Volume 1 · p. 230
Chapter V
secundum veritatem est relativum, et similiter triplici et subduplici et hujusmodi nihil est contrarium, neque alicui talium quæ secundum totum id quod sunt, ad aliquid sunt, sicut pater filius, frater soror, dominus servus, et alia his similia. Sic ergo neque omni nec soli convenit ista proprietas, sed convenit quibusdam quæ secundum modum solum sunt ad aliquid.
CAPUT V.
De proprio relativorum quod est suscipere magis et minus.
Alia autem similis huic proprietas nec soli nec omni conveniens proprietas est, quod videntur relativa et magis et minus suscipere, quod inductione probatur et exemplorum positione. Simile enim et magis et minus dicitur: unus enim magis et minus similis est alteri cui similis est et ad quem dicitur. Similiter autem et inæquale magis et minus dicitur. Quamvis enim æquale sit uno modo tantum secundum quod alteri suppositum nec excedit nec exceditur, propter quod æquale secundum veritatem non suscipit magis et minus, tamen inæquale magis vel minus est secundum quod plus vel minus recedit ab æqualitate. Sed simile et dissimile utrumque recipit, scilicet magis et minus, sicut album et nigrum, justum et injustum. Sed non sic rectum et curvum, si vere et proprie sumatur rectum, ut diffinit Plato, cujus medium ab extremis non exit: hoc enim significat ut in termino sicut et æquale: sed contraria illorum suscipiunt magis et minus secundum recessum ab illo quod significat rem suam ut in termino. Simile ergo et inæquale, ut dictum est, magis et minus suscipiunt, cum tamen utrumque sit relativum secundum modum et non secundum esse totum. Simile enim ponit unam qualitatem subjectam similitudini, quæ non est ad aliquid, et æquale ponit unam quantitatem subjectam æqualitati, quæ non est ad aliquid: et per oppositum dissimile et inæquale diversas supponunt qualitates et quantitates, cum sint relativa secundum modum. Simile enim dicitur alicui simile et ad alterum, æquale autem alicui æquale ad aliquid.
Hoc autem proprium non omnibus relativis convenit. Non enim relativa suscipiunt magis et minus, nisi ea sola quæ secundum modum et non secundum totum esse sunt relativa. Unde non omnia relativa secundum unam similitudinem suscipiunt magis et minus, ut duplex, subduplex: nec aliquid talium relativorum quæ secundum veritatem et modum simul sunt relativa.
Hoc autem proprium causatur ex præcedente, quia minus suscipere est plus habere de contrario, magis vero suscipere est minus habere de contrario 1. Multa autem accidunt relativis quæ secundum solum modum sunt relativa, quæ non accidunt eis quæ secundum veritatem et modum sunt relativa, propter hoc quod inest eis etiam aliquid quod est alterius prædicamenti, quod non inest aliis quæ secundum totum id quod sunt, relativa sunt, sicut ista duo consequentia de quibus jam pertractatum est. Et similiter quod quædam eorum relativa intrinseca, et quædam extrinseca. Dico autem relativa intrinseca quæ intra se claudunt per significata sua ea ad quæ referuntur, quæ dicuntur sua correlativa, sicut cum dicitur, isti sunt similes, hoc est, iste illi, et ille isti, vel isti sunt æquales: quod non est invenire in his quæ vere et secundum esse et secundum modum relativa sunt, sicut pater et filius, dominus et servus, causa et causatum, principium et principiatum, et alia hujusmodi: non enim dicitur, isti sunt patres, ita quod iste illius et ille istius, et ista sunt dupla, ita quod hoc ad illud et illud ad istud.
Objiciunt tamen quidam contra ea quæ
according to truth is relative, and similarly to the triple and the subdouble and things of this kind nothing is contrary, nor to any of those things which according to the whole of what they are are toward something, such as father-son, brother-sister, master-servant, and other things similar to these. Thus therefore this property belongs neither to every one nor to it alone, but it belongs to certain things which according to mode alone are toward something.
CHAPTER V.
On the property of relatives which is to receive more and less.
But another property similar to this property, belonging neither to it alone nor to every one, is that relatives seem also to receive more and less, which is proved by induction and the positing of examples. For the similar is said both more and less: for one thing is more and less similar to another to which it is similar and toward which it is said. Similarly also the unequal is said more and less. For although the equal is in one mode only, according as, being set beneath another, it neither exceeds nor is exceeded, on account of which the equal according to truth does not receive more and less, nevertheless the unequal is more or less according as it recedes more or less from equality. But the similar and the dissimilar each receive it, namely more and less, as white and black, just and unjust do. But not so the straight and the curved, if the straight is taken truly and properly, as Plato defines it, whose middle does not go out from the extremes: for this signifies as in a term, just as the equal also does. But their contraries receive more and less according to recession from that which signifies its own thing as in a term. Therefore the similar and the unequal, as has been said, receive more and less, although each is relative according to mode and not according to its whole being. For the similar posits one quality subject to similarity, which is not toward something, and the equal posits one quantity subject to equality, which is not toward something; and by opposition the dissimilar and unequal suppose diverse qualities and quantities, since they are relatives according to mode. For the similar is said similar to something and toward another, but the equal is equal to something toward something.
But this property does not belong to all relatives. For relatives do not receive more and less, except only those which according to mode, and not according to their whole being, are relative. Hence not all relatives receive more and less according to one likeness, as double, subdouble; nor does any of such relatives which according to truth and mode at once are relative.
But this property is caused from the preceding one, because to receive less is to have more of the contrary, but to receive more is to have less of the contrary 1. But many things happen to relatives which according to mode alone are relative, which do not happen to those which according to truth and mode are relative, because there is also present in them something that belongs to another predicament, which is not present in other things which according to the whole of what they are are relative, as those two consequent things concerning which it has now been treated. And similarly that some of them are intrinsic relatives, and some extrinsic. But I call intrinsic relatives those which enclose within themselves, through their significates, those things to which they are referred, which are called their correlatives, as when it is said, these are similar, that is, this one to that one, and that one to this one, or these are equal; which is not to be found in those things which truly and according to being and according to mode are relative, such as father and son, master and servant, cause and caused, principle and principled, and other things of this kind. For it is not said, these are fathers, so that this one is of that one and that one of this one, and these are doubles, so that this is toward that and that toward this.
Some, however, object against those things which
Notes
- This same thing is gathered in book 4 of the Topics, chapter 9. (Hoc idem colligitur in 4 Topicorum, cap. 9.) ↩
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