Volume 1 · pp. 191–193
Chapter XIII. On the doubts which are concerning this, that speech receives true and false
sui mutationem susceptibile esse contrariorum, et quod hæc convenit omni et soli et semper illi substantiæ quæ cadit in genere substantiæ, prout ipsa est prædicamentum, vel prout ipsa est ens constitutum et non absolutum a ratione prædicamentali.
CAPUT XIII. De dubitationibus quæ sunt circa hoc, quod oratio suscipit verum et falsum.
De hoc etiam quod dictum est quod oratio susceptibilis est veri et falsi, una et eadem manens ad rei significatæ mutationem, multæ sunt dubitationes, quæ videlicet sit res significata, et qualiter significatum sit in oratione. Est enim oratio hæc quæ verum et falsum significat, sola oratio quæ enuntiatio vel interpretatio vocatur.
Videtur enim quod oratio in significando non mutatur per hoc quod res mutatur significata: hæc enim oratio, ego sedeo, significat me sedere dum sedeo: nec minus significat me sedere dum non sedeo, sed æqualiter et semper significat me sedere: ergo in significando quod significat nunquam mutatur, facit enim semper quod a prima institutione accepit significare, quod ego sedeo, et hoc semper et immobiliter agit: uno ergo modo se habet ad hoc significandum, sive ego sedeam sive non sedeam. Quod autem uno modo se habet in significando, non modo est verum et modo falsum secundum rei mutationem. Videtur igitur quod oratio non est susceptiva veri et falsi ad rei mutationem.
Adhuc, Omne signum est verum, quando ita significat prout est institutum significare. Sed hæc oratio, ego sedeo, instituta est ut significet me sedere, sive sedeam sive non sedeam. Sive ergo sedeam, sive non, facit quod incepit facere a prima institutione: sed tunc est significativa veri, quando significat sicut incepit significare: igitur sive sedeam, sive non, hæc oratio, ego sedeo, semper est vera significando.
Adhuc, Sicut oratio est significativa rei, ita significativa est conceptus sive cogitationis sive opinionis ejus qui profert orationem illam, eo quod voces sunt notæ passionum quæ sunt in anima. Ergo sicut est susceptiva veri et falsi ad rei mutationem, ita est susceptiva veri et falsi ad conceptus vel cogitationis sive opinionis mutationem illius qui profert orationem: sicut enim est verum quod est adæquatio vocum et rerum significatarum per voces, sic est verum quod est adæquatio vocum et conceptus prolati per voces. Videtur ergo quod hæc oratio, ego sedeo, mutetur de vero in falsum, et e converso, quando ille qui profert eam mutatur secundum opinionem, quod sedeam, vel quod non sedeam. Et hoc jam in hac oratione dixit Pythagoras, qui posuit verum et falsum in dictione opinando vel non opinando id quod dictum est in voce significante.
Secundum autem eumdem modum videtur Anselmus probare 1: quia verum in signo est immobile et unum in omni signo significante: signum enim verum est quando significat hoc quod significare accepit in primæ sapientiæ veritate: sed signum semper hoc significat quod accepit in prima veritate significare: ergo quando significat hoc, sive res sit, sive non sit, semper est verum in significando: sive ergo res sit, sive non sit, oratio quæ est signum, semper vera est in significando: non ergo ad rei mutationem oratio susceptibilis est veri vel falsi, ut videtur.
Adhuc autem secundum hoc videtur, quod una veritas significetur et sit in omnibus veris: omne enim signum significat quod significare accepit in prima veritate: quod autem in prima veritate est, unum et idem est, non diversum: idem
its own change, susceptible of contraries, and that this belongs to every substance and to substance alone and always, namely to that substance which falls in the genus of substance, insofar as it itself is a predicament, or insofar as it itself is a constituted being and not detached from the predicamental account.
CHAPTER XIII. On the doubts which are concerning this, that speech receives true and false.
Concerning this also, which has been said, that speech is susceptible of true and false while remaining one and the same at the change of the thing signified, there are many doubts, namely what the signified thing is, and how the signified is in speech. For the speech which signifies true and false is only that speech which is called enunciation or interpretation.
For it seems that speech in signifying is not changed through the fact that the signified thing is changed: for this speech, I am sitting, signifies me to sit while I am sitting; nor does it less signify me to sit while I am not sitting, but equally and always signifies me to sit. Therefore in signifying what it signifies it is never changed, for it always does what from first institution it received to signify, that I am sitting, and this it does always and immovably. Therefore in one mode it is related to signifying this, whether I sit or whether I do not sit. But what is related in one mode in signifying is not now true and now false according to the change of the thing. Therefore it seems that speech is not susceptible of true and false at the change of the thing.
Moreover, every sign is true when it signifies just as it was instituted to signify. But this speech, I am sitting, was instituted to signify me to sit, whether I sit or whether I do not sit. Therefore whether I sit or not, it does what it began to do from first institution; but then it is significative of truth when it signifies as it began to signify. Therefore whether I sit or not, this speech, I am sitting, is always true in signifying.
Moreover, just as speech is significative of the thing, so it is significative of the concept or thought or opinion of him who puts forward that speech, because words are marks of the passions which are in the soul. Therefore just as it is susceptible of true and false at the change of the thing, so it is susceptible of true and false at the change of the concept or thought or opinion of him who puts forward the speech; for just as truth is the adequation of words and of things signified through words, so truth is the adequation of words and of the concept put forth through words. Therefore it seems that this speech, I am sitting, is changed from true into false, and conversely, when the one who puts it forward is changed according to opinion, that I sit or that I do not sit. And Pythagoras already said this in this speech, who posited true and false in diction by opining or not opining that which is said in the signifying utterance.
But according to the same mode Anselm seems to prove 1: because truth in a sign is immobile and one in every sign that signifies; for a sign is true when it signifies that which it received to signify in the truth of first wisdom. But a sign always signifies that which it received to signify in the first truth; therefore when it signifies this, whether the thing is or is not, it is always true in signifying. Therefore whether the thing is or is not, speech which is a sign is always true in signifying; therefore speech is not susceptible of true or false at the change of the thing, as it seems.
Moreover, according to this it seems that one truth is signified and is in all true things: for every sign signifies what it received to signify in first truth; but what is in first truth is one and the same, not diverse; the same
ergo et unum significatur in omnibus veris, ut videtur.
Adhuc, Idem est et unum quod immobile est ad omnium rerum mutationem: significare autem hoc quod accepit significare in prima veritate, immobile est ad omnium rerum mutationem: ergo idem et unum est, quod significatur in omni signo significante: hoc autem non potest nisi veritas prima, ut videtur: videtur ergo, quod veritas prima significetur in omni oratione significante, et sic totum falsum esse videtur quod dictum est, quod scilicet oratio verum et falsum significat in eo quod res significata est, vel non est. Hæc et hujusmodi sophismata multa induci possunt contra ea quæ determinata sunt, si rationes Heracliti et Pythagoræ et Anselmi in libro de Veritate considerentur.
Ad hæc ergo et hujusmodi dicendum videtur, quod veritas signi, quod est enuntiatio vel dictum enuntiationis, est adæquatio vocis significantis et rei significatæ per vocem, et ideo verum et falsum in voce est sicut in signo relato ad rem significatam: propter quod etiam mutatur significatio ad rei significatæ mutationem, sicut superius dictum est: et nunc manente oratione una et eadem ad rei mutationem, mutatur de vero in falsum, et e converso de falso in verum.
Ad id autem quod objicitur quod idem semper significat, sive sit res, sive non sit, dicendum quod hoc verum est: sed significatio non est vera vel falsa in hoc quod ipsa idem significet, sed in hoc est significatio vera vel falsa, quod rei adæquatur vel non adæquatur significatio, et ideo inæquali facta re cui signum non adæquatur, falsa est oratio.
Ad hoc autem quod objicitur, quod significat quod accepit a prima institutione, dicendum quod a prima institutione accepit ut rem per sui adæquationem ad rem significaret: et quando non adæquatur rei, tunc non facit signum illud quod facere accepit a prima institutione: nemo enim signum sic instituit significare ut vagam et non rei significatæ æquatam habeat significationem: unde quando rei non adæquatur, tunc fallit ab hoc quod accepit a prima institutione: non enim instituta est tantum significare, sed instituta est ut per significationis adæquationem significet rem ut est, nec magis nec minus. Ad hoc enim sermo inventus est, ut dum rebus in communicando nobis invicem uti non possumus propter rerum infinitatem, et propter hoc quod plures res non semper habemus, sermonibus pro rebus uteremur, quando conceptus et affectiones quas de rebus habemus nobis invicem pandere et communicare volumus 2.
Quod autem objicitur de hoc quod sermo semper significat hoc quod in prima veritate significare accepit, dicendum quod in ordinatione primæ veritatis non accepit significare vaga tantum significatione, sed significare rem sicut est ratione rei, significatione rei adæquata: et hoc dico salva fide Anselmi 3. Et ideo falsi et veri susceptiva efficitur per mutationem rei. Si autem non accepisset nisi adæquationem instituentis et signi instituti ad significandum, tunc aliquo modo esset verum quod dicitur, sed hoc meo judicio non est verum.
Ad hoc autem quod dicitur quod verum est in adæquatione intellectus vel conceptus ad signum quod conceptum significat, dicendum quod conceptus vel intellectus vel opinio vel quocumque modo dici possit id quod est in anima, cujus voces prolatæ signa sunt, non absolvitur a rebus quæ sunt causa conceptuum: et ideo illis prout conceptæ sunt res adæquatur: non enim sermo inventus est ad significandum conceptum fictum, qui non est nisi in concipiente, quia sermo inutilis esset, quia per sermonem
therefore one thing and one truth is signified in all true things, as it seems.
Moreover, that is the same and one which is immobile with respect to the change of all things; but to signify what it received to signify in first truth is immobile with respect to the change of all things; therefore that which is signified in every sign that signifies is the same and one; but this cannot be anything except first truth, as it seems. Therefore it seems that first truth is signified in every signifying speech, and thus the whole of what has been said seems to be false, namely that speech signifies true and false in that the signified thing is or is not. These and many sophisms of this sort can be brought in against the things that have been determined, if the arguments of Heraclitus and Pythagoras and Anselm in the book On Truth are considered.
Therefore to these and things of this sort it seems one must say that the truth of a sign, which is an enunciation or the saying of an enunciation, is the adequation of the signifying utterance and of the thing signified through the utterance, and therefore true and false in an utterance is as in a sign related to the signified thing; on account of this the signification is also changed at the change of the signified thing, as was said above; and now, while the speech remains one and the same, at the change of the thing it is changed from true into false, and conversely from false into true.
But to that which is objected, that it always signifies the same thing whether the thing exists or does not exist, one must say that this is true; but signification is not true or false in this, that it signifies the same thing, but signification is true or false in this, that the signification is adequate or not adequate to the thing, and therefore, when the thing to which the sign is not adequate has been made unequal, the speech is false.
But to this which is objected, that it signifies what it received from first institution, one must say that from first institution it received that it would signify the thing through its adequation to the thing; and when it is not adequate to the thing, then that sign does not do what it received to do from first institution. For no one instituted a sign to signify in such a way that it would have a wandering signification not equated to the signified thing; hence when it is not adequate to the thing, then it fails from this which it received from first institution. For it was not instituted only to signify, but was instituted so that through the adequation of signification it would signify the thing as it is, neither more nor less. For speech was invented for this, that since in communicating we cannot use things themselves with one another on account of the infinity of things, and on account of this, that we do not always have many things, we might use speeches in place of things, when we wish to disclose and communicate to one another the concepts and affections which we have concerning things 2.
But what is objected about this, that speech always signifies what it received to signify in first truth, one must say that in the ordering of first truth it did not receive to signify only with a wandering signification, but to signify the thing as it is by the account of the thing, with a signification adequate to the thing; and I say this with the faith of Anselm preserved 3. And therefore it becomes susceptible of false and true through the change of the thing. But if it had received only the adequation of the institutor and of the sign instituted for signifying, then what is said would in some mode be true; but in my judgment this is not true.
But to this which is said, that truth is in the adequation of the understanding or concept to the sign which signifies the concept, one must say that the concept or understanding or opinion, or in whatever way that which is in the soul can be named, of which spoken words are signs, is not detached from the things which are the cause of concepts; and therefore it is adequate to those things insofar as the things have been conceived. For speech was not invented for signifying a fictive concept, which exists only in the one conceiving, because speech would be useless, because through speech
audiens nullam de re conciperet veritatem vel significationem. Et ideo dictum Pythagoræ et Heracliti non habet veritatem: quia dixerunt, quod verum est in apprehendendo vel opinando secundum quod opinio est opinantis passio: sed hoc verum est, quod verum est in opinando vel concipiendo secundum quod conceptus vel opinio est rei significatæ æquata passio vel conceptio: et ideo sermo talis conceptui æquatus, æquatus est etiam rei: et ideo dicit Aristoteles quod veritas est adæquatio rei ad intellectum.
Ad hoc autem quod dicit quod omnia sunt vera prima veritate, quia signa sunt primæ veritatis in hoc quod significant quod in prima veritate acceperunt significare, dicendum ut prius, quod in prima veritate acceperunt, quod significent res, et adæquata significatione significent verum, et non adæquata significent falsum. Et ideo mutata significatione signi mutatur adæquatio. Et quod dicunt de immobilitate veritatis, dicendum quod illa immobilitas non est nisi circa significandum relatum ad significandum, et non circa signum rei significatæ æquatum vel non æquatum: et ideo signo illo manente immobilis est veritas: sed illa prima veritas esse potest, quia corrumpitur et mutatur mutato signo.
Ad id autem quod dicitur, quod omne signum significat id ad quod significare ordinatum est in prima veritate, dicendum quod quamvis hoc concedatur, non sequitur quod omnia sint vera prima veritate, quia in prima veritate ordinatur quod oratio significet res per æqualitatem ad ipsas prout sunt vel non sunt: et sic in prima veritate voces ad res significandas referuntur. Si autem veritas non esset nisi adæquatio vocis ad primam veritatem in significando tantum, tunc posset aliquo modo verum esse quod dicitur. Hæc igitur de prædicamento substantiæ dicta sufficiant.
the hearer would conceive no truth or signification about the thing. And therefore the saying of Pythagoras and Heraclitus does not have truth, because they said that the true is in apprehending or opining according as opinion is the passion of the one opining; but this is true, that there is truth in opining or conceiving according as the concept or opinion is an equated passion or conception of the signified thing; and therefore such speech, equated to the concept, is also equated to the thing; and therefore Aristotle says that truth is the adequation of the thing to the intellect.
To this, however, that it says that all things are true by first truth, because signs are of first truth in this, that they signify what in first truth they received to signify, one must say as before that in first truth they received that they should signify things, and with adequate signification should signify the true, and with non-adequate signification should signify the false. And therefore, when the signification of the sign has been changed, the adequation is changed. And what they say about the immobility of truth, one must say that that immobility is only concerning the signifiable related to signifying, and not concerning the sign of the signified thing, equated or not equated; and therefore, with that sign remaining, truth is immobile; but that can be first truth, because it is corrupted and changed when the sign is changed.
To that, however, which is said, that every sign signifies that to which it has been ordered to signify in first truth, one must say that although this is conceded, it does not follow that all things are true by first truth, because in first truth it is ordered that speech signify things through equality to them according as they are or are not; and thus in first truth utterances are referred to things to be signified. But if truth were nothing except the adequation of an utterance to first truth merely in signifying, then what is said could in some way be true. Therefore these things said concerning the predicament of substance are sufficient.
Notes
- St. Anselm, Book On Truth, chapter 2. (S. Anselmus, Lib. de veritate, cap. 2.) ↩
- And this is a saying of Plato, and is also Aristotle’s in the first book of the Refutations. (Et hoc est dictum Platonis, et est etiam Aristotelis primo Elenchorum.) ↩
- Compare Anselm, book On Truth. (Cf. Anselmum, lib. de veritate.) ↩
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