Volume 1 · pp. 105–108
Chapter VIII. Description of difference insofar as it posits difference; Chapter IX. On the definition which fits only the more proper difference.
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CAPUT VIII.
Descriptio differentiae prout ponit differentiam.
Adhuc autem eamdem differentiam antiqui Peripatetici describunt et assignant per respectum, per quem unum differentium refertur ad alterum secundum differentiam qua differunt ab invicem, diffinientes eam sic: Differentia est qua differunt a se singula. Ea enim quae differunt, differentiis suis a se invicem differunt, Suas autem et proprias habent singula differentias, quibus differunt ab omnibus aliis, in quibus sunt differentiae. Probant autem hanc assignationem hoc modo: quia ea quae oppositis differentiis differunt, et quae ab uno et eodem oriuntur genere, non differunt secundum genus, sed potius in genere conveniunt, cum aequaliter actu et intellectu genus participent: quia genere non differunt, nisi quae sunt in diversis generibus vel generalissimis vel proximis: et secundum hoc quod genere differunt, sic genus est quod facit differentiam inter ea: et haec sunt, quorum una natura non est in communi proximo quod est primum subjectum formabile et determinabile ad esse per proprias differentias communes, secundum ea quae per unam et eamdem divisionem diversarum differentiarum ab uno et eodem genere exeunt: illa vero differunt secundum genus. Et hoc per exempla manifestatur. Sumus enim animalia et nos homines, et etiam irrationalia sunt animalia. Et sic genere non differimus ab eis: sed appositum nobis hominibus rationale pro differentia disjungit nos ab illis, et ita essentialem habemus ad ea differentiam, quamvis in genere conveniamus cum illis. Ab alia autem parte secundum quod convenimus cum diis in hoc genere quod est rationale animal, eo quod nos et dii sumus animalia rationalia, appositum nobis mortale essentialiter separat nos ab ipsis: quia ipsi secundum Stoicos sunt immortalia animalia, nos autem mortalia.
Cum autem sic dicunt antiqui, quod differentia est qua differunt, diffiniunt vel describunt differentiam et proprium effectum ipsius: et est aliqua nominis manifestatio, quamvis non sit vera diffinitio. Nec etiam antiqui has assignationes pro veris induxerunt diffinitionibus.
Si vero objiciatur, quod secundum antecedentia quae dicta sunt de figura arboris describentis a generalissimo usque ad specialissima, duo sunt, animal rationale et animal mortale, quorum unum est sub alio. Talia autem unam aeque immediatam speciem non dicuntur habere, sed potius unum debet esse species alterius, et id quod inferius est, habere sub se speciem specialissimam. Contrarium autem similiter videtur, quando dicitur quod homo est animal rationale mortale. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod in rei natura secundum opinionem antiquorum Stoicorum sic est ut procedit objectio. Et cum dicitur quod homo est animal rationale, ponitur hoc totum complexum pro circumlocutione proximi generis, et mortale additum est differentia ulterius determinans ad speciem specialissimam: et hoc non est inconveniens, quinimo necessarium quod differentia superioris generis cum differentia inferioris et proximi generis in eadem specie conjungatur in diffinitione speciei. Sed differentiae diversorum generum non subalternatim positorum sunt oppositae, et illae non conveniunt in eadem speciei diffinitione. Attendendum est cum dicitur, qua differunt singula quod singula quidem ab aliis differunt suis propriis quae illis et non aliis conveniunt. Sed tamen in ante habitis dictum est, quod propria, cum sint accidentia et non dividant substantiam, non propriam faciunt alietatem, sed per alteritatem ostendunt alietatem quasi jam ante propria factam per propriam differentiam substantialem, quae propria est speciei, quia sic convenit uni quod non alii. Et ideo differentia essentialis est, qua primo et per se differunt singula, aut per formam, aut per materiam, aut per proprium esse formae in hac materia vel illa.
CHAPTER VIII.
Description of difference insofar as it posits difference.
Further, the ancient Peripatetics describe and assign the same difference through the relation by which one of the things that differ is referred to another according to the difference by which they differ from one another, defining it thus: difference is that by which singulars differ from one another. For those things which differ differ from one another by their differences. But singulars have their own and proper differences, by which they differ from all other things in which there are differences. They prove this assignment in this way: because those things which differ by opposite differences and which arise from one and the same genus do not differ according to genus, but rather agree in genus, since they participate genus equally in act and understanding. For only those things which are in diverse genera, either most general or proximate, differ by genus; and according to this, that they differ by genus, genus is what makes a difference between them. And these are things whose one nature is not in the proximate common thing which is the first subject formable and determinable to being through proper common differences, according to those things which through one and the same division of diverse differences come forth from one and the same genus; but those differ according to genus. This is manifested through examples. For we men are animals, and irrational things also are animals. And thus we do not differ from them by genus; but rational added to us men as difference disjoins us from them, and so we have an essential difference toward them, although we agree in genus with them. On the other side, according as we agree with the gods in this genus which is rational animal, because we and the gods are rational animals, mortal added to us essentially separates us from them, because according to the Stoics they are immortal animals, but we are mortal.
But when the ancients thus say that difference is that by which they differ, they define or describe difference and its proper effect; and it is some manifestation of the name, although it is not a true definition. Nor did the ancients introduce these assignments as true definitions.
But if it is objected that, according to the preceding things which were said about the figure of the tree describing from the most general down to the most special things, there are two, rational animal and mortal animal, of which one is under the other. But such things are not said to have one equally immediate species; rather one ought to be the species of the other, and what is lower ought to have under itself a most special species. But the contrary similarly seems to be the case when it is said that man is rational mortal animal. To this one must say that in the nature of things, according to the opinion of the ancient Stoics, it is as the objection proceeds. And when it is said that man is rational animal, this whole complex is posited as a circumlocution of the proximate genus, and mortal added is a difference further determining to the most special species. This is not unfitting; indeed it is necessary that the difference of a higher genus be joined in the definition of the species with the difference of the lower and proximate genus in the same species. But differences of diverse genera not placed subalternately are opposed, and those do not agree in the same definition of species. It must be attended, when it is said, by which singulars differ, that singulars indeed differ from others by their own properties which belong to them and not to others. Yet it has been said above that properties, since they are accidents and do not divide substance, do not make proper otherness, but through otherness show otherness as already made before properties by proper substantial difference, which is proper to species because it belongs to one in such a way that it does not to another. Therefore essential difference is that by which singulars first and per se differ, either through form, or through matter, or through the proper being of form in this matter or that.
Si autem quaeritur, cum dicitur quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula, utrum differant per unam aut per plures differentias: Dicendum quod per unam differunt ab omnibus differentiam illam secum non communicantibus, sicut per rationale differt homo ab omnibus rationem secum non communicantibus, sed ab his quae secum communicant in una, differunt in alia.
Si autem quis objiciat dicens, quod singularia numero sunt infinita ad minus quoad nos, et sic videntur differre ab infinitis: Dicendum quod nihil est inconveniens.
Si ulterius arguet, quod qui novit diffinite unum contrariorum, diffinite novit et alterum. Novit autem homo suam qua a singulis differt differentiarum: igitur videtur quod diffinite novit infinitas singularium differentias, quibus ab ipso differunt, et sic momento novit quasi omnia. Dicendum, quod sequitur quod noscat omnia illa in quantum cum ipso non conveniunt, et hoc est nosse in universali, et in potentia, et non proprie secundum naturam uniuscujusque: et hoc non est inconveniens, quod momento aliquo modo universali et potentiali noscat multa vel infinita.
De exemplo autem quod antiqui induxerunt de mortali, quod habent pro differentia, cum differentia sit pars esse rei, et mortale causam abesse dicere videatur: Dicendum quod si mortale dicat viventis passionem, pro certo tunc dicit causam abesse, et non est differentia constitutiva alicujus viventis. Si autem dicit compositi viventis formam quae est notio tali vita viventis, pro certo est differentia constitutiva et hoc modo est essentia incorruptibilis, sicut et aliae differentiae.
Quod autem dicunt rationale esse formam in qua communicant homines et dii, pro certo secundum opinionem quorumdam Stoicorum dictum est, qui dicebant univoce et nos et deos esse rationalia animalia: et animal non dicebant per denominationem ab anima, sed per hoc quod est forma animati corporis et moti voluntatis motu, cui postea ex inferiori genere, quod est compositum ex corpore commixto ex contrariis et anima, advenit sensus. Et ideo non sequitur, si Deus est animal, quod Deus sit substantia animata sensibilis, eo modo quo deos animalia Stoici esse dicebant, sicut superius jam expositum est, et in libro de natura deorum invenitur.
But if it is asked, when it is said that difference is that by which singulars differ from one another, whether they differ through one or through several differences, one must say that through one difference they differ from all those not communicating that difference with them, as through rational man differs from all those not communicating reason with him; but from those which communicate with him in one, they differ in another.
But if someone objects, saying that singulars in number are infinite, at least as regards us, and thus they seem to differ from infinites, one must say that nothing is unfitting.
If he argues further that one who knows one of contraries definitely knows the other definitely, and man knows his own difference by which he differs from each of the singulars, therefore it seems that he definitely knows the infinite differences of singulars by which they differ from him, and thus in a moment he knows almost all things: one must say that it follows that he knows all those insofar as they do not agree with him, and this is to know universally and in potency, and not properly according to the nature of each one. And it is not unfitting that in a moment, in some universal and potential way, he knows many or infinite things.
But concerning the example which the ancients introduced about mortal, which they hold as a difference, since difference is part of the being of a thing and mortal seems to name a cause of absence, one must say that if mortal names a passion of a living thing, then certainly it names a cause of being absent and is not a constitutive difference of any living thing. But if it names the form of a composite living thing which is the notion of a living thing with such a life, certainly it is a constitutive difference, and in this way it is an incorruptible essence, as are the other differences.
But what they say, that rational is a form in which men and gods communicate, was certainly said according to the opinion of certain Stoics, who said that both we and gods are rational animals univocally. And they did not say animal by denomination from soul, but through this, that it is the form of an animated body and of a body moved by the motion of will, to which sense afterward comes from the lower genus, which is composed from a body mixed from contraries and soul. Therefore it does not follow, if God is animal, that God is animated sensible substance in the way in which the Stoics said that gods are animals, as has already been explained above and is found in the book on the nature of the gods.
Assignant etiam Peripatetici hoc modo, videlicet dicentes quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula: namque secundum genus non differunt quae ab eodem genere per eamdem accipiuntur divisionem. Cujus exemplum est, quod sumus et nos homines animalia, et irrationalia per eamdem rationem sunt animalia sicut et nos: sed additum generi quod est animal, rationale pro differentia hominis constitutiva et Dei, disjungit nos et deos ab illis quae sunt irrationabilia. Adhuc nos et dii rationales sumus in genere quod est animal rationale non differentes, sed mortale pro differentia constitutiva appositum ad animal rationale quod est genus, separat nos homines a diis immortalibus.
CAPUT IX.
De diffinitione quae soli differentiae magis propriae convenit.
Subtiliorem autem adhuc omnibus praeinductis assignationibus Peripatetici differentiae diffinitionem quantum ad intrinseca et essentialia sibi sunt perscrutantes, et speculantes eam per ea quae non conveniunt nisi differentiae, quae differentia dicitur magis propria: et nullo modo nec per se, nec ex consequenti conveniunt differentiae quae dicitur propria, nec etiam ei quae dicitur differentia communis. Propriae enim ex consequenti ad minus convenire potest, quod per ipsam species abundet a genere. Et etiam hoc quod dicitur praedicari de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale est, potest ex consequenti convenire communi differentiae. Et similiter id quod dicitur, quod aptum natum est dividere ea quae sunt sub eodem genere, propriae differentiae potest convenire. Et similiter id quod differentia est qua differunt a se singula: propriis enim differentiis differunt a se singula. Et ideo nulla talium assignationum per intrinseca differentiae data videtur esse.
Sed interius eam perscrutantes, et subtiliter per essentialia speculantes, quae soli magis propriae differentiae dictae conveniunt, dicunt, quod non quodlibet eorum quae sunt sub eodem genere, et dividunt ea quae sunt sub eodem genere, duo oportet modo divisionis est differentia magis proprie dicta. Et dicunt hoc solum esse differentiam magis proprie dictam, quod conducit ad esse, et quod ejus quod est ratio rei pars est. Quod autem hoc differentia sit probant, quia propria sunt de his quae sunt sub eodem genere dividentia ea quae sub genere sunt. Dicamus enim dividendo ea quae sub genere sunt. Animalium aliud aptum natum est arte nautica navigare, et aliud non: cum tamen aptum esse arte nautica navigare sit proprium hominis, et non de esse et essentia ipsius: talibus enim differentiis saepe utimur genus dividentes, cum tamen talia sint propria consequentia esse speciei. Quae autem sunt esse consequentia, non possunt esse completiva esse ipsius, nec perfectiva substantiae, nec pars essentialis esse ipsius substantialis: quamvis compleatur in esse quodam quod non est esse simpliciter, sed est aptitudo quaedam esse substantiale consequens. Et ideo talis differentia propria non est, quales sunt differentiae magis propriae, quae specificae dicuntur differentiae, quia sunt speciei in esse specifico constitutivae. Erunt ergo specificae illae solae quaecumque essentiali qualitate alia aliam faciunt speciem, et quaecumque in eo quod quale de specie constituta praedicantur. Differentiae enim, sicut superius dictum est, et ad genus et ad speciem comparantur, et ad utrumque illorum habent respectum: ad genus quidem prout sunt divisivae, ad speciem autem prout sunt constitutivae. Et ideo sunt sub genere et genus contrahentes, et sunt species sub ipsis. Et species antecedentes sunt ipsae differentiae: quia sunt actu et intellectu in ipsis speciebus sicut constituentes in eisdem.
The Peripatetics also assign it in this way, namely by saying that difference is that by which singulars differ from one another; for those things which are received from the same genus through the same division do not differ according to genus. An example of this is that we men are animals, and irrational things are animals by the same account as we are; but rational, added to the genus which is animal as constitutive difference of man and God, disjoins us and the gods from those which are irrational. Further, we and the gods are rational in the genus rational animal and do not differ, but mortal, added as constitutive difference to rational animal which is genus, separates us men from immortal gods.
CHAPTER IX.
On the definition which fits only the more proper difference.
But the Peripatetics, examining still more subtly than all the assignments introduced before the definition of difference as to its intrinsic and essential things, speculate it through those things which belong only to the difference which is called more proper difference, and in no way, neither per se nor consequently, belong to the difference called proper, nor even to that which is called common difference. For to proper difference at least consequently it can belong that through it species exceeds genus. And also what is said, to be predicated of several things differing in species in that which is what-sort-of, can consequently belong to common difference. Likewise what is said, that it is apt by nature to divide those things which are under the same genus, can belong to proper difference. And likewise that difference is that by which singulars differ from one another, for singulars differ from one another by proper differences. Therefore none of such assignments seems to have been given through the intrinsic things of difference.
But examining it more interiorly, and subtly speculating through essential things which belong only to the difference called more proper, they say that not every one of those things which are under the same genus and divide those things which are under the same genus in a twofold mode of division is difference more properly so called. And they say that only this is difference more properly so called: what contributes to being and what is a part of the account of the thing. They prove that this is difference because properties are among those things under the same genus which divide the things under the genus. For let us speak by dividing those things which are under the genus: of animals, one is apt by nature to sail by nautical art, and another not; and yet to be apt to sail by nautical art is a property of man and not of his being and essence. For we often use such differences in dividing genus, although such things are properties consequent upon the being of species. But things which are consequent upon being cannot be completive of that being, nor perfective of substance, nor an essential part of its substantial being, although it may be completed in a certain being which is not being simply, but a certain aptitude consequent upon substantial being. Therefore such a proper difference is not like the more proper differences which are called specific differences, because they are constitutive of species in specific being. Therefore only those will be specific which by essential quality make one species different from another, and which are predicated of the constituted species in that which is what-sort-of. For differences, as was said above, are compared both to genus and to species, and they have a relation to both of them: to genus insofar as they are divisive, but to species insofar as they are constitutive. And therefore they are under genus and contracting genus, and species are under them. And the preceding species are the differences themselves, because they are in act and understanding in the species themselves as constituting in them.
Cum autem consequentes sint in esse generum prout genera sunt, et omne quod sequitur esse alicujus, sit de genere accidentium, ut dicit Avicenna, videbitur forte alicui, quod sint accidentia generis, sicut propria sunt accidentia speciei, eo quod propria sunt de consequentibus esse specierum. Sed ad hoc dicendum, quod non est similis habitudo generis ad differentiam, et speciei ad proprium. Species enim se habet ad proprium ut ens perfectum quod est de ratione proprii: sicut subjectum est de ratione passionis non existens de essentia ipsius, sed tantum subsistere faciens in seipso. Genus autem se habet ad differentiam et ponitur ut ens imperfectum perficiendum per differentiam, sicut materia per formam, et ut ad eductum de potestate ipsius sicut forma educitur de materia. Et quia nihil perficit substantiam ad esse substantiae, nisi substantia, ideo genus perficitur ad esse speciei per differentiam. Species vero est substantia. Oportet ergo, quod differentia sic respiciens genus et speciem, sit substantia et substantialis forma.
Et quod dicitur quod est consequens esse generis: Dicendum quod esse generis ut genus, est esse imperfecti. Et ideo quod consequitur ipsum sic, est sicut actus qui consequitur potentiam, propter quod oportet quod sit substantia. Si autem generis esse, perfecti esset esse, de necessitate sequeretur quod differentia esset accidens generis: et tunc non posset esse substantia speciei: quia quod est uni accidens, nulli potest esse substantia, ut dicit Aristoteles 1. Si tamen consideretur genus non ut genus, sed ut universale praedicatum de pluribus, quod propria habet individua sicut animal praedicatur de hoc animali, et illo, sicut in tractatu de Genere, est determinatum. Dicunt quidam, quod sic consideratur ut ens perfectum in esse proprio, et sic comparatur ad ipsum differentia ut consequens ipsum. Et dicunt, quod sic considerata differentia, est accidens generis. Sed re vera non est accidens secundum naturam accidentis,
But since they are consequent in the being of genera insofar as they are genera, and everything which follows the being of something is of the genus of accidents, as Avicenna says, perhaps it will seem to someone that they are accidents of genus, just as properties are accidents of species, since properties are among the things consequent upon the being of species. But to this one must say that the relation of genus to difference and of species to property is not similar. For species is related to property as a perfect being which belongs to the account of the property, just as subject belongs to the account of passion while not existing of its essence, but only making it subsist in itself. But genus is related to difference and is posited as an imperfect being to be perfected through difference, as matter through form, and as to something educed from its power, as form is educed from matter. And because nothing perfects substance to the being of substance except substance, genus is therefore perfected to the being of species through difference. But species is substance. Therefore difference thus regarding genus and species must be substance and substantial form.
And as to what is said, that it is consequent upon the being of genus, one must say that the being of genus as genus is the being of something imperfect. Therefore what follows it in this way is as act which follows potency, on account of which it must be substance. But if the being of genus were the being of something perfect, it would follow of necessity that difference was an accident of genus; and then it could not be the substance of species, because what is an accident to one thing cannot be substance to anything, as Aristotle says 1. If, however, genus is considered not as genus but as a universal predicate of several, which has its own individuals, as animal is predicated of this animal and that one, as was determined in the tractate on Genus, certain people say that it is thus considered as a perfect being in its own being, and thus difference is compared to it as consequent upon it. And they say that difference so considered is an accident of genus. But in truth it is not an accident according to the nature of accident,
Notes
- Aristotle, Physics, book 1, text-comments 26 and 27. (Aristoteles, I Phys. tex. com. 26 et 27.) ↩
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