Volume 1 · pp. 172–173
Chapter IV. That when first substances have been destroyed it is impossible for any of the other things to remain
CAPUT IV. Quod destructis primis substantiis impossibile sit aliquid aliorum remanere.
Manifestum est autem ex his quæ dicta sunt, quod cætera prædicabilia omnia sive substantiæ, sive differentia, sive accidentia propria, vel communia, aut dicuntur de principalibus et primis substantiis ut de subjectis sibi directe in linea prædicamentali, sicut substantiæ secundæ, aut sunt in eis sicut in subjectis ab accidentibus quæ insunt denominatis. Sequitur igitur hæc consequentia, si secundæ substantiæ sunt de primis et accidentia in primis substantiæ primæ sunt, ergo a destructione consequentis si primæ substantiæ non sunt, impossibile est esse aliquid eorum, sive sit de numero secundarum substantiarum, sive sit de numero accidentium.
Hoc autem facile manifestum fiet ex his quæ nunc dicenda sunt. Proponantur igitur singula cæterorum quæ sunt alia a primis substantiis. Et primo proponantur de secundis substantiis quæ prædicantur de primis. Dico quod animal de homine prædicatur ut genus de specie: prædicabitur ergo utrumque istorum, animal scilicet et homo, quæ sunt genus et species et secundæ substantiæ, etiam de quodam homine ut de particulari. Si enim diceretur, quod non de aliquo prædicatur, quod est oppositum contradictorie ejus quod est prædicari de aliquo, cum non de aliquo et de nullo prædicari æquipolleant, sequeretur quod animal de nullo prædicatur homine, et sic non prædicabitur animal de homine: datum autem erat quod de homine prædicaretur, prædicabitur ergo et de quodam homine: non autem prædicabitur aliquid de aliquo, nisi per hoc quod inest illi secundum doctrinam, quæ jam præcessit de Universalibus: animal igitur et homo sunt in quodam homine.
Similiter probatur de accidente quod
CHAPTER IV. That when first substances have been destroyed it is impossible for any of the other things to remain.
It is manifest from the things that have been said that all the other predicables, whether substances, or differences, or proper or common accidents, either are said of principal and first substances as of subjects directly beneath them in the categorial line, as second substances are, or they are in them as in subjects, from the accidents which are in denominated things. Therefore this consequence follows: if second substances are of first substances and accidents in first substances are first substances, then, from destruction of the consequent, if first substances do not exist, it is impossible for anything of them to exist, whether it be of the number of second substances or of the number of accidents.
This will easily become manifest from the things now to be said. Therefore let the several things among the others, which are other than first substances, be proposed. First let the proposal be made concerning second substances which are predicated of first substances. I say that animal is predicated of man as genus of species; therefore each of these, namely animal and man, which are genus and species and second substances, will also be predicated of some man as of a particular. For if it were said that it is not predicated of something, which is contradictorily opposite to its being predicated of something, since not of something and of nothing to be predicated are equivalent, it would follow that animal is predicated of no man, and thus animal will not be predicated of man. But it had been granted that it was predicated of man; therefore it will also be predicated of some man. But something will not be predicated of something except through this, that it is in that thing according to the doctrine which has already preceded concerning Universals; therefore animal and man are in some man.
Similarly it is proved concerning an accident that
est in prima substantia: est enim color in corpore, igitur in aliquo corpore. Si autem non in aliquo est singulorum corporum, sequitur quod in nullo est corpore, et sic omnino non est in corpore: datum autem fuerat quod erat in corpore, sequitur igitur quod est in aliquo corpore. Quæcumque autem sunt in aliquo, non habent esse extra illud. Substantiæ autem quæ sunt secundæ substantiæ et accidentia sunt in prima substantia secundum esse. Nullum igitur habent esse extra illius esse: omnia igitur alia de substantiis principalibus dicuntur, aut in eis sunt sicut in subjectis: ergo non existentibus primis substantiis, ita quod nulla primarum substantiarum sit, impossibile est esse vel remanere in esse aliquod aliorum. Sed omnia alia aut de subjectis primis substantiis dicuntur, aut in subjectis eis sunt: et quæcumque altero istorum modorum se habent ad primam substantiam, non habent esse nisi in prima substantia, et non habent esse extra ipsam: sed si non sit prima substantia, tunc non habent esse in prima substantia, ergo destructa prima substantia secundum esse, nihil remanet secundarum substantiarum vel accidentium.
Et hoc quidem contrarium videtur ad illud quod in doctrina de quinque universalibus dictum est, quod scilicet destructo quolibet homine et qualibet alia specie animalis et quolibet individuo adhuc remanet animal: remanet enim substantia animata sensibilis.
Adhuc autem secundæ substantiæ priora sunt, quia sunt de constitutione ultimorum quæ dicuntur substantiæ primæ. Sed posterioribus destructis non sequitur destructio eorum quæ priora sunt.
Adhuc ab inferioribus non valet ad superius argumentationis processus, nisi affirmando et non negando. Si autem vera sunt quæ hic dicuntur, tunc locus ab inferiori ad superius valet destruendo sive negando, quod est inconveniens: arguitur enim sic, inferius non est, ergo superius non est, quod non sequitur; sed e converso, superius non est, ergo inferius non est.
Ad hæc autem dicendum, sicut in doctrina Universalium meminimus nos dixisse, quod superiora esse actuale secundum naturam non habent, et esse perfectum ultima perfectione, nisi in individuis, quæ sola perfectum esse in natura attingunt, et quod omnia quæ sunt in genere et specie, esse habent in potentia et indeterminatum et confusum et fluidum quousque illud attingunt: et ideo illis non existentibus, nihil aliorum habet esse actuale in natura et determinatum.
Ad ea autem quæ contra hoc objiciunt, dicendum quod priora secundum naturam non destruuntur ut priora, destructis sequentibus posterioribus, secundum esse priorum: et sic destructis individuis remanet esse eorum quæ natura priora sunt individuis, et destructis speciebus remanet esse eorum quæ speciebus priora sunt secundum esse illud quo priora sunt eis: hoc autem est esse intellectuale quo sunt genera et species, et non est esse actuale perfectum in natura: quo ad hoc enim destruuntur destructis primis, quia tale esse non habent nisi in primis.
Ad hoc autem quod objicitur de loco ab inferiori ad superius, qui non valet nisi affirmando, dicimus quod hoc verum est: sed non est locus ab inferiori, sed est locus a partibus sufficienter enumeratis sicut hic: hoc non habet esse nisi in A, et B et C; si igitur nec est A, nec B, nec C, sequitur necessario ipsum non esse, et hoc quidem est verum. Sic ergo verum est quantum ad esse actuale in natura perfectum, quod destructis primis et principalibus substantiis impossibile est aliquid aliorum secundum esse tale remanere.
Si quis autem opponat et dicat quod non sequitur quod si non remaneat secundum tale esse, quod non remaneat secundum esse simpliciter. Dicendum quod
is in first substance: for color is in a body; therefore it is in some body. But if it is not in some one of singular bodies, it follows that it is in no body, and thus that it is not in body at all; but it had been granted that it was in body; therefore it follows that it is in some body. But whatever things are in something do not have being outside that thing. Now substances which are second substances and accidents are in first substance according to being. Therefore they have no being outside its being: therefore all other things are either said of principal substances, or are in them as in subjects. Therefore, if first substances do not exist, so that none of the first substances exists, it is impossible that any one of the other things exist or remain in being. But all other things either are said of first substances as of subjects, or are in them as in subjects; and whatever things are related to first substance in either of those modes have being only in first substance, and do not have being outside it. But if there is no first substance, then they do not have being in first substance; therefore, when first substance has been destroyed according to being, nothing of second substances or accidents remains.
And this indeed seems contrary to what was said in the doctrine concerning the five universals, namely that when any man and any other species of animal and any individual have been destroyed, animal still remains; for animate sensible substance remains.
Moreover, second substances are prior things, because they belong to the constitution of the ultimate things which are called first substances. But when posterior things have been destroyed, the destruction of the things that are prior does not follow.
Moreover, from lower things to a higher thing the process of argumentation is not valid except by affirming and not by denying. But if the things said here are true, then an inference-place from the lower to the higher is valid by destroying or denying, which is unfitting: for one argues thus, the lower does not exist, therefore the higher does not exist, which does not follow; but conversely, the higher does not exist, therefore the lower does not exist.
But to these things one must say, as in the doctrine of the Universals we remember that we said, that higher things do not have actual being according to nature, and perfect being with ultimate perfection, except in individuals, which alone reach perfect being in nature, and that all things which are in genus and species have being in potency, indeterminate, confused, and fluid until they reach that being; and therefore, when those do not exist, none of the other things has actual and determinate being in nature.
But to the things which they object against this, one must say that things prior according to nature are not destroyed as prior things when following posterior things have been destroyed, according to the being of prior things; and thus, when individuals have been destroyed, the being of those things which by nature are prior to individuals remains, and, when species have been destroyed, the being of those things which are prior to species remains according to that being by which they are prior to them. But this is the intellectual being by which genera and species are, and it is not actual being perfected in nature; for with respect to this they are destroyed when the first things have been destroyed, because they have such being only in first substances.
But to what is objected concerning the inference-place from the lower to the higher, which is valid only in affirming, we say that this is true; but here there is not an inference-place from the lower, but an inference-place from sufficiently enumerated parts, as here: this thing has being only in A and B and C; therefore, if neither A nor B nor C exists, it necessarily follows that it does not exist, and this indeed is true. Thus it is true with respect to actual being perfected in nature, that when first and principal substances have been destroyed, it is impossible for any of the other things to remain according to such being.
But if someone opposes and says that it does not follow that, if it does not remain according to such being, it does not remain according to being simply. It must be said that
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