, for whose essence knowing and willing precede.
This is generally true in real sciences, that the knowable according to that which it is seems to precede our knowledge which is about the knowable itself. Therefore in few cases, or perhaps in none, can someone receive knowledge together with the knowable being. But I say “in few” on account of moral things; but in none in this sense, that even in those cases the knowable in some mode, as conceived, although not as posited in being, is before knowledge.
Further, this same thing is proved in another way: because from the knowable to knowledge the consequence is not converted. But the knowable, when removed, at the same time takes away knowledge; for if the knowable does not exist, knowledge does not exist, because there is no knowledge which is not of some knowable thing. But if, conversely, knowledge does not exist, nothing prevents the knowable still existing; for as Boethius says, there are many knowable things whose knowledges have not been discovered, as can be understood in the quadrature of the circle, because although it is knowable, nevertheless knowledge concerning it has not yet been discovered.
Further, this same thing is proved by arguing from the lesser thus: it seems less that when animal is removed knowledge is taken away than that when the knowable is removed knowledge is taken away; therefore much more is it taken away when the knowable is removed. For when every animal is removed there cannot be knowledge; but positing that there is no animal and there is no knowledge, it still happens that many things exist which are of the number of knowable things.
But relatives which are about sense and the sensible that is referred to sense stand similarly to these. For the sensible seems to be prior by nature to sense made according to act, because we are speaking about this sense and not about that which is in the potency of the one sensing. For the sensible, an object acting upon sense, is prior to sense and prior according to nature than sense; and therefore the sensible, when destroyed, at the same time destroys sense according to act, sense made according to act. But sense made according to act, when destroyed, does not destroy the sensible. The cause of this is that sense made according to act is only about a body which is perceived by sense, and sense according to
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