Volume 1 · pp. 222–223
Tractate IV. On the Predicament Toward Something. Chapter I. How what is toward something is a predicament
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TRACTATUS IV
DE PRÆDICAMENTO AD ALIQUID.
CAPUT I.
Quomodo ad aliquid sit prædicamentum.
Tractaturis nobis de coordinatione prædicabilium quæ sunt in genere ad aliquid, primum occurrit nobis omnium antiquorum dissensio circa prædicamentum ad aliquid. Zeno enim et quidam alii hoc prædicamentum dicebant non esse prædicamentum, sed esse secundum rationem aliis prædicamentis immixtum ex eorum ad invicem comparatione. Et cum prima genera sint voces, primarum rerum genera significantes: cum autem hoc genus non significet ut ens ab aliis separatum, sed ut aliis immixtum, videtur quod significatum ejus non sit ens quod sit de primis partibus entis. Adhuc autem ad idem induxit, quod ad aliquid consistit in comparatione: comparatio autem materiæ inest comparatæ: comparatio ergo secundum intellectum comparata et res in qua est comparatio ponit secundum intellectum ante se: quod autem secundum intellectum aliquid ponit ante se præter subjectum, non est primum genus: videtur ergo quod ad aliquid non sit principium generis alicujus accidentis: id enim in quo fit comparatio et comparationis rationem ponit ante se quæ non est subjectum, sed aliquid de intellectu accidentis in quo fit comparatio. Hoc autem confirmabat per hunc modum: si enim comparetur A ad B, oportet quod aut secundum seipsum comparetur ei, aut mediante aliquo quod sit ratio comparationis. Non seipso, quia sic quodlibet ad aliquid comparabitur, et nihil erit absolutum: ergo comparetur A ad B, mediante c; oportebit igitur quod c sit ratio comparationis A ad B; si ergo non est c, non erit comparatio: intelligitur ergo c, inesse A et B ante comparationem: nihil autem talium ante quod secundum intellectum est accidens, est genus primum accidentis: ergo ad aliquid non est genus accidentis.
Adhuc nullum generum accidentis est accidens alterius: comparatio autem sive ad aliquid accidit omnibus generibus accidentis, sicut per se patet: igitur ad aliquid non est generalissimum inter genera accidentis.
Adhuc autem ad aliquid coaccidit omnibus ex hoc quod in eis sunt genera et species, et totum et pars; videtur ergo quod ad aliquid sit quoddam coaccidens omnibus aliis ex ipsa coordinatione generum et specierum: non ergo per se constituit genus, ut videtur.
Adhuc quia genus et species sunt in omnibus, non dicimus quia generalitas sit genus, et similiter non dicimus quod specialitas constituat genus, vel etiam differentia, vel proprium, vel accidens: omnia enim hæc circuunt genera ratione modi prædicandi qui invenitur in ipsis: a simili ergo ex quo ad aliquid est accidens commune quod accidit omnibus ex comparatione prædicabilium ad invicem, non debet esse genus, sed generum aliorum quoddam accidens.
Adhuc autem fortius objecerunt quidam posteriorum, sicut Avicenna et Alfarabius, dicentes quod nulla forma quæ sit ens, est in re quæ non sit absoluta secundum esse quod habet in ipsa, sicut patet inducendo de calido, frigido, albo, et nigro, et omnibus aliis: sed comparatio quæ fit rerum ad invicem secundum formas quæ sunt in rebus, fit actu rationis, quæ dicit quod in quibus non est una qualitas sunt dissimilia, et in quibus est una sunt similia: comparationis ergo forma quæ est in his quæ sunt ad aliquid, non est res sed ratio, ut videtur, quia nihil est extra animam comparantis unum alteri: generalissima autem prima genera rerum significant: ad aliquid autem non est ens ratum apud naturam extra, sed ens rationis: ad aliquid ergo non potest esse generalissimum de talibus quæ sunt apud animam rebus, quia sic generalissima non significarent prima genera rerum simpliciter.
TRACTATE IV
ON THE PREDICAMENT TOWARD SOMETHING.
CHAPTER I.
How what is toward something is a predicament.
Since we are about to treat the coordination of predicables which are in the genus toward something, first there occurs to us the disagreement of all the ancients concerning the predicament toward something. For Zeno and certain others used to say that this predicament is not a predicament, but is according to account mixed into the other predicaments from their comparison to one another. And since the first genera are words signifying the genera of first things, but since this genus does not signify as a being separated from others, but as mixed into others, it seems that its signified is not a being which is among the first parts of being. Further, he induced toward the same thing that what is toward something consists in comparison; but comparison is in the compared matter; therefore comparison according to intellect posits before itself the things compared and the thing in which the comparison is; but what according to intellect posits something before itself besides the subject is not a first genus. Therefore it seems that what is toward something is not the principle of the genus of any accident; for that in which comparison is made also posits before itself the account of comparison, which is not the subject, but something of the understanding of the accident in which the comparison is made. But he confirmed this in this mode: for if A is compared to B, it must either be compared to it according to itself, or by means of something which is the account of the comparison. Not by itself, because thus anything whatever will be compared toward something, and nothing will be absolute. Therefore let A be compared to B by means of c; therefore it will be necessary that c be the account of the comparison of A to B. Therefore if c does not exist, there will be no comparison; therefore c is understood to be in A and B before the comparison. But none of such things before which according to intellect there is an accident is a first genus of accident; therefore what is toward something is not a genus of accident.
Further, no genus of accident is an accident of another; but comparison, or what is toward something, happens to all the genera of accident, as is clear through itself; therefore what is toward something is not most general among the genera of accident.
Further, what is toward something co-happens to all things from this, that in them there are genera and species, and whole and part; therefore it seems that what is toward something is a certain co-accident to all the others from the very coordination of genera and species. Therefore it does not through itself constitute a genus, as it seems.
Further, because genus and species are in all things, we do not say that generality is a genus, and similarly we do not say that specialness constitutes a genus, or even difference, or property, or accident; for all these things go around the genera by reason of the mode of predicating which is found in them. Therefore by likeness, since what is toward something is a common accident which happens to all things from the comparison of predicables to one another, it ought not be a genus, but a certain accident of the other genera.
Further, certain later men objected more strongly, such as Avicenna and Alfarabius, saying that no form which is a being is in a thing unless it is absolute according to the being which it has in it, as is clear by inducing concerning hot, cold, white, and black, and all the others; but comparison which is made of things to one another according to forms which are in things is made by an act of reason, which says that those things in which there is not one quality are unlike, and those things in which there is one are alike. Therefore the form of comparison which is in those things which are toward something is not a thing but an account, as it seems, because there is nothing outside the soul comparing one thing to another. But the most general first genera signify things; what is toward something, however, is not a fixed being outside in nature, but a being of reason. Therefore what is toward something cannot be most general among such things as are things before the soul, because thus the most general things would not signify the first genera of things simply.
Ex his et similibus rationibus moti fuerunt Antiqui et fere omnes præter Platonem et Aristotelem qui dixerunt ad aliquid non esse genus quod sit prima pars accidentis vel una de primis, sed dixerunt ipsum ex habitudinibus aliorum generum ad invicem per actum rationis comparantis unum ad alterum omnibus aliis esse immixtum, ita quod dicunt ad aliquid non esse unum de generibus primis, sicut tangit Averroes super quintum primæ philosophiæ Aristotelis 1.
Nos autem Platoni et Aristoteli consentientes, dicimus ad aliquid esse generalissimum, et esse unum de primis generibus accidentis: eo quod tam Porphyrius quam etiam Aristoteles et Avicenna dicunt, quod accidens duobus modis prædicatur de eo cujus est accidens, et duobus modis causatur a subjecto. Quoddam enim est forma absoluta et non per aliquid est accidens, nisi quia in subjecto sequitur esse perfectum subjecti in suis substantialibus: et ideo est accidens, quia non potest esse de substantia rei quod sequitur perfectum esse, et sic quantitas est accidens, et qualitas et hujusmodi. Quoddam autem est accidens, non quia sequatur esse rei perfectum, nec quia sequitur ad rem nisi gratia substantialium, sed ex aliquo quod est extrinsecus se habens ad rei substantialia, sicut hoc ad hoc quod aliquid sit ejus quod se habet ut primum, aliud ut secundum, vel unum ut totum, et aliud ut pars, vel ut conveniens vel differens ab alio, sequitur ab extrinseco quod unum sit comparabile ad aliquid secundum ipsam rem: quæ comparatio ad actum reducitur quando actu per rationem comparantur, et a tali accidente quod sic accidit rebus proprie causatur ad aliquid: et propter hoc quod tale accidens invenitur in multis, propter hoc putatur esse omnibus aliis immixtum, cum tamen sit modus accidentis ab aliis accidentium modis distinctus: et ideo proprium accidens significat, quod in genere suo est primum. Nec moveat quemquam quod ab omnibus aliis est causatum, et ideo videbitur forte non esse generis unius sed omnium: non enim causatur ab omnibus ut divisa et discreta sunt, sed causatur ab eis ut unum, et una ratione communi est in eis: et hæc comparabilitas vel ratio comparationis, et quod sic sequitur ad rem, est ad aliquid et non absolutum.
Ad hoc quod objicit Zeno, dicendum quod ad aliquid non relinquit ante se aliquid quod sit de intellectu ipsius, sicut genus vel sicut magis commune est de intellectu speciei vel minus communis quod relinquitur ante se: sed relinquit ante se illud quod est causa talis accidentis, et hæc est ratio comparationis, sive id in quo fit comparatio. Hoc autem non impedit quin sit genus speciale accidentis, quia quodlibet genus accidentis ante se relinquit in subjecto causam per quam efficitur in subjecto.
Ad hoc quod dicitur quod nullum genus accidentis est accidens alterius, dicendum quod si dicatur, quod unum genus accidentis non accidit alteri ut subjecto, dicendum quod hoc verum est: sed
Moved by these and similar reasons, the Ancients and nearly all except Plato and Aristotle said that what is toward something is not a genus which is a first part of accident or one of the first parts, but they said that it, from the relations of the other genera to one another through an act of reason comparing one thing to another, is mixed into all the others, so that they say that what is toward something is not one of the first genera, as Averroes touches upon the fifth book of Aristotle's First Philosophy 1.
But we, agreeing with Plato and Aristotle, say that what is toward something is most general, and is one of the first genera of accident, because both Porphyry and also Aristotle and Avicenna say that accident is predicated in two modes of that of which it is an accident, and in two modes is caused by the subject. For one accident is an absolute form and is not an accident through something except because in a subject it follows upon the perfect being of the subject in its substantial things; and therefore it is an accident, because what follows perfect being cannot be of the substance of the thing, and thus quantity is an accident, and quality and things of this sort. But another is an accident, not because it follows the perfect being of a thing, nor because it follows upon a thing except by reason of substantial things, but from something extrinsic having itself toward the substantial things of the thing, as this toward this: that something is of that which has itself as first, another as second, or one as whole and another as part, or as agreeing with or differing from another, it follows from the extrinsic that one is comparable toward something according to the thing itself. This comparison is reduced to act when they are compared in act through reason, and from such an accident which thus happens to things, what is toward something is properly caused; and on account of this, because such an accident is found in many things, on account of this it is thought to be mixed into all the others, although nevertheless it is a mode of accident distinct from the other modes of accidents; and therefore it signifies a proper accident, which in its own genus is first. Nor should it move anyone that it is caused by all the others, and therefore perhaps it will seem not to be of one genus but of all; for it is not caused by all as they are divided and discrete, but it is caused by them as one, and by one common account it is in them; and this comparability or account of comparison, and that which thus follows upon the thing, is toward something and not absolute.
To this which Zeno objects, one must say that what is toward something does not leave before itself something which is of its own understanding, as a genus, or as the more common, is of the understanding of a species or of the less common which is left before itself; but it leaves before itself that which is the cause of such an accident, and this is the account of comparison, or that in which the comparison is made. But this does not prevent it from being a special genus of accident, because any genus of accident leaves before itself in the subject the cause through which it is effected in the subject.
To this which is said, that no genus of accident is an accident of another, one must say that if it is said that one genus of accident does not happen to another as to a subject, one must say that this is true; but
Notes
- Commentary 20. (Com. 20.) ↩
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