Volume 1 · p. 183
Chapter IX. On the property of substance, which is that nothing is contrary to substance
quod nihil est de sua substantia. Aliter autem aliquantulum differentia significat quale quid, quod dicit Avicenna, hæc enim suo nomine dicit quale, quid autem quod est subjectum formabile, non dicit nisi per effectum, quia scilicet in actu facit ipsum.
Sed hic adhuc surgit quæstio de generalissimo: hoc enim in se non habet differentiam, et sic videtur dicere quid et non quale quid. Sed ad hoc respondetur, quod differentiam qua formabile est, in se habet per potestatem, et sic aliquo modo habet eam: et in quantum habet eam, in tantum quale quid significat.
Cum autem dicimus quod substantia secunda et differentia significat quale quid sub appellationis figura, non intelligimus quod sic significet quale quid, sicut album quod sub appellationis figura videtur qualitatem circa substantiam significare: quia album per qualitatem quam circa substantiam significat non significat nisi qualitatem quæ vere et secundum se qualitas est, et accidens subjecti illius circa quod ponitur qualitas illa in figura appellationis per denominationem significatur: quale autem quod significat animal vel homo vel rationale, est qualitas essentialis quæ significat quamdam substantiam illa qualitate perfectam. Sed per illam qualitatem in genere secundum appellationis figuram signatam fit plus in hoc determinatio, quia determinatur genus ad plura significanda quoad ambitum communitatis quam in specie: tam enim species quam genus qualitate differentiæ determinantur, sed genus per suam qualitatem determinatur ad significandum plus quam species, quia genus sua qualitate determinat sibi subjecta differentia specie et numero, qualitas autem quæ speciei communitatem determinat, non determinat speciem nisi ad hoc ut contineat differentia solo numero. Et ideo dicens animal plus complectitur in animalis qualitate, quam dicens hominem complectitur in hominis essentiali qualitate: quamvis utriusque qualitas communis sit multorum.
CAPUT IX. De proprio substantiæ quod est substantiæ nihil esse contrarium.
Nunc dicendum videtur de proprietatibus substantiæ secundum quod substat accidentibus, et est subjectum generum aliorum: quia enim, ut dicit Aristoteles 1, subjectum nullum est contrarium et ideo subjectum est contrariorum: sic inest substantiæ et proprium ejus nihil illi esse contrarium. Hoc autem probatur inductione, quia nihil potest esse contrarium primæ substantiæ eo quod maxime substat, et ei quod substat utrique contrario, nullum potest esse contrarium, sequitur quod nec fingi posset, si fingere liceret, primæ et principali substantiæ aliquid esse contrarium, ut alicui homini nihil est vel potest esse contrarium. At vero nec homini qui est substantia secunda et generaliter secundæ substantiæ aliquid potest esse contrarium, nec animali quod est genus aliquod est contrarium.
Objiciunt autem quidam quod non corrumpitur aliquid nisi contrarium contrario: substantia autem corrumpitur: ergo contrarium habet a quo corrumpatur. Adhuc autem ut in secundo de Generatione 2 habetur, ignis aquæ contrarius est, et aer terræ: hæc autem substantiæ: ergo substantia substantiæ est contraria. Multa autem talia sophistica objici possunt, quæ omnia solvit Aristoteles 3. Subjecto enim communi nihil potest esse contrarium secundum seipsum, sed contrarietatem habet in dispositionibus suarum qualitatum, et sic unum
beyond which nothing belongs to its substance. But in another way difference signifies a qualified what somewhat, which Avicenna says, for by its own name this says qualified, but the what which is the formable subject it says only through effect, because namely it makes it in act.
But here still a question arises concerning the most general, for this in itself does not have difference, and thus it seems to say what and not a qualified what. But to this it is answered that it has in itself, through potency, the difference by which it is formable, and thus in some mode it has it; and insofar as it has it, to that extent it signifies a qualified what.
But when we say that second substance and difference signify a qualified what under the figure of appellation, we do not understand that it signifies a qualified what in the way that white, under the figure of appellation, seems to signify quality concerning substance: because white, through the quality which it signifies concerning substance, signifies only a quality which truly and according to itself is quality, and an accident of that subject concerning which that quality is placed is signified by denomination in the figure of appellation. But the qualified which animal or man or rational signifies is an essential quality which signifies a certain substance perfected by that quality. But through that quality marked in the genus according to the figure of appellation, more determination occurs in this, because the genus is determined toward signifying more things with regard to the range of community than in the species. For both species and genus are determined by the quality of difference, but the genus through its own quality is determined to signify more than species, because genus by its own quality determines things subject to it differing in species and number; but the quality which determines the community of the species does not determine the species except to this, that it contains things differing only in number. And therefore one saying animal embraces more in the quality of animal than one saying man embraces in the essential quality of man, although the quality of each is common to many.
CHAPTER IX. On the property of substance, which is that nothing is contrary to substance.
Now it seems that one must speak of the properties of substance according as it underlies accidents and is the subject of other genera, because, as Aristotle says 1, no subject is contrary and therefore the subject is of contraries; thus it belongs to substance, and is its property, that nothing is contrary to it. But this is proved by induction, because nothing can be contrary to first substance because it underlies most of all; and to that which underlies each contrary nothing can be contrary. It follows that not even something contrary to first and principal substance could be feigned, if it were permissible to feign it, as nothing is or can be contrary to some man. But indeed neither can something be contrary to man, which is second substance, and generally to second substance, nor is anything contrary to animal, which is a genus.
But certain persons object that nothing is corrupted except contrary by contrary; but substance is corrupted; therefore it has a contrary by which it is corrupted. Moreover, as is held in the second book On Generation 2, fire is contrary to water, and air to earth; but these are substances; therefore substance is contrary to substance. But many such sophistical arguments can be objected, all of which Aristotle solves 3. For nothing can be contrary to a common subject according to itself, but it has contrariety in the dispositions of its qualities, and thus one
Notes
- Aristotle, At the end of the first book of the Physics, text, commentary 57. (Aristoteles, In fine primi Physicorum, tex. com. 57.) ↩
- Text, commentary 24. (Tex. com. 24.) ↩
- Aristotle, At the end of the first book of the Physics, text, commentaries 67 and 82. (Aristoteles, In fine primi Physicorum, tex. com. 67 et 82.) ↩
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